Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – I/L – Morale

High pay for PMC’s undermines military morale

Sweet 2010 (Lynn, http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/02/schakowsky_sanders_push_to_ban.html, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) today introduced legislation that would phase out private security contractors in war zones. The United States last year employed more than 22,000 hired guns in Iraq and Afghanistan. They protected diplomats, trained military and police officers, repaired and maintained weapons systems. Contractors also were involved with interrogations and intelligence gathering. "The American people have always prided themselves on the strength, conduct, and honor of our United States military. I therefore find it very disturbing that now, in the midst of two wars and a global struggle against terrorism, we are relying more and more on private security contractors - rather than our own service members - to provide for our national defense," Sanders said. "The behavior of private contractors has endangered our military, hurt relationships with foreign governments, and undermined our missions overseas," Schakowsky added. The Stop Outsourcing Security Act would restore the responsibility of the American military to train troops and police, guard convoys, repair weapons, administer military prisons, and perform military intelligence. The bill also would require that all diplomatic security be undertaken by U.S. government personnel. The White House could seek exceptions, but those contracts would be subject to congressional oversight. The legislation also would subject contracts exceeding $5 million to congressional oversight. Agencies with military contractors would have to report the number of contractors employed, disclose the total cost of the contracts, and make public any disciplinary actions against employees. High pay for contract workers in war zones both burdens taxpayers and saps military morale, Schakowsky and Sanders said. While some soldiers who risk their lives for their country struggle to support their families, private security company employees are paid two or three times as much, sometimes pocketing as much as $1,000 a day. 

High pay for PMC’s undermines military morale

Grim 2010 (Ryan, 2/23, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/23/house-dems-want-to-phase_n_473784.html, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK
One morning, Uncle Sam woke up and his military had been privatized. There had been no national debate. No congressional action. No sweeping White House order. It just happened. Today, the Pentagon employs more than 217,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, doing the kind of work that enlisted military personnel would have performed in the past, according to a Congressional Research Service report. Now, there's a move in Congress to change that. On Tuesday, Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) introduced the Stop Outsourcing Security Act, which would make it the military's responsibility to use its own personnel to train troops and police, guard convoys, repair weapons, run military prisons and do military intelligence activity. There are strategic reasons to move away from a reliance on contractors, says Schakowsky, a senior member of the intelligence committee. They damage the U.S. reputation with reckless behavior, are overly costly and hurt the morale of troops, who see private guards earning much more money than they do.
PMCs demoralize troops

McGarvey 4 (Ayelish, The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=outsourcing_private_ryan, date accessed:6/27/2010) AJK
I would imagine that the troops on the ground find this contracting business to be demoralizing. After all, they are paid relatively little for risking their lives. Is this correct? Have you heard any such sentiments from military personnel regarding the contractors? There are several sentiments. On one hand, people in the military often feel caught between challenges and pressures. There is so much work to be done, and contractors can fill some of the roles that they don't have the capacity to accomplish. In other cases, contractors do work that military personnel would prefer not to do. But the flip side? The pay for contractors is sometimes mind-boggling, especially when compared to the money soldiers are making. A good example of this difference: A truck driver for Halliburton is making the same amount as four-star General John Abizaid -- he's in charge of [everyone] … that's absurd! This can lead to some resentment, but it also affects the numbers of troops who re-up, resulting in retention problems. And finally, there are issues of chain of command, and appropriateness of roles. There are many people moving in and out of these zones who are not officially part of the military chain of command. This is [cause for concern] for many local commanders.

Readiness – I/L – Morale and Retention

PMC’s drain human capital and destroy morale

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

Several of the factors identified by Singer as destabilizing influences exist in current deployments. Contractor employees can receive higher pay and more generous benefits for similar work. The yearly base pay for an Army specialist or corporal with more than four years of experience is $21,769, while civilian truck drivers can earn $80,000 to $100,000 annually.70 Blackwater USA compensates private security contractors in the range of $450 to $800 per day.71 The first $80,000 of civilian pay is nontaxable if the employees meet certain “days in-country” requirements, while soldier bonuses (combat pay) are tax free. Civilians also retain the right to resign whenever they feel uncomfortable with their working conditions, a luxury not generally afforded to military personnel. One civilian driver recently claimed that only three employees remain from his original group of about 20.72 Pay differentials may eventually lead to lower levels of retention (as enlistments expire, former soldiers may opt to work for contractors) and the necessity of higher bonuses (enlistment and retention) and hazard pay. Reductions in the military force and the proliferation of PMC’s translate into fewer promotion opportunities and the eventual elimination of many uniformed positions. Moreover, a recent DOD review of 32,155 positions identified 9,500 additional positions that were “candidates for military to civilian conversion.”73 Unequal economic advantages and sense of well-being—especially when regular military units provide security for contractor convoys, essentially taking more risk for less pay and less job security—can be extremely detrimental to soldier morale.
PMC’s trade-off with military retention and recruitment and hurt morale.
Kupcu and Cohen 5 (“Privatizing Foreign Policy” Maria Figueroa Kupcu and Michael A. Cohen, New America Foundation Fall 2005 http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2005/privatizing_foreign_policy_6702)KM

In addition to thorny political and legal issues, the increasing reliance on PMC’s may also be eroding the capacity of the very states that employ them. If not properly managed, contracting can hamstring a government’s ability to innovate and also retain skilled individuals. An experienced Special Forces operative can earn up to $250,000 annually with a PMC -- two to ten times more than in the military -- plus benefits, vacation, and the choice to opt out of risky operations. The exodus of military personnel to the private sector has significant longterm implications for a military that has spent years and taxpayers’ money preparing highly trained soldiers. To take one example, there are more former members of Britain’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) serving with PMC’s in Iraq than there are members of the SAS in the British force there.32 Mixing public and private warriors in security operations is also affecting the morale of enlisted troops and is leading to practical dilemmas in the field. In Fallujah, the political ramifications of the violent deaths of Blackwater employees forced military planners to engage insurgents sooner than they would have preferred. The subsequent combat operations resulted in significant U.S. casualties and further strained relations between the military ranks and contractors.33