Regional political parties in india s. Bhatnagar pradeep kumar



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26. Selig S. Harrison. India the Most Dangerous Decades, P. 206.

27. The Hindu, (Hyderabad,) 3 January, 1983, P. 9.

28. The Times of India, (New Delhi). 6 January, 1983, P. 1.

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AKALI DAL IN PUNJAB

Pradeep Kumar

Regional parties have a very special role to play in a one-party dominant system. While the system may accommodate some of the regional sentiments, it is generally incapable of coping with all the regional demands and expectations. As one political scientist1 has pointed out in such a situation as this, the provincial sentiments arc expressed through the regional parties which tend to counter-weigh the all-embracing nature of the national parties.

The Origin

While some scholars2 of Indian politics, have considered regionalism to be a post-independence phenomenon, and thereby maintained that most regional parties came in to prominance only after the bargaining culture developed in the late 50's and mid 60's, the Akali Dal in Punjab traces its origin to 1920. The Dal (Shiromani Akali Dal) emerged as a movement of the Sikhs in Punjab to liberate their Gurudwaras from the control of the Mahants who had a corrupting influence on these holy shrines3. The Dal successfully wrested the power from these Mahants after the Britishers yielded to the Akali agitation and agreed to enact the Sikh Gurudwara Act of 1925. Under the act the management and control of these shrines shifted to the newly constituted body, the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (The SGPC). It was but natural for the Akali Dal (AD) to have a firm grip over the SGPC. This further legitimised its claim as the sole political body of the Sikhs which could speak and fight for their cause.

Akali Dal's influence over the Sikh community particularly in the State of Punjab where a large majority of them live, is not only in the realm of politics but to a great extent it is true of social and religious life. Unlike

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the western concept of a secular state where political and spiritual powers are separated from one another, the Sikh tradition has still not been able to separate the "Church" from the "State". It is widely believed among the Sikhs, more particularly, the Akalis, that the power and religion go together and the former is very necessary to protect the latter.4 This intermingling of religion and politics has, more often than not, created many complications and complexities in the politics of the Akali Dal. At times the Akali Dal has claimed to be the sole political party which can legitimately lay its claim on the Sikh community.5 It is this intermixing of the religion and politics that has always kept the party's membership confined to the Sikhs.6 Here it may be worthwhile to maintain that the dependence of the Dal on the support of a particular community alone, has been a source of strength as well as weakness. This is so because the more the party tries to broaden its base (say by collaborating with other secular parties or by raising non-religious broad based demands), the more it gets alienated from its own community. The latter still looks forward to it as a band of revolutionaries ready to sacrifice their lives for the Panth.7 On the contrary, its exclusive dependence on the Sikhs and its non-secular postures tend to generate some kind of a suspicion in the minds of the minority community (the Hindus). The support of the latter (even if tacit, say through some kind of a coalition) is very vital for the Dal, in view of the sizeable percentage of this community in Punjab.8



Assertions in Post Independence Period

While the Muslims remained dispersed (after the partition) almost all over India (despite their sizeable percentage in many Indian provinces, including Jammu&Kashmir where they formed a numerical majority), the Sikhs were able to find themselves in a relatively more compact region, namely East Punjab, where they out numbered the Hindus after the reorganisation of the State in 1966. If the partition resulted in the weakening of the bargaining power of the Muslims (as a result of delinking of the Muslim majority provinces), it favoured the Sikhs by giving them an opportunity to organise themselves on a territorial basis.9 It is this territorial organisation alone that makes it possible for a particular socio-cultural group to manifest its strength in a federal system. It is again this territorial organisation which imparts a federal character to a plural society.10 The Sikhs, unlike the Muslims, did not suffer from any kind of suspicion after the partition. While the Muslims elite either went over to Pakistan or receded into background as a result of the renewed efforts

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to protect the nascent slate against the onslaughts of the various centrifugal (particularly communal) forces, the Sikh elite saw a new dream of an azad (free) Punjab where the Sikhs could numerically dominate.



In fact the economic component of Sikh regionalism was not so obvious in the incipient years of the Republic and most of the Akali demands for a separate Sikh State were primarily based on a fear of Hindu domination.11 All that the Akali leadership wanted at that time was to have a province where the "Sikh religion will be more safe". For this Master Tara Singh, the then chief spokesman of the Akali Dal, demanded a separate unilingual Punjabi suba, thereby making a demand for a Sikh majority State.12

The creation of the Punjabi Suba in 1966 with the Sikhs as a majority community, opened a new chapter in the life of the Akali Dal. It was only after the separation of this Sikh dominant area from the rest of the Hindu dominant (Hindi&Pahari) region that the Akali Dal could consolidate its strength. This had a sobering and moderating influence on the Akali Dal. The electoral politics became more gainful for the Akalis who were compelled by the logic of electoral democracy to adopt a more pragmatic approach to politics.13 More of it at a later stage.

Like most other regional movements, the Akali movement also first concentrated its efforts on the creation of a homogeneous State. Once such a State was actually carved out in 1966, the Akali Dal concentrated its efforts on consolidation of the gains of its fight for a separate Punjabi-cum-Sikh State. The logic of reorganization did benefit the Akai Dal when in the first ever general elections in the Suba (in 1967) the Dal captured power (with the help of the Jana Sangh) for the first time in the post-independence period. Although it was at a time when the overall climate had become anti-Congress (or anti-Centre), yet the reorganization of the State was a major reason for the Akali gains.

The Akali Dal's main demands in the re-organised Punjab can be categorised as (a) those dealing with the clamour for autonomy14 (b) those voiced as grievances against the Centre's allegedly anti-Punjab attitude.15 This includes demands for merger of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab, handing over the management of the Bhakra-Beas Management Board to Punjab and better deal in the distribution of river waters (c) those demands which aim at deriving more benefits for the Punjabi peasantry16 (posed as industrial-agrarian divide), and last of all, (d) religious demands of the Sikhs, such as the enactment of an all-India Sikh Gurudwara Act, declaration of Amritsar as a holy city, carrying of Kirpans by the Sikhs while travelling by air, to restore the Sikh percentage

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in the defence forces, relay of the Kirtan from the Golden Temple and recognition of the Sikhs as a community distinct from the Hindus.17 While some of these demands might have been met by the Central Government, the Akali Dal has, by and large, not accepted the Government's solutions to some of these problems. The Centre's offers have been generally inadequate for the Dal's leadership.18



A cursory glance on these demands shows that they comprise all categories of demands, viz political, religious, social and, finally, economic. If some of these demands are concerned mainly with the State of Punjab, others concern the neighbouring States too. Similarly if some concern the Sikh community alone, others seem to be secular in character. In fact a peep into the genesis of these demands will show that all of them emanate from a single factor, namely, the desire of the Sikh community to enjoy considerable autonomy within the State of Punjab. Even economic and religious demands of the Akalis reflect upon their urge for some kind of "Independence" within the federation.

In the early years of the Republic when the leadership of the Dal was in the hands of Master Tara Singh, this desire was in fact the desire to combat the fear of Sikhs being absorbed into the majority community of Hindus, the line between the two communities being very thin.19 However, with the reorganisation of State on the linguistic basis and shifting of the leadership from Master Tara Singh to Sant Fateh Singh, the emphasis too changed from purely religious demands of the Sikhs to the autonomy demands for the State of Punjab in particular and all States of the Union in general. Though the demand was raised several times after the creation of the new State of Punjab in 1966, it remained somewhat vague in expression. The increasing hold of the Sant's Akali Dal over the masses after the Fourth General Elections,20 pushed back the extremist leadership of Master Tara Singh and with this, the latter's demand for a Sikh Homeland within the Union of India, receded into the background. Fateh Singh's emphasis on relatively secular aspects of politics (viz-greater autonomy for the State) took him nearer to the common massess, and made his politics more pragmatic and practical which could be accommodated within the framework of the Constitution of India, without any suspicion of fear of separation.

The first ever clear expression of the Akali Dal's views on various dimensions of their autonomy demand was found in the famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution21 adopted at Shri Anandpur Sahib in October 1973 by the Working Committee and finally ratified by All-India Akali conference in October 1978 at Ludhiana. Though the Anandpur Sahib

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resolution aimed at spelling out the demands of the Akali Dal, it became quite controversial owing to the vagueness of expression. The "resolution" was drafted in the Gurmukhi script and the meaning and the nuances of the various words of the Punjabi language do not have the exct counter-parts in English. Moreover, some words were capable of being interpreted in more than one ways.22 This confusion was made worse by the various interpretations of it given by the leaders of various political shades and at times by the leaders of the Dal itself. While on several occasions the senior Akali leaders23 have attempted to clarify that all that it demanded was autonomy to the State within the federal set-up and that there was not even a tinge of secession in it, the resolution goes to the extent of demanding that all powers except the defence, foreign affairs, communications, railways and currency, should be handed over to the State. As if this was not enough, even the power to frame its own constitution has been demanded for Punjab. In fact the Akali leaders have often cited the Russian analogy in this connection thereby asserting that even the right to secede from the Union does not go against the unity and integrity of the nation.24 This reference to the U.S.S.R. had sometimes given an impression that the Akalis want to share the sovereignty of the country and have diplomatic relations with other countries.25 The suspicion of the resolution also gets strengthened with the emotional speeches, made at times, by some senior Akali leaders, giving expression to the idea that it would have been wonderful if the Sikhs had decided to keep their separate territorial identity, like the Hindus and the Muslims, at the time of partition, thereby prefering even the semi-autonomous sikh State (as proposed by Jinnah within Pakistan) to the present federal set up of India26. Not only this even the senior leaders are reported to have demanded rewriting of the Constitution on Russion lines.27

It is generally alleged that the Akalis fight for autonomous status only when they are out of power but keep mum over the issue when they share power in the State. While there may be some truth in it, the Akalis have never allowed the issue to slip away from their hands. This is natural for a party which harps on the religious support base. Whenever the party feels demoralised on the election front it has to get back to its Sikh clientele which alone can revitalise it, it being essentially a party giving expression to the religious and social grievances of the Sikhs in particular. Quite vocal speeches were made by the Dal leaders during the period 1977-79 when it shared power with the Janata Party at the Central and the State levels. The then Education Minister of Punjab, Sukhjinder Singh, joined the issue with the Union Government on retaining education on the con current

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list after the 42nd Amendment. While there was some justification for Central planning soon after Independence, he alleged, it was shocking if the Centre succumbed to the temptation of arming itself with additional powers, even after so many years.28



Similarly, the then Akali Chief Minister of Punjab demanded at a meeting of the Committee of the National Development Council that it was logical that the quantum of Central assistance to the States was at least equivalent to 50 per cent of the total resources available with the Centre for Plan purpose, as against 29 per cent in 1977-78 and about 31 per cent in 1978-7929. The Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal infact maintained that although the States had the main responsibility for development, the devolution of taxes favoured the Centre with a lion's share30. With regard to the depressed cotton prices the Akali Chief Minister pleaded his helplessness thereby maintaining that the Centre alone enjoyed real powers.31 The then President of the Dal, Jagdev Singh Talwandi, went to the extent of alleging Central discrimination against Punjab and described the Janata rule as "old wine in new bottles".32 The demand for autonomy was also made an issue in the SGPC election held during the Akali -Janata regime.

The party manifesto of the Akali Dal for the 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls once again emphasised the old demands ranging from the issue of Punjabi speaking areas and the demands for internal autonomy to the modification of the formula for the distribution of Ravi-Beas waters. The manifesto also pledged to take away from the Centre the power to dissolve the Vidhan Sabhas.33 After losing power in the 1980 elections, the Dal continued to raise these demands in various formus.34

While the main grievances of the Dal may have remained the same old allegations of discrimination by the Centre against the State of Punjab in general, and the Sikhs in particular, the developments of 1984 (operation Blue Star, the assasination of Mrs Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh riots that followed her assasination), have changed the content and tone of these grievances. The short lived Akali Government that came to power after the 1985 elections, held in the pursuance of Rajiv-Longowal Accord (popularly known as Punjab Accord), could not fully satisfy the aspirations of its own cadres. As is usually the case with the Akalis, they are good fighters but not so good rulers. The Dal soon got split up and a separate faction under the leadership of the former Akali Dal Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal came out of the Government to form a separate Dal, naturally opposed to the old faction which now came to be known as the Akali Dal (L). This split (which in some

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quarters was termed as power struggle only) added momentum to some of the new demands of the Akalis and the Akali Government of Surjit Singh Barnala was embarrassed to face the allegations of toying the line of the "anti-Sikh-Congress-Centre". The new emphasis was now on such demands as transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab (as envisaged in the Punjab Accord) without simultaneously transferring the territory from Abohar-Fazilka area in lieu of Chandigarh. Later demands for the release of Jodhpur detenus and stoppage of "State terrorism" and killing of "innocent Sikh youth in false encounters", gained momentum. In fact some of these demands have been picked up by the Akali Dal (Longowal) itself after the dismissal of its Government in May 1987 on the eve of Haryana assembly elections.

Elections and the Akali Participation

The Akali Dal has always adopted the constitutional as well as the extra-constitutional methods to press its various demands. Its strategy, though at times agitational, has always kept an eye on the electoral prospects of the party in various general elections. This has, however, been a more successful strategy after the leadership passed into the hands of the relatively moderate faction of the Dal and after the Sikh dominant State of Punjab came into existence in November 1966. The Dal realised that it had no choice but to participate in the elections with all ernestness to capture power in the newly carved out State. The Akalis could never secure a sizeable number of seats in the combined state of Punjab but in the Fourth General Elections, they secured 24 seats with 20.5 percent of total votes polled.35 The mid-term polls held in 1969 further increased the Akali share in the electoral gains when it could capture as many as 43 seats with 29.59 per cent of total votes polled. This was more significant in view of reduced strength of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha after the reorganisation of the State. Earlier in the third general elections the Dal had won only 19 seats - with 11.7 per cent of total votes polled and in the 1957 general elections the Akalis had joined the Congress party in large numbers.

The electoral successes in the 1967 and 1969 polls made the party more enthusiastic and pragmatic at the time of 1972 assembly polls. The Dal very strategically entered into an alliance with the urban-Hindu-Bania based Jana Sangh to counter the Congress strategy to capture power. The Dal also decided to extend its support to the CPM nominees. However, its anti-Congress strategy which had made it strike a bargain with the Jana Sangh miserably failed. The Congress - CPI combine

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was able to capture the majority in the State.



The Akali defeat in the elections made the job of the moderates very difficult. The Anandpur Sahib resolution (referred to earlier) may be seen in this light. It aimed at revitalising the declining influence and grip of the Dal on the Sikh masses. However, the events took a turn in the mid-75 when the Akalis, like most other opposition parties, found them once again pitted against the Congress. This confrontation was qualitatively different from all other confrontations that the Akalis had faced against the Congress-dominated Centre. The 19 month emergency had given them an opportunity to unite once again with the Jana Sangh-turned-Janata in Punjab. It was a fight for survival. The anti-Congress sentiments were as strong in Punjab as elsewhere in northern India. The result was that the Akalis once again captured power in the June 1977 elections, this time with the help of the newly formed Janata Party. The Akali Dal secured 58 seats while its coalition partner Janata got 25. The latter had pleaded the case for decentralisation though it never went to the extent of supporting all that the Akali Dal wanted in the name of autonomy.36

Like in many other States of north-India, the Congress recaptured its dominance in the State of Punjab after the May 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls. The Akalis got only 37 seats (with 26.9 per cent votes) out of the 73 that it contested. This time there was some change in the electoral alliances. The Bhartiya Janata party (BJP), the successor of the erstwhile Jana-Sangh, decided to go alone in the elections. The CPI which had on many occasions supported the Congress, became a partner in a joint front with the Akali Dal and the CPM. This alliance was described as a political necessity37 which contested almost all the seats in cooper-tion.38 It was only at Nangal and Kharar that they clashed with each other.39

The elections of 1985 were however crucial in more than one way. In the first place, the elections were held for the first time after the operation Blue Star which had left definite impact on the Sikh psyche in general. Moreover, the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and some other parts of north India after the assasination of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had also hurt the Sikh community and consequently had somewhat alienated them, even if temporarily. The efforts at reconciliation via Rajiv Longowal Accord had not even completed that the signatory to the Accord from the Akali side, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was murdered, understandably by those who opposed the Accord. The Vidhan Sabha elections, which were a part of the Accord, were, however, held almost as scheduled. The murder of the Sant was highlighted by the Dal as a

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martyrdom for peace. By and large there was a feeling among the Sikhs that the Akalis needed their electoral support. The only faction which gave a boycott call was the United Akali Dal, headed by Baba Joginder Singh, the father of the Late Jarnail Singh Bhinderwale.

The Akalis for the first time emerged victorious in the State without the electoral support of any other political party. It seems that particularly the emotional factor in the wake of the sensitive incidents in the immediate past, played significant cohesive role in rallying the sikh populace behind the Akalis. It is maintained that even some Hindus this time extended their support to the Akali Dal as against the Congress party. That is why perhaps even in the Hindu dominated area of Hoshiarpur district, the Akali Dal won 3 seats. Thus with some 38 percent of the votes polled, the Akalis secured 75 percent of the seats.40

Apart from the emotional reason mentioned above, the DS-4 factor41 might have also taken away a sizeable chunk of Congress I votes thereby strengthening their rivals, the Akalis42. Last but not the least, the Akalis Victory in the elections was also attributed to some kind of an understanding in the ruling party (Congress-I) circles to allow the Akalis win the election by fielding relatively new and unknown persons on the Congress ticket The Congress&the Akalis, however denied this. The former maintained that the tickets were given to new faces only to induce fresh blood into the party.

A comparative analysis of the election manifestos of the Akali Dal in the period that followed the creation of the new Punjabi suba, makes an interesting study. It seems that the Akali Dal had not forcefully pleaded for any sectarian demands, in its manifestos.43 Its emphasis had been rather on the general economic and political demands concerning broadly the general public of the State, which could conveniently be termed as secular or non-sectarian demands. This happened in 1967 elections when contrary to the Master Akali Dal's manifesto which made demand for the Sikh Home Land, the Sant's Dal simply pleaded for communal harmony and economic development of the State. This happened again at the time of the mid-term polls when the Dal got a large number of seats without making any serious reference to the autonomy demand in the manifesto. Even in 1977 the Dal did not stress the Sikh-grievances and rather pleaded its case with other secular parties. However in the 1971-72 elections the Dal did make clear references to the "really federal form" and "more autonomy" to the States particularly in the fields of finance and legislation. It also pledged to impose a ceiling on urban property to bring it one at par with the ceiling on land ownership in the rural

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areas.44 The manifesto of the dal in the 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls also made a strong plea for a complete federal Constitution and internal autonomy for the States. It also promised to set up a commission to resolve all the inter-State disputes. Keeping in view the dissolution of the Vidhan Sabhas by the Congress that had led to the May 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls, the manifesto also demanded abolition of the provisions dealing with the powers of the president to dissolve the State Legislative assemblies. It also once again promised to work for the inclusion of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into the State of Punjab.45


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