Three important notes about this file

Church/State Mpx

Religious liberty is k/t all human rights and preventing atrocity- history overwhelmingly proves

Scharffs 04- JD from Yale Law, professor of law at Brigham Young University (Brett, “The Autonomy of Church and State,” lexis//MGD)

Religious liberty is at once the grandparent and the neglected stepchild of international human rights norms.21 Recognized at least since the first century A.D., religious liberty, in this now secular era, has lost some of its urgency, perhaps due to the marginalization of religious belief, at least among academic and policy elites, and perhaps due to the inevitable conflicts that arise between religious rights and other important human rights.22 But because of the fundamental importance of religious liberty and the horrific problems with religious fanaticism, the once neglected grandparent has again moved to the fore. As Arcot Krishnaswami observed over forty years ago in his influential study of religious liberty, [t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is probably the most precious of all human rights, and the imperative need today is to make it a reality for every single individual regardless of the religion or belief that he professes, regardless of his status, and regardless of his condition in life.23 Nevertheless, whether viewed with a wide historical lens from antiquity—through the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages—or through a prism focused on the terrible middle years of the last century and the attempted extermination of the Jewish people, or with a focus on the events of September 11, 2001, religion has served as a factor in much of the pain and suffering that human beings inflict upon one another.24 Given the importance of religious liberty and the dangers associated with religious fanaticism and hatred, finding and developing appropriate approaches that allow for freedom of religion or belief while guarding against atrocities such as those mentioned above must be counted as one of the most pressing and vexing problems facing the world today.25

Coercion Mpx

Separation of church and state k/t solving worst instances of government coercion

Audi 89- professor of philosophy at Notre Dame (Robert, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 259-296//MGD)

It is plain that a society without religious liberty is simply not ade- quately free. Moreover, freedom is required for democracy, at least in any sense of 'democracy' relevant here.9 Thus, if one's ideal is a free and democratic society, one wants a social (presumably constitutional) framework to guarantee at least this: (I) freedom of religious belief, understood to prohibit the state or anyone else from inculcating religious beliefs in the general population, where this is taken to exclude or re- strict cultivation of competing religious beliefs; (2) freedom of worship, involving, minimally, a right of peaceable religious assembly, as well as a right to offer prayers by oneself; and (3) freedom to engage in (and to teach one's children) the rites and rituals of one's religion, provided these practices do not violate certain basic moral rights. Clearly, then, a free and democratic society should adopt the libertarian principle. Without the freedom it guarantees, there would be inadequate protection against governmental coercion.

Discrimination Mpx

Church/state separation k/t prevent religious takeover that leads to mass discrimination

Audi 89- professor of philosophy at Notre Dame (Robert, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 259-296//MGD)

The case for the equalitarian principle is more complicated. The (or a) central premise is that if the state prefers one or more religions, people might well find it hard to practice another, or would at least feel pressure to adopt the (or a) religion favored by the state. The degree of pressure would tend to be proportional to the strength of governmental prefer- ence. The pressure might be as great as requirement of a certain reli- gious affiliation as a condition for holding a government job, or as minor as inviting clergy from just one religion to officiate at certain ceremonies. Any governmental preference, however, creates some tendency for greater power to accrue to the preferred religion, particularly if it is that of the majority. Such concentrations of power easily impair democracy, under which citizens should have equal opportunities to exercise politi- cal power on a fair basis, even if certain disproportionate powers do not actually (or at least do not directly) restrict anyone's liberty. Moreover, when a state establishes or prefers a given religion, it is to be expected (though it is perhaps not inevitable) that certain laws will significantly reflect the outlook on life associated with that religion. These are among the reasons why a free and democratic society should adopt the equali- tarian principle. Even when the libertarian principle is respected, the equalitarian principle is needed for protection against governmental dis- crimination.

Mpx Magnifier- Social Condemnation

Failure to keep religion out of state policy leads to social condemnation of all outsiders- turns racism and discrimination

Audi 89- professor of philosophy at Notre Dame (Robert, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 259-296//MGD)

What is the rationale for the neutrality principle? Recall that religious liberty, broadly conceived, includes the freedom to reject religious views. If the state shows preference for religious institutions as such (or for religion in general), there may well be pressure to adopt a religion, and quite possibly discrimination against those who do not. On the other hand, there are kinds of governmental preference that are consistent with religious liberty; hence, the neutrality principle cannot be simply derived from the libertarian principle. There are many domains of possi- ble preference for the religious: prayer sessions in public schools, ex- emptions from combat duty, and eligibility to adopt children are exam- ples. Such preference may also tend toward political domination by the religious. Thus, even if there is protection both from religious tyranny and from discriminatory exclusions on religious grounds, govemmental preference of the religious as such is likely to give them political, eco- nomic, and other advantages that threaten a proper democratic distribu- tion of political power. It can also reduce the level of free exercise of lib- erty, as opposed to its mere legal scope. What is legally permitted, or even solicitously protected by law, may still seem to many people too trouble- some to be worthwhile in day-to-day life. If, for example, exercising a freedom goes against governmental policy or even social tradition, it may be costly. Consider someone who declines to participate in state-spon- sored patriotic activities; here, and surely even in absenting oneself from state- or community-sponsored voluntary prayer sessions, one might conspicuously separate oneself from most others.