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166 
[5] Vaughan V. Menlove. Court of Common Pleas. 1837. 3 BINGHAM 
N.C. 468. 
But the doing of any act, however lawful, usually imposes 
the legal duty of taking so much care as an ordinary 
reasonable man would take to prevent its causing damage to 
any one. 
[VAUGHAN, at the time of the injury complained of, was the owner 
of two cottages. The defendant was possessed of a close of land, 
with certain buildings and a hayrick thereon, near the said 
cottages. Owing to the spontaneous ignition of this hayrick, 
fire was communicated to the defendant's buildings. This fire 
spread to the plaintiff's cottages; which were thereby 
consumed.] 
At the trial it appeared that the rick in question had been made 
by the defendant near the boundary of his own premises; that the 
hay was in such a state when put together, as to give rise to 
discussions on the probability of fire; that though there were 
conflicting opinions on the subject, yet during a period of five 
weeks the defendant was repeatedly warned of his peril; that his 
stock was insured; and that upon one occasion, being advised to 
take the rick down to avoid all danger, he said "he would chance 
it". He made an aperture or chimney through the rick; but in 

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spite, or perhaps in consequence of this precaution, the rick at 
length burst into flames from the spontaneous heating of its 
materials; the flames communicated to the defendant's barn and 
stables, and thence to the plaintiff's cottages, which were 
entirely destroyed. 
Patteson, J., before whom the cause was tried, told the jury 
that the question for them to consider, was, whether the fire 
had been occasioned by gross
37
negligence with reference to the 
standard of ordinary prudence, a standard too uncertain to 
afford any criterion; but whether he had acted bona fide to the 
best of his judgment; if he had, he ought not to be responsible 
for the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of 
intelligence. The action under such circumstances, was of the 
first impression. ... 
R.V. Richards, in support of the rule. 
First, there was no duty imposed on the defendant, as there is 
on carriers or other bailees, under an implied contract to be 
responsible for the exercise of any given degree of prudence. 
The defendant had a right to place his stack as near to the 
extremity of his own land as he pleased: Wyatt v. Harrison
38
. 
Under that right, and subject to no contract, he can only be 
called on to act bona fide to the best of his judgment. If he 
37
. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. Negligence is divided into three degrees - slight, ordinary, 
extraordinary. "Gross" negligence is an ambiguous term; usually meaning "extraordinary", but 
sometimes employed (as in the present case) to mean no more than the "ordinary" degree; see Story on
Bailments, sec. 17.] 
38
. 
3 B. & Adol. 871. 

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has done that, it is a contradiction in terms, to inquire 
whether or not he has been guilty of gross negligence. At all 
events what would have been gross negligence ought to be 
estimated by the faculties of the individual, and not by those 
of other men. The measure of prudence varies so with the varying 
faculties of men, that it is impossible to say what is gross 
negligence with reference to the standard of what is called 
ordinary prudence. In Crook v. Jadis
39
, Patteson, J., says, "I 
never could understand what is meant by parties taking a bill 
under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of 
a prudent man": and Taunton, J., "I cannot estimate the degree 
of care which a prudent man should take."... 
TINDAL, C.J. I agree that this is a case primoe impressionis; 
but I feel no difficulty in applying to it the principles of law 
as laid down in other cases of a similar kind. Undoubtedly this 
is not a case of contract, such as a bailment or the like where 
the bailee is responsible in consequence of the remuneration he 
is to receive. But there is a rule of law which says you must 
so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another; and 
according to that rule the defendant is liable for the 
consequence of his own neglect. And though the defendant did 
not himself light the fire, yet mediately he is as much the 
cause of it as if he had himself put a candle to the rick; for 
it is well known that hay will ferment and take fire if it be 
not carefully stacked. It has been decided that if an occupier 
39
. 
5 B. & Adol. 910. 

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169 
burns weeds so near the boundary of his own land that damage 
ensues to the property of his neighbour, he is liable to an 
action for the amount of injury done, unless the accident were 
occasioned by a sudden blast which he could not foresee: