Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Conclusion: a federal project lacking legitimacy
The TPLF’s initial justification for introducing a federal system was the
commitment to the principle of national self-determination. Although vaguely
defined, this commitment was not merely a result of pragmatic considerations,
but definitely an outcome of ideological influences from both the Marxist-
Leninist inspired student movement and Tigrayan nationalism of the 1960s and
‘70s. It is therefore fair to say that Ethiopian federalism has a clear normative
base. Federalism was chosen because it was a way of fulfilling an ideological
aspiration: granting national groups the right to determine their own affairs
within their own territory. After the transition, the TPLF justified the
introduction of federalism by other, slightly more pragmatic and functionalist
arguments. Empowering national groups through federalism was not only an
end in itself, but essentially a means to maintain the unity of the country. One
part of the political opposition against the EPRDF (the AAPO and the EDUP)
has rejected this whole idea, claiming that ethnic federalism would lead to a
split-up of the Ethiopian state. But the opposition’s critique of the EPRDF’s
federal project is not only based on disagreements about the actual ideas that
federalism is based on. All opposition parties, including both anti- and pro-
federal parties, reject the current federal arrangements and the way they are
implemented because they claim that it is only serving the party in power.
The ruling party has failed in the attempt to achieve legitimacy for its federal
solution much because of the way in which the so-called federal bargain was
offered. The lack of transparency and participation in the process has fed the
argument that the EPRDF’s federalism is a way of ensuring TPLF hegemony.
Firstly, the TPLF before the transition never clarified whether it wanted an
independent Tigrayan republic or regional autonomy for Tigray within
Ethiopia. This has made the opposition suspicious of the TPLF’s commitment
to a unified Ethiopia, despite the fact that the front later has expressed its
dedication to averting the disintegration of the country. Secondly, the process
of introducing federalism in Ethiopia is more of a federal imposition than a
federal bargain. When Riker (1964) describes why political elites accept a
federal bargain, he claims that there is always an element of pressure on those
who are offered the bargain. But some kind of trade-off had to be present, for
example the promise of peace and stability. In Ethiopia, however, the EPRDF
never really asked the opposition whether they wanted federalism or not. The
military superiority of the TPLF and the control that they imposed during the

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transitional period made the opposition unable, both physically and politically,
to reject the so-called federal bargain. According to Young (1996a: 532), the
TPLF was convinced that their success in the battlefield during the struggle
against the Derg confirmed the superiority of their political convictions. They
were therefore basically unwilling to modify their ideas through bargaining.
Although the transitional conference and the transitional charter had an
element of bargaining, EPRDF’s principle of national self-determination was
adopted unmodified. The legitimacy the EPRDF might have gained in the
transitional conference was eventually lost in the process of drafting the new
constitution. As Mohammed Hassen has expressed it, the new constitution was
“produced single handed by one organisation and its partners. It lost
legitimacy even before it was ratified” (1999:253).

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