The United States Congress should restrict the National Security Agency’s ability to collect “bulk data” without a warrant

1NC---Unsustainable

Economic collapse is 100% inevitable---the only question is whether it happens fast enough to avoid warming

Dr. Samuel Alexander 14, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, February 2014, “Post-Growth Economics: A Paradigm Shift in Progress,” http://www.sustainable.unimelb.edu.au/files/mssi/Post-Growth%20Economics.pdf

There is one final post-growth perspective deserving of acknowledgement, even if the intricacies cannot be explored. It builds upon the recognition by some ecological economists that there is a close connection between energy use and economic activity (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012). From this view – sometimes called ‘biophysical economics’ – the unprecedented levels of economic growth experienced since the industrial revolution have been largely due to the available abundance of cheap energy in the forms of coal, gas, and especially oil. Fossil fuels are finite resources, however, and energy analysts since Marion King Hubbert (1956) have known that at some time the production of finite fossil fuels will ‘peak’ and, after a plateau, eventually enter decline. The concern here is that, while production may plateau, demand is still expected to increase (Hirsch et al, 2010), thereby putting an upward pressure on the price of fossil fuels, even as the ‘energy return on investment’ declines (Murphy and Hall, 2011). This phenomenon seems to be underway already in relation to oil, with crude oil production entering a plateau around 2005, causing the price of oil to increase from around $25 per barrel, historically, to an average price of $110 since 2011 (IEA, 2013a: 2). In a world that consumes 90 million barrels of oil every day, such sharp price rises have significant economic implications, by sucking discretionary expenditure and investment away from the rest of the economy. Indeed, some analysts argue that expensive oil is at least part of the reason the global economy, which is so dependent on oil for transport, pesticides, plastics, etc., is showing persistent signs of stagnation and instability (Heinberg, 2011). Furthermore, if expensive oil and other ‘limits to growth’ are indeed bringing an end to more than two centuries of economic growth, then this is likely to cause havoc with the heavily indebted societies around that world that currently, under a capitalist framework, depend on growth to pay back debts and keep unemployment at bay. At the pessimistic end of the spectrum, some analysts argue that the global financial crisis was merely the first of series of forthcoming crises that are going to increase in magnitude as the growth model fails to deal with, or even acknowledge, energy, resource, and debt limits (Tverberg, 2012). From such perspectives, the world may have an alternative to the growth model imposed upon it sooner rather than later, irrespective of whether the world wants or is ready for such an alternative (see, e.g. Clarke and Lawn, 2010).

The relationship between energy and economics also becomes problematic in the context of climate change mitigation. Currently, fossil fuels make up over 80% of the global energy supply (IEA, 2013b: 6). If nations around the world choose to decarbonise economies in response to climate change (see Wiseman et al, 2013), this may well imply an end to growth, or even significant economic contraction, because there are serious doubts about whether renewable energy will be able to fully replace the energy-dense fossil fuels in a timely or affordable way (see, e.g. Trainer, 2013a, 2013b). This is not an argument against renewable energy, of course; the suggestion is merely that growth-orientated consumer societies could not be sustained if the world rapidly decarbonised to run solely or primarily on renewable sources of energy (Hopkins and Miller, 2013). A transition to 100% renewable energy, therefore, may well imply consuming significantly less energy, and in the highly developed regions of the world, energy descent would probably mean transitioning to some post-growth economic paradigm via a process of planned economic contraction, or degrowth. Kevin Anderson’s work is particularly important here (see Anderson, 2013), for he is one of the only climate scientists who recognises (or is outspoken enough to say) that the world’s shrinking carbon budget requires degrowth and reduced consumption in high consumption societies. That is not an implication many are prepared to accept, even amongst many or even most participants in the broad environmental movement. Indeed, this blindness – it might even be wilful blindness – is arguably the environmental movement’s greatest short-coming.

2NC---Unsustainable

Economic collapse inevitable --- now’s better than later

MacKenzie 8 [Debora, Are We Doomed, New Scientist, Vol. 197 Issue 2650, p32-35, 4p, 4 May 2005, EBSCO)

DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet, leaving a few survivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every civilisation in history has collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different? Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid, all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic pandemic. Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the very nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is destined to collapse sooner or later? A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity theory suggest that they are right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing down. Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too late, and that we can - we must - act now to keep disaster at bay. History is not on our side. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya. In his 2005 best-seller, Jared Diamond of the University of California, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the same way unless we choose to stop destroying our environmental support systems. Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees. He has that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about saving civilisation," he says. Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started to settle down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years, problem solving has produced increasing complexity in human societies," says Joseph Tainter, an archaeologist at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies. If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a bigger population, build more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums paid. That much the Sumerians knew. Diminishing returns There is, however, a price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost in terms of energy, the common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And increasing complexity, Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced by each extra hour of labour - or joule of energy invested per farmed hectare - diminishes as that investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere, Tainter says. To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of specialists, more resources to manage, more information to juggle - and, ultimately, less bang for your buck. Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing level of complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade, overstretched institutions break down and civil order collapses. What emerges is a less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group. Tainter sees diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all ancient civilisations, from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar energy that could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart. Western industrial civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but these are limited. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns: the energy required to get is mounting and although global is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope with environmental degradation and evolving - the yield boosts per unit of investment in innovation are shrinking. "Since problems are inevitable," Tainter warns, "this process is in part ineluctable." Is Tainter right? An analysis of complex systems has led Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history. Social organisations become steadily more complex as they are required to deal both with environmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring societies that are also becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says. This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the way the society is organised. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they are managing," Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to networks in which decision-making is distributed. We are at this point. This shift to decentralised networks has led to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't foresee a collapse in society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in which decision making was centralised. Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that didn't." As connections increase, though, networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled. This means the impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher vulnerability in some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood." The reason is that as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them. "The intricate networks that tightly connect us together - and move people, materials, information, money and energy - amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising effects, from one side of the world to the other." For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and Europe suffered when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly coupled networks like these create the potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on industrial accidents and disasters. Credit crunch Perrow says interconnectedness in the global production system has now reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown everywhere". This is especially true of the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest player, the US. The

consequences could be enormous." "A networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam, "random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear - it may not even be predictable - which chunks of our densely networked civilisation are critical, until it's too late. "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you lose enough of it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable. That means civilisation is very vulnerable." So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place - something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle. Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex systems are prone to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in ecosystems, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily more complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly coupled system. "It becomes an extremely efficient system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions - an insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the impact cascades through the system. The end result may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one. Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our systems to a narrow range of conditions, he says. Redundancy is being systematically eliminated as companies maximise profits. Some products are produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes sense, as mass production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity and speed of our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits." Is there an alternative? Could we heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder? Tainter knows of only one civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine empire lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they simplified their entire society. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to peasant militia." Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more advanced society. Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we need to encourage distributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even if its suppliers are temporarily out of action." The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest. Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what he calls "tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled system outside the range of conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth, the growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are running out of cheap and plentiful energy. "This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to allow for the healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal," Homer-Dixon says. This is what happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by increasing complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse. Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The world can no longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am starting to see how an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a race between tipping points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more. Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute limits. Studies of the way by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable.

AT: Tech

Tech’s not sufficient to make global industrial civilization environmentally sustainable

Dr. Samuel Alexander 14, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute; and Jonathan Rutherford, Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex, 2014, “The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition,” Simplicity Institute, http://simplicityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Deep-Green-Alternative.pdf

Evidence continues to mount that industrial civilisation, driven by a destructive and insatiable growth imperative, is chronically unsustainable, as well as being grossly unjust. The global economy is in ecological overshoot, currently consuming resources and emitting waste at rates the planet cannot possibly sustain (Global Footprint Network 2013). Peak oil is but the most prominent example of a more general situation of looming resource scarcity (Klare, 2012), with high oil prices having a debilitating effect on the oil-dependent economies which are seemingly dependent on cheap oil to maintain historic rates of growth (Heinberg, 2011). At the same time, great multitudes around the globe live lives of material destitution, representing a vast, marginalised segment of humanity that justifiably seeks to expand its economic capacities in some form (World Bank, 2008). Biodiversity continues to be devastated by deforestation and other forms of habitat destruction (United Nations, 2010), while the global development agenda seems to be aiming to provide an expanding global population with the high-impact material affluence enjoyed by the richest parts of the world (Hamilton, 2003). This is despite evidence crying out that the universalisation of affluence is environmentally unsupportable (Smith and Positano, 2010; Turner, 2012) and not even a reliable path to happiness (Lane, 2001; Alexander, 2012a). Most worrying of all, perhaps, is the increasingly robust body of climate science indicating the magnitude of the global predicament (IPCC, 2013). According to the Climate Tracker Initiative (2013: 4), the world could exceed its 'carbon budget' in around 18 years, essentially locking us into a future that is at least 2 degrees warmer, and threatening us with 4 degrees or more. It is unclear to what extent civilisation as we know it is compatible with runaway climate change. And still, almost without exception, all nations on the planet - including or especially the richest ones - continue to seek GDP growth without limit, as if the cause of these problems could somehow provide the solution. If once it was hoped that technology and science were going to be able decouple economic activity from ecological impact, such a position is no longer credible (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011). Technology simply cannot provide any escape from the fact that there are biophysical limits to growth. Despite decades of extraordinary technological advance, which it is was promised would lighten the ecological burden of our economies, global energy and resource consumption continues to grow, exacerbated by a growing population, but which is primarily a function of the growth-orientated values that lie at the heart of global capitalism (Turner, 2012).

Against this admittedly gloomy backdrop lies a heterogeneous tradition of critical theorists and activists promoting what could be called a 'deep green' alternative to the growth-orientated, industrial economy. Ranging from the radical simplicity of Henry Thoreau (1983), to the post-growth economics of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al, 1972; 2004), and developing into contemporary expressions of radical reformism (Latouche, 2009; Heinberg, 2011; Jackson, 2009), eco-socialism (Sarkar, 1999; Smith, 2010), and eco-anarchism (Bookchin, 1989; Holmgren, 2002; Trainer; 2010a), this extremely diverse tradition nevertheless agrees that the nature of the existing system is inherently unsustainable. Tinkering with or softening its margins - that is, any attempt to give capitalism a 'human face' - is not going to come close to addressing the problems we, the human species, are confronted with. What is needed, this tradition variously maintains, is a radically alternative way of living on the Earth - something 'wholly other' to the ways of industrialisation, consumerism, and limitless growth. However idealistic or Utopian their arguments might seem, the basic reasoning is that the nature of any solutions to current problems must honestly confront the magnitude of the overlapping crises, for else one risks serving the destructive forces one ostensibly opposes.

*1NC – Trade Bad

Trade regionalism coming now and solves war, the aff’s push for global trade liberalization decks the transition

Brkic 13, Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo (Snježana, 3/25, Regional Trading Arrangements – Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275)

Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists, such as Frankel and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international economic integrations can vary and that, for this reason, regionalism can be – depending on circumstances – linked to greater or smaller global trade liberalization. In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of regionalism occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new regionalism". The most specific characteristics of new regionalism include: geographic spread of RTAs in terms of encompassing entire continents; greater speed; integration forms success; deepening of integration processes; and, the most important for this theoretical discussion, generally non-negative impact on outsiders, world economy as a whole, and the multilateral liberalization process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish between the "benign" and "malign" regionalism. On the one hand, regionalism can advance the international economic stability, multilateral liberalization and world peace. On the other, it can have mercantilist features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts. Analyses of trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. Forces driving the contemporary regionalism development differ from those that used to drive earlier regionalism periods in the 20th century. The present regionalism emerged in the period characterized by the increasing economic inter-dependence between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent attempts to make the members' participation in the world economy easier, rather than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new initiatives are less frequently motivated exclusively by political interests, and are less frequently being used for mercantilist purposes. After the Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also contributed to the prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional integrations primarily seem to lead to trade creation. Contrary to the “beggar thy- neighbor” model of former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of the "optimistic" proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this growth results both from the increase in intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional trade has been growing faster, both by total value and by its share in world GDP. The extra-regional trade share in GDP was increasing in some regions – in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to whether the extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance, transport communications, political relations among states. One should also take into account certain contemporary integration features – the primarily economic, rather than strategic motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes countries that are significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA, many believe that the negative effects on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been highly integrated economies for a long time already, while the Mexican economy is relatively small. The same view was pointed out by the EU, with respect to its expansion. It particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this will actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with these countries. Most EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area (EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few years already, and conduct some 70% of their total international exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most significant foreign-trade partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion. Besides, according to some earlier studies, during the previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was far greater than trade diversion: trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin America, the new regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extra-regional exports and imports also continued to grow. Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to 12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30 Since the described trends point to the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character. Besides, the pending establishment of FTAA – Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the same group, the so-called "natural" trade partners – countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore unlikely to be affected by strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows that intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the most powerful countries, i.e. blocs, are extremely dependent on the rest of the world in terms of trade. For the EU, besides the intra-European trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well. The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides, the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55. Any attempt to move towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade, other research was conducted that was supposed to point to the reasons why the new regionalism has mainly a non-negative impact on outsiders and global liberalization. The distinctive features of new regionalism were also affected to characteristics of international economic and political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however, the neo-liberalism represented by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground” in all parts of the world. Regionalism growth in the circumstances of multilateral system existence is, among other things, the consequence of distrust in multilateralism. „The revival of the forces of regionalism stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper liberalization within more limited groups of like-minded nations... Such efforts would at least liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to go along with multilateral liberalization.“33 Kennedy's round and Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain progress in the global trade liberalization. However, the 1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision. In this vacuum that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism from the point when GATT inadequacy became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution – establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started working on designing a North American integration.

2NC – Multilat Trade is Worse/RTAs Solve War

That outweighs—multilateral trade causes wars with a larger impact

Thoma- Economics Prof, U of Oregon- ‘7 Mark, Trade Liberalization and War, July, http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/trade-liberaliz.html

Globalisation is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade flows. What then was the net effect of increased trade since 1970? We find that it generated an increase in the probability of a bilateral conflict by around 20% for those countries separated by less than 1000kms, the group of countries for which the risk of disputes that can escalate militarily is the highest. The effects are much smaller for countries which are more distant. Contrary to what these results (aggravated by our nationality) may suggest, we are not anti-globalisation activists even though we are aware that some implications of our work could be (mis)used in such a way. The result that bilateral trade is pacifying brings several more optimistic implications on globalisation. First, if we think of a world war as a war between two large groups or coalitions of countries, then globalisation makes such a war less likely because it increases the opportunity cost of such a conflict. Obviously, this conclusion cannot be tested but is a logical implication of our results. From this point of view, our work suggests that globalisation may be at the origin of a change in the nature of conflicts, less global and more local. Second, our results do confirm that increased trade flows created by regional trade agreements (such as the EU) are indeed pacifying as intended. Given that most military conflicts are local, because they find their origins in border or ethnic disputes, this is not a small achievement. These beneficial political aspects of regional trade agreements are not usually considered by economists who often focus on the economic distortions brought by their discriminatory nature. Given the huge human and economic costs of wars, this political effect of regional trade agreements should not be discounted. This opens interesting questions on how far these regional trade agreements should extend – a topical issue in the case of the EU. The entry of Turkey in the EU would indeed pacify its relations with EU countries (especially Greece and Cyprus), but also increase the probability of a conflict between Turkey and its non-EU neighbours. However, our simulations suggest that in this case, the first effect dominates the second by a large margin. More generally, our results should be interpreted as a word of caution on some political aspects of globalisation. As it proceeds and weakens the economic ties of proximate countries, those with the highest risk of disputes that can escalate into military conflicts, local conflicts may become more prevalent. Even if they may not appear optimal on purely economic grounds, regional and bilateral trade agreements, by strengthening local economic ties, may therefore be a necessary political counterbalance to economic globalisation.

2NC – RTAs Solve Trade/Multilat Impacts

RTAs best solve their impacts

Powell & Low 11 (Stephen Powell --- Professor of International Trade Law @ Florida Law and former chief counsel for Department of Commerce, Trisha Low --- JD from Levin College and Associate Legal Counsel @ Deutsche Bank, “Is the WTO Quietly Fading Away?: The New Regionalism and Global Trade Rules” 2011, 9 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 261)

D. RTAs Increase Liberalization

RTAs provide flexibility in terms of their design and content.58 Countries often have a number of non-economic considerations in approaching RTAs such as national security and regional stability.59 RTAs in Latin America and the Caribbean have occurred for various reasons including economic complementarity, geographical proximity, and political affinity.60 They can address issues on a regional level that multilateral agreements cannot, such as migration, energy, transit, water, customs, labor, and standards.61 The specific problems related to each issue differ based upon the country and region. Therefore, it is not feasible for multilateral agreements to encompass each of these issues in a way that is favorable to all countries involved. It would make multilateral agreements far too complicated and cumbersome. RTAs provide a framework for making progress on these issues.62 In addition, many governments are more familiar with the governments of neighboring countries and RTAs provide a forum for promoting liberalization in a manner that is consistent with their national interests.63 For example, MERCOSUR was established to decrease tensions between Brazil and Argentina.64 "It also helped avert a coup in Paraguay following reaffirmation by the presidents of the MERCOSUR member countries that democracy was a condition for membership."65 While MERCOSUR was established to become a customs union, it also provides member countries a platform to discuss other issues such as security and drug trafficking.66 Trade liberalization increases competition in domestic markets.67 For some countries it is not politically feasible to open its internal market to trade from all countries.68 Therefore, RTAs provide a stepping stone toward liberalization.69 RTAs condition states for liberalization, while making states more amenable to true multilateral trade.70 RTAs may also encourage countries to liberalize by presenting a non-member country with a "carrot" if it liberalizes.71 Under the "carrot" approach, RTAs can merge and expand to encompass more economies as a bridge to global trade.72 RTAs can increase liberalization through new trade rules in the area of market regulations and investment rules.73 By eliminating internal barriers and creating larger internal markets, these new trade rules can raise the return on investments and create an incentive for members and third countries to invest.74 Firms investing in the RTA countries can achieve economies of scale by serving a larger market of potential buyers, decrease their transaction costs, and if services are included, can benefit from more efficient telecommunications, financial, and other services.75 New trade rules may also induce greater efficiency in transactions with the global economy. Investments to reach the local market may include utilizing lower cost production sites within the RTA to serve the wealthier customers.76 For example, one study done in 2004 showed that firms in the businesses of electronics, textiles, and autos moved their production to Mexico to serve the U.S. market.77 Some scholars argue that removal by RTAs of trade barriers among partners can create economies of scope at the individual firm level and economies of scale at the industry level.78 Economies of scope and economies of scale allow for the increased rationalization of production, leading to the efficient use of resources and resulting in a greater volume of global trade.79 This benefits members and non-members, and the benefits which spill over to outsiders may outweigh the costs of the original trade diversion.80 Larger markets can increase competition between suppliers and take advantage of differing regional factor prices in order to increase productivity and cause more rapid growth.81 Increased competition forces firms to develop more efficient methods of production and can decrease the cost of the product. Firms have an incentive to create goods that are cheaper and more improved than similar goods from similar firms, thereby benefitting the global welfare. This rapid growth attracts intra-bloc and extra-bloc investments.82

Solves trade faster and more efficiently

Leal-Arcas 11 (Rafael, PhD – European University Institute, JSM – Stanford Law, LLM – Columbia Law, M. Phil – London School of Economics, BA/JD – Granada University, Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law & European Union Law and Deputy Director of Graduate Studies @ Queen Mary University of London, “Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?” Winter 2011, 11 Chi. J. Int'l L. 597)

The development of new technologies has also contributed toward shaping international trade by changing the way business is conducted and the way people interact. The rapid development of technology has generated both new challenges and new opportunities for economic agents worldwide. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy recently said that "it now costs less to ship a container from Marseille to Shanghai--half way around the world--than to move it from Marseille to Avignon--100 kilometers away. A phone call to Los Angeles [from Europe] is as inexpensive as a phone call next door." n77 What are [*621] then the main economic, political, and technological factors shaping world trade? What is the potential of technological progress and innovation for improving the trading position of the poorest countries? What is the role of the WTO rules-based multilateral system in contributing to the global economic recovery? Might these be reasons why countries engage in RTAs so frequently? n78 There are both economic and political reasons why countries engage in RTAs so frequently. One of the economic reasons for the conclusion of RTAs is that countries are in constant search for larger markets since they feel the pressure of competitive regional liberalization. The negotiations of EPAs n79 between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) n80 countries and the EU are of particular relevance in this process, not least because of their importance for LDCs. EPAs have been negotiated with ACP regions engaged in a regional economic integration process. EPAs are thus intended to consolidate regional integration initiatives within the ACP. They are also aimed at providing an open, transparent, and predictable framework for goods and services to circulate freely, thus increasing the competitiveness of the ACP and ultimately facilitating the transition toward their full participation in a liberalizing world economy--thereby complementing any initiative taken in the multilateral context. n81 Formal negotiations started in September 2002 and EPAs entered into force on January 1, 2008. Moreover, deeper integration is always much easier at the regional level than it is at the multilateral level. Furthermore, as we know from previous [*622] experience, multilateral negotiations can take a very long time and are very complex, whereas RTAs move much faster. n82 Despite repeated statements of support and of engagement, WTO Members seem incapable of marshalling the policies and political will needed to move the multilateral trade agenda forward. A worrying leadership vacuum has opened that has so far proven difficult to fill. A very good example is the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which started in November 2001 in the Qatari capital. A WTO mini-ministerial conference took place in July 2008 composed of a trade G-7. n83 Governments' attempts to salvage a deal in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations broke down on 29 July 2008, as trade ministers acknowledged that they were unable to reach a compromise after nine days of a WTO mini-ministerial summit. This raises the question of how to move forward in this complex international trade negotiations scenario. n84 Given how difficult it is to move forward multilaterally, there has been in recent years a proliferation of RTAs. Trade powers want to gain greater access to one another's markets but, at the same time, have struggled to lower their own trade barriers. n85 At the G8 Summit in Muskoka in June 2010, world leaders dropped a commitment to complete the troubled Doha Round in 2010 and vowed to push forward on bilateral and regional trade talks until a multilateral deal could be finalized. n86 This decision demonstrates that bilateralism/regionalism is the natural consequence of failed or troubled multilateralism. n87 This decision to [*623] move forward bilaterally/regionally certainly has dangerous repercussions for weak economies. n88 Assuming that the Doha Round will be concluded in 2011, it will then take another four years to ratify the multilateral agreements that will come out of the Round, which means that it will have taken at least fourteen years for these new multilateral agreements to see the light of day. There are several political reasons for countries to engage in RTAs: they ensure or reward political support; regulatory cooperation is easier regionally than it is multilaterally; there is less scope for free riding on the MFN principle; and there are always geopolitical as well as security interests for the conclusion of RTAs. Thus, while most countries continue to formally declare their commitment to the successful conclusion of the Doha Round--which would contribute toward enhancing market access and strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system--for many countries, bilateral deals have taken precedence and their engagement at the multilateral level is becoming little more than just a theoretical proposition. The emergence of rapidly growing economies and new forms of South-South relations, as illustrated by the case of China in Africa, further complicates the equation and renders the need for empirical research, information, and dialogues in this area even more acute. VI. EFFECTS OF REGIONALISM ON MULTILATERALISM The effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system remain unclear, as is their impact on trade and sustainable development. While preferential deals can contribute to strengthening regional integration, n89 some RTAs have generated negative effects on regional integration schemes, as was the case of the Andean [*624] Community-US RTA n90 and certain EPAs signed with individual countries and not with the region as a whole. The effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system are manifold. One of the positive effects is that RTAs allow for greater efficiency gains thanks to the elimination of barriers to trade, which is key to achieving economies of scale. n91 RTAs are also laboratories for change (a very good example being that of the EU, whose transformation since its inception in the 1950s has been absolutely remarkable n92). In addition, RTAs provide competition and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). An example of this last point is Spain in the case of the EU, or Mexico in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). n93 In both cases, Spain and Mexico benefited very much from FDI thanks to the EU and NAFTA, respectively.

It’s a sufficient substitute

Trakan 8 (Leon, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard); Professor of Law and Immediate Past Dean, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, “THE PROLIFERATION OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: BANE OR BEAUTY?” UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2007-54, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 42, 2008 ) ***Footnote 3 Added
The proliferation of bilateral trade agreements has helped to fill a gap in a multilateral trade process that is impeded by the impasse of negotiations in the World Trade Organization [WTO].1 At the same time, the development of bilateral trade agreements arguably has discouraged some states from engaging in multilateral negotiations.2 The result is a new genre of trade relations in which bilateral and regional mechanisms are increasingly adopted in substitution for multilateral trade processes.3 3 This sidelining of WTO dispute resolution will include the tendency to direct a greater volume of trade disputes to state courts and regional tribunals. On dispute resolution under the WTO, see Yang Guohua, Bryan Mercurio & Li Yongjie, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: A Detailed Interpretation (London, Kluwer Law International, 2005); Petros C. Mavroidis & N. David Palmeter, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Un. Press, 2004); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (London, the Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997). On regional trade agreements, see e.g. James H Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the International Trade Requirement (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002). While, bilateral trade agreements diverge significantly in their form and substance, they are having an important, albeit disparate impact upon multilateral trade.4