Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

AFF—Terror

Nuclear reactors are devastating terror targets.

PSR 16 ["Dirty, Dangerous And Expensive: The Truth About Nuclear Power". 2016.Psr.Org. Accessed August 8 2016. http://www.psr.org/chapters/washington/resources/nuclear-power-factsheet.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/][Premier]

In addition to the threat of nuclear materials, nuclear reactors are themselves potential terrorist targets.  Nuclear reactors are not designed to withstand attacks using large aircraft, such as those used on the September 11, 2001.(7)  A well-coordinated attack could have severe consequences for human health and the environment.  A study by the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that a major attack on the Indian Point Reactor in Westchester County, New York, could result in 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation sickness and more than 500,000 long-term deaths from cancer among individuals within 50 miles of the reactor.

Further Nuclear Power proliferation massively increases the chances of terrorists getting nukes.

Miller & Sagan 9 [Steven, Scott; Director of the International Security Program, Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal, International Security, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; Fall 2009; “Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?”; http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/daed.2009.138.4.7; [Premier]

Third, states that face significant terrorist threats from within face particular challenges in ensuring that there is no successful terrorist attack on a nuclear facility or no terrorist theft of fissile material to make a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb. Figure 3 displays data from the United States Counterterrorism Center comparing the five-year totals of terrorism incidents in the existing states that have nuclear power facilities and the iaea list of aspiring states. India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and nuclear power facilities and which face severe terrorist threats from homegrown and outsider terrorist organizations, clearly lead the pack. But as Figure 3 shows, the states that are exploring developing nuclear power would take up six of the slots on a “terrorist top ten risk list” if each of them develops civilian nuclear power in the future.

NPPs at risk of terror attacks-warning, risk management,, and backup systems fail

Gottfried 6 [Kurt; "Climate Change and Nuclear Power." Social Research: An International Quarterly 73.3 (2006): 1011-1024. Project MUSE. Web. 8 Aug. 2016. .][Premier]

In the last two decades the American nuclear power industry has learned how to operate its plants more reliably, and there have been fewer malfunctions that require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to demand a shutdown. But serious problems persist. The most glaring example is the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, which came to within 6 months of having a large hole bored through its head by boric acid, which could have led to a catastrophic core meltdown. This was not just a technical near-failure, but a failure by the NRC, as its own post incident review concluded. Nevertheless, after more than two years the NRC has not implemented a quarter of its “high priority lessons learned.” Climate Change and Nuclear Power 1017 That terrorism poses a serious threat to nuclear power plants only became widely recognized after 9/11. Not only the nuclear reactors, but the neighboring spent fuel, could wreak havoc if attacked. Since 9/11, the NRC has upped the “Design Basis Threat” (DBT) that defines the level of attack that the plant operator is responsible for; above this the government is responsible. The DBT is classified, as it should be. It is known, however, to be based on the unrealistic assumption that the risk attending an attack can be reckoned in the same way as the risk of an accident. However, in an accident, backup systems should work, whereas they would also be the target of terrorists. Moreover, testing of readiness, which was ridiculously weak before 9/11, is still too limited, and the Department of Homeland Security does not have the authority or resources to insure that operators can handle the Design Basis Threat. If nuclear power is to play a major role in addressing the climate challenge, the NRC must undergo fundamental reforms that will make it truly independent of the industry it is supposed to regulate. Congress must provide it with the funding and political authority to strictly enforce the existing regulations pertaining to accidents. Homeland Defense and the NRC must together establish a coherent and effective security regime that can cope credibly with the threats of the post 9/11 world.

Increased nuke power means more people can share secret intel

Kanellos 10

Michael Kanellos, Green Tech Media, January 22, 2010 “Should the U.S. Expand Nuclear Power?” http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/should-the-u.s.-expand-nuclear-power [Premier]

A knowledge problem also exists. Expanding nuclear power means educating more engineers and technicians on how to build and operate plants. In turn, that means more people that could be susceptible to bribes and blackmail from less democracy friendly nations. This can't be dismissed lightly. If the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory in the Netherlands hadn't hired and trained a newly minted PhD named A.Q. Khan back in 1972, Pakistan and North Korea may not have missiles today. On the same day that Areva announced its Fresno plans, an intelligence report from the International Atomic Energy Agency stated that Iran cut a secret deal to obtain uranium from Kazakhstan.

A2 NPT Checks Terror

The NPT is too permissive-North Korea proves

Gottfried 6 [Kurt; "Climate Change and Nuclear Power." Social Research: An International Quarterly 73.3 (2006): 1011-1024. Project MUSE. Web. 8 Aug. 2016. .][Premier]

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) suffers from a serious defect in that it allows a non-nuclear power to acquire essentially all the capabilities for manufacturing weapons material short of actually using this capability for that purpose, and to leave the treaty regime shortly before taking this last step. That was done by North Korea. Removing this defect in the NPT is very difficult politically, mainly because the nuclear powers have for decades put higher priority on satisfying their own, separate national interests than on strengthening the NPT regime. In recent years the United States has put an extra heavy burden on the NPT by adopting nuclear weapons policies that are in conflict with the spirit (though not the letter) of its obligations under the NPT, and by refusing to ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The United States has not carried out any reprocessing to obtain plutonium from civilian reactors for some 30 years. But North Korea did while abiding to the letter though certainly not the spirit of the NPT. Some countries that do not worry us also reprocess. In particular, Japan does, but its accounting system is such that enough plutonium for more than 10 weapons is not accounted for.