This dissertation has been

We say : The enjoyment of looking at the face of a beloved one in this world differs [in intensity] ac­cording to the factors [involved]. (For instance), (1) how perfeot or deficient the beauty of the beloved one is, [2) how perfect the power of love is, (3] how perfect the apprehending ability is, and (4] how strong the pressure

is of the confusing obstacles and of the pains preoccupying the heart. Consider [for instance] a- lover who is weak in his love looking at the face of his beloved one from behind a thin screen from a distance that prevents his real form

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from being *evealed, while at the same time he is in a state where scorpions and wasps have gathered upon him injuring and stinging him and preoccupying his heart. Under such circumstances he does not lack some enjoyment on account of witnessing the beauty of his beloved one. Now if suds. denly such a situation arises that the screen is rent away, the light shines, and the injurious objects are driven away from him so that he is left free from hurt and unoccupied. He is also assailed by such excessive strong passion and love that he attains^'the utmost limits (of them]. Considas now how his enjoyment so multiplies that his first enjoyment has no comparison of any significance to-it.

Likewise you should understand the enjoyment of observation as compared with that of knowledge : The thin screen^.is an example of the body and preoccupation by it. The scorpions and wasps are an example of the physical desires which exercise authority over man, such as hunger and thirst. Anger, anxiety, sorrow, weakness of passion and of love are an example of the failure of the soul in this world, its deficiency in yearning for the Heavenly

(19) • (20)

Host", and its turning towards "the lowest of the low".

19. 
    37:8; 38:69. Of. p. 89, 183 above.
    
20. 
    "Asfal - 95:5. The definite article al placed here before the term sfifilin is missing in the Qa7in.
    

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It is like [the case ofd a child who fails to see the en­joyment of being governor, and so gives himse.,f to playing with a sparrow.

No matter how great his knowledge in this world may become, a man of knowledge is not free from these phy­sical desires, nor is it conceivable at all that he should be free from them. It is true that in some cases these

obstacles may become weak and do not persist with him.

No wonder then if he appears (to possess] knowledge which is so perfect that it amazes the mind, the enjoyment of

which is so great that his heart reaches the point of
(21)

being unable to contain it. Yet that (state of affairs)

(188) is like a lightning that takes away the sight, for it seldom lasts. Rather some diverting factirs, some thoughts and impressions recur to him which disturb and trouble it. This is a permanent necessary condition in this transitory life. Enjoyment continues to be troubled till death. Comfortable life comes only after death, as real life is

life to come, "for surely the world to come is the world (22)

of real life, if they [only) knew this". Every one who

Oa

(29 lit. "stlitting asunder" (yanfatir). (22) 29 : 64(4.

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has reached this stage of knowledge surely like to meet God, and therefore likes death and does not hate it, ex 

cept for (the fast] that he looks' for further perfection (23)

in knowledge; for indeed knowledge has no bounds, and

so it is impossible to comprehend the real majesty of God. Yet the more abundant and greater becomes one's knowledge of God, of His attributes, deeds, and the mysteries of His Kingdom, the more abundant and greater becomes his joy of meeting Him.

0 God, do not take us out of this world except as those possessed with knowledge, who seek perfection in it, wholly taken up with [Thy, Oneness and separated from the affections and vanities of this world; by Thy mercy, 0 Thou Most Merciful One

(23) m*. "The ocean^-of knowledge has no shore (babr al-ma‘rifah 11 s as lahu).

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TART VII 3

A CONCLUDING SECTION ON

THE SCIENCE OF DIVINITY)

Its benefit has bearing upon the preceding isectionsj about the knowledge of the soul and its fa­culties, by which (knowledge] we proceed gradually to the knowledge of the Real One and His attributes and deeds; for beginnings lead up to conclusions, and conclusions refer back to beginnings. Every science which does not lead to the knowledge of the Creator is of no use or benefit, yielding but little profit or return.

CHAPTER XXVII ]

POD, HIS ATTRIBUTES AND DEEDS 3

(189) To proceed, we have proved the existence of the

soul in a general way by the knowledge of its actions and (1)

deeds. Thus we know the vegetable soul by its actions,

namely, absorption of nourishment, growth, and the repro­duction of its kind; the animal soul by its actions, such

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(1) Cf. p. 19 above.

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as, sensation and voluntary movement (harakah ikhtiviripah); and the human soul by its movement (tahrfk) and its ap­prehension of universals. We have also learned that these actions are connected with a source which is called soul. Their subsistence and specific property are due to that source, which is the soul. likewise you should know that an existent being is either one whose existence is con­tingent upon some other thing , the termination of which as an existent would involve the termination of the other, or one not so dependent. If it is contingent we call it one that is possible (min); if it is not we call it necessarily existing in itself (wiJib bidhitihi). The knowledge of the following things concerning the One Necessary of'Existence (Wilib al-Wu_/tad) necessarily follows :

1. 
   That He is not an accident since an ac­cident is dependent upon a body, whose cessation to exist necessarily results in its becoming non-existent.
   
2. 
   That He is not a body, since by its quantitative nature a body is divisible into parts, in which case the whole becomes dependent upon the pats, which [fact] makes it something caused. Besides, a body is composed of matter and form, both of which are in a way
   

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interdependent upon each other.

(3). That He is not like a form, sinoe a form is connected with matter; nor is He like matter since matter is the seat of a form, and does not exist except together with it.

(4), That His existence is no other than His being (maniiwah), which being is something other than

;(190) entity (101m1), for an existence of which entity is the expression is an accident of being. But every accident is something caused; for if it were something existing by itself it would not be an accident of some other thing, since that which is an accident of some other thing is dependent upon that other thing. Now, if its cause is something ether than being, then it (its cause] cannot be the One Who is necessary of existence, upon Whom all existing things depend. If its cause is being, being cannot be such before existence, as a cause is some­thing which has full existence; so before existence it does not exist. By this is proved that the entity Omni­yirah) of the One Who is necessary of existence is His being (mihiyyah), and that necessety of existence (wuJib, al-wuJid) in relation to Him is as being is in relation to others. Prom this it becomes evident that the neoes 

(8). That every thing other than the One necessary

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sarily Existing One is not similar to any other than Him­self at all, and no one can attain a real knowledge of Him.

5. 
   That He does not depend upon some other thing the way that other thing depends upon Him, in the sense that each one of them is the cause of the other, so that they correspond. This is indeed impossible.
   
6. 
   That He is not connected with slime other thing in the way that other thing is connected with Him by way of correlation (tadiyuf), for then He becomes one that is possible of existence.
   
7. 
   That it is not possible that there should be two things each of which is necessary of existence. Just as each single body can not have but one soul the universe can not have but One Lord Who is the Creator of all, and upon Whom the whole is dependent. for existence and continuanoe. Besides, if there were two that are necessary of existence how whould the one be distingbished
   

(191) from the other ? If by some accidental quality then each of them would be something that is caused, while if by some essential quality then it would be of a composite nature and therefore would not be necessary of existence.

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of existence ought to be emanating from the One necessary of existence. Just as the soul is the perfection of an organic natural body, likewise the lord is the Creator of the whole, to Whom is due the perfeotion of the whole, the continuance of existence of the whole and the beauty of the whole. We have already mentioned that there can be only One Who is necessary of existence. All else is not necessary but possible Cod existence). So it is in need of One Who is necessary of existence.

Now it may be asked : What evidence is there that there is a Creator Who is necessary of existence upon Whom the whole is dependent but Whose existence is not de­pendent upon any other than Him, and Who therefore is the source of existing things from Whom requests are obtainable.

In answer we say : An existing thing is either one that is necesqary of existence or one that is possible of existence. The one that is possible of existence is of necessity dependent upon some other one for existence and persistence therein. But the whole universe is one that is possible of existence. Therefore it is dependent upon the One Who is necessary of existence.

As to the conclusions that can be drawn from ° the proof that the soul is &substance which has neither

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measure ure nor quantity, as we have established by demonstra- tions, you should know first that the soul is a substance, while the Creator is not a substance; for substance is that which exists but not in a place, i.e., when it comes into existence its existence dues not occur in a place, which is a mark of its being a created thing. Now sub­stance is an expression of real existence, likewise the

(192) real being of the One Who is necessary of existence is His existence, and His existence His real being. Having fol­lowed thus far you will know that by a proof based on spe­cific propositions and another one based on approximate propositions we have roved the existence of the soul and

(3)

that it is a substance. The specific proof showed that the

(4)

soul is not out of touch with itself. But if among the

things of His creation there is one with such a qualifiqa­tion what would you say about an Existent One from Whom it receives all its real existence ? Now Cifi every real thing, which with respect to its real being that makes it real is one and the same unity, cannot be plainly indicated, how 6much less then the Self-Subsisting One (Who had do­minion] over the spiritual world ? Further, if the soul is

r4 See p. 24ff above. 3 See P. 20-^g3 above. See p. 21f above.

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not out of touch with itself while it is not a single unity, then the Real One around Whose oneness no multi­plicity, divisibility, or duality hovers is more fit that

He shaald not be out of touch with Himself, So He is One Who knows Himself as well as all that He has created, and brought into being and existence; "no slumber seizes Him

(5)

nor sleep^y.₅₎ This is the meaning of the term "ever-liv- (

ing" (41m); for theaver-living One is the One Who knows

Himself. We have shown that the soul is one unity which has neither quantity nor measure. Likewise you should

know that the Real Creator has neither quantity nor measure.

By this it is known that all the delirious talk of the Mushabbihah,⁽⁶⁾ who set out to prove [that God hasl dimensions, high location, form, space, and that He moves, is altogether false; for the Creator is not a substance (lawhar), which is susceptible of opposites, that He may change; nor is He an accident (^$amad) that His existence may be preceded by substance, nor can He be described in terms of quality (lag) that He may be resemblable or comparable; or quantity (kamm) that He may be measurable

(6) 2 : 255/256Ca); (of Ps, 121:4).

6 Al-MUshabbihah are^-Muslim thinkers (not a seet)

accused of the heresy of tashbrh, the anthropomorialito doctrine of God in Islam. For details see Strothman, R. "Tashblh", B. Islam, vol. IV, p. 685-687.

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or divisible; or possessive relationship (idifah) for any

(193) one to be equal or like Him in existence; or place (11_1 that He may be encompaased.or contained; nor time (mate) that He may_, move from one period (af time) into another; or position (wad^t) that He may assume different postures and

be citcumscribed by bounds and limits; or possession (11114)+ that He may be comprehended in any thing; or emotion (infi 

-17)

⁶i1) that His existence may be altered by an active agent.

Now that it is established that there is no plurality in the being of Him Who is necessary of exist­ence, and since it is indispensable that He should be described with attributes, it is also indispensable to determine these attributes in a way that will not lead to (the idea of] plurality. Thus we hold Him free from having any ultimate genus or proximate difference, for any one who

Al-jidah is the predicament of milk, e.g., wearing a signet ring, a turbanotc.

(7) This is a complete list of the ten predicaments. 01. aloplaaallt al^eashr in'lane, A^gEtt P. 2995, where instead of %rat; and fill (actIdd) and milk (possession) are

given respective y.-^-Mknawl and Bust agree with the

Arabic editor that lick:4 is a synonymluf milk,- which is a

state of affairs that accidentally occurs to a thing on account of what surrounds it; and changes as the surround­ing agent changes, ("Al^.;mi tied al- ukame' 3atun

ta^tru4u li!l-shay⁴ bi-dabab is wa ailu u

biⁱnti dlihi wa sama bi i ah..."):- Kashshaf, p,

336f; a vo . II, p. 2005 (where instead of 13.4.rat^uki, it^-has plat ).

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has nothing in common with others does not have any proximate difference to distinguish him from them. From this it is known that all His names (i.e., attributes), including existence, are (applied] in a homonymous sense, not in the sense of agreement. Besides, His attributes are not determined in the sense that they are accidental things, such as color, which exists in a (particular) place, or our knowledge, which the soul attains in an ac­cidental way, for that leads to the idea of priority and subsequence, and multiplicity. Rather we determine the attributes by way of their relationship to actions or by

way of their primary and secondary causes in relation to (8)

their material effects.

Prom this it becomes evident that He is ever-living (4m), for He is One Who knows Himself. We know assuredly )hat He is One Who knows because He is incor­poreal and exists in and by Himself. But that which is one unity and incorporeal attains itself. So it knows itself and is not out of touch with itself. Its know­ledge of itself is not something additional to itself

•

(8) All the paragraph and the following^-conclusions are based on the orthodox Muslim doctrine of tanzrh and tashblh in connection with God, His being and attributes. For details see Strothman, R. O^p.cit., (esp. p. 686f).

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(194) that it may necessarily cause plurality in it. That is so because when a man knowd himself, that which he knaws is either himself or someone other than himself. If it is someone other than himself, it follows that it is not himself that he knows but someone else. But if that which he knows is his very self then he himself is the knower

and the known. Therefore the knower and the known are one (9)

and the same. You should understand that it is even so

with regard to the Creator. Now /just as the knower is the same as the one known, knowledge also is the same as the one known, just as sensation is the same: as that which is sensed, since %ht^.:latter is that which is impressed upon that which senses, not something external.. Similarly know­ledge is that which is knvwn, the difference being only in the terms of expression, such as knowledge (^g-ilm), knower (^cilim)and known (ma^iqam). From this it becomes evident that He [the Creator) is One Who knows all the kinds and genuses of existent things. "Not an atom's weight (of what there is) on earth or in heaven escapes His know 

(10) (11)

ledge, nor what is smaller or greater than that", for

Oa

9. 
   Cf^. a similar statement by Eckhart - Huxley, A., the Perennial Philosanky (New Mark and London, ¹945), 17. 12.
   
10. 
    "M aftabu ^can .. "; in the Qur^Ittn, -
    

it reads, ya tabu ^tanha" (= nothing escapes Him).

9. 
   34 3,CO3.
   

)15

since He knows Himself He ought to know it as it is , being Himself an abstract reality.⁰²⁾ But He Himself is the Source and Creator of all existent things, and is an out­pouring One pouring out existence upon all. He therefore knows that which He causes to exist and submit itself to Him. But the multiplicity of the numerous things He knass does not lead to a multiplicity in Himself; for His know­ledge is not based upon the presentation of premisses and turning about of tho^.acht and reflection. He Himself pours out knowledge upon mankind, and does not acquire knowledge from men. It is His knowledge that is the cause of exist­ence, not existence the cause of His knowledge, for He has the treasures of the unseen world, which no one knows ex­cept Him. Furthermore, just as He knows the genuses and kinds [of things] He also knows possible things which come into existence even though we do not know them, for so long as that which is possible is known to be such it is impos 

95) Bible to know whether it will occur or not; for what is known of it is its quality of being possible. That means that there is a possibility that it should come into exist­enCe and a possibility that it should not. But every thing

" . as His being is abstract to Himself" (dhi- tuhu^: muJarrad⁴¹¹ lidatihi) (i.e., free from material enielop­ments, eto. as a universal form is something abstract, or abstracted to the human intelligence).

(13) Cf.p, 14, n, 12 above.

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which is possible in itself is necessary [of existence) on account of its cause. If its cause is known to be existing then its existence is neoessary. Thus if we become ac­quainted with all the causes of one (particular) thing and know that they exist we decisively conclude that that thing exists.

The First Real One knows things that come into

existence and their causes, for all things ascend to Him 113)

in the ascending chain [of order). Now as He knows the

causes in order of occurrence He knows also all, both causes and effects. So His knowledge is free from phy­sical sense, imagination, multiplicity, and change. Now then you should understand His knowledge. When yob do that you should know that He is One Who wills, for indeed He wills and cares. But His will and care are not some­thing additional to His being. The proof of His being One Who wills is that an active cause acts either by fits own) nature, may He be exalted above that, or at will. A na­tural action is one which is without any knowledge of its effect, it being one of the natural actions in existence, acting by way of compulsion. An active muse which acts

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at will is one that has knowledge of its effects. Hence He [the First Real Onel has knowledge of the things lie makes and created. He does so by choice, not under any compulsion. This may be expressed by the term will (iridah).

In short the specific assignment of actions and their distinction from each other are evidence of the exist­ence of will. His providential care is His conception of the order of the whole and the quality of His effects in

(196) this order in the best and most perfect manner, without

having any defensive or motivating purpose compelling Him (14)

to will What He wills, for there is nothing more wortby

of it than He. He does not act to escape blame or receive praise.

Likewise, just as He is One Who knows and willdp, He is also powerful (cidir), the term cidir meaning he who does what he wills and does not do what he does not will.

(14) This is the orthodox ( sh^tsri) Muslim view con­cerning the actions of God, who, concontrary to the Mtttazilah, maintain that it is not permissible to ascribe His ac to some motivating purpose. The Mu^gtazi1ah, on the other hand argue that it is.unbecoming to think of God as acting without such a purpose, such an action being in vain (¹ Al al- ta^lirah. "II a &zu to ^.121u afertlihi