The United States Congress should restrict the National Security Agency’s ability to collect “bulk data” without a warrant

Internet Freedom Bad

1NC CCP Collapse Mod

Xi is increasing Internet censorship now – he’s intensified his efforts in order to strengthen party unity and control

Feeney 12 (Caitlain, Claremont McKenna, CMC Thesis, "China's Censored Leap forward: The Communist Party's Battle with Internet Censorship in the Digital Age")

Media and information controls have long been an essential dimension of the CCP’s authoritarian system, and the apparatus for censoring and monitoring internet communications increased dramatically during the decade of the Hu Jintao-led Politburo Standing Committee. Nevertheless, since the change in leadership in November 2012, the dedication of top leaders to reasserting party dominance over an information landscape whose control was perceived to be slipping away has contributed to a more sophisticated, strategic, and in many ways, effective effort compared to the pre-existing apparatus.¶ In particular, after intellectuals and members of civil society urged the CCP to adhere to China’s constitution and a rare strike by journalists at a major newspaper sparked broader calls to reduce censorship, the authorities responded with campaigns to intensify ideological controls. These efforts and their impact contributed to China’s slight decline on Freedom House’s recently released Freedom of the Press 2014 index.[1]

The plan causes a collapse of the CCP – internet freedom in China is a MASSIVE threat to regime stability

- Evidence cites: Isaac Mao, Chinese venture capitalist and blogger who has been threatened by the regime for internet freedom violations

Tech In Asia 12 ("What Would China Be Like If the Internet Wasn't Censored")

Everyone I spoke with agreed that whatever other effects it might have on society, a free internet would force a greater degree of honesty and transparency from both the government and Chinese companies. As Jeremy Goldkorn put it: An open Internet would place the government and companies under a great deal of scrutiny which would lead to more openness and make corruption more difficult, but would also lead to political battles and competition between companies playing out in a nasty and vicious way online. Could that transparency (and that public ugliness) bring an end to the one-party rule of the CCP? Isaac Mao thinks so. He didn’t want to speculate on a specific timeline, but he said that “the CCP is the natural enemy of freedom” and that eventually only one of those two things can survive. Sinocism founder Bill Bishop was not so sure. “They [the CCP] have survived plenty of challenges,” he said, and as long as they continue to deliver an increasing quality of life for Chinese citizens, they might be able to survive a free internet, too. “But,” he added, ”if the transparency and accountability that an uncensored Internet provides are anathema to the Party then probably not. [...] Ideological work is one of the key pillars for the Party going back to its founding, and a free for all Internet may corrode that pillar even faster than the current managed one.”

CCP collapse causes global nuclear war and extinction

Yee and Storey ‘02 [Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5]
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario – nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

Taiwan Impact

Threats to the CCP will cause a lashout against Taiwan to boost domestic support

Martin 2007 (Peter B Martin, “America's Nuclear Military Dilemma with China”, American Thinker, August 20, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/08/americas_nuclear_military_dile.html

A year from now China will be on its benevolent best conduct, two years from now that could all change. There is little to fear from China until the Olympics are over; what follows may be a different story altogether. Just as Ancient Greeks would recess their wars during the Olympic Games, China will keep the peace leading up to and during the games. But nationalism has not been entirely sidelined, as it is an essential device to preserve communist rule. China's leadership has an inherent fear of losing power; this perpetual dread is what drives their political and strategic decisions. And Taiwan is the principal catalyst to preserving the Beijing government. Should the political system feel threatened, nationalism would come into play and Taiwan would be the scapegoat.

That draws in the United States and causes nuclear conflict -

Straits Times 2000 (“No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, Pg 40)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

2NC Censorship Up

Censorship is increasing –

A. Social media crackdowns -

Council on Foreign Relations 14 (Beina Xu, September 25th 14, "Media Censorship in China")

The Xi administration, in power since March 2013, has further tightened the reins on journalists. A new July 2014 directive on journalist press passes bars reporters from releasing information from interviews or press conferences on social media without permission of their employer media organizations. The government also said it would not grant press passes to those who failed to sign the secrecy agreement.¶ Publicizing the CPD guidelines also invites punishment, as they may be classified as "state secrets." Such was the case of Shi Tao, a journalist who served eight years in jail for detailing, in a Yahoo! email, the CPD's instructions for how to report the fifteenth anniversary of Tiananmen Square. Pottinger adds that on top of such national restrictions, local officials also release their own directives. Some of these have restricted information at the cost of public health, as in early 2014, when China's national poultry association requested provincial governments to stop reporting individual cases of H7N9 bird flu infections, fearing damage to profits.

B. He is ramping up control because he perceives it to be essential to regime survival

Lloyd 13 (October, 2013, John, Reuters Columnist, "Colum: China's Great Firewall Grows Ever Higher")

Not only have the boldest spirits among China's journalists been squelched, but the Internet has, too. Bill Clinton once argued that trying to control the Internet was "like nailing jello to the wall," but in China it's being controlled nonetheless. Reportedly up to 2 million Internet monitors scan the estimated 700 million Chinese Web users (which is more than half the population), while an even greater army of "50-centers" put out positive messages about society, government and the Party for which they are paid 50 cents. The artist Ai Weiwei managed to persuade one of them to speak to him last year: the 50-center told the artist that every day, an email from the government's Internet publicity office gives "instructions on which direction to guide the netizens' thoughts, to blur their focus, or to fan their enthusiasm for certain ideas."¶ On the micro blog site Weibo - developed by the Sina online media corporation after the Chinese authorities barred Twitter from the country, now with 500 million users' accounts - the more outspoken commentators have been warned to cool it. In one case, Charles Xue, a Chinese-American venture capitalist with 12 million followers on Weibo, was arrested in August, and charged with having sex with a prostitute: whatever the truth of the charge, Mr. Xue's public apology was not for a sin of the flesh but for - as he said in his confession - "irresponsibility in spreading information online (in)…a negative mood…freedom of speech cannot override the law." An authoritative account for the Reuters Institute by the Beijing-based reporter Bei Jiao concluded that "control over Weibo is intensifying, limiting freedom of speech. Journalists are increasingly cautious posting anything significant after learning the lessons of their own or others' mistakes."¶ One observer, Xiao Qiang of the University of California at Berkeley, told the New York Times that "we're only seeing the beginning of this campaign…(the authorities) will be much harsher, and the targets will be the more influential people in the Chinese public sphere."¶ Most observers credit the crackdown to Xi Jinping, the new Communist Party leader and president: though Chinese top level politics remain opaque, informed commentators believe that he and his closest colleagues have a strong bias toward closer control over all aspects of society.¶ Last week, People's Daily published a long editorial by the chief editor Yang Zhenwu. It was a commentary on Xi Jinping's speech in August, at a conference on propaganda and ideology, underscoring how important the words of the new leader were. The piece repeated, many times, the absolute necessity of having the media "run by politicians" - by which the editor means that all media must be under the direction of the Party, and "consolidate and expand mainstream ideology and public opinion."

2NC IFreedom Link Run

First – Regime stability – opening up of the internet runs counter to the CCP political strategy of controlling messaging – causes a SERIOUS THREAT to the regime

Feeney 12 (Caitlain, Claremont McKenna, CMC Thesis, "China's Censored Leap forward: The Communist Party's Battle with Internet Censorship in the Digital Age")

As a powerful but insecure authoritarian regime,. the CCP values its survival above ¶ anything else Because the Internet threatens the Party’s monopoly of power, few should be ¶ surprised that the CCP will apply censorship to maintain its control. Confronted with the ¶ possibility of the 500 million Chinese Internet users utilizing the web as an outlet to publicize ¶ opinion or discontent, the Party’s Internet censorship and regulation has “evolved into a ¶ comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and ¶ social use as well as legal domains.”25 The relationship between the Internet and democracy ¶ worldwide is clear, and it is commonly understood that the Internet poses a serious threat to ¶ communist regimes. There is often the expectation that the introduction of the Internet in ¶ authoritarian countries will lead to the regime’s demise, but “Internet use and development in ¶ ¶ 23 Ibid, 118. ¶ 24 Chung, 732. ¶ 25 Liang and Lu, 105. China has so far failed such an expectation, and some even argue that the Internet has become a ¶ new tool for government control.”26

Leadership perception is the ONLY thing that matters in terms of evaluating the link – the Chinese leadership PERCIEVES their stability to be tied to the opening of the internet

- Even if they try to kick solvency this still applies because the plan triggers perception of threats to total control of the internet

- Proves our lash-out arguments, if China perceives they are going to face push-back from their public they are more likely to be adventurist in order to spark nationalism.

Cook 5/14/14 (Sarah, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia, Freedom House, The Freedom House, "Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States")

Emphasis on the leadership role of the party in managing the media. This may be nothing new but its reiteration indicates the limited prospects of the party voluntarily loosening its grip on the media or internet sector. One set of internal party instructions, Document No. 9, specifically warned against “propagating Western news views” and “opposing Party leadership of our media, in an attempt to open breaches for the ideological infiltration of our country.”[2] ¶ A heightened sense of insecurity, lack of control, and depleted ability to influence public opinion, even to the point of this being an existential threat to the regime. The speeches and documents convey an especially high level of anxiety over the spread of ideas about democracy or its components, including an independent judiciary or an unfettered press. In an August speech by Xi to cadres involved in propaganda work, he acknowledges popular dissatisfaction with the government, notes that positive comments about the party are challenged or attacked online, and expresses concern that mainstream media are losing their influence, especially among young people who instead look to the internet for information. Interestingly, one of the other concerns Xi voices is that party cadres themselves are not ideologically “clear.” According to reports of the speech published by Xinhua News Agency and an apparently authentic, more complete leaked version, Xi noted that “we are currently engaged in a magnificent struggle that has many new historical characteristics; the challenges and difficulties we face are unprecedented.”[3] As a result, according to Xi, “on this battlefield of the internet, whether we can stand up, and gain victory directly relates to our country’s ideological security and regime security.”[4]¶ Responding with a combination of militant rhetoric and calls for innovation. In outlining what the party should do in response to the sense of weakened influence and control, Xi draws on warlike imagery, describing the situation as an “ideological battleground” and in a more disturbing use of terminology reminiscent of Mao-era campaigns calls for a “public opinion struggle (douzheng).”[5] This sometimes anachronistic aggressiveness is combined with calls for innovation, including increasing the attractiveness of state media content, improving expertise on new media to resolve a “skills panic,” and developing different approaches for different segments of the population and across various media types.¶ These speeches and attitudes have translated into a number of concrete actions, including an aggressive campaign to reassert dominance over social media. In one striking example, four days after Xi’s aggressive August speech to party cadres on the subject, Chinese-American businessman Charles Xue, whose web commentaries on social and political issues were regularly shared with more than 12 million followers on Sina Weibo, was detained for allegedly soliciting prostitutes.[6] He was later shown handcuffed on state television, expressing regret over the way he had used his microblog account to influence public opinion.[7] The appearance reinforced suspicions of a politically motivated prosecution and his case became the first in a series of events signaling a multi-faceted clampdown on social media that my co-panelist David Wertime will describe in more detail.

AT: Impact Turn – Econ

It doesn’t the US doesn’t do anything to the businesses – they are there to make money not political statements

Mulvenon (James, "Breaching the Great Firewall? Beijing's Internet Censorship Policies and US-China Relations")

The current economic environment in China encourages the Internet’s ¶ commercialization, not its politicization. As one Internet executive put it, for ¶ Chinese and foreign companies, “the point is to make profits, not political ¶ statements.”24¶ Even so, American companies involved in the Chinese information revolution ¶ have come under increasing scrutiny from NGOs and the Congress for their ¶ possible collaborative role in the construction and maintenance of the Great ¶ Firewall. On the software and services side, the controversial practices of Yahoo!, ¶ Google, Microsoft and others have already been documented above. On the ¶ hardware side, companies like Cisco and Nortel have been accused of designing, ¶ selling, installing, and maintaining equipment used to censor the Chinese ¶ Internet. Cisco has even been accused of producing a custom “censorware” box ¶ 22 Guo Liang, The CASS Internet Report 2003: Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Twelve ¶ Chinese Cities (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for Social ¶ Development, 2003), 55–57. About 72 percent of Internet users surveyed agreed that the Internet ¶ would provide people in China greater opportunities to express their political views, ¶ approximately 61 percent stated that it would make it easier to criticize government policies, some ¶ 79 percent indicated it would improve people’s understanding of political issues, and 72 percent ¶ said they believed the Internet would allow government officials to enhance their understanding of ¶ the public’s views. 23 Guo Liang, 2003, p. 55. ¶ 24 Interview with U.S. businessperson, 2001. ames Mulvenon 89¶ for China,25 though the company’s CEO in February 2006 denied the charge before ¶ the House International Relations Committee. Indeed, much if not all of the ¶ functionality ascribed to a custom censorware box is available from off-the-shelf ¶ Cisco equipment like the PIX Firewall. At the same time, the company has not ¶ explicitly denied that it provides customized training to use Cisco equipment for ¶ censorship purposes, not has it denied that in China, Cisco products are marketed ¶ explicitly for Internet policing. ¶ Even if some U.S. software and hardware companies are complicit in Chinese ¶ Internet censorship, however, there are very few attractive policy options to deal ¶ with the situation, given the domestic Chinese competition faced by U.S. ¶ companies and the inherently dual-use nature of the technologies involved. ¶ Google’s introduction of the censored google.cn, for example, was largely a ¶ response to its dramatic loss of market share to a domestic Chinese search engine, ¶ Baidu, which is known as “China’s Google.” Yahoo! and Microsoft also confront ¶ successful and dynamic domestic competitors in the e-mail and blog market ¶ spaces. Penalizing these companies for their role in censorship would only further ¶ erode their market share and cede more of the market to Chinese companies that ¶ have few if any qualms about collaborating with the Beijing government to control ¶ Internet information. Similarly, penalizing companies like Cisco for selling routers ¶ and firewalls to China would simply drive the authorities to purchase their ¶ equipment from competing vendors in Europe, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere.

US China War Boosters

US-China war escalates- subs increase risk for miscalc

Twomey, co-director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2009 (Christopher P., Arms Control Today, January/February, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism)
Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

1NC AT Chinese Soft Power

Chinese soft power fails

Boot 10—Snr Fellow, CFR. Master’s in diplomatic history, Yale (Max, The Rising Dragon and “Smart” Diplomacy, 27 September 2010, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/category/contentions?author_name=boot)

For years we have been hearing about how effective Chinese diplomacy is — a supposed contrast with a ham-handed, distracted Uncle Sam who was letting the rising dragon take over East Asia while we weren’t paying attention. No one should underestimate the rising military challenge posed by China. As Robert Kaplan notes in this Washington Post op-ed: China has the world’s second-largest naval service, after only the United States. Rather than purchase warships across the board, it is developing niche capacities in sub-surface warfare and missile technology designed to hit moving targets at sea. At some point, the U.S. Navy is likely to be denied unimpeded access to the waters off East Asia. China’s 66 submarines constitute roughly twice as many warships as the entire British Royal Navy. But a funny thing happened on the way to Chinese hegemony: its rise has alarmed pretty much all its neighbors, ranging from India and Australia to Japan and South Korea. The latest sign of how Chinese hectoring and bullying is souring other countries is the flap over a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with Japanese coast-guard vessels near a disputed island in the East China Sea that is claimed by both countries. The Japanese agreed to release the fishing captain on Friday after what the New York Times described as “a furious diplomatic assault from China,” which included the cut-off of “ministerial-level talks on issues like joint energy development, and curtailed visits to Japan by Chinese tourists.” In the short term, this is a victory for China. But for the long term, it leaves hard feelings behind and convinces many more Japanese — and other Asians — that China’s rise poses a threat to them. Keep in mind that the Democrats, the current Japanese ruling party, came to power talking about weakening the U.S.-Japanese alliance and strengthening ties with China. If China were better behaved, that might have come to pass. But Chinese assertiveness is rubbing the Japanese the wrong way. The same is true with South Koreans, Australians, and other key Chinese trade partners. In those countries, too, hopes of a closer relationship with China have been frustrated; instead, they are drawing closer to the U.S. The fundamental problem is that China’s ruling oligarchy has no Marxist legitimacy left; its only claim to power is to foster an aggressive Chinese nationalism. That may do wonders for support on the home front, but it is doomed to antagonize its neighbors and possibly bring into being a de facto coalition to contain Beijing. That, at least, should be the goal of American policy. Even as we continue to trade with China, we should make sure to curb its geo-political ambitions. That is a goal in which we should be able to get the cooperation of many of China’s neighbors — if we actually practice the sort of “smart power” diplomacy that the Obama-ites came into office promising.

Alt causes to Chinese soft power and they won’t use it effectively

Walker 11—Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council, senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute (28 June 2011, Martin, China's soft-power hurdle, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Walker/2011/06/28/Walkers-World-Chinas-soft-power-hurdle/UPI-39731309267283/)

It is far from clear that this will succeed. Three years ago, at the time of the Beijing Olympics, the goodwill for what China called its "peaceful rise" was widespread. The World Bank's Robert Zoellick was talking of China as a fellow stakeholder in the global economy, ready to play by the common rules of international commerce and behavior.

That was then. This is now. Surging with self-confidence after navigating the global financial crisis, China has been throwing its weight around in the South China Sea, alarming Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei with its insistence that the whole sea and its mineral wealth belong to China. Japan has been shaken by some minor clashes over other disputed islands, and India frets over China's apparent plans to start building dams in Tibet near the source of the Brahmaputra River, which supplies about a third of northern India's water.

China's impressive investments in Africa have become controversial, since so many of the jobs in construction are going to imported Chinese workers rather than Africans. China's readiness to do business with unsavory regimes does not go down quite as well in the age of the democratic upsurge of the Arab Spring as it did before.

China's latest clampdown on various dissidents and on the Internet (while also being blamed for many cyberattacks) has caused alarm. The United Nations startled Chinese diplomats with its recent press release expressing concerns over China's "recent wave of enforced disappearances."

Doubtless China will learn from this, even as it navigates the preliminary phases of the transition of power to the next generation of leaders, a process that may help explain the latest crackdown on dissidents, human-rights lawyers and other activists. And doubtless China's astute deployment of its massive wealth to investments and various causes overseas will also pay dividends.

But the fact remains that China may well be influencing people, and it has a highly impressive record of economic management to flaunt, but it is not exactly winning friends. Joseph Nye of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government invented the concept of soft power, as opposed to the hard power of coercion. He defined it as the ability to get other people and countries to want what you want. China has yet to show it understands the distinction. It is in Beijing's own interest -- as well as the world's -- that the Chinese leadership learns this quickly.

1NC Returning Anyway

Major returners now, even with censorship- trending towards returns

Liu 2/12 [IRENE JAY LIU, Reuters, Feb 12, 2015, For many of China's biotech brains-in-exile, it's time to come home, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-china-health-returnees-idUKKBN0LG2UQ20150212In biotech parks across the Yangtze River Delta, dozens of start-ups are working to develop drugs to treat China's biggest emerging diseases - from diabetes and Hepatitis B to respiratory illnesses and cancer.]

It's early days, but firms like Hua Medicine and Innovent Biologics embody China's hopes for competitive biomedical innovation. And their Chinese-born, Western-educated founders represent the long-awaited return of the nation's brightest life scientists.

    From school in the late 1970s and 1980s, when only elite students gained entry intoChina's few biochemistry and molecular biology programs, they left China, graduated and worked their way up to senior positions in the world's top pharmaceutical companies.

    For decades, China tried to woo them home, but they were reluctant to return to a cloistered, politicized scientific establishment where winning research funds and promotion often depends on who you know. It took the jobs squeeze of the 2008 global financial crisis and fresh government incentives - from state-of-the-art research labs to grants, loans and government venture capital - to prise them from international careers to launch their own start-ups in China.

    "To obtain major grants in China, it's an open secret that doing good research is not as important as schmoozing with powerful bureaucrats and their favorite experts," returnees Shi Yigong and Rao Yi wrote in a 2010 editorial in Science.

    "If returnees want to do innovation, in academia there is traditional resistance and old practices," said Huiyao Wang at the Center for China & Globalization. "It's the private sector that really attracts people to start new ventures."

    China has committed more than $300 billion to science and technology, with biotech one of seven pillar industries in the latest Five-Year Plan. Biomedical research investment jumped more than four-fold in 2007-12, though it is still dwarfed by spending in the United States and Europe, according to a 2014 study in the New England Journal of Medicine.

    Returnee firms have listed in New York and London, work closely with 'Big Pharma' and attract investment from U.S. venture capital and multinationals.

    "China is coming up, especially with returnees coming back. The innovation will come with the people," said Jimmy Zhang, a vice-president at Johnson & Johnson Innovation, which opened a regional center in Shanghai last autumn.

2NC Returning Anyway/Drug Trials Alt Cause

Returners already high and drug trail processing time is a major alt cause

Liu 2/12 [IRENE JAY LIU, Reuters, Feb 12, 2015, For many of China's biotech brains-in-exile, it's time to come home, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-china-health-returnees-idUKKBN0LG2UQ20150212In biotech parks across the Yangtze River Delta, dozens of start-ups are working to develop drugs to treat China's biggest emerging diseases - from diabetes and Hepatitis B to respiratory illnesses and cancer.]

"I sometimes ask myself, 'why did I return to China?' I had a very comfortable life in the U.S. and my family's still there," said Michael Yu, Innovent's founder and CEO. "But for lots of Chinese men, there's always something in the heart ... a desire to go back and do something. Biotech has only just started in China so you can have significant impact for a whole industry, for a country."

After completing postdoctoral training at the University of California, San Francisco, Yu spent a decade at U.S. biotech firms before going home in 2006 to co-found Kanghong Biotech, which developed the first homegrown innovative monoclonal antibody to be approved by China's regulators. He later launched Innovent with funding from Chinese and U.S.-based investors, including bioBAY, a government-funded biosciences park in Suzhou. bioBAY spent $140 million on Innovent's 1 million square foot (92,903 square meter) laboratory and production facility.

Another returnee, Li Chen, was chief scientific officer at Roche's China R&D center when, in 2009, he was invited to dinner by U.S.-based ARCH Venture Partners, which encouraged him to go out on his own. "It wasn't something I was expecting," Chen said. He launched Hua Medicine in 2011 with $50 million from U.S. and Chinese investors. Last month, it closed another $25 million in series-B financing.

The returnee start-ups are leveraging shifts in the global R&D landscape. The financial crisis, expiry of blockbuster drug patents, and mega-mergers have forced major drugs firms to reprioritize, giving newcomers a chance to develop promising compounds already in the pipeline.

Hua is about to launch Phase 2 trials for a novel Type 2 diabetes drug in-licensed from Roche. Zai Laboratory, another returnee firm, has an in-licensing deal with Sanofi to develop two compounds to potentially treat chronic respiratory diseases.

    By focusing on diseases that are on the rise in China, these firms can recruit from a vast patient population, speeding up the time it takes to conduct clinical studies.

    However, China's regulatory environment, especially for drug approval, "has been quite inefficient and often inadequate," says Jonathan Wang at OrbiMed, a global healthcare-dedicated investment firm. Getting approval for human trials can take over a year, compared to just weeks in the United States.

"Everything else being equal, you'd go where the approval process is easier," said Wang.

EMPTY NESTS AND ANGEL MONEY

    For some, coming home is as much a personal as professional issue. Many are 'empty nesters' whose own children are now at college, or they have ageing parents.

"In the U.S., people have family and friends who can support them with 'angel money.' As first-generation immigrants, we don't have that kind of access there," said Zhang at J&J Innovation.

For the returnees, it's just the beginning.

    "We've planted the seed for a fast-growing, innovation driven environment in China," said Steve Yang, chief operating officer at WuXi AppTec. "The impact of this group will be better measured in another 10-20 years."

1NC No I/L

Censorship just causes offshoring of Chinese biotech scientists- that just means they relocate to places like the US and continue doing their research

1AC EV Jacobs 1/29/15

Andrew Jacobs is an American correspondent for The New York Times. Jacobs has been based in Beijing, China, since April 2008, NYT, January 29, 2015, “China Further Tightens Grip on the Internet”, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/asia/china-clamps-down-still-harder-on-internet-access.html

On Tuesday, however, a senior official at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology acknowledged that the government was targeting V.P.N.s to foster the “healthy development” of the nation’s Internet and he announced that such software was essentially illegal in China. “The country needs new methods to tackle new problems,” Wen Ku, a director at the ministry, said at a news conference, according to People’s Daily. In recent weeks, a number of Chinese academics have gone online to express their frustrations, particularly over their inability to reach Google Scholar, a search engine that provides links to millions of scholarly papers from around the world. “It’s like we’re living in the Middle Ages,” Zhang Qian, a naval historian, complained on the microblog service Sina Weibo. In an essay that has been circulating on social media, one biologist described how the unending scramble to find ways around website blockages was sapping colleagues’ energy. “It’s completely ridiculous,” he wrote of the wasted hours spent researching and downloading V.P.N. software that works. “For a nation that professes to respect science and wants to promote scientific learning, such barriers suggest little respect for the people actually engaged in science.” It is not just scientists who have come to depend on an unabridged Internet for their work. Cheng Qingsong, a prominent film critic, complained that it was more and more difficult to stream foreign movies. Andrew Wang, a professor of translation at Beijing Language and Culture University, worried that his students would be unable carry out assignments that require them to watch English-language videos on YouTube, which has long been blocked here. The vast majority of Chinese Internet users, especially those not fluent in English and other foreign languages, have little interest in vaulting the digital firewall. But those who require access to an unfiltered Internet are the very people Beijing has been counting on to transform the nation’s low-end manufacturing economy into one fueled by entrepreneurial innovation. Illustrating such contradictions, the central government this week announced a series of programs that seek to lure more international business talent by easing visa requirements and through other incentives. “We have to focus on the nation’s strategic goals and attract high-level talent to start innovative businesses in China,” said Zhang Jianguo, director of the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, who bemoaned the nation’s shortage of scientists and technology entrepreneurs. Those goals, however, will not be helped by the assaults on Internet access, critics say. Avery Goldstein, a professor of contemporary Chinese studies at the University of Pennsylvania, said the growing online constraints would not only dissuade expatriates from relocating here, but could also compel ambitious young Chinese studying abroad to look elsewhere for jobs. “If they aren’t able to get the information to do their jobs, the best of the best might simply decide not to go home,” he said. For those who have already returned to China and who crave membership in an increasingly globalized world, the prospect of making do with a circumscribed Internet is dispiriting. Coupled with the unrelenting air pollution and the crackdown on political dissent, a number of Chinese said the blocking of V.P.N.s could push them over the edge. “It’s as if we’re shutting down half our brains,” said Chin-Chin Wu, an artist who spent almost a decade in Paris and who promotes her work online. “I think that the day that information from the outside world becomes completely inaccessible in China, a lot of people will choose to leave.”

India fills in to solve- that’s probably where the Chinese scientists would go btw since your ev says their firms are basically identical

1AC EV Frew et. al, 8

[Sarah Frew is a research associate at the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health, University Health Network and University of Toronto, in Ontario, Canada. Hannah Kettler is a program officer at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in Seattle, Washington. Peter Singer is a senior scientist at the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health, “ The Indian And Chinese Health Biotechnology Industries: Potential Champions Of Global Health?,” Health Affairs, 27, no. 4 (2008)]

DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND DELIVERY OF "accessible"—that is, affordable, appropriate, and available—products to treat infectious diseases such as HIV, malaria, TB, and respiratory and diarrheal diseases, as well as noncommunicable diseases, are critical to improving the health of the world’s poor. During the past ten years, global health product development has improved dramatically, with new money from government and philanthropic donors, new not-for-profit initiatives, and contributions of expertise from the private sector. But sustainable solutions are still lacking. One approach to this problem is to explore opportunities to use the market potential of the poor.1 As Bill Gates noted in his June 2007 remarks at Harvard’s commencement: We can make market forces work better for the poor if we can develop a more creative capitalism—if we can stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or at least make a living, serving people who are suffering from the worst inequities.2 Multinational drug companies and even some larger biotechnology companies are making important contributions to global health through product donation and not-for-profit research and development (R&D) initiatives.3 However, their core business model, which depends primarily on earning blockbuster returns to compensate risky and expensive R&D and commercialization while also meeting investors’ expectations for return on investment (ROI), is by definition poorly suited to addressing the health needs of the world’s poorest populations. Through a better understanding of how pharmaceutical and biotech companies in India and China are already making a profit serving the poor, we can gain insight into sustainable business models in global health. Drug manufacturers in China and India—specifically, Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Hetero—are well known in the global health community for manufacturing and selling low-cost antimalarial and antiretroviral therapies in Africa. Less well known are the products and strategies of the emerging biotech companies in India and China. Our case studies of Indian and Chinese biotech companies reveal a surprising and important focus on appropriate, affordable products for infectious diseases and other local maladies.4 For example, we found that Shanghai United Cell Biotech had developed the only tablet formulation of cholera vaccine; that the Serum Institute of India (Pune), through its 138-country global distribution network and relationships with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), provides one of every two doses of vaccine given worldwide; and that Shantha Biotechnics (Hyderabad) developed a cost-effective manufacturing process for hepatitis B vaccine (Shanvac-B), India’s first indigenously developed recombinant DNA product, driving down the price from US$15 per dose for the imported product to US$0.50, and is now supplying about 30 percent of UNICEF’s global requirement for hepatitis B vaccine. In addition, recent changes in intellectual property (IP), industrial, trade, and regulatory policies have caused Indian and Chinese companies to move farther up the value chain—investing in innovative research and entering new, wealthier markets. We contend that existing global health financing vehicles could be made more sustainable through greater inclusion of emerging-market companies.

1NC AT Disease Impact

No impact to any diseases

Nick Beckstead 14, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter Doherty, recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the University of Edinburgh, Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, “How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18 Nov 2014, Science Direct

That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion. While there is little published work on human extinction risk from pandemics, it seems that it would be extremely challenging for any pandemic—whether natural or manmade—to leave the people in a specially constructed refuge as the sole survivors. In his introductory book on pandemics (Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues:¶ “No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species. Even without the protection provided by modern science, we survived smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded history. Way back when human numbers were very small, infections may have been responsible for some of the genetic bottlenecks inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is no formal proof of this.”¶ Though some authors have vividly described worst-case scenarios for engineered pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a special effort to infect people in highly isolated locations, especially the 100+ “largely uncontacted” peoples who prefer to be left alone. This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery systems, flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these people.

1NC AT PovertyRadicalization

Poverty doesn’t lead to radicalization- that’s their internal link claim

Heathershaw and Montgomery ’14 [John Heathershaw and David W. Montgomery, The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics, November 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141111PostSovietRadicalizationHeathershawMontgomery.pdf]

It has become routine to assume that the combination of authoritarianism and poverty cause radicalization. 24 This claim is prevalent throughout ICG reporting. The 2011 report Central Asia: Decay and Decline noted that Central Asian governments ‘should realize that tolerating the status quo will bring about the very problems they fear most – further impoverishment and instability, radicalization and latent state collapse’. 25 The ‘disappearance of basic services’, 26 ‘poor living conditions, corruption and abuse of office’, 27 ‘economic crisis and rigged elections’, 28 ‘declining¶ demand for labour migrants’, 29 ‘woeful social and economic conditions’, 30 and ‘a venal and corrupt political elite’ are all cited as causes of radicalization in ICG reports. 31 The conflation of political and economic underdevelopment in these reports reflects a deep-seated modernization thinking which is routine in Western secular security discourse and particularly evident in ICG reports. From this very narrow optic, it is underdevelopment which causes both high levels of religiosity and religious violence. Even Central Asia’s one emerging economy is subject to this analysis. The report Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change puts it bluntly, While there are many different theories as to who is behind the [terrorist] attacks [that Kazakhstan suffered in 2011] and the kind of ideology and agenda they follow, the expert and political community in Kazakhstan is almost unanimous about the main reason for the existence and spread of religious radicalisation: the grim socio-economic situation in the regions, especially the west. 32 This claim in the myth of post-Soviet radicalization is apparently commonsensical and is consistent with the kind of political analysis offered by many journalists and policy commentators. It is particularly powerful because it is widely shared between the elites of Western states, regional powers and Central Asian republics (all of whom have experienced long-term and large-scale secular modernization themselves). Non-governmental voices in the least repressive parts of Central Asia are quick to make similar claims. For example, the Kyrgyz analyst Kanybek Osmaniliev refutes the claim that recent acts of political violence in Kyrgyzstan could be considered ‘religious terrorism’ but speculates about the increased influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in the country as a reaction to the authoritarian nature of the government. 33 Such an analysis is consistent with the international secularist security discourse about Islam in Central Asia. Once again, however, there is little or no evidence to support this claim. There are no reliable data on the magnitude of support across the region for banned transnational groups – violent or nonviolent – that hold extremist political views. However, such groups clearly have some support in Kazakhstan (by far the wealthiest Central Asian republic) and in Kyrgyzstan (one of the poorest). These are also the two ‘most democratic’ according to respected indices. Yet Turkmenistan, with the most authoritarian government in the region, has not seen acts of violent extremism. Uzbekistan is also highly authoritarian but has successfully suppressed and/or ejected most of the groups that have emerged on its territory. In Tajikistan, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that were minor players during the civil war declined following its conclusion in the late 1990s. 34 The Tajik experience suggests that there is an obvious relationship between political instability and the manifestation of violent extremism, including, though by no means primarily, Islamic extremism. But this is to make a statement that borders on tautology. Where there is conflict, Islam – as a¶ major social force – will find itself drawn into that mix as one of several sources of contention and conciliation. 35 All this is not to diminish the importance of poverty, authoritarian government and attendant political instability in the region’s plight. It is merely to say that there is no evidence to support the idea that radicalization is more likely to occur in authoritarian states and among poor populations. Furthermore there is growing evidence suggesting that a small number of individuals and small groups are drawn to violent extremism from within democratic and prosperous Western societies. However, scholars of radicalization are able to offer few convincing and valid explanations for why (and where) this radicalization takes place.