Nsa negative

No Econ Losses – Increased Security

(___)

(__) Companies have increased security and encryption to keep customers, they haven’t lost business.

Verton, 2014
Dan Verton Editorial Director, Editorial Director - FedScoop, 11-3-2014, "Is the post-Snowden cloud apocalypse real?," FedScoop, http://fedscoop.com/happened-post-snowden-cloud-predictions

"With or without the Snowden controversy, security is still the biggest hurdle for cloud adoption, particularly in the enterprise segment," Poon said. "Industry verticals that are still subject to stringent regulatory requirements, they are unlikely to offload workloads to third-party public cloud providers. The typical, preferred model we see so far is private cloud deployment — a dedicated private cloud with physical isolation (both on-net / off-net), followed by virtual private cloud [and] hybrid cloud." The new demands being placed on cloud providers by European customers may be manageable, but they are also an added cost, Neivert said. "Much of the [Snowden] fallout is also hidden in the cost line, not the revenue line," he said, referring to emerging requirements to store data locally and add new encryption requirements.

Data localization is inevitable- extension

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(__) Multiple factors generate internet fragmentation, not just surveillance: dominance of international bodies and cyber crime.

Patrick, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2014
(Stewart, “The Obama Administration Must Act Fast to Prevent the Internet’s Fragmentation,” The Internationalist, 2-26-2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/02/26/the-obama-administration-must-act-fast-to-prevent-the-internets-fragmentation/

Since the dawn of the digital age, the United States had consistently supported an open, decentralized, and secure cyber domain that remains largely in private hands. Even before the Snowden disclosures, that vision was under threat, thanks to disagreements among governments on three fundamental issues. First, some world leaders are questioning whether the ITU( International Telecommunications Union) ought to play a more active role in regulating cyberspace. To the degree that the Internet is “governed,” the primary regulatory body remains ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), an independent, nonprofit corporation based in Los Angeles. The outsized role of ICANN—and the widespread perception of U.S. (and broader Western) control over the Internet—has long been a sore point for authoritarian states, as well as many developing countries, which would prefer to move cyber governance to the intergovernmental ITU. A second threat to the open Internet has been a surge in cyber crime—and disagreement over how to hold sovereign jurisdictions accountable for criminality emanating from their territories. Estimates of the magnitude of cyber crime range from large to astronomical. In 2012, NSA director general Keith Alexander put the annual global cost at $1 trillion. Most cyber crime is undertaken by nonstate actors against private sector targets for motives of financial gain. But national authorities have also been involved in economic espionage, both directly and through proxies. The most infamous case involves a unit of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which allegedly has been at the forefront of Chinese hacking efforts to steal industrial secrets and technology from leading U.S. companies.

Data localization is inevitable- extension

(__) Data localization was not caused by Snowden’s NSA revelations.

Fontaine, President of the Center for a New American Security, 2014
(Richard, "Bringing Liberty Online Reenergizing the Internet Freedom Agenda in a Post-Snowden Era." Center for a New American Security (9/2014).http://www.cnas.org/internetfreedom#.VaClavlViko

A cautionary note is in order when interpreting the reactions to the Snowden affair. Some developments – such as data localization requirements and worries about a splintering Internet – predated the revelations and have been accelerated rather than prompted by them. Autocratic governments also drew lessons from the technology-fueled Arab Spring, resulting in actions aimed at limiting Internet freedom. Other white-hot responses cooled when rhetoric turned to action. Brazil’s new “Marco Civil” Internet law, approved in April 2014, left out a number of the strongest responses that had been widely debated in the run-up to its adoption. The EU did not go through with its threatened Safe Harbor data-exchange boycott. And for all of the worries about laws that would require the local storage of users’ data, few countries have actually passed them. Nevertheless, the potential for such fallout remains.

(__) Much broader questions drive international conflicts over “internet freedom,” the plan can’t solve.

Nocetti, Research Fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), 2015
(Julien, “Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance”. International Affairs, 91: 111–130. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12189)

It is not surprising that it is the younger nation-states that seem to be the most strongly committed to a neo-Westphalian approach to internet governance. In many respects, the battle over the vision of internet governance cannot be characterized entirely accurately as between authoritarian, undemocratic states and liberal, freedom-loving states; it is also, and indeed more centrally, a conflict between long-established, cosmopolitan states and newer states that do not yet feel safe in their sovereignty. Russia fits into the latter category, as a relatively young nation-state that has been experiencing, since the chaotic 1990s transition to a free market economy and pluralism, a potent feeling of insecurity. This feeling stems in part from the complex interactions between state authorities and the media ecosystem since the 1980s, when Soviet leaders tolerated increased access to previously suppressed information, thus opening the ‘information gates’ to the masses. In the 2000s, with Russia striving to recover its full sovereignty and struggling against the ‘permeability’ of its neighbourhood, Putin gradually saw the information revolution—driven by the considerable growth in (domestic) internet access—as one of the most pervasive components of US expansionism in the post-Soviet sphere, most notably in Russia itself. Russia's policy on global internet governance issues therefore cannot be separated from a domestic political context in which digital technologies are increasingly used for purposes of contention by an active and articulate ‘netizen’ middle class.