Regional political parties in india s. Bhatnagar pradeep kumar

Cited in Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966) p 37.

12. For Master Tara Singh's Speeches on this issue see. Ibid, p 37. Also see, Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of Struggle (Delhi, U.C. Kapur&Sons, 1970) p 171.

13. the Akalis knew that without the support of the Hindu-voters they would not be able to acquire power (through electoral means) on their own. This made them coalesce with the non-Akali parties, thereby imposing on them the constraints of a coalition.

14. The Akali demands pertaining to autonomy have been spelled out in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. For the English text of the same one may see Appendix V, in Akhtar Majecd (ed.) Regionalism: Developmental Tensions in India (New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1984) pp 203-206.

15. The grievances could be catalogued as those pertaining to the attitude of the Centre in regard to the Ravi-Beas Waters dispute, handing over the management of the Bhakra Beas Management Board to Punjab and finally the inclusion of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab.

16. The Akalis claim that while mechanisation of agriculture has increased per hectare yield of foodgrains, the rising cost of the agricultural inputs has made agriculture a non-profitable profession. Consequently the procurement prices fixed for the various food grain items, on the recommendations of the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC), have remained much below the expectations of the peasantry. The Akalis therefore demand, adequate peasant-representation on the APC, subsidised agricultural inputs and higher procurement prices for their farm produce.

17. A few years back, Article 25 of the Constitution of India became handy with the Akali Dal. The Akalis alleged that the clubbing of the Sikhs with the Hindus in this article, tends to merge their identity with the Hindus.

18. For example: a) the Government's acceptance of the Akali demand of relaying the holy Kirtan from the Golden temple on the All India Radio, has not satisfied the Akalis. The latter want more time on the AIR for the same. b) The meat and cigarette shops have been removed from the places adjacent to the Golden temple, but the whole city of Amritsar has not been declared a holy city. c) The procurement prices of food grains

126

(particularly wheat) have been increased from time to time but it has been termed grossly inadequate by the Akalis.

19. Master Tara Singh stressed the need 'to retain the entity of the Khalsa Panth and — resist every effort to absorb the Sikhs into the Hindu Community". (emphasis is mine) see Ajit Singh Sarhadi Op-cit p-171.

20. The seats won by the two Akali Dals in the Fourth General Election (in the 104-member Vidhan Sabha) were as given below: Akali Dal (Master Tara Singh) 2, Akali Dal (Sant Fateh Singh) 25.

21. For details of the Resolution, See Akhtar Majeed Op-cit. or V.D. Chopra et at Agony of Punjab (New Delhi, Patriot, 1984).

22. For example the words quam and azadi could be interpreted as community/nation and freedom/independence. For details one may see, K.S. Khosla. "Ambiguities in Anandpur Resolution" in Times of India April 2, 1982 p 7.

23. While participating in the debate on the budget estimates for 1982-83 in the Vidhan Sabha, Akali leaders, Surjeet Singh Barnala and Balwant Singh have given this interpretation of the Resolution. See K.S. Khosla Ibid.

24. See The Tribune March 19,1979 p 11.

25. See Ibid March 21, 1979 p 1.

26. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, a senior leader of the Dal is reported to have given expression to this idea. See "a Victory for Moderation", in The Tribune October 9, 1978 p-4.

27. The SGPC Chief, Gurcharan Singh Tohra was one such Akali leader. See The Tribune December 27, 1978, p 1.

28. See The Tribune May 23, 1978, p 1.

29. Ibid. August 22, 1978, p 10.

30. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.

31. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.

32. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.

33. Shiromani Akali Dal dachon Pattar (Punjab Vidhan Sabha 1980) (Sri Amritsar, Shiromani Akali Dal, 1980) pp 3, 5-6.

34. See the Indian Express February 4, 1981, p 5. and also the Times of India, April 14, 1982, p 1.

35. This docs not inclued 2 seats won by the Master Akali Dal. The Sant and the Master Akali Dals together secured 26 seats and 25.05 per cent of votes in the Fourth general elections. Sources: the Times of India Directory SYear Book, 1967 pp 1052 to 1055.

Asian Recorder 1967, pp 7619. 7623

36. See Election Manifesto of the Janata Party (1977) (New Delhi, Janata Party, 7 Jantar Mantar Road, 1977) pp 8-10.

37. The alliance of the three parties was described by the Secretary of Punjab CPI, Avtar Singh Malhotra, as "a political necessity which is neither new nor exceptional in today's politics". He interestingly conceded that there was no ideological affinity between the Akali Dal and CPI and the broad differences on policy matters still remained between the two. The Tribune May 13, 1980.

127

38. The CPM leader from West Bengal, Jyoti Basu was to reach Chandigarh on May 20 on a three-day tour of Punjab to canvass for candidates of the three parties front CPI, CPM and the A.D. See The Tribune May 15,1980.

39. While in Kharar it was the CPI candidate who contested against the Akali Dal candidate, at Nangal the fight was between the CPI nominee and the CPM candidate. The third such place where the front had earlier failed in reaching the choice of a joint candidate was Dasuya - where CPI and the CPM both had fielded their separate nominees. However, the CPI nominee later withdrew in favour CPM candidate.

40. See Voting Bhaviour in Punjab election 1985: Report of a seminar.

41. Pamphlet Series I (Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, 1986) p.4 DS-4 Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti is an organisation of the lower castes powerful in the Doaba region.

42. See Voting Behaviour in Punjab Elections Op cit p. 5.

43. See the manifestos of the Akali Dal released from time to time on the eve of Vidhan Sabha Elections.

44. See Manifesto of the Akali Dal released in Chandigarh on February 1,1971. Also see Asian Recorder 1971, p 10024.

45. Shiromani Akali Dal da Chon Pattar (Punjab Vidhan Sabha 1980) Op-cit. pp 3-5.

46. The Hindu continued to constitute 37.5% of the total population in 1971.

47. For a detailed analysis of these issues, please see, Pradeep Kumar, "How a National Party coalesces with a Regional Party: A Study of Akali-Janata Coalition in the period of 1977-79." in the Indian Journal of Politics Vol. XIV No. 1,2 and 3 1980.

48. Jaswinder Singh Brar, an Akali leader, had claimed that the Akali Dal Chief and the SGPC President (the extremist faction at that time) represented the soul of the Akali Dal. The Tribune September 29, 1978 p 1.

49. Prem Bhatia, the Editor-in Chief of The Tribune observed, "Punjab could not have had a more secular or a more acceptable Chief Minister at this time than Mr. Parkash Singh Badal... he is not agressively theocratic, Further, he had a background of educational and social upbringing which gives him certain breadth of mind." See Prem Bhatia. "An Emotional Volcano", in The Tribune September 28, 1978 p 4.

50. The former Education Minister Sukhjinder Singh had expressed his extremist stand by saying that the "conscientious" ministers might have to quit the Cabinet if the Government failed to take up measures against the Nirankaris, See The Tribune September 1978, p 9.

51. The State Janata Ministers and the State level President of the Janata Party had strongly told the Chief Minister that their support could not be taken for granted. Similarly the Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, had instructed the Punjab Government to provide all necessary safeguards to the Nirankaris in the State. The reopening of the Nirankari Satsang Bhawans and lifting of the censorship from the 11 Jullunder newspapers can be accounted

128

for the pressure exerted by the Janata Centre. See The Trubune September 28, 30 and October 8, 1978.

52. The Tribune October 1, 1978 p 1.

53. Since the Delhi Akalis, led by the late Jathedar Avtar Singh Kohli were not a party to the coalition with the Janata, they felt free to oppose the Centre's decision to allow the holding of the 31st annual congregation of the Nirankaris at the Boat Club in Delhi. The Tribune November 20,1978 p 4.

54. See The Times of India, February 8, 1978, p 7.

55. The Tribune October 30, 1978 pp 1&7.

56. Ibid. October 27, 1978, p 1.

57. Ibid. October 30, 1978, p 1.

58. Jat Sikhs of Punjab are like the Patidars or Patels of Gujarat. Though the Sikh Gurus were Khatris by caste, the Jats enjoy a very high position in the social hierarchy of the Sikhs in Punjab.

59. It is believed by the Congress party itself that in the 1980 Assembly elections in Punjab, a large number of Jat Sikhs voted for the Akali Dal. As against this, the Congress Party got its support mainly from among the Harijans, and the Hindus. See The Tribune June 5, 1980. Also see Pradeep Kumar&Nisha Garg, "Assembly Elections 1980: A Case Study of Candidates in a Punjab Constituency", in Paul Wallace&Surendra Chopra, (eds.) Political Dynamics of Punjab (Amritsar, G.N.D. University, 1981) pp 193-208.

For the attitude of the Scheduled Castes towards the various political parties in Punjab and their views on the demand for the inclusion of Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab, please see, Pradeep Kumar and Nisha Garg, "Minorities Political Attitude a Case Study of Scheduled Castes in an Indian Village", in Indian Political Science Review, July 1982.

60. See The Tribune February 5, 1979, p 8.

Also see Pradeep Kumar, "Socio-Economic Determinants of Federalism in India", (Doctoral Thesis - Punjab University, 1982) Chapter VI.

61. See Baldev Raj Nayar, Op-cit. p 50.

62. Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Continuities and Changes in Electoral Behaviour: The 1971 Parliamentary Elections in India," in Asian Survey December 1971, p 1126.

63. For details, see Pradeep Kumar, "Agrarian, Industrial and Commercial Interests in a Federation," in Journal of Political Studies, September 1978.

64. The Tribune March 20, 1979 p 1.

65. See for example T.R. Sharma, " Induced Capitalism and Federal Tensions in India", paper presented at an ICSSR Regional Seminar held at Kurukshetra University December 5-7, 1983.

66. For details see Pradeep Kumar's Doctor l Thesis, Op-cit Chapter V.

67. The issue has been discussed earlier on these pages.

68. For details, one may see, Pradeep Kumar, "Communal Dimension of Regionalism in Indian Federation: A Study of trends in Akali Politics", in Akhtar Majeed, (ed.), Op-cit pp 147-158.

129

69. One could refer to such parties as National Conference, CPM and Janata Party etc.

70. The Janata was a national party in a very special sense of the term. It was a mixture of a number of parties which held sway over their respective regions. This made the party adopt national postures.

71. For the elaboration of the point one may also see, author's article, "Growing Regionalism in India", in Asian Profile. August 1984.

SOME RECENT WORKS

1. Rajiv A Kapur, Sikh Separatism (London, Allen&Unwin, 1985).

2. Amrik Singh (ed), Punjab in Indian Politics (Delhi, Ajanta, 1985).

3. Nina Puri, Political Elite and Society in Punjab (1900-1920) (New Delhi, Vikas, 1985).

4. Gopal Singh (ed), Punjab Today (Delhi, Intellectual, 1986).

5. A.S. Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej the Akali politics (New Delhi, Gitanjali, 1983).

6. V.D. Chopra, R.K. Mishra&Nirmal singh Agony of Punjab (New Delhi, Patriot, 1984).

130 131

AIADMK IN TAMIL NADU Its Emergence And Unprecendented Growth*

R. Thandavan

I

Introduction

National and regional parties in India have different roles to play amidst social diversities, economic variations and political differences. Commonly, it is held that while national parties are engaged in activities that reduce diversities in the country and promote the politics of integration and modernization, regional parties are interested only in the welfare of the local groups, interests, castes or classes. Therefore much fear is entertained about the bid of the regional parties to court with the politics of traditions, culture, subnationalism and violence.1

What, then, is the nature of regional political parties? Do they function merely as political instruments for the social groups and interests? Should regional parties always resort to violence to achieve their aims? Regional parties always compete with the Centre and do not strive cooperation in Union-State relations? Do they necessarily contribute to the might of inimical forces which want the nation to disintegrate? Answers to these basic questions are manifestly important to grasp the origins, nature, characteristics and role of regional political parties in India.

II

Party System in Tamil Nadu

Around the turn of the century, the acquisition of Western liberal education had prompted the Brahmins of Tamil Nadu to indulge in political

* The article was written before the death of MGR - Editors

132

aspirations. They had contributed very largely to building up of the Indian National Congress and later dominated that organisation in deciding its ends and means. The non-Brahmins of Tamil Nadu, who had been fast catching up with the Brahmins in education, had found to their distress that the Brahmin monopoly in every walk of life was unshakable. Therefore the non-Brahmins entered into a social controversy with the Brahmins and they did not hesitate to employ political means to solve that conflict. The non-brahmin political instrument was the Justice Party. Thus social problems had their sharp reflections in the political arena of the Tamils, and this trend continues to dominate till today.

Politically, the Brahmins had initiated the organization of national forces in Tamil Nadu, while the non-Brahmins were responsible for the mustering up of the regional forces. With the passage of time the national forces stood divided into four major traditions, viz., Congress, Communists, Socialists and Conservatives. Likewise, the regional tradition crystalized into two groups, viz., parties for the welfare of the non-Brahmins (or progressively for Backward communities) and parties for the promotion of the glory and development of the Tamil language.

While recapitulating the Congress tradition in Tamil Nadu, both the parent body and its off-shoots must be taken into consideration.2 However, the Congress neglect of the cultural specificities of Tamil Nadu and their disregard for mass politics did not allow them to move beyond a point.3 The Congress tradition is represented by Congress (I), Congress (0), Janata, Gandhi-Kamaraj National Congress, and Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress.

The second important political force of the national tradition is the Communists. The communist force is represented by CPI, CPI (M) and CPI (ML) or Naxalite movements. The third important force of the national tradition is the Socialists. The socialist movement in Tamil Nadu contained two important streams in it, viz., democrats and Gandhians. The fourth important force of the national tradition is formed by the conservatives. The conservatives themselves can be sub-divided into communal and non-communal traditions. The Indian Union Muslim League and the Bharatiya Janata Party follow communal traditions, while the Swatantra Party before it lost its identity as a separate entity belonged to non-communal traditions.

The geneaology of the regional parties, which profess the welfare of the non-Brahmins and Backward Communities, can be seen sequentially in the South Indian Liberal Federation (Justice Party formed in 1916), the Self-Respect Movement (formed in 1925), the Dravida Kazhagam

133

(formed in 1944), the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (formed in 1949) and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (formed in 1972)4. The regional parties, which have attempted the propagation of the glory and development of the Tamil language, were the Tamil movement, the Tamil Arasu Kazhagam, and the Tamil Desiya Katchi.

On the contrary, C.N. Anadurai, popularly known as Anna, of the Dravidian tradition, carefully blended among the Tamils the primordial concern for the non-Brahmin Backward communities and the Tamil Language. Further, he spelt out a policy of non-congressism and built a movement which could draw support from all the Conservatives and the centrists. The DMK's anti-religious posture and welfare schemes of leftist implication attracted the people to the Party in large number. Besides, the DMK had a technique of political communication of its own through oratory and cinema which fetched not only mass sympathy but also financial strength. The sheding of the demand for Dravidastan invested the DMK with political respectability and the anti-Hindi agitation that it launched in 1965 provided the immediate spark. Thus, the DMK was destined to win power in 1967 in Tamil Nadu, thereby enabling the primordialists win the day over the instrumentalists.5

III

The Main Differences Between the Congress and the DMK

The main differences between the Congress and the DMK were: (1) The Congress absorbed all other traditions which existed at the national level. The DMK devoured not only the national traditions except the Congress, but also the other important regional traditions which worked for the cause of the Tamil language. (2) The Congress had absorbed, in general, not merely the ideologies but also personalities from other traditions leading to factional problems. But the DMK had devoured only the ideologies of the other traditions (and very few weak personalities). Therefore serious factionalism did not appear within the DMK for quite long. (3) The Congress was concerned with only organizational problems of its growth, but the DMK gave equal attention to organizational and communication problems of the party.

Since the inflow of most of these ideologies and a few personalities in the DMK were in the nature of strengthening the organization the DMK never hesitated to welcome them. However, when the influence of the film world began to dominate it, factions appeared in the DMK as well.

134

In the quarrels between the organizational and extra-organizational personalities, it was seen that the former always submitted themselves to the latter. The quitting of the party by E.V.K. Sampath to form a new party of his own in 1961 and Karunanidhi's success over Neduchezhian in achieving the office of the Chief Minister in 1969 were specific instances of this truth.6

The very same problem of the clashes between the organization and the extra-organization (cinematic) personalities returned to the DMK after a decade. The emergence of Maradhur Gopalan Ramachandran, popularly known as MGR, in the politics of the State too is a case of extra-organizational strength and domination.

IV

Emergence of All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kaz-hagam

The emergence of the AIADMK is the outcome of intra-party factional politics of the DMK. It is an established fact that when conflicts, rigidity and factions begin to appear within the ranks of a party, sub-groups emerge. Sometimes they are found to whip up some electoral or policy controversy. Sometimes they are endeared with impressive continuity. The controversies of the first type are digested by the party as minor skirmishes. But factions with impressive continuity become troublesome, threatening the very existence of the parent party itself.7 The D.M.K. faced factional problems even before the emergence of AIADMK. One such problem arose during the lifetime of C. Annadurai and the other after his death. The former factionalism was led by E.V.K. Sampath in 1961 and later by V.R. Nedunchezhian in 1969. But these two did not affect the parent party. But the factional fight that arose in 1972 between M. Karunanidhi (the prisoner of the factional politics inside the DMK) and M.G. Ramachandran (the stalwart of the cine world and the one who had played a dominant role as a king maker in the succession struggle of 1969) rocked the organization to its very core.

As early as the 1960s, Karunanidhi, Nedunchezhian, Anbazhagan and other leaders (except Annadurai) found it very difficult to share public platforms with M.G. Ramachandran. Enthusiastic audiences cheered him and almost ignored the rest. Seemingly there was a growing concern inside the DMK over the popularity and strength of MGR and his MGR manrams (political and cultural organizations) at the grass-roots level which strengthened the political base of the DMK and the charisma of

135

their leader -MGR.

MGR, whose early life steeped in poverty, had learnt from his experiences in the worlds of drama, cinema and politics that man should not live his life at the biological level merely to satisfy the animal appetites and desires but he must transcend those natural processes in order to live on a distinctly human level.

MGR docs not believe in the self-sufficiency of material values, he desires that the unifying and ennobling impulses in human life should overrule the scramble for wealth, social position and power. His lifelong public service is inspired by the conviction that it is within the possibility of every human being to so develop as to be fully worthy of his human nature and to contribute to the welfare of all.

When riches came his way, MGR began to help the poor directly. He was always the first to give disaster reliefs, to support several orphanages, hospitals, and schools and to help his collegues in the film industry and outside. This has earned him the affectionate epithet philanthropist-par-excellence. Truly, the reciprocity of his love for society and in turn, its love for him, is the secret of his success in mass relation.8 To foster the tendencies of being human, MGR cultivated several good habits from his younger days. He has been handsome, simple, soft-spoken, gentle, patient, courteous, truthful and friendly. When his association with the DMK since 1953 brought him riches he became generous and philanthropic. On the other hand, to resist the tendencies that degrade a human being he had always worked in the utmost capacity.

In the world of cinema, MGR's films were born out of his own experience. Naturally, there was identification of the actor with his roles and the roles with the actor. When more and more of such films began to appear, MGR became the protector of the common man. And the common folk began to love him, discuss him, adore him and worship him in a serious vein. The fans began to organize "Rasigar Manrams" throughout Tamil Nadu. These manrams, in course of time, gave publicity of MGR's films, and also undertook the political activities of the DMK. Thus, the actor, the fan-clubs, the messes, the cinema and the DMK had become one ideological and one organizational whole. His position in the DMK was unchallengeable.9 Incindentally he had pre-empted the designs of Shivaji Gancsan (another actor of the Tamil Screen) and the congress to use the medium of cinema to obtain political power. Again, MGR's political success in Tamil Nadu had induced the actors of the neighbouring states to try their hands in politics--N.T. Rama Rao had obtained power in Andhra Pradesh and Rajkumar of Karnataka and Prem

136

Nazir of Kerala are waiting for the right moments.

After Krunanidhi's ascendancy to Chief Ministership the pattern of decision-making within the DMK changed rapidly. Unlike Annadurai, who could make important policy decisions and have them accepted without any question, Karunanidhi was the leader of the most important faction, rather than a leader above factions; therefore, had to accommodate and control other factions. Factionalism inside the DMK had grave consequences on several fronts. The DMK began to neglect ideological issues. To be successful, every ideology must be brought upto-date according to the changes in circumstances. Karunanidhi failed to understand the implications of this exercise. He devoted his entire time in consolidating his position in the party.