Study manual

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[10] Hammack V. White. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 1862. 11 C.B., 
N.S. 588. 
Facts which are not sufficient to prove Negligence in a 
Rider. 
THIS was an action upon Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, 
by Mrs. Hammack, the widow and administratrix of William 
Hammack, to recover damages against the defendant for having by 
his negligence caused the death of the intestate. 
The declaration alleged that the deceased, in his life-time, was 
lawfully passing in and along a certain common and public 
highway, and that the defendant so carelessly, negligently, and 
improperly rode a certain vicious horse in the said highway, 
that, by and through the carelessness, negligence, and improper 
conduct of the defendant in that behalf, the said horse ran with 
great force and violence upon and against the deceased, and cast 
and threw him down and so injured him that the deceased died. 
The defendant pleaded not guilty; whereupon issue was joined. 
The cause was tried before the Recorder of London in the Lord 
Mayor's Court, when the following facts appeared in evidence:- 

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On the 7th of May, 1861, the deceased was walking on the foot-
pavement in Finsbury Circus, when he was knocked down and kicked 
by a horse on which the defendant was riding. He was picked up 
and carried to St Bartholomew's Hospital, where he died on the 
16th from the injuries. The defendant had bought the horse at 
Tattersall's and had taken it out to try it, when the horse 
became unmanageable and swerved from the roadway on to the 
pavement, notwithstanding the defendant's efforts to restrain 
him. It did not appear that the defendant had omitted to do 
anything he could have done to prevent the accident: but it was 
insisted on the part of the plaintiff, that the mere fact of the 
defendant's having ridden in such a place a horse with whose 
temper he was wholly unacquainted, was evidence of negligence.
Some reliance was also placed upon the fact of there being 
certain police-notices affixed at various parts of the Circus, 
cautioning all persons not to exercise horses there. 
The learned Recorder, being of opinion that there was nothing in 
the evidence to warrant a jury in finding that the defendant had 
been guilty of negligence, directed a nonsuit. 
Patchett obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of 
misdirection. 
 
Patchett, for plaintiff... The deceased was walking on the 
foot-pavement in a populous thoroughfare, when he was knocked 
down and killed by a horse which the defendant was "trying", 

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having only purchased him the day before at Tattersall's, where 
it is well known that all horses are sold without warranty.
That, it is submitted, was ample prima facie evidence of 
negligence. [WILLIAMS, J. The defendant was carried against 
the deceased by a horse which all his apparently well-directed 
efforts were ineffectual to control.] What more could the 
plaintiff do than shew that the deceased was in a place where he 
might reasonably conceive himself to be safe, and that the 
defendant rode where he had no right to be? [ERLE, C.J. The 
fair result of the plaintiff's evidence was that the defendant 
was riding along quietly, when, for reasons not given, the horse 
became restive.] If the defendant had been called, it might 
have come out on cross-examination that he incautiously used a 
whip or a spur. [ERLE, C.J. The question before us, is, 
whether, on the evidence then before him, the judge was right in 
point of law in nonsuiting the plaintiff.] 
ERLE, C.J. .... The plaintiff in a case of this sort is not 
entitled to have his case left to the jury unless he gives some 
affirmative evidence that there has been negligence on the part 
of the defendant. The sort of negligence imputed here is, 
either that the defendant was unskilful in the management of the 
horse, or imprudent in taking a vicious animal (or one with 
whose propensities or temper he was not sufficiently acquainted) 
into a populous neighbourhood. The evidence is: that the 
defendant was seen riding the horse at a slow pace, that the 
horse seemed restless and the defendant was holding the reins 

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tightly, omitting nothing he could do to avoid the accident; but 
that the horse swerved from the roadway on to the pavement, 
where the deceased was waling, and knocked him down and injured 
him fatally. I can see nothing in this evidence to shew that 
the defendant was unskilful as a rider or in the management of a 
horse. There is nothing which satisfies my mind affirmatively 
that the defendant was not quite capable of riding so as to 
justify him in being with his horse at the place in question.
It appears that the defendant had only bought the horse the day 
before, and was for the first time trying his new purchase, - 
using his horse in the way he intended to use it. It is said 
that the defendant was not justified in riding in that place a 
horse whose temper he was unacquainted with. But I am of 
opinion that a man is not to be charged with want of caution 
because he buys a horse without having had any previous 
experience of him. There must be horses without number ridden 
every day in London of whom the riders know nothing. A variety 
of circumstances will cause a horse to become restive. The mere 
fact of restiveness is not even prima facie evidence of 
negligence. Upon the whole, I see nothing which the learned 
Recorder could with propriety have left to the jury. 
WILLIAMS, J .... It is said that prima facie the defendant was 
guilty of negligence because he was wrongfully on the foot-
pavement. But the fact of his being on the foot-pavement is 
nothing unless he was there voluntarily: said, to say the least, 
it is quite as consistent with the facts proved that he was 

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there involuntarily as that he was there by his own 
mismanagement.... It was further contended that there was 
evidence to warrant the jury in coming to the conclusion that 
the defendant was riding a horse which he knew not to be fit for 
the purpose. But there was no evidence of a scienter. 
KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion. If the evidence had 
shewn that this horse was a quiet and manageable horse, and that 
the deceased at the time he met with the injury which resulted 
in his death was walking on the foot-pavement, I must own I 
should have thought that there was prima facie enough to call 
upon the defendant to shew that he had used due care and skill. 
Because then it would have been more consistent to assume that 
the accident arose from his want of care and skill. But here 
the evidence gets rid of that difficulty; for it shews that the 
beast was restless at the time, that be took fright, and that 
the defendant against his will, and not negligently, (inasmuch 
as he was doing all he could to avoid it), got placed in the 
position from which the mischief arose. That being so, the case 
is left in this position, that it is equally probable that there 
was not as that there was not as that there was negligence on 
the part of the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, fails to 
sustain the issue the affirmative of which the law casts upon 
her. 
Rule discharged. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE. This case was followed in Manzoni v. Douglas, 

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L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 145. 
On the other hand, "if a man's horses, galloping through a 
street, run on and injure a passenger on a side-walk, a prima 
facie case of wrong is shown; it may be fully explicable, but it 
calls for explanation". These words of an Ontario court were 
quoted with approval by McCardie, J., (L.R. [1924] 2 K.B. at p. 
85). And in a Scotch case (6 Sessions Cases 43) it was said 
that "Where a child is run down in broad daylight by a van, the 
case starts with a presumption against the owner of the van"; 
though the accident may prove to be due not to negligence (e.g. 
flimsy harness) but only to some latent and undiscoverable 
defect in the harness. 
That a horse, left unattended in a public street, bolted, is in 
itself prima facie evidence of Negligence; res ipsa loquitur.
But not so if a motor-car (an inanimate object) left in a level 
street, with its brakes in order, starts off; (Martin v. Stan-