Regional political parties in india s. Bhatnagar pradeep kumar

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move to forge alliance with the All India Jharkhand party (N.E. Horo group). But this could not be achieved. The parliamentary elections of 1984 were fought in an altogether different political climate. The sympathy wave, created due to the murder of Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, was felt all around. Coupled with this, the issue of national integration and threat to the security of the nation was being experienced in all corners of the country, including the tribal Bihar. As a result of all these, the voters in tribal Bihar felt and voted in the same way the voters in the rest of the country did. The parties contesting with regional issues were rejected. The J.M.M. like wise was rejected for its regional appeal during the parlimanetary elections.

The J.M.M. programme of socio-economic transformation is much more elaborate, concrete and practicable than the policies and programmes so far proposed by any tribal organization. Its leaders are aware that a social movement is impossible unless there is an ideology, in order to legitimise it, and an organization that is an instrument of ideology. J.M.M. has both an ideology to legitimise its agrarian, social and cultural reforms and an organization of devoted workers and supporters to implement its programmes. Their ideology may be lacking a 'world-view', and may not stand the specific tests of ideology; in broader sense, it has a definite ideology of social transformation and creation of a Jharkhand State.21

The Jharkhand in Bihar consists of the six tribal districts of Ranchi, Santal Parganas, Singhbum, Hazaribagh, Palamau and Dhanbad. According to the J.M.M., Jharkhand is an internal colony exploited by the outsiders. The process of development in tribal areas itself has proved exploitative because outsiders, i.e., non-tribals have floched in efforts to build up to seize all opportunities of employment. There is a Jharkhand nationality and raise demands for self determination to chalk out their own path of social formation. Thus the demand that the Jharkhand must be formed separately.

As the tribals of the state are still wedded to agricultural land and forest for their survival, the agrarian question has been foremost in the J.M.M. programme. K.S. Singh points out that "The formal political slogan of a separate state was not given up but the emphasis shifted to the conditions of the tribals, the nature and consequences of exploitation isolation and neglect. There is a better articulated demand for a dominant role of the tribals in regional administration, for better educational facilities, and more employment opportunities. There is also a demand for restoration of alienated land, provision for legal and institutional safe-

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guards to protect tribal interests and to end all forms of exploitation'.

A number of programmes have been taken up by the Mukti Morcha. Schools have been opened in villages, A relentless effort has been made to break the drinking habit of the tribals, for the tribal leaders feel that liquor has been a tested method of dissipating tribal anger into a self-destructive channels. Apart from this, in several areas the tribals have resorted to forcible seizure of land lost to landlords and forcible harvesting of crops standing in landlord's fields.

The Morcha aims to bring about a socio-cultural transformation of its people by establishing 'AkilAkharas' (Wisdom schools), co-operatives, afforestation, small-scale industries, training centres for women, eradication of dowry, child-marriage, drinking and other social evils, organizing 'Chetav Baishi'. (Village panchayat to resolve local tribal-non-tribal conflicts) and setting up of 'grain golas' to suppoprt the tribals in adversity. The Morcha is not afraid of using force when required. They have taken step to discipline not only the tribal masses but have also tried to enforce discipline on money lenders and business people inhabiting the regions of their influence.

Mukti Morcha, thus, aims at ending tribal exploitaition and usher in an era of equality, freedom and plenty for them. But then it does not give a guarantee against exploitation of the tribals.22 In an age of industrialization and modernization in which every society is 'dependent' it aims to establish an Utopian society of self-sufficient tribals. This can ultimately prove only a vote catching device rather than an earnest desire to attain the dream. Knowing it fully well that the autonomy demand is not going to be conceded because the tribals are not homogeneous group and there is no under current of political rivalry between the San-tals, the Munda and the Oragon, the leadership of J.M.M. has been propagating such a demand. On the one hand it goes for an electoral alliance with a nationalist party like Congress (I) and on the other dupes the tribal masses to support the desired state.

That the influence of J.M.M. cannot be altogether overlooked, is very well reflected in the performance of the party in early 1985 Assembly elections. The attitude of the voters that largely supported the national issues at the time of 1984 parliamentary elections and as a result of which no regional party could get even a foothold, immediately realised the importance of regional issues when assembly elections were declared. The influence of J.M.M. thereby and the leadership of its leader Shibu Soren became significant right from the stage of campaigns. Even the acknowledged vote mobilisers such as Dr Jagannath Mishra and Sri

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Chandra Shekhar Singh, the Ex-chief ministers of Bihar, refrained from campaigning in the tribal area. It could not be out of place to view the fact of bypassing this area from campaign by even the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The J.M.M. has also effected certain changes in its mode of operation in the tribal region. Earlier the J.M.M. had become fairly unpopular among the non-tribals inhabiting Santal Parganas due to its policy of looting and harvesting the standing crops. In the recent days, however, the J.M.M. has given up this practice due to which it has now been able to endear even the non-tribals as its supporters which was adequately reflected in the last 1985 assembly elections.

With respect to the electoral performance, in the region, the J.M.M. tally has declined from 14 to 10 over all and it won seven seats in the tribal belt However, five independents have also won who are believed to support the idea of Jharkhand state. The J.M.M. performance in assembly elections just on the heels of parlimentary elections where it drew a blank reveals its wide spread support. The separatist cause for which the party stands also seems to have got a shot in the arms.23

Undoubtedly, the emergence, growth and penetration of the J.M.M. in the tribal masses is an indication of their disenchantment with the poor implementation of the government policies, opening up of the floodgates of "rising expectations," growing unemployment among the educated tribals and the unbecoming behaviour of the non-tribals in general and the government officials in particular. Political extremism is something which, indeed, is not in the general nature of the tribals. The tirbal political leaders have been injecting a kind of new militancy into the younger generation of tribals. The Banjhi incidence in Sahibganj district in which 15 tribals were killed in a clash between tribals and non-tribals and the police in April 1985 marks a new beginning in the strengthening of tribal unity. Looking at their reduction to insignificant minority in their own land heading towards a socio-culutral-economic bankruptcy, the J.M.M. has begun a move to bring the tribal groups and parties under one banner to renovate their strategy for Jharkhand state. The J.M.M., the Jharkand Vichar Manch (J.V.M.), a new non-political organisation of educated tribal youth affiliated to the J.M.M. and Jharkand party (JP.) have regrouped in the second half of 1986 for a renewed stir for the creation of a separate Jharkand state in a peaceful and democratic manner under the framework of the constitution.

No doubt, most of the tribal regional parties of Bihar thrive on the demand for a separate Jharkhand state. That has become a convenient

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slogan for the regional tribal leaders to evoke when their political base begins to dwindle. Jharkhand stir in the past has failed to evoke any concrete impact because the leaders could not instil faith, confidence and understanding among the tribal masses. The stir has remained leader oriented or personality oriented. Whenever the leaders compromised with the ruling parties or backed out, the agitation received serious jolts as we saw in 1963, 1967-69, and 1980. The inter-elite conflict has stood in the way of the unity of the tribal parties. The different Jharkhand parties are personalistic cliques centering around their leaders. Attempts to unite them have invariably failed because the leaders of the various factions have no desire to give up their leadership. Birsa Jaipal Singh, the UK-educated son of the Jharkand party founder, Jaipal Singh, founded the Jharkhand Mahasabha in 1984 and made a bid to unite the Jharkand factions, his attempts, however, failed.

A look at the history of the Jharkand party reveals that like all regional parties, this party too has failed to fight the fragmentation and disintegration fever due to the lack of a cohesive leadership. The proliferation of Jharkhand parties in the wake of the 1963 Congress merger of the Jharkand amply demonstrates the fact. The only Jharkhand faction which carries some drive is the J.M.M. Rest of them are not even worth being called regional political parties. At best they can be called regional groupings. JMM has inherited the mantle and the legacy of the old Jharkhand party. It has been consistently engaged in building mass-support and maintaining grass-root links. Borrowing some of its ideological moorings from the leftist groups it has been able to steal the thunder from the leftist parties which were making inroads in the traditional Jharkhand areas. J.V.M. now has sprung up to educate the tribal masses and create an awareness among them of their exploitation and miseries. Acting as the 'think tank' or 'brains-trust' of the J.M.M., the J.V.M. promises to penetrate the masses to provide J.M.M. greater vigour in its political activities. Jharkhand as a party had definitely failed but as a movement it still lives on. Greater and consistent efforts are required by the government to ameliorate the dissatisfied tribal masses and bury the movement for all times to come by assimilating the tribals in the general social system.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. L.P. Sinha "Origin and Development of Political Parties in Bihar", The Searchlight, 15.8.1969.

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2. See for details, K.K. Datta, The Santal insurrection (Calcutta, 1940), and his History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar (Patna, 1957) and Tarapad Roy, Santal Rebellion, Documents (Calcutta, 1983).

3. Beatrice Pitney Lamb, India : A world in Transition (New York, 1966), p.248.

4. See R .N. Dubey, Paternalistic Idea logy and the Administration of a tribal area : the Evolution and Working of the Santal System, unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Bhagalpur University, 1973 pp. 293-94.

5. See S.V. Kogehar and R.L. Park (eds.) Report on the Indian General Election 1951-52 (Bombay, 1956).

6. See B.K. Roy Burman 'Perspective of Nagaland' The Institute of Defence Analysis Journal, Vol. I (January 1969) and See aslo L.P. Vidyarthy 'Approaches to the Problem of Integration of Tribals in India' inM. Rafiq Khan (ed.) National Integration (Varanasi, 1970), pp. 112-13, for a discussion on 'infra-nationalism', and 'sub-ntaionalism'.

7. S.N. Mishra, Party Politics in a Backward State, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to L.N. Mithila University, 1977, p. 142.

8. S.C. Pauchbhai, the Jharkhand Movement Among the Santal' in K.S. Singh (ed.) Tribal Movements in India, Vol. 2 (New Delhi 1983), p.35.

9. K.S. Singh, 'Tribal Autonomy Movements in Chotanagpur Tribal Movements in India, p. 10.

10. Quoted in Panchibhai, Op. cit., p.39

11. Dube, op, cit., p.296.

12. 'Kharwar'according to Rev. Skrefsrud, 'is the ancient tribal name of the Santals, and in their minds is associated with the golden era of their history, namely, the time when they lived in Champa in absolute independence, and had no rent or tribute to pay, but only to bring a small annual offering to their leaders in virtue of their office'. Ordinarily, Santals are quiet and contented but when any grievances rankle in their minds, the spirit of unrest arises and their leaders of self-interested agitators appeal to the ancient traditions of the race and the hope of independence. See H.McPharson. Final Settlement Report of Santal parganas (Calcutta, 1909), pp37-38.

13. Yogi Agrawal, 'Caste-Ridden Bihar", Imprint, March 1981, pp.50-51.

14. See A.N.Das, Struggle of Wrokers and Tribal Peasants in Chotanagpur' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.10 No.9. (1975), pp 384-86.

15. See P.C. Roy, Social-Political Technological Factors in Transformation' in B. Singh and J.S. Bhandari (Eds.), The Tribal World and its Transformation (New Delhi, 1980.)

16. See Ajai Mishra, 'Miners always in debt', the Telegraph (Calcutta), dated 26.7.84.

17. Sachichidananda. The Tribal Voter in Bihar (New Delhi, 1976), p. 23.

18. Ibid.

19. In 1983 the 'Kolhan' activitists submitted a memorandum to the Commonwealth General Secretary in London seeking member status for the

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State' see The Telegraph, 28.8.84.

20. See for details, Panchbhai, Op. Cit., pp. 45-46.

21. 'An ideology is more or less systematic interpretation of society and history, regarded by its supporters as the highest truth. If we broaden the meaning of the term 'ideology' to include opinions and preferences, whatever the degree of elaboration, every country, class and every region has its ideolgoy', See Raymond Aron, Progress and Disillusion (London, 1968), p. 194.

22. This is a plausible guess in view of the fact that the social infra-structure created during the plan periods were mainly shared by the affluent section of the tribal and the suffering of the lower strate of the tribals increased. See Ghanshyam Narain Singh, 'Design of Development for the Tribal Region of Bihar' in D.M. Najundappa&R.K. Sinha (eds.) Backward Area Developments, Problems and prospects (New Delhi, 1982), pp, 243-252.

23. The party has adopted a new strategy for Jharkhand in 1986. See for details theTimes of India (patna), 13.8.86 andThe Indian Nation (Patna), 14.8.86.

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TELUGU DESAM PARTY

V. Bhaskara Rao

Introduction

The Telugu Dcsam Party (T.D.P.) is a new regional party which emerged in Andhra Pradesh under the leadership of N.T. Rama Rao. Surprisingly, even though its founder had no experience in politics, his party won more than 2/3rds of the seats in the Legislative Assembly elections held (in 1983) barely within nine months of its formation. It was shocking to all the political analysts to witness the defeat of all the national political parties and especially the Congress (I) which was ruling the state for 35 years without any hindrance or opposition. It is therefore, interesting to take note of the developments of this new party in a matter of nine months after its inception. N.T. Rama Rao, popularly known as 'NTR' or 'Anna' was a cine actor before he turned into a politician, and it is said that he was following the foot-steps of M.G. Ramachandran of Tamilnadu in establishing his party. The Party after winning election assumed office of the government on 9 January, 1983, in a unique and unprecedented manner in the history of the country. His ministry was sworn, in front of the people who witnessed the oath-taking ceremony of all the ministers.

NTR came to power, all by himself without any political experience or without help from any established political party. He adopted a new method of electioneering, and defeated all the stalwarts in the game of politics and was a source of inspiration to all the youth and the old alike. His party candidates won in most of the constituencies because of his popularity but for him the candidates could not have won the elections, many candidates were unknown young men and women chosen by his party.

The emergence of TOP appears to have changed not only the course

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of history of Andhra Pradesh but it posed many problems to the Centre and to the leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi. The TDP created news in the world-media and after NTR assumed office as Chief Minister he had taken a series of sporadic administrative as well as political decisions. It was alleged that due to his inexperience in the field, he was hasty in taking decisions affecting all sections of the people in the fields of politics, religion, civil service, business, students, teachers, the common man, and the centre-state relations. The people were forced to look to the government for changes day in and day out for one reason or other.

This study attempts to analyse the NTR wave and see what the future holds for the party and the society. Does the impact remain longer or will it fade away just as it emerged? It remains to be seen whether the party achieves its objectives, provides clean administration and establishes a welfare society.

The study goes into the details of the Manifesto issued by TDP and the election promises made to voters, election technique - the campaign and propaganda employed. NTR drew thousands of people night and day in his historic 19 day electioneering and this explains the cause of TDP's victories. This study is limited in its scope and confined to only the emergence of T.D.P. and formation of N.T.R. government in 1983.

Emergence of Telugu Desam Party

On 28 May, 1981, the 59th birth day of Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao, the matinee idol of the Telugu screen who having acted in 300 films or more and thus carved out for himself a place in the hearts of the Telugu people as a star, disclosed to a group of journalists while shooting for a film in Ootacamund, that he desired to enter into public life on the completion of his "Shashti-Poorthy" (60th year). Following this hint, members of his 900 fan clubs began to press him to join politics.

In June 1981, Rama Rao celebrated the marriage of his daughter with N. Chandrababu Naidu, Minister in Anjaiah's cabinet and this relationship in a way expedited the process of his joining politics. Further, a controversy over the chairmanship of Chittoor Zilla Parishad led a rival Congress group spread a rumour that Naidu was in league with his father-in-law to form a regional party on the lines of AIADMK in Tamilnadu.

In February 1982, Rama Rao went to the Raj Bhavan of Andhra Pradesh to witness the oath taking ceremony of Bhavanam Venkatram Reddy and other members of his government. Rama Rao met there a number of congress leaders who suggested that he should go in for the membership of the Rajya Sabha in order to fulfil his desire to do social service.

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On 29 March 1982, he formed the "Telugu Desam" party, at a time when speculation was rife that Assembly elections would be held in July that year.

Until 1983 when Telugu Desam captured power, Andhra Pradesh had experienced an uninterrupted rule of the Congress even though the latter had always been a divided house. To look into the factionalism of the Congress, it suffered its first set-back in 1951 when a split occurred in its ranks. One faction led by Prof. N.G. Ranga formed the Krishikar Lok Party (KLP) and the other the Kissan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) by T. Prakasam. Later on, the KMPP merged itself with the Socialist Party and became the Praja Socialist Party. Prakasam left the PSP to join back the Congress fold and became the first Chief Minister of the Andhra State. After 13 months of its existence, the first Andhra Ministry was over thrown by a vote of no-confidence necessitating a mid-term poll. A United Front was formed under the leadership of the Congress party, with the KLP and the PSP as its other constituents. After the Telangana armed struggle of the peasantry,1 the communist emerged as a powerful political force to be reckoned with. The 1957 elections administered to it a major blow in terms of its representation in the state legislature.2 However, it staged a come-back in 1962 elections and became the major opposition party in the Assembly.3

Another significant development of the period was the famous Mulki agitation in the late 1960's it demonstrated the discontentment of the Telangana people against Andhras. The very logic on which Andhra was separated from Madras operated here in as much as the people of the Andhra area in their turn would practise exploitation of the less developed Telengana area. The understanding was that if an Andhra becomes the CM., the Deputy Chief ministership must go to Telangana4 and vice versa. This understanding was flouted by Sanjeeva Reddy who abolished the post of the Deputy Chief Minister5. To highlight the injustice thus done to the Telangana people, the Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) was formed by M. Chenna Reddy as its Chairman. This movement was engineered by the feudal interests both in Telangana and Andhra areas.6 Ultimately, the TPS dissolved itself and joined the Congress (R). Thus, came to an end the TPS, which started with the head of a lion and disappeared with the tail of a snake7.

Ever since the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 various factors have contributed to the waning of the opposition parties and groups. Every successive election since 1957 marked their decline. In 1952 the Communists with the credit of having organised political and mass movements

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had seemed to be a sizeable force. For, they and the independents supported by them, together polled 20 per cent of votes and 39 seats in the Andhra region as against 29 per cent of votes and 39 seats by the Congress. Many notable Congress candidates had also been defeated8. In those days, the Congress could not withstand the fierce onslaught of the mighty opposition mainly due to the relatively stronger support that the latter received from non-Telugu speaking areas of Madras and Hyderabad states which were traditional weak spots for the communists.9

In 1957 the Congress recouped its strength by mobilising all non-communist parties against the communists. Since then there was no looking back and no other political group or party could fill the vacuum to make up for this erosion of the opposition support base. Subsequently, the opposition parties and groups under different labels - the Swatantra Party, the Jana-Congress, the People's Democratic Party, the Telangana Praja Samiti, the Janata Party and the Lok Dal, failed to project a viable alternative to the Congress party. In essence, the dissidents of the ruling Congress posed themselves as opposition. In fact, dissidence in the ranks of the Congress particularly in this State has been a chronic feature. The different elections were fought between the official candidates and its unofficial candidates, the latter posing as opposition. Thus, factionalism and infight in the Congress helped the opposition candidates to some extent It is this factionalism in the Party which has constrained the Congress (I) High Command to change the chief minister four times within a period of four and a half years, (i.e. between March, 1978 to September, 1982).10 Not only that, the Andhra Pradesh Governor set a new record by swearing in 177 ministers within three years.11 Referring to the nomination of K. Vijayabhaskara Reddy as Chief Minister, the State Lok Dal chief remarked that it was the second time that Mrs Gandhi had chosen one who was not a member of the state legislature12, the first being T. Anjaiah. Dr Chenna Reddy was replaced as Chief Minister because of the revolt against him by his cabinet colleagues. Anjaiah was then the Union Minister for Labour when he was asked to succeed Reddy as Chief Minister. Later on, when he was unceremoniously asked by the Congress (I) High Command to step down, there was no justifiable reason for his ouster. The criticism against Anjaiah was non-performance and he was censured for not reducing the cabinet strength of 43 members despite repeated hints.13 Bhavanam Venkatram Reddy was then appointed as the Chief Minister.