208
footpath. It seems to me that there was evidence of negligence,
but it did not go so far as to establish that such negligence
led to the death of Wakelin. It fell
short of proving that the
immediate and proximate
53
cause of the calamity was the
negligence of the defendants. We are left to mere conjecture as
to whether it was the causa causans, and that we cannot resort
to. The plaintiff undertook to establish negligence as a fact,
and that such negligence was the cause of her husband's death.
She failed to do so, and the proper course
to have adopted at
the close of the plaintiff's case was to have directed a verdict
for
the defendants....
It has been truly said that the propositions of negligence and
contributory negligence are (in such cases as that now before
your Lordships) so interwoven as that contributory negligence,
if any, is generally brought out and established on the evidence
of the plaintiff's witnesses. In such a case, if there is no
conflict
on the facts in proof, the judge may withdraw the
question from the jury and direct a verdict for the defendant,
or if there is conflict or doubt as to the proper inference to
be deduced from the facts in proof, then it is for the jury to
decide. But if the plaintiff can establish his case in proof
53
.
[EDITOR'S NOTE.
There are other synonyms; e.g. `natural' (cf. p. 54 supra), `probable,'
`effective', `proximate', `normal', `causa causans,' `immediate', `direct'. Lord Sumner has expressed
(L.R. [1920] A.C. 984) preference for `direct'. The appropriate
adjective `proximate' has - he points out - the drawback of having acquired a specially narrow
meaning when applied to marine or fire Insurance. There "only the
causa proxima, the last cause
alone, must be looked to", although in other liabilities a defendant may be responsible for an event
which is simply an efficient cause of the damage.]
209
without disclosing any matters amounting to contributory
negligence or from which it can be reasonably inferred - then
the defendant is left to give such evidence as he can to sustain
that issue....
Appeal dismissed.
[EDITOR'S NOTE. With this case the student may usefully contrast
that of
Fenna v. Clare (supra), p. 465),
where the very peculiar
facts rendered it less necessary to connect the nuisance and the
injury by express evidence; and also that of
Byrne v. Boadle
(infra, p. 562), where the mere cause of the injury raised, of
itself, a presumption of negligence. See also p. 26 n.
supra.]