The republic of uganda in the supreme court of uganda at kampala

9. THAT at about 5.00 p.m. 15th February 2001, Hon. Okwir telephoned me and requested for a meeting. I agreed to meet him on 17th February 2001. on the evening of 17th February 2001, Hon. Okwir and I met at Okapi Gallery Bunga, where we held a long discussion concerning National security matters in which the Petitioner was named.

10. THAT I called Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo the Acting Chief of Military Intelligence and informed him that I had received information from Hon. Okwir on important national security matters to discuss. The three of us agreed to meet at Sheraton Hotel, a venue selected by Hon. Okwir.

11. THAT a meeting was held at the Sheraton where Hon. Okwir repeated the information pertaining to the Petitioner’s involvement in subversive activities against the state of Uganda.

12. THAT on the 18th February 2001, Hon. Okwir offered to escort me to Sembabule where I was to attend the funeral of a relative. At Sembabule Hon. Okwir told me that he had decided to withdraw from EBTF. Hon. Okwir then addressed the mourners and told them he had withdrawn from EBTF. We later returned to Kampala where we had dinner together.

13. THAT on the morning of the 19th February, 2001, 1 proceeded to the International Conference Centre where I found Hon. Okwir had already written a Statement which was being typed announcing his withdrawal from the EBTF. In the room were other officers namely Lt. Col. Mayombo and Lt. Col Gowa. The room where we were is ordinarily used by the Army for the Kisangani Probe Committee of which Lt. Col. Gowa is a member.

14. THAT after the statement was typed, Hon. Okwir voluntarily signed it in my presence and we shook hands. He promised to put in writing the reports he had given us verbally relating to security matters. He requested for three (3) days to make his report. He (Okwir) telephoned his wife Solange who came and we had lunch together at Nile Hotel

15. THAT before lunch we considered inviting the members of the Press for a Press Conference but on a second thought Hon Okwir suggested that being a Youth M.R, he would prefer briefing members of his constituency (the Youth) first. He asked whether Government could arrange for him facilities at Ranch on the Lake to enable him meet his constituents. He also requested for security in view of the information he had divulged to us. Lt. Col Noble Mayombo then rang Military Intelligence whose personnel then brought a pistol and two guards with rifles. Lt. Col. Mayombo gave Hon. Okwir the pistol and the guards were assigned to him. I asked him to prepare details of his requirements for Ranch on the Lake and asked Lt. Cal. Mayombo to handle, and then I left.

16. THAT in the evening, I received a telephone call from Lt. Col. Mayombo who told me that he could not trace the whereabouts of Hon. Major Okwir Rwaboni. Fearing that he could have been harmed by the EBTF after hearing his statements over the radio. We decided to trace his whereabouts but to no avail

17. THAT on the 20th February 2001, I received information that Hon. Okwir was apprehended at the Entebbe Airport and taken to the Headquarters of Military Intelligence. I proceeded to the said offices where I met Lt. Col Mayombo and Hon. Okwir. He informed us that the Monitor story of that morning alleging that he had stated that he had been forced to make a statement withdrawing from EBTF was not true.

18. THAT Hon. Okwir talked to the 1st Respondent on telephone in our presence and again denied the truth of the Monitor story. He told the 1st Respondent that he wanted to go abroad for treatment and rest. The 1st Respondent Lt. Col. Mayombo to facilitate him to go.

19. THAT Hon. Okwir then personally voluntarily wrote a statement announcing his withdrawal from the EBTF in my presence. I later learnt from the media that he read the same statement to the Press at Parliamentary Buildings.

20. THAT I visited Hon. Okwir at his home two days later where he appeared to me to be in good spirits and health.

21. THAT I know Hon. Okwir voluntarily decided to withdraw from ETBF.

22. THAT at no time what so ever did I force Hon. Okwir to sign a statement withdrawing from EBTF nor was Hon. Okwir forced to sign such a statement by any other person in my presence as alleged.”

The affidavit of Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo also rebutted the affidavits concerning the arrest of Rwaboni. The rebuttal affidavit is also set out below:

“3. THAT I AM a Member of Parliament representing the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and also the Ag. Chief of Military Intelligence and Security of the UPDE

4. THAT my job involves collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence reports on matters of security and distribution of such information to the President, Army Commander, Commanders of various units and other Security Organisation of the Country.

5. THAT I have perused the Petition of Col (Rtd) Dr. Kizza Besigye and the Affidavits of Hon. “Major (Rtd)” Okwir Rwabwoni and of Hon. Winnie Byanyima both dated 23rd March 2001, in support of the said Petition and I wish to reply thereto as hereunder.

6. THAT it is not true as stated in the Petition, paragraph 4 of the affidavit Hon. “Major (Rtd)” Okwir Rwabwoni (hereinafter called “Hon. Okwir”) and paragraph 7 of Hon. Winnie Byanyima, that on the 19th February, 2001, he was made by myself and Maj. Gen. David Tinyefuza to sign a document at Nile Hotel, Kampala an announcing his withdrawal from the Elect Besigye Task Force (hereinafter referred to as “EBTF”).

7. THAT ft is not true that on 21 February 2001 I forced Hon. Okwir to make a statement disassociating himself from EBTF as stated in paragraph 8 of the said affidavit of Hon. 0kw!,.

8. THAT on 1st January 2001, Hon. 0kwir my younger brother and very close friend, came to my house for the New Year Celebrations and in the course of a political debate told me of his intentions to support the Petitioner.

9. THAT from the time Hon. Okwir returned from Rwanda, I have been using him to collect intelligence on security matters in Uganda.

10. THAT Hon. Okwir often gave me very good intelligence on security matters in Uganda.

11. THAT in my capacity as Ag. Chief of Military Intelligence I encouraged him to join the Elect Besigye Task Force (EBTF) so that he gives me information about security related plans of that group and he agreed to do so.

12. THAT on many occasions between that date and 17th February, 2001, Hon. Okwir gave me in formation of a security nature and received remuneration from me for that purpose

13. THAT on the 17th February 2001, at 11.30 I received a telephone call from Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza who informed me that he had been meeting Hon. 0kwir, for three hours and that it was in the interest of national security that I go to Okapi Gallery Bunga and join them.

14. THAT I suggested that we meet elsewhere. Hon. 0kwir suggested that we meet at the Sheraton Hotel. I went ahead and booked room 1006 for $202 and paid Mr. Isingoma who is known to both myself and Hon. 0kwir

15. THAT Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza and Hon. Okwir came and we had a meeting till 4.00 a.m. While meeting we were served with food and drink including Champagne.

16. THAT in the meeting Hon. Okwir informed us that the Petitioner and Nasser Ssebagala were planning to start insurgency in the event that the Petitioner lost the elections. That they had linked up with people who were throwing bombs in the City, they were hatching plots to kidnap their own members and blame it on the Government and had hired assassins to kill prominent politicians and leaders in Government. Further that they had imported guns and were receiving money from neighbouring countries, which were interested in destabilizing Uganda.

17. THAT on Sunday 18 February 2001, at 7.30 a.m. I went to the house of Hon. 0kwir in Bunga, had breakfast with him and traveled with him to Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza’s residence at Kyangera where he repeated these allegations. I left him with Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza and went to meet the Army Commander over the said intelligence reports.

18. THAT on Monday 19th February 2001, 1 went to Hon. Okwir’s residence, found many people including my brothers, had breakfast with them and traveled with him in the same car to International Conference Centre Room 328. Hon. Okwir Rabwoni wanted typing services for his statement withdrawing from EBTF and my Secretary Aida provided the services. While at I.C.C. 0kwir met and discussed with officers like Lt. Col. Gowa, Lt. Cal. Mugisha, Col. Kasirye Gwanga about his decision to abandon EBTF because it was involved in planning subversive activities.

19. THAT Hon. Okwir signed the document withdrawing from EBTF and Hon. Okwir, Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza and I proceeded to the Nile Hotel and booked a Room No. 220 and we had lunch together with his wife Solange as the document was being faxed.

20. THAT in view of the intelligence he had given Hon. Okwir asked for security from me and 1 gave him a pistol for his personal protection and two armed escorts, one uniformed to guard his house and the other in civilian attire to travel with him.

21. THAT Hon. Okwir asked for facilitation to call his youth supporters to Ranch on the Lake on the Wednesday 21 February 2001, to explain his decision that he was leaving the EBTF.

22. THAT after leaving the hotel, my attempts to contact Hon. Okwir were fruitless as his phone was switched off. I got worried.

23. THAT on the 20th February 2001. I approached Maj. Gen. Tinyefuza and we decided to start looking for Hon. Okwir I was convinced that the EBTF had seen him with us and heard the statement on the radio and had kidnapped or killed him.

24. THAT at 9.30 a.m., I received a telephone call from one of my intelligence contacts in EBTF that Hon. Okwir was going to be killed in Adjumani by the EBTF members.

25. THAT I telephoned the Director of CID and the Inspector General of Police and we decided to stop him from traveling.

26. THAT I am the one who deployed Lt. (flow Capt.) Monday and Capt. Rwakitarate to stop Hon. Okwir Rabwoni from travelling.

27. THAT I gave the orders in my capacity as Ag. Chief of Military Intelligence. By virtue of my office, I can give orders to any intelligence officer in the Military regardless of whether he is in Presidential Protection Unit or other unit of the Military.

28. THAT Capt. Rwakitarate informed me that he was at Entebbe Barracks at the time and I ordered him in his capacity as an Intelligence Officer of the UPDF being the highest ranking officer in the Entebbe area at the time to take charge of the events at Entebbe Airport.

29. THAT when the officers were obstructed by the Petitioner and others. I informed the Director CID who instructed his officers at Entebbe to effect the arrest.

30. THAT I kept being informed by my officers that the Petitioner obstructed the Police and Military Intelligence and Military Police from 10.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. and all attempts to persuade him to release Hon. Okwir were futile.

31. THAT Hon. Okwir was subsequently arrested and brought to my office at Kitante because the Petitioner’s camp was mobilizing their supporters in Kampala to interfere with the arrest and remove him from any Police Station forcefully.

32. THAT while at my office Hon. Okwir said that he was not feeling well. I called Dr. Karongo of Mbuya Military Hospital who checked him and reported to me no particular, complaint, no evidence of bodily injury and no necessity for medication.

33. THAT while in Kitante Hon. Okwir received a bed, blanket and bed Sheets, took a bath, received food and cigarettes supplied by his wife.

34. THAT his sister Gertrude Katuramu, brothers David Olimi, Dan Itwara, nieces Dorothy and Rachael, nephews Job and Paul came and visited Hon. Okwir for three hours.

35. THAT Hon. 0kwir asked me to avail him an opportunity to talk to H. E. the President, which I provided. That he talked to the 1st Respondent in my presence and he told the Respondent that he wished to travel abroad for treatment rest and adequate security as the said arrangements were being made.

36. THAT upon the 1st Respondent’s directive I requested the British Government to issue Hon. Okwir and his wife with Visas and I obtained them tickets and money to use while abroad.

37. THAT Hon. Okwir was escorted to his residence in Bunga where he stayed with his father and relatives for one week before traveling abroad. That while at home he did not disclose to me or to anybody that I know he had been tortured while at my office by any of my officers.

38. THAT I know Hon. Okwir was escorted by members of the family to the Airport and that he was received by Uganda High Commission staff in London and is still in contact with me by phone.

39. THAT I have never tortured or ordered the torture of anybody in my 16 years of Military service.

40. THAT it is not true as alleged in paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Hon. 0kwir that he was forced to make a statement disassociating himself from the EBTF in my presence or by me. He made the statement voluntarily in the presence of his wife Solange and Brother Dan.”

Captain Moses Rwakitarate the Intelligence Officer of the PPU was apparently the Officer who supervised Rwaboni’s arrest at Entebbe Air Port. In his affidavit of 12-4-2001, he said that on 20-02-2001, he was at the Entebbe Barracks for the PPU when Mayombo instructed him by telephone to oversee the Rabwoni’s arrest at Entebbe International Airport. He went to the Airport and found the arrest in progress. The Petitioner, Hon. Winnie Byanyima and Rwaboni were in the VIP Lounge. He (Rwakitarate) asked Rwaboni to go with him to Kampala. Although Rwaboni was willing to go to Kampala, the Petitioner and other members of his group urged Rwaboni not to go and threatened to use force to stop him. The Divisional Police Commander, Entebbe, and other Police Officers arrived at the scene to effect Rwaboni’s arrest. Police Officers in plain clothes proceeded to the lounge but returned and informed the DPC that Rwaboni had resisted arrest and physical force was necessary to effect the arrest.

Rwakitarate returned to the lounge to attempt to convince Rwaboni, but Rwakitarate was threatened with physical harm by the Petitioner and Edith Byanyima. The Petitioner and his wife, Hon. Winnie Byanyima deliberately encouraged Rwaboni to resist arrest. He (Rwakitarate) reported the matter to Mayombo. Rwakitarate’s group was later joined by Captain Kayanja Mulenga who had been requested to reinforce the Police with Military Police who subsequently effected the arrest.

I accept the evidence of Rwaboni, the Petitioner and Hon. Winnie Byanyima that Rwaboni was a member of the Task Force for the election of the Petitioner. He was the Chairman of the Petitioner’s Youth and Student’s Campaign Committee. I also believe their evidence that on 20-02-2001, Rwaboni was brutally arrested at Entebbe International Airport by the PPU, tortured and detained at the Officers of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence on Kitante Road, Kampala. In my considered opinion, the purpose of Rwaboni’s arrest was to force him to abandon the Petitioner’s team. This was successfully accomplished by all concerned. It must also have had the effect of intimidating and discouraging other people from supporting1 the Petitioner as the incident had wide publicity in the media throughout the Country.

I do not accept the evidence in rebuttal that Rwaboni was a spy planted in the Petitioner’s election campaign team and that he was working as an undercover agent for the Chieftaincy of Militant Intelligence and that he was arrested to save his own life because there was a plot to kill him (Rwaboni) by the Petitioner’s team in Adjumani. There are several reasons for this.
First, Rwaboni resisted the arrest.

Second, because it is absolutely incredible that the Petitioner would want to have the campaign Chairman of his Youth and Student’s Committee killed during the campaign. What would the Petitioner and his campaign team achieve by committing murder of the head of its Youths and Students Committee, Rwaboni? Would the purpose be: to enhance or to destroy his chances of being elected President? What would be the purpose? It is self-evident that the suggestion that the Petitioner would kill an important member of his campaign team is completely devoid of any sense.

Third, Rwaboni was not informed of the reason for his arrest at the time or at all. Nor was he produced or charged in court. Only a person who had committed a heinous crime would have been arrested with so much brutality as Rwaboni was arrested.

Fourth, if Rwaboni was a spy as it was claimed, why was he arrested with so much brutality and torture? He was forcefully arrested, bundled on to a pick-up truck by armed soldiers. On the truck the soldiers sat on his head, his chest and his legs. When the motor vehicle drove off, other soldiers were kicking him. In my view that is not the manner in which a person would be handled by his colleagues with whom he or she is working for the same cause. That is not how to treat an ally for whatever cause the allies are working.

Fifth, arrangements were made to send Rwaboni, though at his request, out of the Country where he would be unable to be physically involved in the Petitioner’s electoral campaign any more. That was the best way to make sure that Rwaboni was completely removed away from the Petitioner’s campaign efforts. Exiled overseas, he would be physically of no use to the Petitioner any longer. Rwaboni’s request for a trip and treatment abroad was the direct outcome of the torture he had received. In that sense his trip abroad was not entirely voluntary. It was the result of coercion for him to flee overseas.

Sixth, prior to his arrest on 20-02-2001, Rwaboni had been twice prevented by the PPU from consulting with the Petitioner’s supporters in Kanungu Trading Centre, Rukungiri District. Rwaboni himself and many other witnesses have testified to that effect. This, in my view, reinforces the view that the Military and other authorities did not want him to campaign for the Petitioner’s election. He had to be removed at all costs.

I also find that in view of paragraphs 15 and 16 of his affidavit, the 1st Respondent had knowledge of the circumstances regarding Rwaboni’s arrest.

I shall now move on to consider other evidence regarding involvement of the Military, and other government and L.C. officials, organizations and others in harassment, threats and intimidation of the Petitioner’s supporters and agents. There are over one hundred such witnesses from all the sides in the Petition. It is impossible to evaluate all their evidence within the time available. Consequently, I shall consider only samples of such evidence, sufficient to give an overall view of the size of the complaints and the denials.

Bernard Masiko was a registered voter at Nyabitunda Polling Station — Ntungamo Parish, Rukungiri. He was also the Petitioner’s campaign agent at Kayonza Sub- County. In his affidavit dated 20-03-2001, he deponed that on 9-2-2001, at 3.00 p.m. he saw Deputy RDC Mugisha Muhwezi Nyindombi, accompanied by Gommbolola Internal Security Officer (GISO), one Paul Bagorogoza who went to their office with army men from PPU and ordered their office attendant to remove their candidate’s (the Petitioner’s) posters and the sign post to their office and keep it inside, which the office attendant did for fear of being harmed.

Four days to polling day Mrs. Jackline Mbabazi went and held a meeting with Sergeant Nankunda, Paulo Bagorogoza and ordered the 1st Respondent’s supporters to beat up all the Petitioner’s supporters. Masiko personally heard her giving that order. Sam Karibwende, Chairman LC III also threatened to shoot Masiko and others if they did not close the Petitioner’s District Campaign Office. When Masiko returned the following day, he found another lock had been fixed on the office door. From then on they gave up the office.

On Polling day, he arrived at the Polling Station at 6.30 a.m. He and their other agents found that polling had already started earlier. All the voting was done by the 1st Respondent’s agents. One Biryomuhaisho had about 200 ballot papers. He ticked all of them and put them in the ballot box. Masiko found that the same thing was done in all other Polling Stations of that area by Sulait Mugaye and Ismail, all of them the 1 Respondent’s agents. When Masiko and other Petitioner’s agents tried to stop the practice1 they were forcefully chased away from the Polling Station by Polling officials with the help of armed men and their appointment letters confiscated. By 3.00 p.m. voting had already ended. Many of the Petitioner’s supporters1 especially the youths found that their names had already been ticked and their ballot papers cast by the 1 Respondent’s agents. Masiko went to a nearby polling station called Kyeshero and found there the same procedure. He witnessed Camen Muryakazi and Rwamahe also ticking ballot papers as they wished. Masiko found this strange and Rwamahe who was armed with an A1C47 chased him away with the help of LDUs and some army men who were threatening voters. Incidents similar to those ones were widespread in their area and the surrounding Sub Counties and Masiko personally witnessed many of them. In the circumstances it became impossible for them to hold free and fair elections, he said. The affidavit is based on knowledge and belief. Belief is irrelevant since Masiko deponed to what he witnessed.

Masiko’s affidavit was rebutted by Mugisha Muwhezi. In his rebuttal affidavit of 2-4-2001, he said that he was the Deputy RDC for Rukungiri District. He had read Masiko’s affidavit. It was not true that on 9-2-2001, he went with PPU, GISO and Sub-County Chief of Kayonza to the Petitioner’s campaign office and ordered the office attendant to remove the Petitioner’s sign post and posters and keep them inside the office. Throughout the campaign period, he never entered that office at all. The LCIII Chairman of Kayonza Sub-County is not called Karihwende, but called Baikirize. Muhwezi did not say why Masiko should have fabricated such allegations against him if they were lies. On the other hand as the Deputy RDC, Muwhezi would not be expected to admit that he committed electoral Offences, which Masiko’s allegations amounted to if they were true, I would expect the Deputy RDC to deny them, as he did. In the circumstances, I would accept what Masiko said and reject Masiko’s denials, and I do.

Bernard Matsiko’s affidavit was also rebutted by Captain Atwooki B. Ndahura, the Commander of the deployed in Rukungiri. In his rebuttal affidavit of 4- 4-2001, he said that it is not true that men from the PPU accompanied the Deputy RDC, Mugisha Muhweze to Kayonza Sub-County when he allegedly ordered the removal of the Petitioner’s posters from his offices as alleged by Bernard Matsiko. The Captain did not say that he was present at the scene, nor why Matsiko invented such an accusation if he did. On the other hand, the Captain had every reason for denying the PPU of which he was the Commander, did such criminal acts. He would be expected to deny what Matsiko said. For those reasons, I would accept Matsiko’s evidence as true and reject the Captain Ndahura’s denial as false.

The affidavit of Sam Kakuru, of Karuhinda Village, Kijububwa Kirima, Kanungu District has already been referred to in another context in this judgment. In his affidavit of 2003-2001, he said that he was registered to vote at Karuhinda Polling Station. He was also the Petitioner’s Task force Chairman for Kirima sub-County.

In early January, 2001, the task force held a meeting at James Musinguzi’s placer in Kiragiro. Suddenly, they were surrounded by PPU soldiers, numbering about 14. They went in the vehicle of the Deputy RDC, Mugisha Muwhezi. The PPU soldiers just stayed around, staring at the people in the meeting until the meeting was abandoned to let the participants go home early.

About two weeks later, Kakuru went to Kambuga to meet Rwaboni. He found PPU personnel beating up Kanyabitabo and Chappa Bakunzi because they had been mobilizing people to meet Rwaboni. As soon as the PPU soldiers saw Kakuru, they hit him with a stick, but he was able to turn his motor cycle round and he drove off. They chased him with their double cabin pick-Up but failed to catch up with him.

Around mid February, Kakuru’s campaign Task Force went to meet the Petitioner’s Kirima Task Force. As soon as they stopped at Modern Hotel, Kanungu GISO and his group smashed the task force’s vehicle, breaking its windscreen and headlights. On 10-02-2001, two days before polling the same GISO’s Kihanda group found Kakuru’s Task Force meeting. The task force members at the meeting apprehended one of their assailants and took him to Kihihi Police Station. L.C.lll Chairman, one Beshesya Charles who was also the Chairman of the 1st Respondent’s Task Force, with GISO, soldiers, and Deputy RDC, Muwhezi, stormed the police station and forcefully released the said assailant, alleging that he had been abducted. On 11O3-2OO1, the group of the Deputy RDC, GISO and PPU returned to Kihinda and rounded up all of the Petitioner’s agents in that Parish and detained them until after the elections. As a result, the Petitioner had no polling agents in Kihinda Parish on the polling day. Kakuru said that PPU was heavily deployed all over the District. Member of the Petitioner’s Task Force and agents were finally released without being taken to court. Kihinda had been the Petitioner’s strong hold. Kakurku further said that on polling day he got up at 5.00 a.m. On the way, he was intercepted by people unknown to him singing