Study manual

188 
[9] Cotton V. Wood. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 1860. 8 C.B., 
N.S.568. 
The burden of proving that the damage was caused by 
Negligence is on the plaintiff. 
THIS was an action under Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 
93, brought by the plaintiff, as administrator of his deceased 
wife, for an injury which resulted in her death.... 
The circumstances out of which the action arose were as 
follows:- 
The defendant was the proprietor of an omnibus running between 
Camberwell Gate and Hackney. On the 30th of November 1859, the 
omnibus was proceeding at a moderate pace on a journey from the 
latter place, the evening being dark, and snow falling fast, 
when, upon its reaching the Eastern Counties Railway Station, 
the wife of the plaintiff, accompanied by another woman, was 
attempting to cross the road (not at any ordinary crossing-
place) in front of the omnibus, but, alarmed by the approach of 
another vehicle from the opposite direction, turned back, and 
was knocked down and run over by the omnibus before she could 
regain the pathway, and so injured that she died. The 
defendant's omnibus was on its right side, and within seven or 
eight feet of the kerb. The only circumstance which was at all 

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189 
suggestive of negligence on the part of the defendant's servant, 
was, that, though he saw the woman cross in front of his 
omnibus, he had (at the moment they turned back) looked round to 
speak to the conductor, and was not aware of their danger until 
warned by the cry of a bystander, but too late to avert the 
mischief. 
It was proved on the part of the plaintiff, that the deceased 
had by her industry contributed to the extent of about 10s. 
weekly towards the maintenance of the family. 
On the part of the defendant it was submitted that there was no 
evidence to go to the jury of actionable negligence on the part 
of the defendant's servant. Of this opinion was the learned 
judge, Willes, J.: but, to avoid the necessity of going down 
again if the court should think otherwise, he left the case to 
the jury, who returned a verdict for £25,-£10 for the plaintiff 
himself, and £15 for the children.... 
Thomas, Serjt., and Griffits, now shewed cause. They submitted 
that the fact of the driver permitting his attention to be 
called from his horses for a moment in a crowded thoroughfare 
was amply sufficient to justify the jury in finding negligence; 
and, they having by their verdict affirmed negligence, the court 
would not interfere.... 
Montagu Chambers was not called upon to support the rule. 

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190 
ERLE, C.J. I am of opinion that this rule must be made absolute 
to enter a nonsuit. The Plaintiff is not entitled to succeed 
unless there be affirmative proof of negligence on the part of 
the defendant or his servant; and there can be no such proof, 
unless it be shewn that there existed some duty owing from the 
defendant to the plaintiff, and that there has been a breach of 
that duty. Now, I am utterly at a loss to find any evidence of 
any breach of duty here. It is as much the duty of foot-
passengers attempting to cross a street or road to look out for 
passing vehicles as it is the duty of drivers to see that they 
do not run over foot-passengers. Where it is a perfectly even 
balance upon the evidence whether the injury complained of has 
resulted from the want of proper care on the one side or on the 
other, the party who founds his claim upon the imputation of 
negligence fails to establish his case. 
According to the evidence, the plaintiff's wife, on a dark 
night, and in a snow-storm, proceeded slowly, accompanied by 
another female, to cross a crowded thoroughfare, whilst the 
defendant's omnibus was coming up on the right side of the road, 
and at a moderate pace, and with abundant time as far as I can 
judge for the women to get safe across if nothing else had 
intervened. But, in turning back to avoid another vehicle, they 
returned and unfortunately met the danger. What, then, is the 
ground for imputing negligence and breach of duty to the 
defendant's servant? One of the plaintiff's witnesses stated 

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191 
that the driver was looking round at the time to speak to the 
conductor. That alone clearly would be no affirmative proof of 
negligence. The man was driving on his proper side and I don't 
find it imputed to him that he was driving at an improper pace. 
As far as the evidence goes, there appears to me to be just as 
much reason for saying that the plaintiff's wife came 
negligently into collision with the defendant's horses and 
omnibus as for saying that the collision was the result of 
negligence on the part of the defendant's servant. 
Pollock, C.B., in a case of Williams v. Richards
44
laid it down 
that "it is the duty of persons who are driving over a crossing 
for foot-passengers, which is at the entrance of a street, to 
drive slowly, cautiously, and carefully; but it is also the duty 
of a foot-passenger to use due care and caution in going upon a 
crossing at the entrace of a street, so as not to get among the 
carriages, and thus receive injury". And I think I have known 
that to have been since followed by more judges than one. In 
Toomey v. The London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway 
Company
45
, which was an action against a railway company for 
negligence, the facts were these:- On the platform of the 
station there were two doors in close proximity to each other; 
the one, for necessary purposes, had painted over it the words 
"For gentlemen", the other had over it the words "Lamp-room". 
The plaintiff, having occasion to go to the urinal, inquired of 
44
. 
3 C. & K. 81. 
45
. 
3 C.B., N.S. 146. 

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192 
a stranger where he should find it, and, having received a 
direction, by mistake opened the door of the lamp-room, and fell 
down some steps and was injured. It was held by this court, 
that, in the absence of evidence that the place was more than 
ordinarily dangerous, the judge was justified in nonsuiting the 
plaintiff, on the ground that there was no evidence of 
negligence on the part of the company. My Brother Williams there 
said: "It is not enough to say that there was some evidence; 
for, every person who has had any experience in courts of 
justice knows very well that a case of this sort against a 
railway company could only be submitted to a jury with one 
result. A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there 
may have been negligence on the part of the defendants, clearly 
would not justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury: 
there must be evidence upon which they might reasonably and 
properly conclude that there was negligence". And that was 
adopted by Bramwell, B., in the case of Cornman v. The Eastern 
Countries Railway Company
46
. The very vague use of the term 
"negligence" has led to many cases being left to the jury in 
which I have been utterly unable to find the existence of any 
legal duty, or any evidence of a breach of it. I am clearly of 
opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make out any cause of 
action here, and consequently the rule for entering a nonsuit 
must be made absolute.... 
WILLIAMS, J. I wish merely to add, that there is another rule of 
46
. 
4 H. & N. 781. 

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193 
the law of evidence, which is of the first importance, and is 
fully established in all the courts, viz. that, where the 
evidence is equally consistent with either view, - with the 
existence or non-existence of negligence, - it is not competent 
to the judge to leave the matter to the jury. The party who 
affirms negligence has altogether failed to establish it. That 
is a rule which ought never to be lost sight of. 
The rest of the court concurring, Rule absolute. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. The student may refer to The East Indian Ry. Co. 
v. Kalidas Mukerjee, L.R. [1901] A.C. 396, where a railway 
passenger in a smoking carriage had been burned by the explosion 
of fireworks brought into this carriage by a fellow-passenger.
It would have been negligence in the railway company to permit 
knowingly the introduction of such a parcel. But the mere fact 
that the company had failed to detect the nature of the parcel 
was no proof that they had been negligent by so failing. It was 
for the plaintiff to prove that the parcel was a 
suspicious=looking one; not for the company to give proof that 
it was not.] 

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