Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

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Up to now (year 2001), no official map of Federal Ethiopia is published and several
conflicts over boundaries have occurred (Tronvoll, Kjetil 2000: 23).

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(Art.5,1). The woreda administration should in every aspect be a subordinate
organ of the regional government, but has the power to “prepare, determine
and implement within its own areas concerning social services and economic
development.” (Art.40,1). In heterogenous areas, all ethnic groups are
supposed to have their own woreda or zone structure, or where this is not
possible, guaranteed representation in the elected woreda councils. The
regional governments should decide the structures below the woreda, which in
most cases are called kebele. Proclamation 41 of 1993 (41/93), gives a further
elaboration on the powers and duties of the central and regional executive
organs of the transitional government: the role of central ministries and
commissions and regional bureaus.
Despite the fact that proclamations 7/92 and 41/93 give a fairly detailed
sketch of federal-regional structures and sub-regional arrangements, the fiscal
issues, which are essential in determining the regions’ abilities to carry out their
duties and responsibilities, are left out. But another proclamation, defining the
sharing of revenues between the central government and the national/regional
self-governments, tries to fill this gap (proclamation 33/92). It defines both
regional and central revenue sources (chapter 5-6). The revenues granted for
the central government are much larger than those for the regions, which gives
a clear vertical imbalance. A correction of this imbalance is attempted by
opening up for subsidies from central to regional level (chapter 7). Many
financial issues are left unclarified in this proclamation, such as the rules that
will determine the joint revenue sources. Despite this, the constitution (Art.95)
largely repeats what is stated in proclamation 33/92, and there are no
additional fundamental clarifications on the financial ambiguities there (Cohen
1995:172). After the transitional period ended, however, new types of subsidies
and grants have been introduced and determined by the House of the
Federation in order to correct both horizontal and vertical imbalances. But
these new developments have no constitutional entrenchment and are more a
result of political than legal considerations. The financial arrangements would
therefore be a part of my analysis of the de facto functioning of the Ethiopian
federation (chapter 6 of this study), and not a part of the de jure arrangements
in this chapter.
Setting the principles of national self-determination and federation
in the constitution of 1994
The constitution of 1994 clearly states that Ethiopia is intended to be a federal
state. Article 1 defines the nomenclature of the state: “This constitution
establishes a federal and democratic state structure”. The sovereign power is
not given to the Ethiopian people at large or to the federal member states, but
“resides with the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia” (Art.8,1).
Article 39, which actually is to be found in the chapter on fundamental human
rights, gives a further elaboration on what this sovereignty is about. It largely
repeats from the transitional charter’s article two, and asserts that “[e]very
nation, nationality and people has an unconditional right to self-determination,
up to and including the right to secession”. The definition of nations,
nationalities and peoples is essentially the same as in proclamation 7/92: “[…]

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a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or
related identities, a common psychological make-up, and an identifiable,
predominantly contiguous territory.” Of the criteria mentioned, it is only
language and territory which are relatively easy to determine and distinguish,
and it is therefore reasonable to claim that the Ethiopian federal units first and
foremost are defined on a linguistic and territorial basis (Abbink 1997: 166).
The other traits, such as common psychological make-up and identities, are
hard to agree on and would probably be more unstable and changeable than
language and territory.
Article 47 lists the names of the states of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia. The fourteen regions defined in proclamation 7/92 are reduced to
nine, following the merger of the southern regions into one in 1994
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. Since the
sovereignty rests with the nations, nationalities and peoples and not with the
people at large or the member states of the country, sub-article two points out
that “nations, nationalities and peoples within the states […] have the right to
establish, at any time, their own states”. The transitional proclamations
sketched out the sub-regional structures of the regional self-governments. In the
constitution, however, there is no mention of the levels below the region. The
sub-regional structures are left for the regions to decide, through the drafting
and ratification of regional constitutions (Art.52, 4).
Central-regional power division and regional representation as
defined in the constitution