Premier Debate 2016 September/October ld brief

NEG—Heidegger K

Belief in nuclear power stems from technocratic thinking

WISE 11

[--World Information Service on Energy, founded in 1978 to promote anti-nuclear ideology, “THE "SELF-LIMITING" FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER,” Dec 9 2011] [Premier]

4. Hubris and Technological Fantasy One final factor pushing nuclear power is its association with progress, complexity , and modernity . Early advocates promised not only a future of electricity too cheap to meter, but an age of peace and plenty (without high prices or shortages in which atomic energy would provide the power needed to desalinate water for the thirsty , irrigate deserts for the hungry , and fuel interstellar travel deep into outer space. Other exciting opportunities included atomic golf balls that could always be found and a nuclear- powered airplane, which the US federal government even spent US$ 1.5 billion researching between 1946 and 1961.(*20) This section suggests that one explanation for the attractiveness of nuclear energy could be its association with national visions of progress. While these visions vary by country and over time, John Byrne and Steven Hoffman propose that the single most consistent predictor of whether a society will embrace nuclear energy is their ability to think in the ´future tense". That is, planners and promoters become enthralled by the possible benefits of nuclear energy in the future, and are willing to accept the costs in the present to realize them. Put another way, they tend to overestimate the advantages of nuclear energy and discount its future costs in the absence of knowledge about current economic or technical compatibility; the reality of present risks and costs is discounted by the unrealized possibilities of future gain.(*21) Indeed, the energy historian Martin Melosi has noted that "it's amazing that commercialization of nuclear power occurred at all.... The energy market had little to do with this important event, since there was no pressing need for a new source of power in the United States. There was, however, strong interest in enhancing American prestige."(*22) Although these psychological benefits are intangible, they are often believed to be real. A cursory look at the genesis of nuclear programs in eight countries - China, France, India, Japan, the former Soviet Union, the US, Spain, and Canada - reveals that, in each case, optimism in the technology and an overarching vision of what nuclear energy could deliver in the future played a role in trumping concerns about present costs.

NEG—Heg DA

Prolif

Loss of US civilian capability causes prolif and loss of US influence-we can’t set innovation and regulatory norms-the US is modeled by the world

Squassoni 13 [Sharon (2013) The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 22-33, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997] [Premier]

The argument for US involvement in civilian nuclear energy to strengthen nonproliferation efforts has two strands: The United States can influence countriesÕ nuclear energy decisions to help support nonproliferation objectives only if it is demonstrating leadership (e.g., innovation) in the civilian nuclear sector. And US exports help maintain American pre-eminence in shaping the nonproliferation regime itself. The first strand of the argument maintains that leadership in the civilian nuclear sector is critical to nonproliferationÑraising the question of what counts for leadership. Is it cutting-edge research and development, and if so, is the R&D confined to particular areas like reactor designs and safety? A wide array of entities, including reactor vendors and US government laboratories, conduct nuclear energy research and development, but electric utilities largely do not. It is plausible to assert that without a vibrant domestic nuclear Squassoni 27 Downloaded by [University of Minnesota Libraries, Twin Cities] at 16:47 08 August 2016 energy sector, reactor vendors will find it more difficult to justify research and development spending. This was in part the justification for the Energy DepartmentÕs Nuclear Power 2010 program. US research into technologies and approaches that improve the proliferation resistance of fuel cycles will need to continue, but such research is not dependent on the operation of civilian nuclear power reactors. Alternatively, one may argue that leadership stemming from operational experience is what will be valued by potential nuclear partners. If so, the operational expertise of utilities would be helpful. The Obama administration has hinted at this kind of leadership in the rationale behind support for peaceful nuclear energy: As countries move increasingly to tap peaceful nuclear energy to provide power generation while advancing climate goals, the world must develop an infrastructure in the countries that seek to use nuclear energy for their energy security needs and climate goals to ensure that nuclear energy is developed in a safe manner. We will do so by promoting safety through regulatory bodies and training of operators, promoting physical security to prevent terrorist acts, and assuring safe and secure handling of fuel at the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle. (White House, 2010) Here, the kind of leadership envisioned for the United States is promotion of norms, training, and best practices, as well as hands-on help. US technological leadership in these areas could help encourage other countries to accept the lead of the United States. The loss of US regulatory and operational expertise from a nuclear exit could potentially mean the loss of that form of leadership.

US exports k2 international norm setting

Squassoni 13 [Sharon (2013) The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69:2, 22-33, DOI: 10.1177/0096340213477997] [Premier]

The second strand of the national security argument for civilian US nuclear power centers on the role of US nuclear exports in setting nonproliferation rules. The basic premise is that the United States can wield more nonproliferation influence if it remains a nuclear supplier. This is because US agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation (so-called 123 agreements, after the relevant section in the Atomic Energy Act) contain provisions governing how material and equipment can be stored, used, processed, and transferred, mostly designed to limit proliferation risk. Also, nuclear suppliers have what many see as an effective forum for discussing how to limit proliferation risksÑthe 47-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). With respect to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, the United States can control only how US material, equipment, and technology are handled.7 The more that other countries engage in nuclear cooperation among themselves, the less impact US policies have. Moreover, the record is mixed on the nonproliferation impact of those policies: Several countries engaged in nuclear cooperation with the United States have, at the same time, engaged in activities that either supported nuclear weapons programs or contributed to capabilities that would support a clandestine nuclear weapons program. These include Taiwan, South Korea, Iran under the shah, and Argentina and Brazil in the 1950s. In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, the United States exerted extraordinary diplomatic pressure to shut down incipient nuclear weapons programs, all the while engaging in nuclear cooperation.