Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories

E. Official Cooperation between the IDF and the Settlers

In the wake of affidavits from the heads of the defense establishment, the High Court of Justice addressed itself to the security rationale of the settlements in a number of judgments dealing with the legality of seizing private land to establish a civilian settlement. In one such judgment, Supreme Court Justice Witkon wrote:

The main thing, however, is that, as regards the pure security aspect, it cannot be doubted that the presence in occupied territory of settlements - even “civilian” settlements - of citizens of the occupying power contributes appreciably to security in that territory, and makes it easier for the army to carry out its task.¹

In accordance with this policy, the IDF also established regional defense units in the Territories similar to those along the borders with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Many settlers do reserve duty in the new units. By this means the IDF enables and encourages the settlers’ involvement in security activity in the Territories, provided that it is executed in coordination with and under the command of the military.²

In a December, 1991 meeting between Brig. Gen. Ya’akov Orr, who then served as commanding officer of the West Bank, and the Binyamin Region Council, Orr announced that the IDF had decided that the involvement of regional defense soldiers from the West Bank in ongoing security activity in the area would soon be increased.³

A month later, the media reported that in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, standby squads of settlers had been organized to assist the IDF by order of Commanding Officer, Central Command, Gen. Danny Yatom. Military sources said that the regional brigade commander would activate the squads through a codeword transmitted via the regional defense officer. Each squad, numbering ten to fifteen men, would proceed to a pickup point and be taken to a predesignated section of road to stop and search vehicles. The commander of each squad in the field would be one of the settlers.⁴

In his report of October 31, 1993, about actions taken following the attack in which Haim Mizrachi was killed, the Binyamin Regional Council stated that:

Roadblocks at short and long distances from each other were set up in the sector, and the reinforced IDF units combed the roads. It should be noted that representatives of the settlements and the council were integrated into the activities of the division headquarters and the brigade.

The close ties between IDF officers and the leaders of the settlers are also evident from their frequent meetings, at which the commanders explain the army’s special deployment against the Intifada. The Binyamin Regional Council bulletin of November 26, 1991, stated:

Within the framework of the ongoing meetings between the IDF and the heads of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, a meeting was held on Wednesday at which officers of Central Command reported to the council’s heads part of the IDF’s special deployment against the Intifada. The meeting included a detailed briefing and a comprehensive field trip…

The settlers display an ambivalent attitude toward the IDF. They express thanks and support for the IDF’s protection,⁵ but they frequently say that the IDF is not doing enough to ensure their safety and is abandoning them to the enemy, just like the government.⁶

Summary

1. 
   International and Israeli law obligate the IDF to attempt to prevent injury to Palestinians. If Palestinians are attacked in the presence of soldiers, the soldiers must arrest the assailant and turn him over to the police. If they are unable to do that, the soldiers must report the incident to the police for an investigation. If Palestinians are in mortal danger from Israeli civilians, IDF soldiers must use every means to remove the danger, including firing at the assailants.
   
2. 
   The powers granted to soldiers and their duty with respect to law enforcement as regards the settlers are not sufficiently clear. Disparities exists between the written guidelines and the public declarations of senior commanders, the orders that filter down to the soldiers in the field, and the way the soldiers interpret those orders.
   
3. 
   It is difficult to say with certainty whether these disparities result solely from a protracted failure of the army high command, which does nothing to clarify the orders, or whether the orders that reach the field reflect true IDF policy, the written directives and media declarations being token gestures of the military to the rule of law.
   
4. 
   The IDF has continuously failed to enforce the law on the settlers and to safeguard the life, person, and property of Palestinians during repeated attacks by Jewish settlers. The army’s attitude toward these manifestations of violence fluctuates between “voluntary non-intervention” and active forms of cooperation.
   
5. 
   Soldiers present during settler violence against Palestinians frequently make no effort to stop or prevent the violence or to require the offenders to identify themselves in order for the soldiers to report them to the police. Attempts by the IDF to prevent illegal acts by settlers against Palestinians, or to arrest the perpetrators, have been infrequent, at best. In some cases the soldiers, far from trying to restrain the settlers, have participated in the violent activities.
   
6. 
   Settler violence often leads the IDF to restrict the free movement of Palestinians by imposing curfew and other, harsher restrictions, but the IDF does not restrict the settlers. Although this is done to protect the Palestinians, the result is absurd - the victim, and not the assailant, is restricted.
   
7. 
   Despite its legal obligations, the IDF has been powerless in dealing with settler violence against Palestinians. Its failure to act, notwithstanding repeated warnings by politicians, journalists, and human rights groups, suggests that its omissions are not the exception, but rather reflect overall IDF policy.
   
8. 
   The special relationship between the IDF and the settlers raises the concern that the policy derives from a situation in which each side is aware of the other’s contribution to strengthening Jewish rule in the Territories. The official position is that the security forces bear sole responsibility for imposing order and enforcing the law in the Territories. In common with the other branches of government, the IDF believes the settlers significantly contribute to security and the maintenance of public order in the Territories, and officially cooperates with them.
   

As long as the IDF pursues this policy of leniency and compromise, and cooperation, at times, in acts of violence, its contributes actively to the perpetuation of such violenc

e2. THE ISRAEL POLICE DEPARTMENT