Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – 1AC – Uniqueness

Status quo budget allocations increase dependency on PMC’s.
Isenberg 10 (David Isenberg Author, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq February 1, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david–isenberg/the–qdr–and–private–milit_b_444706.html)KM

For decades Silicon Valley inventors and entrepreneurs have been boasting that they, not the government, are responsible for the rise and growth of the Internet. But the truth is, as most people, who have ever studied it for a bit know, that without the early funding from government agencies like the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency people would still be limited to reading books on paper, not Kindles. Similarly, private military and security contractors claim that they are more cost effective and organizationally agile than their public sector counterparts. But the truth is that they generally live or die on government contracts. That said, the largest governmental employer of private military and security contractors is the Pentagon. And today it released its latest, long awaited, Quadrennial Defense Review. If any contractors were worried about their future they can relax. While the Defense Department confirms old news, i.e. that it is taking some acquisition positions back in–house and realigning the mix of public and private workers in the overall workforce, the bottom line is what everyone expects. The Department of Defense is not significantly lessening its dependence on private military contractors. In fact, given the future security environment the QDR says the U.S. military must prepare for (See Chap 1, "Defense Strategy") which will be marked by the need to respond to a broad range of contingencies including more Iraqs/Afghanistans, major humanitarian crises, failing states and natural disasters, one can see that that the future will be a target rich environment for PMC’s. Trade groups like the Professional Services Council and IPOA have much to smile about.

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (1/3)

PMC’s undermine US efforts to win public support in Iraq because citizens attribute unprofessional actions done by PMC’s to the military.
Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e damage done by such alleged abuses of power by private security contractors, carried out with impunity, reportedly goes far beyond merely fostering a dim view among Iraqis of the contractors themselves. Extrapolating from their experiences with private security contractors, Iraqi citizens may take a negative view of the entire military occupation and coalition forces as a whole. According to media reports and interviews, resentment occurs mainly because Iraqi civilians do not distinguish between private contractors and U.S. or coalition forces in Iraq. Rather, they see them all as part of the same occupying force (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007). With regard specifi cally to the Nisour Square shooting, a National Public Radio report observed the following: Th e more immediate concern is that Blackwater’s actions in Iraq don’t just refl ect on the security company. It has become a broader American problem because Iraqis don’t distinguish between the Blackwater employees and the American military more generally (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007). When asked if he had learned who perpetrated the Nisour Square shootings after the fact, a family member of two of the Nisour Square victims answered, “You mean, like, security company? What diff erence this makes? Th ey are Americans” (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007).

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (2/3)

Independently, PMC’s risk corruption that allow them to pursue opportunistic parallel forces, perpetuating instability.
Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

3. Political direction from civilians that are poor or opportunistic can undermine stability no matter how good the training. Military capacity need not translate into stability. Capable security instruments can overthrow governments or allow individual leaders or groups to pursue private or partisan ends. While the efforts of US troops are not impervious to this dynamic, PSCs are more likely to feed into opportunism. By their very nature, the flexibility of private forces can more easily be taken advantage of for private gain. This was immediately apparent in the creation of the Facilities Protection Services in Iraq. Reports were that whole militia groups joined in force leading salaries and training to further strengthened the militias. Erinys did not violate the terms of its contract by training these people: the contract did not anticipate this opportunistic action. Initially each Iraqi ministry had armed units from this force to protect their infrastructure and other units protected private property but the Facilities Protection Services is now being moved under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. As indicated above, though, similar infiltration has been reported to have occurred in the police forces. The Ministry of the Interior, under whom the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police and the Directorate of Border Enforcement serve, is also reported to have strong ties with Shiite militia groups. In response to concerns about the infiltration of the Iraqi police, DynCorp spokesman Greg Laguna said, “We don’t control the political situation, the political loyalties of the people.” There are two kinds of opportunism at work in Iraq. One is a very dangerous potential for a diffusion of control that could result in the development of parallel forces that do not work together under central government command. Lessons from a wide variety of transitional states suggest that parallel forces loyal to different leadership can undermine prospects for peace. A crucial element for the development of civilian control is a civilian hierarchy that centralizes command over all forces. The second is lower level corruption where officers pay kick backs to their superiors in order to get supplies and ghost soldiers and police help line political pockets. This second problem is exacerbated by the degree to which governance by local tribal and religious leaders take precedence over or are not well coordinated with the Iraqi constitution and Iraqi law. Both work to undermine training efforts and often they work together. Setting up a system where contracted trainers think it is their job to contribute to managing this kind of opportunism is quite difficult – but it is also vital if we are to avoid US dollars being used to undermine stability in Iraq. Coordination among the different forces in Iraq and the tensions between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the national leadership is something that needs to be monitored carefully.