263
fact. I am of opinion that there is
no relation constituted
between the driver of an omnibus and its ordinary passengers
which can justify the inference that they are identified to any
extent whatever with his negligence.
He is the servant of the
owner, not their servant; he does not look to them for orders,
and they have no right to interfere with his conduct of the
vehicle except perhaps the right of remonstrance when he is
doing, (or threatens to do),
something that is wrong and
inconsistent with their safety. Practically they have no
greater measure of control over his actions than the passenger
in a railway train has over the conduct of the engine-driver. I
am therefore unable to assent to the
principle upon which the
case of
Thorogood v. Bryan rests. In my opinion an ordinary
passenger by an omnibus, or by a ship, is not affected, either
in a question with contributory wrongdoers or in one with
innocent
third parties, by the negligence of the driver or of
the master and crew, unless he actually
assumes control over
their actions and thereby occasions mischief. In that case he
must of course be responsible for the consequences of his
interference....
Appeal dismissed.
[EDITOR'S NOTE. This decision confirms
the emphatic opinion
which Lopes, L.J., had expressed in the court below, that "The
theory of the Identification of the passengers with the driver
is
a fallacy and a fiction, contrary to sound law and opposed to
every principle of justice"; (L.R. 12 P.D. at p. 99).]