This is the first of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32
Yüklə 1,11 Mb.
|
Dies übernimmt Wittgenstein folgendermaßen ins Deutsche: Stellen wir uns einen Sprachgebrauch vor (eine Kultur), in welchem es einen gemeinsamen Namen für grün und rot, und einen für blau und gelb gibt. [...] Umgekehrt könnte ich mir auch eine Sprache (und das heißt wieder eine Form des Lebens denken, die zwischen Dunkelrot und Hellrot eine Kluft befestigt. etc. (EPB, 202) Hier wird der Ausdruck ‚Form des Lebens’ tatsächlich einmal anstelle des Wortes ‚culture’ in der englischen Vorlage benutzt. Doch lässt sich daraus ableiten, dass Wittgenstein generell unter einer ‚Lebensform’ eine ‚Kultur’ verstand? Angesichts der Tatsache, dass es keine Parallelstelle zur zitierten Stelle gibt, erscheint es mir hermeneutisch außerordentlich gewaltsam, aus ihr die Behauptung ableiten zu wollen, hier komme die eigentliche Bedeutung des Wortes ‚Lebensform’ zum Ausdruck, die Wittgenstein in allen anderen Zusammenhängen seiner Verwendung implizit zugrunde gelegt habe. Da er seine englische Vorlage nicht ‚eins zu eins’ übersetzt, sondern im Deutschen oftmals klärt und präzisiert, erscheint es als sehr viel wahrscheinlicher, dass er in der deutschen Version des Textes im Gegenteil den viel zu allgemeinen Ausdruck ‚culture’ bei der zweiten Verwendung durch den engeren und präziseren Begriff der ‚Lebensform’ ersetzte. Denn warum sollte man sich eine ganze Kultur vorstellen müssen, nur um es plausibel zu finden, dass eine Sprache für Dunkelrot und Hellrot keinen gemeinsamen Ausdruck hat? Man muss sich ein Muster des Lebens vorstellen, in der es auf die Betonung einer Gemeinsamkeit beider Farben nicht ankommt; − und mehr nicht! Mit Wittgenstein könnte man dann sagen: Das, was wir mit dem Oberbegriff ‚rot’ bezeichnen, berührt die Menschen, die diese Sprache sprechen, eben „nicht als eine Einheit, als ein bestimmtes Gesicht.“ (Z 376), wie ihre Kultur auch immer aussehen mag. Und darum ist es präziser, hier von ‚Lebensform’, nicht wie in der englischen Vorlage des Brown Book von ‚culture’ zu sprechen. 1 ‘What, however, is the word “primitive” meant to say here? Presumably, that the mode of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it: that it is the prototype of a mode of thought and not the result of thought.’ (RPP I, 916; Z 541). 2 I have modified the translation of ‘Überlegung’ here as ‘reflection’, preferring it to the more opaque ‘consideration’. 3 Cf. Medina 2002, 173. As Montgomery observes, if the carer repeatedly uses the verb ‘want’ while interpreting the infant’s behaviour in certain contexts, it is ‘reasonable to suspect that when the verb emerges in the child’s lexicon it will be in familiar contexts such as [those] where the child has repeatedly heard it being used. The meaning of the term, like the meaning of the prelinguistic gesturing, is bound up in the role it plays within such contexts’ (2002, 372). 4 ‘Primitive pain-behaviour is a sensation-behaviour; it gets replaced by a linguistic expression’ (RPP I, 313). When Wittgenstein says that what the child learns when he learns to replace the sensation-behavior by a linguistic expression is ‘new behaviour’, he is not only suggesting that language is also behavior (using language is primitive behavior), but means to emphasize that in picking up the linguistic expression, the child is not describing with it, but reacting with it. This will remain the case in some adult reactions: ‘The words “I am happy” are a bit of the behaviour of joy.’ (RPP I, 450); ‘For think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: the words “it makes me shiver” are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this belongs among the rest of those sensations.’ (PI p. 174) 5 ‘Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in calculating [variant: ‘... towards a departure from the norm’]’ (RFM VII 61, p. 425). 6 Or indeed, ‘laws of thought’: ‘The propositions of logic are ‘laws of thought’, ‘because they bring out the essence of human thinking’ – to put it more correctly: because they bring out, or shew, the essence, the technique, of thinking. They shew what thinking is and also shew kinds of thinking.’ (RFM 133; I, 90) 7 ‘That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.’ (OC 308) 8 Most of the examples are drawn from On Certainty. 9 For more elaborate discussion, see Moyal-Sharrock 2003. 10 In On Certainty, Wittgenstein gives several examples where stating one’s mastery of a grammatical rule, or merely formulating a grammatical rule, in non-heuristic situations causes nothing but perplexity: ‘If a forester goes into a wood with his men and says “This tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one” – what if he then observes “I know that that’s a tree”? (OC 353); ‘So if I say to someone “I know that that’s a tree” ... a philosopher could only use this statement to show that this form of speech is actually used. But if his use of it is not to be merely an observation about English grammar, he must give the circumstances in which this expression functions’ (OC 433). For a more elaborate discussion of the (technical) ineffability of grammatical rules in the flow of the language-game – their being ‘removed from the traffic’ (OC 210) of ordinary discourse, see Moyal-Sharrock 2007, 65ff; 94ff. 1 Der erste Teil der bearbeiteten Frühfassung ist in PU-KGE, der zweite als Teil I der Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik erschienen. 2 Die Manu- und Typoskripte Wittgensteins werden auf der Grundlage der BEE zitiert. Ich zitiere zwar die „normalisierte” Version der BEE, ergänze sie aber aufgrund der Faksimileaufnahmen der BEE mit allen Textvarianten, die Wittgenstein nicht gestrichen, sondern stehen gelassen hat. Ich habe in den Zitaten die Transkription der BEE überprüft und die Transkriptionsfehler stillschweigend korrigiert, darüber hinaus Wittgensteins Leerzeilen wiederhergestellt. Textvarianten werden in geschwungenen Klammern {…/…} und unterstrichene in kursiver Schrift wiedergegeben. In den angeführten Zitaten verwendet Wittgenstein keine von seinen anderen üblichen Hervorhebungsarten. 1 The justification for the chronological course assumed here is given in Bazzocchi, 2008b. 2 Russell / Whitehead 1927, vol. I, 91. 3 This is a very common habit, in particular for those critics who underline the contradictory aspects of Wittgenstein’s text. In Black 1964, 378, the two propositions are combined in a unique paragraph, without any typographic distinction. 4 Often Wittgenstein amends a proposition not because it was incorrect, but because it was too obvious. 5 From the viewpoint of its decimal structure, therefore, the Tractatus does consist essentially of elucidations (see 4.121: “A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations”). 6 The union of 2.06 and 2.07 corresponds to TLP 2.06. 7 Its first paragraph was later deleted, reappearing inside a comment of further level. In Bazzocchi 2010a, I complete, in this way, the analysis drafted by McGuinness (1989 and 2002). 8 Here I follow the manuscript numeration, as it existed during the time I refer to. All the codes of groups 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 were visibly renumbered as 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 when Wittgenstein added, to page 101, a new proposition on mathematics, with code 6.2. This effort demonstrates that the decimals do not have the purpose of avoiding renumbering, when Wittgenstein needs to insert afterthoughts. 9 Evidently, it is he who surmounts Tractatus’ propositions (included proposition 7) who realises “what can be said” (“i.e. propositions of natural science”, see the preceding 6.43) and can meaningfully talk. The warning of proposition 7 is not addressed to him in any particular way. On the contrary, he has already understood Wittgenstein himself. 10 Such a ladder would lead us to twice overcome the height of the Statue of Liberty; nevertheless, following Conant’s, “what sort of foothold(s) a given remark provide(s) a given reader in her progress up the ladder […] depend(s) upon the sort(s) of aspect it presents to her […] – on the use(s) to which she is drawn to put it in the course of her ascent”. Nor the nightmare seems ended yet: “And then, finally, when I reach the top of the ladder, I grasp that there has been no ‘it’ in my grasp all along (that that I cannot think I cannot ‘grasp’ either)” (Conant, James, in Cray et al. 2000, 217 and 196). At this point, it is no surprise that one is tempted to cling nervously to the ladder, instead of resolutely throwing it away… 11 However, I suggest that we consider that the actual form of proposition 6.54, “then he sees the world rightly”, corresponds to the original “then he will approach, on the right level, what can be said” [dann kommt er auf der richtigen Stufe zu dem was sich sagen läßt]. Later, the remark was modified (since what one can speak about is none other than “the world” of proposition 1) into “then he will approach the world on the right level”. The question of “the right level” is the leit motiv of the whole book. If we understand Wittgenstein, then we understand that the level to be reached (really, the only conceivable level) is the same level of proposition 1, the level of the facts of the world. It finally becomes clear as to why we are able to throw away the ladder without fear: not because, opportunistically, we have already used it to arrive at the top of some scaffolding, but because there was never anything higher to reach. Wittgenstein’s ladder, like Escher’s stairs, leads us to the same level we started from; indeed, there was no need of a ladder at all. Wittgenstein’s advice about ladders: “If the place I want to get to could only be reached by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have to get to is a place I must already be at now. Anything that I might reach by climbing a ladder does not interest me” (Ms109, p. 207, 7.11.1930; quoted by Peter Hacker, in Cray et al. 2000, 382). 12 For a more complete improvement of this perspective, see Bazzocchi 2010b. 1 The main credit for the archive’s survival and good condition goes to the work over many years of M. Price and M. Walmsley (of the Mathematical Association). The Archive is on loan from the MA to Trinity College Cambridge. 2 For which see McGuinness 2008, letter 295. 3 These are quoted from Wittgenstein 2005 and Brian McGuinness, with all due acknowledgement and thanks. (Variations in orthography attempts to preserve the original writing styles.) 4 A Skinner bearing on this appointment is to be found in the Appendix. 5 Sometimes here smaller changes have some importance: at the bottom of page 1 of the Skinner manuscript Wittgenstein appears to have deleted “Note:”, which is “Note.” in Skinner. This has the effect of restoring the following word “Objection:” to a stronger narrative role. This is typical of numerous changes of detail by Witttgenstein. 6 Questions abound here, ones that I would like to pursue while preparing a new edition. For example, may it be that the text written in Wittgenstein’s hand-writing in the Skinner manuscript betray a different route of emergence for the copy which Wittgenstein later intended to be the authoritative version of the Brown Book This may questionably presuppose Wittgenstein entertained such a division of significance about order when he moved on to earlier formulations of the PI? 7 Wittgenstein varied his style somewhat, particularly in relation to three sorts of size of writing he used, though the examples above appear to be typical of all three styles. 8 I have checked the handwriting of other like people and it is certainly not any of the following: Ambrose, Masterman, MacDonald, Anscombe, Geach, Goodstein, Lewy, Moore, Denis Paul, Rhees, Skinner, von Wright, and Wisdom. 1 Im Folgenden sind codierte Stellen kursiv gesetzt. 2 Dieser besteht mehr oder weniger in der Umkehrung des Alphabets: a = z, b = y etc. (Als kleine Abweichung sei der Buchstabe r erwähnt, der sowohl i als auch j bedeutet). 3 Von Wright und McGuinness vermuten allerdings, dass es noch drei weitere Notizbücher aus der Zeit des Ersten Weltkriegs gab, die verloren gegangen sind (McGuinness 1992, 331). 4 In: Schriften I, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960. Die verbesserte und um einige Bemerkungen erweiterte Neuausgabe erschien 1979 bei Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 5 Vgl. McGuinness 1992, 332. 6 7.7.1916. In den philosophischen Tagebüchern wird dieser Gedanke erst am 15.10.1916 und in etwas abgeänderter Form festgehalten: „Was man sich nicht denken kann, darüber kann man auch nicht reden. Im Tractatus, 5.61 heißt es dann: „Was wir nicht denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können also auch nicht sagen, was wir nicht denken können.“ – Allerdings bemerkt Wittgenstein am 22.11.1914, dass er an einer Stelle wieder etwas auszudrücken versuche, „was sich nicht ausdrücken läßt“. 7 Vgl.: „Die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist es, das erlösende Wort zu finden. Das erlösende Wort ist die Lösung eines philosophischen Problems“ (MS 107, 114). Vgl. auch: „Der Philosoph trachtet das erlösende Wort zu finden, das ist das Wort das uns endlich erlaubt das zu fassen was bis jetzt immer ungreifbar unser Bewußtsein belastet hat“ (MS 110, 17). 8 Vgl. auch Schulte 2001, 211. 9 Vgl. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. 10 Laut Drury war dies 1931, schriftlichen Zeugnissen zufolge jedoch erst Ende 1936 (in Briefen an Ludwig Hänsel) und Anfang 1937 (gegenüber Freunden in England). 11 Vgl. dazu Wittgensteins Brief an Ludwig von Ficker [Anf. Nov. 1919], in dem er schrieb, dass sein Werk aus zwei Teilen bestehe: „aus dem, der hier vorliegt, und aus alledem, was ich nicht geschrieben habe. Und gerade dieser zweite Teil ist der Wichtige“. 1 There are three versions of it, MSS139a and b, and TS207, the latter being made, according to Brian McGuinness (2002, 157, n. 36), by G. E. M. Anscombe on the basis of MS139b and then published by Rush Rhees in 1965. McGuinness (WVC, 92, n. 60) conjectures that it may have been a German original. However, that is unlikely first of all because there are two English versions in manuscript and secondly because Wittgenstein gave MS139b to his sister Margarete Stonborough, in all probability the letzter Hand version. For that reason, it seems impossible that TS207 had been prepared by Anscombe based on MS139b since the latter was only rediscovered in 1992 among the Nachlass of Rudolf and Elisabeth Koder to whom Margarete had offered this and other texts shortly after Wittgenstein’s death (see Koder 1993). In my opinion, TS207 was prepared by Wittgenstein himself and read at the lecture. Additional evidence is given not only by a note on the top of the first page of TS207 saying “Manuscript von Dr. Ludwig Wittgenstein”, probably inserted by Schlick or Waismann with whom the lecture was discussed in 1929-30, but also by a letter from Margarete to Wittgenstein in which she writes: “I was very pleased with your letter. And I am in particular looking forward to your lecture. Something to look forward to. A great joy. […] And I thank you very much for the manuscript, I could not easily imagine a greater joy.” (I have slightly amended Ilse Somavilla’s translation in LE 2007, 244. The phrase “Something to look forward to” appears in English in the original, first published in FB, 123.) 2 I am here borrowing expressions from Diamond 1991, 20, and 2000, 149ff. See also, among other texts, Diamond 1991, ch. 6, as well as Conant 2002. 3 Monk’s initial words were not chosen incidentally. Cp. MS139b, 1-2 (TS207, 1 (LE, 37)), as well as MS139a, 1-2. 4 In quoting from the Nachlass, I have added to the Normalized transcription offered by the Bergen Electronic Edition some features of the Diplomatic transcription, namely deleted text and indication of insertions. I use square brackets to indicate additions or alterations and angle brackets to indicate suppressions in the typewritten version. 5 In one of the Vienna Circle conversations from 5 January 1930, recorded by Friedrich Waismann, commenting on his “Lecture on Ethics”, Wittgenstein puts the question in the following way: “In ethics our expressions have a double meaning: a psychological one of which you can speak and a non-psychological one [...]. Everything I describe is within the world. An ethical proposition never occurs in the complete description of the world, nor even when I am describing a murderer. What is ethical is not a state of affairs.” (WVC, 92-93) 6 As McGuinness (2002, 157, n. 36) rightly argued, the appearance of the phrase “for excellence” in TS207 is surely due to a typing mistake. Cp. MS139a, 11-12. Cp. in addition the following considerations recorded by Waismann from a conversation held on 17 December 1930, in which, after criticizing Moritz Schlick’s conception of ethics, Wittgenstein reflects on the concept of “value”: “What is ethical cannot be taught. If I could explain the essence of the ethical only by means of a theory, then what is ethical would be of no value whatsoever. | At the end of my lecture on ethics I spoke in the first person. I think that this is something very essential. Here there is nothing to be stated any more; all I can do is to step forth as an individual and speak in the first person. | For me a theory is without value. A theory gives me nothing.” (WVC, 117) 7 Cp. as well WVC, 93 (5.1.1930): “Astonishment at the fact of the world. Every attempt to express it leads to nonsense.” 8 Cp. MS139a, 14, where Wittgenstein hesitates between “impossible” and “improbable”. 9 Cf. MS139b, 16-17 (TS207, 9 (LE, 43)), and cp. MS139a, 17-18, a passage which includes at the end the following specification: “In the relative sense [the term miracle] simply [means] a hitherto unknown kind of event. Well that’s a trivial meaning. But when we are tempted to use it in what I would like to call a deep 10 This passage deserves to be quoted in full: “Now the answer to all this will seem perfectly clear to many of you. You will say: Well, if certain experiences constantly tempt us to attribute a quality to them which we call absolute or ethical value and importance, this simply shews [shows] that by these words we don’t mean nonsense, that after all what we mean by saying that an experience has absolute value is just a fact like other facts and that all 11 A use of language may be agrammatical if, even adopting (apparently) meaningful words, it violates, so to speak, grammar or logical syntax (e.g. “Socrates is identical” or “Chairman Mao is rare”, to borrow examples from the Tractatus, §§5.473 and 5.4733, and from Dummett 1981, 50-51, respectively), but also if, more than a violation, it produces a real grammatical dissolution which naturally carries with it meaningless expressions. Both cases are different from “piggly wiggle tiggle” in which, besides the meaningless character of its constituent parts, there is no latent grammar as there is, for example, in Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” in Through the Looking-Glass – a poem from which Wittgenstein quoted, in his very first lecture, part of the first verse (“’Twas brillig and the slithy toves/ Did gyre and gimble in the wabe”) – something that, although it is “nonsense”, he says, “can be analysed into subject and predicate and parts of speech” (cf. WL, 3 (20.1.1930)). The sort of dissolution I have drawn attention to can actually be better identified in Antonin Artaud’s remarkable “anti-grammatical attempt” to render the first verse of “Jabberwocky” (1979, 140). 12 With respect to the possible prevalence of sense in “our ethical and religious expressions”, namely the ones taken into consideration, Wittgenstein remarks: “[...] these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but [...] their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language.” (MS139b, 18 (TS207, 10 (LE, 44)); cp. MS139a, 20) 13 This is the only direct reference by Wittgenstein to Heidegger. Peter Keicher (1998, 83-90; 1999) has insightfully argued that the so-called “Dictation to Schlick” also contains references to Heidegger’s philosophy, more specifically to his employment of the phrase “the nothing noths” (das Nichts nichtet) in What is Metaphysics? (cf. TS302, 28ff. (VW, 69ff.)), which is not surprising since the dictation took place after the publication of Carnap’s well-known criticism of such a use of language (cf. 1959, 69-73). Who first argued that in the 1929 conversation Wittgenstein has taken into account What is Metaphysics? (and see Heidegger 1998, 88-93) – as well as On the Essence of Ground, also from 1929 – more than Being and Time (published in 1927), was Michael Murray (1978, 81-83). An approach to the discussion from the perspective of Being and Time, via Kierkegaard, is in turn suggested by Thomas Rentsch (2003, 328-330). We shall never know exactly which text Wittgenstein was commenting upon, but, pace Murray (1978, 81-82, n. 6), who considers that “the precise relation between Dread (Angst) and Being (Sein)” constitutes a problem only “taken up directly” by Heidegger in the 1929 texts – even if there is not a single occurrence of the term “anxiety”, or “dread”, in On the Essence of Ground – we already find in Division Two of Being and Time – a work where two allusions are made to Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety (cf. §40, 235 and 492, n. iv, and §45, 278 and 494, n. vi) – passages like this: “Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individualization of the reticent resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself. As something that keeps silent, authentic Being-one’s-Self is just the sort of thing that does not keep on saying ‘I’; but in its reticence it ‘is’ that thrown entity as which it can authentically be.” (Heidegger 1962, §64, 369-370) Interestingly enough, in Heidegger’s so-called “hut copy” of Being and Time, observed in the Gesamtausgabe edition, there is a marginal note inserted after the word “anxiety”, which here again translates Angst, saying: “that is, glade of being as being” (d.h. Lichtung des Seins als Seins [sic]) (1977, 322-323). Another striking parallel with Wittgenstein in this passage is the occurrence of “[a]s something that keeps silent”, rendering these words als schweigendes, when schweigen is the verb that concludes the Tractatus (“Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.”) Finally, a consideration from Heidegger’s postscript to What is Metaphysics? also reveals a close parallelism with Wittgenstein. It reads: “Readiness for anxiety is a Yes to assuming a stance that fulfills the highest claim, a claim that is made upon the human essence alone. Of all beings, only the human being, called upon by the voice of being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that beings are.” (Heidegger 1998a, 234) 14 In the Tractatus it is said: “The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. | The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling.” 15 Cp. WVC, 93 (5.1.1930): “Man has an inclination to run against the limits of language. This running against them signalizes ethics.” Cp. as well WVC, 117-118 (17.12.1930), especially Wittgenstein’s answer to Waismann’s question “Is the existence of the world connected with what is ethical?”, which runs as follows: “Men have felt that there is a connection and they have expressed it thus: God the Father created the world, the Son of God (or the Word that comes from God) is that which is ethical. That the Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one being indicates that there is a connection here.” * * An earlier version of this paper was read at the Heidegger-Wittgenstein Workshop, University of Wales, Lampeter, on 17 November 2007. I wish to thank Edward Harcourt and James Luchte for their comments and the audience on that occasion for stimulating questions. Yüklə 1,11 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|