NOVEMBER 2017 CTC SENTINEL 5
forces over the years, it continues to control significant swaths of
rural territory in southern and central Somalia.
52
In short, whereas
there is virtually no evidence that the Islamic State in Somalia en-
gages in any real sort of governance—both out of lack of territorial
holding and its small size—for al-Shabaab, one of its primary inter-
pretations of its role in the county is as a stand-in for an impotent
state, to include the provision of a wide-range of governmental and
social services.
Assessing ISS vs. al-Shabaab on Propaganda
Of all three categories investigated, the Islamic State’s propaganda
efforts are the domain in which it is most demonstrably inferior to
al-Shabaab. To date, there is no official media wing of the Islamic
State in Somalia nor is there a robust informal media presence run
by its members or sympathizers. Despite the lack of ISS’ own me-
dia capabilities, Islamic State central’s media apparatus—including
Amaq—has released photos and videos from Somalia, while other
official Islamic State wilayat, as discussed previously, have released
videos about or featuring ethnic Somali fighters.
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Conversely, al-Shabaab’s propaganda machine is generally well-
run and prolific. Al-Shabaab operates several radio stations in
southern Somalia, including Radio Al Furqan and Radio Al Anda-
lus. It frequently produces videos through its Al Kata’ib media wing,
and disseminates photo reports on various aspects of its operations
published by the websites of its radio stations, Al Furqan and Al An-
dalus. Since at least 2015, it has also run the Shahada News Agency,
which reports on its daily activities and also produces photo reports
in a more “traditional” news setting. Al-Shabaab and its supporters
also run several Telegram channels, spreading new and archived
propaganda in English, Arabic, Somali, and Swahili, and most re-
cently, Oromo.
l
Every month, al-Shabaab also releases a monthly
report of its daily operations around the country. Thus, in the main,
al-Shabaab’s myriad media outlets—ranging from radio stations to
internet releases propagated both by al-Shabaab members and its
adopted parent group, al-Qa`ida—leaves al-Shabaab signficiantly
ahead of the propaganda efforts of its would-be rival, ISS, which has
no real parallel capacity of which to speak.
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