This book explores the impact of the 1917 Revolution on factory life
Partial economic action under present economic conditions can only lead to a
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- Despite the severity of their situation, separate demands by
| Partial economic action under present economic conditions can only lead to a
disorganised political struggle by workers in Petrograd. We therefore propose that the Putilov workers restrain their justified displeasure at the conduct of the ministers who have delayed the solution of the conflict by every means. We believe it is necessary to prepare our forces for a speedy and general action. Furthermore we propose to the Putilovtsy that they let the metal- workers’ union conduct negotiations with the employers and ministers concerning their demands ... We believe that even if the wage increases are now granted, the uninterrupted rise in the price of commodities and of accommodation will render this gain worthless. And so a decisive struggle is necessary to establish workers’ control of production and distribution, which, in turn, requires the transfer of power into the hands of the soviets.85 A Putilov worker, reporting on the conference for Pravda explained how the three-month struggle for better wages had radicalised his fellow-workers: ‘We have seen with our own eyes ... how the present Provisional Government refuses to take the resolute measures against the capitalists, without which our demands cannot be satisfied. The interests of the capitalists are dearer to it than the interests of the working class.’86 By the end of June the labour organisations of Putilov could not contain the militancy of the low-paid, and found themselves in danger of being sucked into the maelstrom of dis- content. On 26 June the works committee and the district soviet set up a ‘revolutionary committee’ to keep order at the factory. A Bolshevik member of the works committee, I.N. Sokolov, reported: ‘The mass of workers in the factory ... are in a state of turmoil because of the low rates of pay, so that even we, the members of the works committee, have been seized by the collar, dragged into the shops and told: “Give us money.”’87 By 3 July the labour organisations could restrain the workers no longer. Having made contact with revolutionary regi- ments, they emptied onto the streets.88 The imbroglio of the July Days seems to have had little effect on the movement of the low-paid. On 1 July the first proper delegate conference of chemorabochiefvaA taken place, with representatives from 29 of the largest factories. This demanded fixed prices on subsistence commodities and voted against action by individual factories.89 On 7 July the chemorabochie at Putilov met together to declare that they could no longer live on 6 r.20 k. a day. They demanded ten rubles and a ‘curb on the rapacious appetites of those blood-suckers and pirates who speculate in everyday necessities’.90 Three days later the second delegate conference of chemorabochie met to discuss the deadlock which had overtaken negotiations on the contract. Negotiations between the metal union and the SFWO had begun on 22 June. They almost immediately reached an impasse, because of what Shlyapnikov described as ‘the groundless rejection by our factory delegates of all the SFWO proposals, particularly the point about guaranteed productivity norms’.91 According to Gastev, only four out of the 200 delegates voted for the productivity clause on 25 June.92 Only after the board threatened to resign did a further delegate meeting on 2 July agree to accept productivity clauses as a way of ‘maintaining production at a proper level’ and of ‘removing the necessity for trivial personal supervision by members and organs of administration’. The delegates furthermore agreed that the fixing of norms of output ‘puts on the agenda the question of workers’ control of production as the necessary guarantee of both labour productivity and the productivity of the enterprise as a whole’.93 Having gained agreement in principle to a productivity clause in the contract, the union went back to the negotiating table on 12 July. It was only on 8July that the SFWO was told the rates of pay being proposed by the metal union. The draft contract recommended average hourly earnings of 2 r. to 2 r.20 k. for the highly skilled, 1 r. 90 k. for skilled workers; 1 r.75 k. for semi-skilled workers and rates of between 1 r. and 1 r.50 k. for unskilled male workers, falling to 80 k. for unskilled female workers.94 The SFWO did not object to the rates proposed for skilled categories, but rejected outright the rates proposed for the unskilled, since the relative cost of conceding the wage-increases to the low-paid would have been much greater than the cost of the increases to the highly-paid. Instead the employers proposed an hourly rate of 70 k. to 1 r. for unskilled men, falling to 60 k. for unskilled women, and between 1 r.30 k. and 1 r.50 k. for semi-skilled workers.95 Stalemate ensued and it was agreed on 14July to ask the Ministry of Labour to arbitrate. Against the advice of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which had not yet recovered from the battering it received at the hands of the Kerensky government after the July Days, the leaders of the metalworkers’ union began to prepare for a general strike. The blockage of the contract negotiations had created a further ground- swell of discontent among metalworkers and convinced the union leadership of the need for action. At Putilov around 17 July, mortisemakers, borers, planers and saddlemakers were all on strike - to the annoyance of the shop and works committees - but it was not until 22 July that general unrest blew up, with young workers in the gun-shop wrecking machinery.96 On that day the government arbitration commission announced its decision: chemorabochie were to get around 20% less, and semi-skilled workers around 15% less than had been proposed by the union, but more than was on offer from the SFWO.97 The latter immediately announced that it would not accept the decision. On 24 July a city-wide meeting of union delegates agreed, with one vote against and one abstention, to call a general strike. The next day 152 chemorabochie from 52 factories backed this decision. They also passed a political resolution which condemned the government for fawning to the capitalists and Kadets and for persecuting the Bolsheviks, and called for the transfer of power to the soviets.98 No sooner had the commitment to a general strike been made, than the Ministry of Labour announced that the settlement would be made binding on the employers. On 26 July a further meeting of union delegates met to discuss whether or not to go ahead with the strike, in view of the government’s decision. The feeling expressed by most factory delegates was that it would be very difficult to sustain a strike in the existing conditions. The union and all the socialist parties recommended acceptance of the arbitration settlement. But whilst the delegates agreed to call off the strike, they voted unanimously, with ten abstentions, not to accept the 20% reduction in the wage rates for chemorabockie." In spite of this, the board of the union accepted the reduced offer made by the arbitration commission, and managed to cajole a delegate meeting into accepting that the offer was the best they could hope to achieve. On 7 August the contract was duly signed.100 In the state sector there was strong opposition to the metal contract. Workers in enterprises subject to the Artillery Administra- tion insisted that the original rates proposed by the union be accepted, and the Administration reluctantly agreed on 26 September.101 A conference of workers in Naval Department enter- prises accepted the principles of the tariff on 11 September, but again argued for the original union rates. This led to wrangles between the Naval Department, the works committees and the metalworkers’ union, and a decision was made to hold a ballot of all workers under the Naval Department. At the Baltic works on 16 October the works committee discussed whether or not to accept the contract. A Bolshevik resolution recommending acceptance was passed by 29 votes to 15, against an anarchist resolution supporting higher rates and smaller differentials.102 The result of the general ballot, however, was to reject the final contract by 27,000 votes to 23,000.103 A settlement had still not been reached in the enterprises of the Naval Department at the time of the October uprising. The compromise reached between the metal union and the SFWO cost the chemorabochie dear. Rocketing inflation meant that by the time the contract came into force, the rates for the unskilled barely covered subsistence needs. In general, however, the chemorabochie resigned themselves to the contract, feeling that even an inadequate increase was better than none at all. At the Putilov works the chemorabochie initially refused to accept the terms worked out by the arbitration commission, but they later changed their minds. A further round of e'meutes broke out at the factory, however, after management refused to backdate the contract to 9 June — in direct contravention of the contract’s terms. Dissatisfaction with the contract, together with political frustration caused by the government’s failure to tackle the pressing problems afflicting the Russian people, encouraged chemor- abochie in the metal industry to continue meeting. During August three conferences took place to discuss redundancies, the growing counter-revolutionary threat and the crisis of the Kerensky govern- ment. After the Bolsheviks came to power the chemorabochie began to press for a revision of the rates of the tariff, some even arguing for equal pay for all workers.104 In November the chemorabochie refused to accept a new minimum of 10 r. a day, insisting on 12 r. Revised rates were finally implemented on 19 January 1918, and the least skilled were given the biggest percentage increases.105 The intention of the metalworkers’ contract was thus finally realised, but it was a pyrrhic victory, for by this time thousands of workers were being made redundant every day. To implement the contract, rates commissions were created in the factories. These were to distribute workers into skill-categories and to fix piece-rates. They consisted of equal numbers of worker and management representatives. Any unresolved disputes were to be referred to a Central Rates Commission, consisting of equal numbers from the metal union and the SFWO.106 With inflation soaring wildly, it was understandable that workers should have attempted to achieve as high a wage classification for themselves as possible. The refusal of the rates commissions to capitulate to such sectional pressure engendered bitter conflict. At the Putilov works a general meeting of planers, borers and mortisemakers called on workers in these three crafts in all factories to come to a conference to discuss their low categorisation in the contract.107 In the crucible-shop workers walked out in mid-September when they learnt the category to which they had been assigned. A general meeting of workers in the gun-shop called on them to return to work, saying ‘your strike only plays into the hands of the employers and disorganises the solid ranks of Putilov workers’.108 At the New Parviainen works some 200 fitters and turners in the repair department went on strike to protest their contract classification at the beginning of October — an action lauded by anarchists but deplored by the Bolshevik factory committee.109 Some time later chemorabochie at the factory demanded an equal wage for all workers regardless of skill — a demand turned down by a general factory meeting.110 At the Rosenkrantz works contract disputes had to be referred to the Central Rates Commission, which finally an- nounced its decision in early November. When the decision became known, several groups of workers placed in category three appeared at the director’s office armed with rifles to demand reclassification. When the director pointed out that they were flagrantly con- travening the decision of the Commission, the workers retorted: ‘We spit on the union and on its rates commission.’111 At the Cable, Anchar and Baranovskii works chemorabochie engaged in brief strikes in pro- test against the low rates of the contract.112 In a few factories man- agement was coerced into paying more than the going rate, but the metalworkers’ union strongly opposed this, suggesting to the SFWO that it fine any of its members who did not abide by the contract.113 As early as August, Shlyapnikov wrote a stern article in the union journal condemning sectional opposition to the contract: We propose to comrades dissatisfied with the rates commissions to send petitions directly to the union and not to try to settle disputes out of court, so as not to bring disorganisation into our ranks ... Our contract does not open the gates to the kingdom of socialism ... it is an agreement between two warring sides and thus has force only in so far as each side is organised.114 Three months later Shlyapnikov imputed such sectionalism to exclusive groups of craft workers in the industry: There cannot be several unions in one enterprise - all trades must unite in one family ... Every attempt by individual trades to use the ‘right moment’ to raise separate, particularist demands is inadmissible. The conscious layers of skilled metalworkers - fitters, turners, etc. - understand this beautifully, and refrain from any separate demands. The same position is taken by the very unfortunate, badly-paid chemorabochie. Despite the severity of their situation, separate demands by chemorabochie are rare. Particularism is apparent chiefly among small trades such as welders, who scarcely exceed a thousand people in the whole of Piter, also patternmakers, stokers, draughtsmen, who constitute an extremely limited number, but who are imbued with prejudices to the effect that their own profession is qualitatively different from any other, and that they cannot collaborate with others in the defence of their interests.115 Whilst craft consciousness may have played a part in fostering sectional opposition to the metalworkers’ contract, it is clear that many of the groups hostile to the contract were those whose earnings had fallen in real terms during the war. This was true, for example, of the importunate planers, borers and mortisemakers in the Putilov works.116. One should thus not exaggerate the extent to which craftist sentiment motivated opposition to the contract. The union faced considerable sectional opposition to the contract, but its ultimate success in implementing it in the majority of factories by October was no mean achievement, given the intractability of the industrial crisis. This achievement attests the fact that pressures towards class unity were, in the last analysis, stronger than those towards craft par- ticularism. THE WAGE CONTRACTS: KEY FEATURES A central aim of union policy in drawing up contracts was to reduce
The second contract increased wage-differentials slightly, which suggests that the printers’ leaders were forced to make some concession to craft pressure.121 Negotiation of the contract went less smoothly than in March. When the employers refused to backdate the contract to 1 August, the union brought out twenty print-works, employing 3,000 printers, in a well-organised strike.122 The em- ployers agreed to backdate the contract, but were criticised by the SFWO for so doing. In return, the union agreed to drop earlier demands for formal recognition of the right to control hiring and firing and for longer holidays. This concession provoked discontent among some radical printers (at the Kan works and elsewhere) and among envelope-makers, which the Bolsheviks did not fail to exploit. Nevertheless the union had the solid backing of the majority of printers - 90% of whom were union members, thus making them the most highly unionised group of industrial workers.123 The attempt to reduce differentials was central to the tariff policy of all major unions, as Table 14 makes clear. Differentials were highest in the glass industry, owing to the very high earnings of an elite of glassblowers, but they diminished dramatically after October. In the metal industry differentials had increased during the war, and the union tried to combat this trend by assigning larger percentage increases to the low-paid than to the higher-paid. The diminution in wage-differentials which came about was not just the result of tariff policy, but of market forces and inflation. The collapse of industry in
Source: Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, 1919 pp.22-3. early 1918 produced a reduction in differentials, which was especially marked in the wood, glass, leather, print and chemical industries. By April 1918 the metal union felt that this ‘spontaneous’ levelling had gone too far and, in an effort to create incentives for skilled workers, increased differentials from 139 to 175 between July and September.124 A second interesting aspect of contracts concerned their policy on piece-rates. Before 1917 the labour movement had generally opposed piece-rates, seeing them as the neplus ultra of the capitalist work-ethic and profoundly inimical to socialism. In 1907, for example, the first national conference of printers had urged their abolition.125 After the February Revolution piece-rates were abolished in many factories in the private sector, and the first contracts sought to formalise this abolition. The leather union contract initially demanded an end to piece-rates, but on 15 August the union dropped this demand in return for the SFWO’s acceptance of the rest of the contract.126 The rapid fall in labour-productivity seems to have persuaded other unions that piece-rates were inevitable. Clause six of the metal- workers’ contract declared that: ‘work must be done by piece in all cases where factory management finds such a method of work possible and technically necessary for the maintenance of produc- tion’.127 The rates commissions were to so determine piece-rates as to ensure that workers earned the hourly rates proposed by the tariff.128 In early October a meeting of 217 members of factory rates- commissions in the metal industry agreed that piece-rates need not be a means of‘wringing sweat’ from the workers.129 The woodturners’ contract also specified that piece-rates, determined jointly by the SFWO and the unions, should be the norm.130 There is no doubt that piece-rates were a powerful factor disposing the SFWO to accept contracts. In early September the employers’ newspaper opined: ‘The other extremely important point in our collective wage contracts concerns the introduction of piece-rates ... against which the workers fought so energetically until recently. This is dictated by the necessity of raising labour-productivity, which has fallen so low.’131 One of the most controversial aspects of the contracts was their productivity clauses. Employers were implacable in their insistence that in return for a guaranteed wage there should be guaranteed output. As we have seen, metal union leaders had to overcome strong opposition from rank-and-file delegates to get this principle accepted. The chemical workers’ contract included a productivity clause almost identical in wording to that of the metalworkers’ contract.132 The paperworkers’ contract specified that norms of output should be agreed jointly by management and workers and that in case of non-fulfilment of norms, workers should receive only two-thirds the agreed rate.133 In September the Provisional Central Committee of the national metalworkers’ union urged local branches to pay greater heed to productivity: Yüklə 4,02 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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