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Source	Agriculture				Pastoral
Total
Total		Services/Products		Investiment		Services/Products		Investiment
n° of contracts	value (R$)	n° of contracts	value (R$)	n° of contracts	value (R$)	n° of contracts	value (R$)	n° of contracts	value (R$)
FNE	1312	10,304,872	10599	31,901,942	402	1,424,574	22777	44,300,356	35090	87,931,743
IHC	0	0	72	922,167	0	0	734	4,799,390	806	5,721,557
P.Rural	3019	16,706,847	68	580,315	915	5,109,313	604	3,753,098	4606	26,149,572
RTN	3	12,408	211	157,958	5	15,899	432	851,823	651	1,038,088
Total Sergipe	4334	27,024,127	10950	33,562,381	1322	6,549,786	24547	53,704,666	41153	120,840,960
Total Brazil	469472	5,349,317,025	408852	4,017,370,532	188875	2,092,068,651	756011	4,900,221,943	1823210	16,358,978,153
%Sergipe/Brazil	0.9	0,5	2,7	0,8	0,7	0,3	3,2	1,1	6,6	0,7
FNE Total NE	5526	39,464,085	251690	799,687,890	30,261	111,377,860	526798	1,109,844,371	784044,261	2,060,374,209
% FNE Sergipe	23,7	26,1	4,2	4,0	1,3	1,3	4,3	4,0	33,5	15,8

Table 2. PRONAF contracts and values in reais for the 07 Alto Sertão municipalities (SAS) – 2012.

Municipality	Services/Products		Investiment		Comercialization		Total
Municipality	n° of contract	Value (R$)	n° of contract	Value (R$)	n° of contract	Value (R$)	n° of contract	Value (R$)
Gararu	556	2.437.348	2455	7.228.383	0	0	3011	9.665.731
Porto Folha	475	2.352.957	1947	7.069.292	0	0	2422	9.422.249
N.Sra.Glória	166	1.312.698	1915	5.338.796	0	0	2081	6.651.494
Monte Alegre de Sergipe	157	1.299.627	1747	5.669.496	0	0	1904	6.969.123
Poço Redondo	40	352.751	1781	4.714.318	0	0	1821	5.067.069
N.Sra.Lourdes	76	366.953	628	1.654.751	0	0	704	2.021.704
Canindé de São Fco.	64	445.667	428	1.252.345	0	0	492	1.698.012
Total SAS	1534	8.568.001	10901	32.927.381	0	0	12435	41.495.382
Total Sergipe							41153	120.840.960
SAS/Sergipe							30,2	34.3

In parallel, there are other financial instruments that could be used by rural borrower focused on rural activities. For 2013-14, the Harvest Plan allocated US$3 billion for the semiarid region. The main rural credit operating agents are the Bank of Brazil, BNB, CEF for all Northeast Brazil, and BANESE only for Sergipe state.

The sources of funding available in the region also provide various forms of agricultural and non-agricultural credit such as savings accounts and insurance which can be important for rural producers. Moreover, some environment funds have established specific lines in last 2 years to combat desertification and sustainable management in order to promote climate change adaptation and biodiversity conservation.

In 2011-2014 period, environment government Funds (FNMC, FNMA) have provided about U$ 40M in grants for environment projects in ASD, promoting SFM, environmental recovery, seeds houses, energetic efficiency and security, among other combat desertification activities. Sergipe State has only access 0,2% of this amount.

The main finding of the PPG study was that various potential sources of credit and other funding exist on paper, but that it is difficult for family farmers, cooperatives, NGOs and State to access financing for sustainable land management (SLM) activities in formal financial institutions and government funds in ways that are appropriate for this target group. Traditional public banks are not familiar with the specificities of this demand and are not always convinced that it provides sufficient payback in the appropriate time frames. Norms are inflexible. Since it is not their priority, they have little interest in the complex projects, which are not part of their performance goals. There are serious problems with default on previous loans and a culture of non-payment. Collective undertakings come up against individualistic attitudes. It is difficult for family farmers to provide all the documents that are required. Cooperation among banks and government agencies does not always function as it should.

A major difficulty in access to PRONAF is the need for Declarations of Eligibility for PRONAF (DAP), which lag far behind the levels of coverage in the South and Southeast of Brazil. The existence of branch offices in the interior is also limited. The Bank of the Northeast (BNB), for example, only has branches in two small municipalities in the Alto Sertão (Gararu and Nossa Senhora da Glória), not in the largest municipalities with the most family farmers.

Table 3. Institutions involved in credit and funding, problems and mitigation.

Institution	Problems	Mitigation
MMA, National Climate Fund (FNMC)	Producers unfamiliar and banks prefer traditional credit lines.	Coordination with BNDES to transfer funds to BNB and BANESE, rural development agents, funds for grants, training for staff, better extension, dissemination material.
SEMARH, ADEMA	Need to prove land ownership, need for approved plans, ambiguity of norms, need for licenses.	Institutional strengthening, technology, capacity-building at the municipal level, territorial governance.
BNDES	Low level of investment, few branch offices, preference for large loans, low interest rates unattractive for banks.	Decentralization, decision-making at higher levels, review of current interest rates.
BNB	Rigid norms, delay due to lack of documentation, lack of promotion, lack of demand, problems in relations with EMDAGRO.	Reduce bureaucracy, promotion of SLM, combine credit with grants, rewards for banks and clients who practice SLM, promotion of productive clusters (APLs), anti-poverty partnerships, transfers in tranches, more field visits without onus to producers, more data on impacts.
Bank of Brazil (BB)	Need for profit for shareholders, complexity of credit lines, low awareness regarding SLM, barriers regarding licensing, non-payment, limited field monitoring.	Stronger governmental posture, more appropriate dissemination material, consideration of capacity of entire family farm unit, reduce transaction costs, better data collection, better use of Climate Fund.
CEF	Limited experience with environment and rural development, lack of experience with SLM.	Capacity-building on SLM, use of funds from the Climate Fund, collection of socioeconomic and environmental data to evaluate impact of loans.
BANESE	Staff lacks familiarity with SLM.	Capacity-building on SLM together with technical assistance personnel, transfer of funds from BNDES, collection of socioeconomic and environmental data to evaluate impact of loans.
OCESE	Producers are being foreclosed and losing their property, cooperatives do not pay members, interest charged grew more than income.	Strategic planning with professional management, inclusion of women and inclusion of youth, renegotiation of debts, rural environmental registry (CAR), diversification of monocultures with forestry.
EMDAGRO	Lack of capacity to meet demand, loss of staff through retirement, disagreements with BNB.	Rediscussion of respective institutional roles, new hiring, increased technical assistance and monitoring for entire project lifetime.
CFAC	Banks not interested in agroecology, high default rates, lack of credit.	More involvement of women, including community banks, capacity-building on SLM in the Caatinga, improved understanding of how to make continued use of credit.
INCRA	Individualism instead of collective cooperation, lack of information on SLM, difficulties of access in new settlements.	Solidarity economy, appropriate capacity-building with exchanges of experience, partnerships with various government agencies and MST.
Rural producers	Stagnation due to years of drought, low educational level, 75.3% have less than 10 ha.,low technological level, high indebtedness and default, little knowledge of SLM, limited access to knowledge and markets.	Capacity-building and technical assistance, public policies integrated with local people for inclusive socioeconomic development, community banks and collective savings and differentiated access to credit.

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