Regional political parties in india s. Bhatnagar pradeep kumar

It seems that the moderation in the language of the manifestos of the Dal came as a result of, what can be termed as, secularisation process within the legislative wing of the party. This may be broadly ascribed to (a) the party's alliances and coalition-making with the political parties, (b) the shift in its support structure from the urban to rural Punjab and finally (c) the change in the spatial distribution of the Sikhs after the 1966 re-organisation. These three factors, put together, made the party a potential ruling party (though always with the support of the Janata/BJP). This transformation in the 70's contributed a lot towards changing the image of the Dal from a regional chauvinist party to a political party capable of ruling the State.

Coalition Making

Though the reorganisation of the State elevated the status of the Sikhs to a majority community, the Hindus continued to form a sizeable minority.46 The Akalis had long time back recognised this and attempted to broaden their base by entering into electoral alliances with the other important party of the region, namely the Jana Sangh, which held a sway over the urban Hindus. The Akalis could very rightly realise their limitation that the logic of support structure would not enable them to capture power through electoral means unless the other major community also extended its indirect support to it. Thus the support bases of the two parties did not actually clash but were rather complementary.

As a result of its alliance and seat adjustment with some opposition parties (the major being the Jana Sangh) the Akali Dal captured power in the 1967 Vidhan Sabha elections, the coalition government formed after the elections included the representation from the CPI. However the strained relations between the Jana Sangh and the CPI and also between a faction of the Akalis and the CPI fractured the coalition. Later defections from the Dal led to the formation of the new ministry headed by the faction leader Lachman Singh Gill, and supported (from outside)

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by the Congress party. After the mid-term polls of 1969 a new coalition was formed, this time between the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal, under the leadership of the Akali Dal (Gurnam Singh and Parkash Singh Badal were the two Chief Ministers who led this coalition one after the other). This coalition ended a little before the 1972 elections to the State assembles.

The second spell of the coalition ministry in Punjab was witnessed after the restoration of democracy in the 1977 elections. The Vidhan Sabha elections in June 1977 brought to power the Akali-Janata coalition in Punjab. The Janata, as mentioned earlier, was by and large the old Jana Sangh in Punjab. Though not much lessons were learnt by the earlier experiments with the coalition (1967-72), the fact that the Dal entered into a coalition (as a junior partner) with the Janata Party, at the Central level also, made some qualitative changes in the working of the coalition.

Right since its assuming power in June 1977, the Akali Dal in Punjab came in conflict with the Janata Party, broadly on two issues.47 One of course was the old demand for greater State autonomy and decentralisation of financial powers etc. But the other issue on which the two coalition partners saw quite a strained relation, was the demand by a section of the Akali Dal to take stern measures against the Nirankari sect Here one may ignore such issues as related to prohibition, transfer of education of the State list, etc. This is a little less relevant in the context of Punjab as these issues are not peculiar to the politics of Punjab but have been raised quite forcefully by some other State Governments too. Thus the Nirankari issue and the demand for autonomy issue can be safely considered to be of special significance for Punjab. Although the autonomy issue has been raised elsewhere also (perhaps with equal eloquence), yet the geneses of the demand in Punjab are slightly different from those in other States.

The Akali-Nirankari relations assumed a new political significance after the armed clash between the two that took place on the Baisakhi day (13 April) in 1978 at Amritsar. Some of the persistent demands of the Akalis since then had been the ban on the two Nirankari books, "Avtar bani" and "Yug Purush", restricting the movements of the Nirankari Baba Gurbachan Singh (who was later murdered by the terrorists) and preventing the Nirankaris from holding their Satsangs (holy congregations) at some places in Punjab. Though these demands were raised only by a faction of the Akali Dal (then known as its extremist faction) it assumed significance as this faction claimed to represent the true spirit of the

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Dal.48 Not only this, the leadership of the moderate Sikhs (like the Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal49) was challenged by this faction.50 The Akali Dal in such a situation was placed in a dilemma where the party's coalition with a secular party (in the sense of Janata being a co-sectarian party) was at stake in view of the extremist pressures on it. The Janata leaders, both at the State and the Central levels, had expressed their resentment over the sectarian demands of a section of the Akalis.51 The Janata ultimately succeeded in restraining its coalition partner from adopting a hard line. The strong resentment against the alleged ineffectiveness of the Akali Government in tackling the Nirankari issue, shows the pressures which the moderate Akali leadership had to reckon with in order to survive its alliance with the Janata.

In fact even some of the extremist leaders like Harchand Singh Longowal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra became less indomitable after they realised the contsraints on the working of their party. These leaders became less rigid and decided not to put the Chief Minister in an embarassing situation by forcing him to take a hard stand on the Nirankari issue.52 Thus, the Akalis in Punjab had been refrained from going an extremist way by their coalition partner, the Janata.53

The coalition of the Janata with the Akali Dal also resulted in the pressures on the Janata Party to listen to the Akali demands a little more seriously. In the 1978 clashes at Delhi, the Akalis were compelled to withdraw their representative from the Central Cabinet It was in fact a step towards maintaining the legitimacy of the Akali Dal a protector of the Sikh faith. This was enough to embarass the Janata partner of the coalition and consequently both the partners to the coalition agreed on a three-point settlement to ask for the withdrawal of the resignations of the two Akali Ministers, Surjeet Singh Barnala and Dhanna Singh Gulshan, from the Central Ministry. Besides this, a committee was also set up to look into the anti-Sikh preachings in the Nirankari literature.

Another major issue on which the two partners to the coalition clashed, was that of greater State autonomy. The Janata Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, had been stressing the point that India was federal country but with a difference and, therefore, it had to work in the unitary spirit as evisaged in the Indian Constitution.54 The Janata President, Chandra Shekhar, was in a broad agreement with the Akalis on the demand for more devolution of powers to the States, but he had clearly opposed the move of the Akali Dal to leave with the Centre only a few items of national importance, like the defence, communications and the foriegn policy etc. He was categorical in rejecting the Anandpur Sahib

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resolution. Not only this, Chandra Shekhar even rejected the Akali demand for a true federal system.55

The Akali Dal felt that its demands for autonomy were in close approximation to Janata Party's commitment to political and economic decentralisation. It was in this context that the Janata President was invited to attend the All-India Akali Conference at Ludhiana.56 However the attempt was not fruitful and all that the Janata party agreed to, was the assurance of a frank and free discussion to devolve powers not only at the State level but also at the district and Panchayat levels.57 But in practice the Janata did not move even an inch in accepting the Akali's demand for more autonomy (either in principle or in practice).

The coalition with the Janata was considered by the extremist faction of the Dal to be an unnecessary constraint on the functioning of the party. But the alliance was not a hindrance in the pursuit of the path of autonomy by the moderate Akalis. On the contrary, the alliance should be seen as a part of the strategy to bargain with the Centre, whatever little the outcome may be, the Akalis continued to pressurise the Centre through this coalition and whenever the situation was considered to be more congenial, the Akalis did not spare any chance in getting whatever little they could manage in the bargain. This happened when the Janata was in trouble at the Centre due to the internal dissensions or the threats from the opposition.

Support Structure of the Leadership

The Akali Dal generally claims to represent the interest of the Sikh community (or panth) in particular and the people of Punjab in general. However in terms of electoral support structure it has always claimed the loyalty of a section of the Sikhs, though an important section. In earlier times when the leadership was in the hands of Master Tara singh (pre-split era), the Akali Dal broadly represented the urban business community of the Sikhs, which generally was non-Jat (usually Arora/Khatri etc.). However with the shift of leadership to the Sant faction in the early 60's the support base of the Dal also underwent a change in terms of socio-economic composition.

The new leaderships largely came from the Sikh peasantry of Jat origin, and was more moderate and relatively secular in nature. When the gains of the Green Revolution were consolidated in the 60's, this section of the peasantry was a major beneficiary. This affluence also strengthened their political position. Since then the leadership of the Dal has largely remained in the hands of the Sikh Jats (an agriculturally prosperous

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community)58 and the representation or support of other sections of the Sikh community was almost symbolic. On the other hand non-Jat (Arora/Khatri) and Mazbi, ad-dharmi and other scheduled caste Sikhs (these are all the lower castes among the Sikhs) have, by and large, extended their support to the Congress Party in the State.59 This is why the Congress in Punjab has always depended on these communities for countering the influence of the Dal. They have clearly opposed the demands put forward by the Akali leadership.60 So much so that the Sikh Harijans had even opposed the creation of a Punjabi Suba. The latter, they thought, would "crush" them further under the dominant Jat peasantry. These lower caste Sikhs always believed that the demand for a separate province was the demand of the Jat peasantry. To undermine the basis of the Punjabi Suba, the Sikh Harijans went to the extent of denying Punjabi as their mother tongue, and together with some Hindus, declared Hindi as their mother tongue at the time of census operations in 1961.61 It is this opposition (to the Akali demands) from the lower caste Sikhs that has paid rich dividents to the Congress at the time of general elections. It is widely believed that the Congress could rout the Akali Dal in Punjab in the Parliamentary elections of 1971, partly because of the support it could muster from the Scheduled Castes (including the Sikh Scheduled Castes) who constituted nearly one fifth of the total population of the State.62

The other section of the Sikhs that has normally found itself at a distance from the general policies of the Akali Dal, is that of the urban/industrial Sikh entrepreneurs. This perhaps accounts for the rural bias in the approach of the Akalis. It has generally been observed that the industrial and urban interests tend to support a strong Centre, and the demands for State's rights have always got strength from the agrarian population63. This is the reason that in Punjab too, the Sikh industrialists have normally opposed the Akali demands for greater State autonomy64. It has been argued by some scholars65 that the autonomy demands were raised by the rich peasants to compel the Centre to invest the surplus capital generated from the agricultural sector (more particularly after the green revolution) into the agricultural sector itself, hence the demands for investing in the agro-industries in Punjab. This industrial-agrarian divide has clearly divided the base of the Akali Dal (i.e. the sikh community) and the latter has, by and large, found itself on the side of the agriculturists.66

The 1985 elections, it seems, did not follow the support structure theory, and for a variety of reasons mentioned on earlier pages, perhaps almost the entire Sikh Community (with some percentage of the Hindus

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as well) sided with the Akali Dal. One is tempted to conclude this by the fact that the Akalis captured power on their own and this is not possible unless the lower caste Sikhs (Mazbis, Ad Dharmis etc) and the Urban middle castes (Arora/Khatris etc), the traditional support base of the Congress among the sikhs, also voted for the Akalis.

Changing Contours of the Party Strategy

The working of the Akali Dal has combined both the strategies, namely constitutional methods. Though both the methods have been adopted by the Dal workers to exert pressure on the government to get their demands accepted, the dependence on either of the two strategies has been determined by the political composition of the ruling party. The Dal has generally adopted the agitational approach whenever it has been in the opposition. But when in power it has always tried to restrain its extremist faction within limits. This is a political necessity for every political party. It is worth mentioning here that on the issue of form and pace of Akali agitations, the Dal members have by and large been divided. If the legislative wing has adopted a relatively moderate approach, the organisational wing has preferred the agitational path. Or in other words, one could say that the Dal always adopted a dual approach on the issue of pressurising the government for its demands. Although, when in power, the moderate faction has been able to keep the extremist faction under its hold, yet the moderates have also been under heavy pressure to adopt stern measures to get their demands accepted. The pressure exerted on the moderate faction (headed by the then Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal) on the issue of the anti-Nirankari measures (during the coalition of 1977-79) is a testimony to the above. It was this enormous pressure which had forced the Akali Dal to withdraw its support from the Janata-Akali coalition at the Centre and impose a ban on the Jullunder vernacular press.67 Once again the leadership went into the extrmist hands after the defeat of the Dal in 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls. This further led to a period of agitations which ultimately slipped into the hands of the terrorists.

Despite the dual approach of the Akali Dal to get its various socio-economic and political demands accepted, one noticed a gradual change in its over all strategy in the 70's.68 This change was noticed in the shift of party's emphasis from a Sikh party to a party that (at least apparently) spoke on behalf of the people of Punjab. Most of the demands and grievances put forward during this period were made out to be the demands and grievances of all the communities of Punjab. It became a

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case of "anti-Punjab attitude" of the Centre rather than "anti-Sikh attitude". In fact the party had changed its form from a communal party to a regional party long back in 60's when the leadership had passed into the hands of the moderate faction led by Sant Fateh Singh. But the party became more pragmatic in approach after its victory in the 1977 elections when it collaborated with some other parties69, and made out its case for more state powers on the non-communal lines.

The change in the party's broad approach was partly a result of the change in its support base from urban to rural agricultural Jat peasantry (in the 60's) and partly due to its coalition with other parties (in the 70's). the latter included not only the CPM but also the Janata Party which claimed to be national party.70 As discussed earlier in this paper the compulsions of coalescing with the Janata party restrained the Dal from taking an extreme position on communal issues.

However, what is being argued is not that the Akalis ceased to be sectarian as a result of the coalition with the Janata and other parties. In fact the thrust of the argument is that while the communal tinge remained in the demands of the State autonomy, the communalism of the Dal became negotiable and pragmatic. Even though the demands made in the period, primarily aimed at the betterment of the Sikh community, the bargain with the Centre was on non-communal basis. Most of the charges that the Akalis levelled against the Centre in the 1977-79 period, were similar to such other charges as were levelled by some other regional parties also (like the CPM in West Bengal). These included charges pertaining to the Ravi-Beas waters dispute, transfer of education back to the State List, complaints of political, economic and cultural discrimination against Punjab during the 30 years of the Congress rule etc.

The end of the Akali-Janata coalition rule in the year 1980, once again weaned away the leadership of the Dal from the moderates. Moreover the Dal was left free to pursue its demands through extra-constitutional agitational methods.

The early 80's saw more or less complete alienation of the Akali Dal from the parliamentary politics. The rise of violence and politics of Dharma Yudha and morchas created new problems for the Akali politics. The watershed came after the happenings of June and November 1984, and the signing of the Rajiv Longowal Accord in the following year. The Accord once again brought the Akalis and the electoral politics back. Soon, however, the split in the Dal which was spearheaded by Parkash Singh Badal, made the Barnala Ministry defunct The Akali government's dismissal by the Centre in 1987 finally brought an end

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to the Akali rule. The general pattern it seems is that the Akalis fight unitedly when they are out of power, and fight separately when one faction happens to form the Government.

Future Prospects

With the increasing capability of the regional forces to manifest themselves in the wake of the declining all-India leadership, the regional parties have got a new lease of life. The post-partition climate that had made every one to see with suspicion the activities of the regional forces, has become a matter of history. After having insured the independence and integration of the country at the political level, the various sub nationalistic forces have started making a clamour for undoing the excessive centralisation in the name of nationalism. The failure of the Congress party (which for various reasons had come to develop some kind of an all-India character) to accommodate the emerging regional or State level leadership, has forced the regional sentiments to find expression in the various regional level parties71. In otherwords, the wind is in favour of the regional leadership.

However, the Akali Dal has always lived in a dilemma. It has depended for its strength on the support of a particular community. While this support has given it a solid base, it has also restricted it from becoming a broad-based secular regional party of AIADMK/DMK stature, so necessary in a region where the Sikhs arc only marginally superior to the second strongest religious community in terms of numerical strength. Akali's second dilemma is that some of their demands go in fact against their election prospects. The most important is that of the merger of the remaining Punjabi-speaking areas into Punjab. It is well-known that most of these areas (such as Chandigarh and parts of Haryana, Himachal and Rajasthan) are not Sikh dominant areas and their actual merger in Punjab will further weaken the already not-so-solid electoral base of the party in Punjab.

The Akali Dal has bright future, like any other regional political party, in view of the rise of peasantry in politics and changed mood of the country in favour of the regional autonomy. But, like other regional parties, it will have to undergo a metaporphosis to shed its sectarian approach. It must learn sufficient lessons from its coalition experiments with the Janata, Jana Sangh and Communist parties. The leadership must be forced by its clintele to coalesce with the other important parties of the region it will not only brighten the electoral prospects of the Dal, but will have a restraining influence on the extremist leadership of the party.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Steven Muller, "Federalism and the Party System in Canada", cited by Sub-hash C. Kashyap, Indian Parties and Politics (New Delhi, ICPS, 1972) p-34.

2. For example K.V. Rao argues that "autonomous provinces were artificially created in India under the Act of 1935 and the sentiments of State right as well as autonomy proper were artificial."

K.V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India (Calcutta, The World Press, Pvt. Ltd., 1961) pp 275-276.

3. The priestly duties in most of the Sikh Gurudwaras were performed by Mahants. Many of these priests were not fully Sikhs in their priestly traditions and they also worshipped Hindu idols. As Khushwant Singh maintains some of these Mahants were men of "loose character and carried on their debauchery within temple precincts."

For details see Khushwant Singh, The Sikhs Today (New Delhi Sangam Books, 1976) p 52.

4. The Sikhs generally believe that Raj bina nahin dharam chale hai i.e. it is not possible to protect one's religion without acquiring political power.

5. At times the non-Akali Sikhs in the Congress have been dubbed as Ganga Rams. Ganga Ram is a character in Punjabi literature and actually corresponds to a traitor or the one who has no conscience of his own.

6. Though there are a few Muslim members of the Akali Dal from Maler-kotla (a muslim majority town of Punjab), and even though the Dal gave its ticket to Anwar Ahmad, a Muslim for the Vidhan Sabha poll, the non-Sikh representation is only symbolic. Even in these cases the members enjoy only "associate" status.

7. Some Sikh voters in the Kajauli and Khunt villages of Rupnagar Parliamentary Constituency (1977 - General Elections) of Punjab told this author that they were voting for the Dal to protect the "Panth". Some of them even said that if Guru Gobind Singh could sacrifice his two sons to safeguard the religion, why could not they cast vote for the same. It was much smaller a sacrifice, they added.

8. The Sikhs constituted 60.2 per cent and the Hindus 37.5 per cent of the total State population at the time of Census operations in 1971. The percentage of the Sikhs has gone up to 60.8 as per the 1981 Census.

9. The Sikhs constituted just 12% of the total population of Punjab before the partition of the country in 1947. The percentage rose to 33% (1961 census), as a result of delinking of Muslims dominant areas. However the Sikhs got a majority (60.2%) only after the second partition of the State in November 1966.

10. A plural society is not necessarily a federal society. It can be called federal only if the plurality is organised in a territorial fashion. Moreover, it is

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the organisation of the centrifugal forces that helps them manifest themselves and again it is this manifestation that has implications in a federal society. For detail see, Pradeep Kumar, Socio-Economic Determinants of Federalism in India (A Doctoral Thesis, Punjab University, 1982).

11. Master Tara Singh in an interview with the then Chief Minister of Punjab, Bhim Sen Sachar, on January 21, 1955 stated: what he had in mind was not a linguistic Punjabi State but a Sikh State where the Sikhs would be in a numerical majority, what he wanted was Azadi (independcnce) for which he was ready to revolt.