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Collier, Q.C., obtained a rule nisi for a new trial on the 
ground of misdirection on the subject of negligence, and that 
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[EDITOR'S NOTE. 10 M. & W. 546. In this action - which Lord Campbell, C.J., calls "the 
often-quoted Donkey Case" - the facts were these. The plaintiff, having tethered the forefeet of his 
donkey, turned it on a public highway, eight yards wide. Here the donkey remained, and was grazing
on the side of the road, when the defendant's waggon and horses, coming down a slight descent at a
smart pace, ran against it, and hurt it. The driver of the waggon was careless in being some
distance 
behind his horses whilst they were going so fast. The judge told the jury that the 
plaintiff's negligence in leaving the tethered donkey on the public highway was no answer to the
action, unless the donkey's being there was the immediate cause of the injury. The Court of 
Exchequer held that as the defendant might, by proper care, have avoided injuring the animal, he was
liable for the consequence of his negligence, though the animal were there through the faulty act of
the plaintiff. For that fault was connected with the injury only remotely; and not as its proximate
cause. Cf. L.R. [1924] A.C. 401.]

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the verdict was against evidence. 
COCKBURN, C.J. This rule should be discharged. 
As to the verdict being against the evidence, my Brother Willes, 
who tried the cause, reports to us not only that he was not 
dissatisfied with the conclusion the jury came to, but that he 
thinks the verdict was right: under these circumstances, 
therefore, the rule cannot be sustained on that ground. 
As to the other ground, I have satisfied myself that the 
direction of the judge was right. The first objection to the 
summing up is, that it was left to the jury to say whether the 
plaintiff had by his own negligence directly contributed to the 
result: and it was contended, that, looking at the 296th and 
298th sections of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. 
c. 104, the case as to this part of it should have been left to 
the jury independently of the question of the plaintiff's having 
been contributory to the accident.... But all that the statute 
has done, is, to bring within the category of negligence the 
non-observance of the regulations prescribed by s. 296; so that, 
in the event of accident arising from such non-observance, the 
case stands precisely the same as it did before, and the 
question is to be tried by the ordinary rules. That being so, I 
think the direction was right, and that the true question in 
these cases, is, whether, the damage having been occasioned by 
the negligence of the defendant, the negligence of the plaintiff 
has directly contributed to it; and I think that, in this case, 

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if the defendant could have made out negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff, that would have been an answer to the action. The 
way in which it was put on the part of the defendant was this, 
that, by his own negligence in omitting to keep any look-out, 
the plaintiff contributed to the accident. If that had been 
established to the satisfaction of the jury, the plaintiff would 
have been directly contributory, and the defendant would have 
been entitled to a verdict. That question was left to the jury, 
with such observations as suggested themselves to the learned 
judge. There being no misdirection, therefore, and the learned 
judge not being dissatisfied with the verdict, we see no ground 
for disturbing it. 
WILLIAMS, J.... After well considering the case of Dowell v. The 
General Steam-Navigation Company
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, I am unable to distinguish 
the mode of directing the jury here from that which the Court of 
Queen's Bench sustained there. The law was there laid down, in 
conformity with several previous decisions, that, if the 
negligence or default of the plaintiff was in any degree the 
proximate cause of the damage, he cannot recover, however great 
may have been the negligence of the defendant: but that, if the 
negligence of the plaintiff was only remotely connected with the 
accident, then the question is whether the defendant might not 
by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided it. So far the 
doctrine of the cases is perfectly plain. But then comes the 
question, what is meant by the negligence of the plaintiff being 
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5 Ellis & Blackburn 195. 

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proximately (or directly) contributory, or only remotely 
connected with the accident? And that is a question which must 
somehow or other be disposed of at the trial. I dissent 
entirely from the proposition urged by Mr. Collier, that the 
plaintiff is disentitled to recover if his negligence is either 
proximately or remotely connected with the accident. But I feel 
great difficulty in dealing with the question whether the 
negligence was proximate or remote: and I certainly feel great 
difficulty in getting rid of that question of law by leaving it 
to the jury. That, however, was the course adopted in the case 
of Dowell v. The General Steam-Navigation Company, and followed 
upon this occasion
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.... 
Rule discharged. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the 
Exchequer Chamber; 5 C.B.N.S. 573. American lawyers call the 
rule laid down in it "the doctrine of the Last Clear Chance," 
imposing the injunction "Look and Listen." 
As is suing for damage received from B's negligence: but A was 
himself negligent. Yet if "his negligence brought about [only] 
a state of things in which there would have been no damage had 
not B been subsequently and severable negligent, A recovers"; 
L.R. [1924] A.C. 420.] 
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. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. And now followed invariably. For, though the question may be extremely 
subtle, it is one of Fact and not of Law.] 

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