Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (3/3)

Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism.

The National Interest 7 (“Keeping the Lid On”, Lexisnexis, May–June 2007)

THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all–out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al–Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.
Terrorism risks extinction

Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review on “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”, http://www.amazon.com/New–Terrorism–Fanaticism–Arms–Destruction/dp/product–description/0195118162)

Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (1/5)

Retention low now – PMC’s create a cycle where military talent is hired away which creates demand for more PMC’s who steal more talent.
Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e diff erence in pay between private security contractors and troops is a recurring theme in interviews, anecdotal accounts, and analyses of how contractors are aff ecting the military. Christopher Spearin, for instance, notes that the employment decisions of special operations forces (SOF) are aff ected mainly by remuneration and operational tempo, and that private sector employment off ers both better remuneration and more moderate operational tempo than military employment (Spearin, 2006). In July 2005, former SOF personnel in Iraq were earning approximately $12,000–$13,000 per month. In contrast, some private security contractors were being paid as much as $33,000 per month (GAO, 2005). At the same time, the Global War on Terrorism has only increased the operational tempo for U.S. special forces, which had already seen a threefold increase from 1991 to 1997 in the number of soldiers deployed every week. Employment with private security fi rms off ers a more fl exible schedule, with better leave options and greater choice of deployment locations (Spearin, 2006). Arguments have been made that the comparatively desirable work conditions off ered by the private security industry have the unintended side eff ect of reducing rates of military retention. Because private security fi rms generally hire only those with at least some former military experience, military retention rates (or continuation rates, as noted below), rather than recruitment rates, can off er some insight into the question of a tug–of–war between the military and private sector over skilled personnel. As Ralph Peters, a retired Army offi cer and frequent commentator on military issues, suggested in 2007, Th e disgraceful cycle works like this: Contractors hire away military talent. Th e military fi nds itself short of skilled workers, so contractors get more contracts. With more money, they hire away more uniformed talent (quoted in Lardner, 2007, p. 3).

Prolonged retention problems will cripple American hegemony

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael *P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint** Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

The Future of the Two–War Planning Framework—and Future Military Contingencies for the United States US defense planning since the end of the Cold War has been organized around the need to be prepared to fight two overlapping wars. In 2001 the George W. Bush administration modified the two–war concept somewhat, but kept much of the basic logic and the associated force structure (which Kagan has argued was, from the beginning, always inadequate to support the strategy).1 In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, further changes are now needed in America’s armed forces and their undergirding defense strategy. The deterrent logic of being able to do more than one thing at a time is rock solid. If involved in one major conflict, and perhaps occupied in one or more smaller ongoing operations around the world, the United States also needs additional capability to deter other crises—as well as maintain its forward presence at bases around the world and on the seas, carry out joint exercises with allies, and handle smaller problems. The current conflict in Iraq highlights the limitations of our two–war force structure, since the US military is patently unable to contemplate another “major theater war” at the present with anything other than horror. But our inability to cope with such a scenario only increases the likelihood that one will emerge, as opportunistic enemies take advantage of our perceived weakness and overcommitment.