Transportation and maritime law

Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to himself.
Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
Law does not protect negligence of passenger.-- Law does not protect negligence of passenger to the extent of doing harm or damage upon a public utility
Diligence required of passenger.-- Diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to himself.
Effect of negligence of passenger.-- Where the proximate cause of the death of or injury to the passenger is his own negligence, and not that of the CC, the CC is exempted from liability
Effect of passenger's contributory negligence.-- Contributory negligence on the part of the passenger does not justify the CC's exemption from liability. Where it is not the proximate cause of the death or injury, he or his heirs are not barred from recovery of damages, provided of course that the CC is the proximate cause of his death or injury

Cangco vs MRR 38 Phil 768
F: supra. EE riding on train who stepped on watermelons.
Held: The conduct of plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly underway was not characterized by imprudence and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

The circumstances show that it was no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.

Isaac vs A. L. Ammen
F: supra. Passenger aboard a bus who placed his left arm on the window lost his arm when the bus collided with a pick up.
Held: By placing his left arm on the window, the passenger is guilty of contributory negligence, and although contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce his liability (Art. 1762), this is a circumstance which militates against plaintiff's position. It is negligence per se for passengers to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury.

In this case, the bus driver had done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision. The injury was due to passenger's fault.

Liability of air carrier under the Warsaw Convention (Oct. 12, 1929)
Art. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Art. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air.

(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or goods are in the charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in case of a landing outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.

(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If however, such transportation takes place in the performance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery, or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the transportation by air.
Art. 19. The carrier shall be liable for damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods

SC has held that these provisions merely declare the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. Neither said provisions nor others in the Convention regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier.

D. Damages Recoverable from Common Carriers
1. In general
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded with the title XVIII of this book concerning damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;

(2) Moral;

(3) Nominal;

(4) Temperate or moderate;

(5) Liquidated;

(6) Exemplary or corrective.

2. Actual or compensatory

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded with the title XVIII of this book concerning damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least P 3,000 (now P50,000), even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Cariaga vs LTBCo., 110 Phil 346
F: Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth year medical student of UST, was a passenger of an LTBC bus which bumped against a train of MRR on the national highway crossing a railroad tract at Laguna de Bay. Cariaga suffered severe injuries on the head making him unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident, reducing his intelligence by 50% and rendering him in a helpless condition, virtually invalid, both physically and mentally. LTBC paid all medical expenses plus allowance during convalescence. Later, Cariaga's parents brought an action to recover damages from LTBC and MRR in the amount of P 312,000 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages. LTBC disclaimed liability and filed a cross-complaint against MRR for recovery of expenses paid by it to the plaintiff placing MRR negligent for not providing a crossing bar at the national highway railroad track. Laguna CFI dismissed the cross-complaint against MRR and held LTBC liable for P 10,000 as compensatory damages with interest. Plaintiff and LTBC appealed.
Held: The train driver was not negligent. He sounded the train's whistle four times before the intersection, which were heard even by the bus passengers. The bus did not slow down but instead the bus driver tried to pass the intersection before the train. In addition, another LTBC bus which arrived ahead of the bus in this case, at the crossing heeded the train whistle by stopping and allowing the train to pass. Clearly, the bus driver was negligent in totally disregarding the warning. On the other hand, MRR cannot be held to be contributorily negligent because LTBC was not able to discharge its burden of proof when it alleged that MRR violated its charter by failing to ring the locomotive bell.

The evidence shows that Ed C. had been rendered physically and mentally invalid by the accident. He suffered head injuries specifically a fractured right forehead necessitating the removal of all the right frontal lobe of his brain, which reduced his intelligence by 50% so that he can no longer finish his medical course. In addition, he has to lead a quiet and retired life because if the tantalum plate which replaced a portion of his skull is pressed in or dented, it would cause his death.

LTBC admitted that under Art. 2201, it is liable for damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. It however claims that the said provision contemplates only the medical, hospital, and other expenses in the total sum of P 17,719.75. The SC ruled that the income which Ed could earn if he should finish the medical course, and pass the corresponding board exams must be deemed included because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus.

While his scholastic record may not be first rate, it is sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished his course and would have passed the board exams in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a doctor, P 300 (accdg. to LTBC witness, Dr. Doria) could easily be expected as minimum monthly income of Ed C. had he finished his studies. Compensatory damages should be increased to P 25,000.

The claim for moral damages could not be granted because Art. 2219 enumerates the instances when moral damages may be recovered and the present case does not fall under any of them, even par. (2) thereof because this case is not one of quasi-delict and could not be considered as such because of a pre-existing contractual relation between Ed C. and LTBC. Neither could LTBC be liable under Art. 2220 because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. Attorney's fees could also not be granted because this case does not fall under Art. 2208.

The claim by the parents for actual and compensatory damages is also without merit because the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage and the parents were not a party thereto, and were not themselves injured as a result of the collision.

Pan Am vs IAC, 164 SCRA 268
F: supra. Baggage containing promotional and advertising materials for films to be exhibited in the US, clutch bags, barong tagalogs and personal belongings was lost. PAN AM sought to limit its liability to the amount specified in the ticket absent a declaration of higher valuation and the payment of addtl. charges.
Held: On the basis of stipulations printed at the back of the ticket, Pan Am contends that its liability for the lost baggage of Pangan is limited to $ 600.00 ($20 x 30 kilos) as the latter did not declare a higher value for his baggage and pay the corresponding charges.

The SC applied the ruling in Mendoza vs PAL: Before defendant could be held to special damages, such as alleged loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery, it must have appeared that he had notice at the time of delivery to him of the particular circumstances attending the shipment, and which probably would lead to such special loss if he defaulted. In order to impose on the defaulting party further liability than for damages naturally and directly, i.e. in the ordinary course of things, arising from a breach of contract, such unusual or extraordinary damages must have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to contracting. In the absence of proof that Pan Am's attention was called to the special circumstances requiring prompt delivery of Pangan's luggages, petitioner cannot be held liable for the cancellation of Pangan's contracts as it could not have reasonably foreseen such eventuality when it accepted the luggage for transit. Pan Am was not privy to the contracts of Pangan nor was its attention called to the condition therein requiring delivery of the promotional and advertising materials on or before a certain date.

No attorney's fees could be awarded since there was no unjustified refusal by Pan Am to satisfy the passenger's just and valid claim.

Villa Rey Transit vs CA, 31 SCRA 511
F: Policronio Quintos boarded a Villa Rey Transit bus at Lingayen, Pangasinan for Manila and was seated on the first seat right side. When they reached the national highway in Pampanga, the bus frontally hit the rear side of a bull cart filled with hay. The end of the bamboo pole tied to the cart hit the windshield and landed on the face of Quintos who was seated in front. He died of cerebral injuries. His sisters and surviving heirs brought an action against the bus co. The TC and CA held Villa Rey liable for P 63,750.00.
Held: The determination of damages due is dependent on 2 factors : (1) on the no. of years on the basis of which damages shall be computed (life expectancy); and (2) rate at which the losses sustained should be fixed.

CA determined life expectancy accdg. to the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and since Quintos was around 30 years old at the time of his death : 2/3 x [80 - 30] = 33 1/3 years. The bus co. wanted to use the 4 year basis adopted in Alcantara vs Surro but the court held that the case is not controlling as it did not lay down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. In fact, it declared that there is no fixed basis for determination of indemnity and much is left to the discretion of the court considering the material damages involved and that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations.

Villa Rey impugns the decision on the ground that damages will have to be paid NOW where most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This argument if offset by the fact that payment of the award will take place upon the finality of the decision, fixed at the rate of P 2,184 per year and did not anymore compute the potentiality and capacity of Quintos to increase his future income, upon conclusion of his training, when he would be promoted and receive a higher salary.

In determining the losses sustained by the dependents and heirs of Quintos. they consist NOT of the full amount of his earnings but of the support they would have received from him had he not died. In fixing said amount, the necessary living expenses should therefore be deducted from his earnings. The amount recoverable would therefore be the NET earnings, which is the portion which the beneficiaries would have received. To this sum must be added P12,000 pursuant to Art. 104 and 107 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 2206, NCC and P 1,727.95 for the amount actually spent by the sisters for his medical and burial expenses and

P 2, 500 attorney's fees.

PAL vs CA, 185 SCRA 110
F: In 1960, Nicanor Padilla boarded the PAL flight from Iloilo to Manila. The plane crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro. The plane, a PI-C133, was manufactured in 1942 and was acquired by PAL in 1948. It had been certified airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla demanded P 600,000 as actual and compensatory damages plus exemplary damages and P 60,000 attorney's fees.

Prior to his death, Nicanor Padilla was 29 years old, President and General Manager of Padilla Shipping Co. at Iloilo City, and a legal assistant of the Padilla Law Office. Upon learning of the death of her son, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who was still single was living with her. Nicanor had life insurance of P 20,000, the proceeds of which were paid to his sister. Eduardo Mate of the Allied Overseas Trading Co. testified that the deceased was one of the incorporators of the co. and also its VP with a monthly salary of P 455. Isaac Reyes, auditor of Padilla Shipping Co., declared that the deceased was President and General Manager and received a salary of P 1,500 per month.

The RTC and the CA awarded damages of P 477,000 as award for the expected income of the deceased, P 10,000 as moral damages; P 10,000 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs. PAL appealed the decision since accdg. to it, the court erred in computing the awarded indemnity based on the life expectancy of the deceased rather than on the life expectancy of the mother. Accdg. to it, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is used in computing for amount of damages.
Held: Under Arts. 1764 and Article 2206 (1), the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased and not of the beneficiary. In this case, the lower courts determined the deceased gross annual income to be P 23,100 less P 9,200 as living expenses, resulting in a net income of P 13,900. The lower court allowed the deceased a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his annual net income by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is P 417,000, which is the death indemnity due to his mother and only forced heir.

Because of the long delay in this case, the mother already died without being able to receive the indemnity she deserved. PAL is ordered to pay her heirs the death indemnity with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum.

3. Moral
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases :

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

xxx

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 2206. xxx

(3) The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Fores vs Miranda 105 Phil 266
F: supra. While the jeepney was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control, causing it to swerve and hit the bridge wall. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent. The CA awarded moral damages.
Held: Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the CC was guilty of malice or bad faith. In the case at bar, there is no other evidence of such malice to support an award of moral damages. To award moral damages for breach of contract, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the CC, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted legislation. A CC's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the CC's EEs. The exception is a mishap resulting to the death of a passenger in which case Art. 1764 makes the CC subject to Art. 2206 (award of moral damages).

Air France vs Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
F: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipinos that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. Air France, through its authorized agent, PAL, issued to plaintiff a first class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled first class, but at Bangkok, Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying because there was a white man who had a better right to the seat. There was a commotion when plaintiff first refused to give up his seat, but he was pacified by his fellow Filipino passengers to give up his seat and transfer to another class.

The lower court sentenced Air France to pay P 25,000 as moral damages, P 10,000 as exemplary damages, the difference in fare between first class and tourist class plus P 3,000 for attorney's fees and costs of suit. The CA reduced the refund from P 393.20 to P 383.20.

Held: Air France contended that the issuance of the first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. The SC ruled that it could not understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its EEs. Plaintiff was indeed confirmed for first class all the way to Rome.

There was contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage. Said contract was breached when the CC failed to furnish the first class transportation at Bangkok. Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's EE compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation after he was already seated and to take a seat in the tourist class by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that the complaint did not use the term Bad Faith. But the interference of BF is there. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment -- just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. This is certainly BF. For the willful malevolent act of CC's manager, the CC-ER must answer. Moral damages are recoverable.

CC's contract with Carrascoso is attended with public duty. The expulsion of Carrascoso is a violation of a public duty by the CC -- a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. The manner of ejectment of Carrascoso fits into the legal precept for awarding exemplary damages in addition to moral damages.

Lopez vs Pan Am, 16 SCRA 431
F: Plaintiffs made first class reservations with defendant air carrier, in its Tokyo-SF flight, which reservation was confirmed and first class tickets issued; but defendant's agent by mistake canceled plaintiff's reservations and thereafter deliberately withheld from plaintiffs the information, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed, expecting some cancellations of bookings would be made before the flight time, which failed to occur. Upon arrival in Tokyo, only then were the plaintiffs informed that there were no accommodations for them in the first class, and they were constrained, due to pressing engagements in the US, to take the flight as tourist passengers, which they did under protest. Plaintiffs sued the defendant for moral and exemplary damages. The Rizal CFI awarded the plaintiffs moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Upon plaintiff's MFR, said damages were increased in amount.
Held: In so misleading the plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in conviction that they had confirmed reservations when in fact they had none, defendant willfully and knowingly placed itself into position of having breached its contract with plaintiffs.

Such actions of the defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to plaintiffs as passengers and foreclosing on their chances to seek the service of other airlines that may have been able to afford to them first class accommodations. All the same, in legal contemplation, such conduct already amounts to action in BF. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest of ill will. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers, but it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.

Plaintiffs are entitled to moral damages. Considering their official, political, social and financial standing, they are awarded P 200,000 as moral damages, P 75,000 as exemplary damages all with interest, and P 50,000 as attorney's fees considering the standing of plaintiff's counsel.

Ortigas vs Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610
F: Plaintiff took a first class accommodation on Lufthansa Airlines in Rome for his trip to Manila, with confirmation of the airlines office, but its EE on seeing plaintiff's Filipino nationality in his passport, disallowed him to board the place and his seat was given to a Belgian. Plaintiff having a heart ailment was advised by his physician to take only a first class seat, but he was compelled to take an economy seat with a promise of the Lufthansa EE that plaintiff will be transferred to first class in Cairo and onward to Hongkong. Upon arrival in Cairo, the promise was not complied with. Similar false representations were made to him at Dharnan and Calcutta. Plaintiff sued the airlines for damages. TC awarded plaintiff moral and exemplary damages.
Held: It is the opinion of the SC that moral damages should be raised from P 100,000 to P 150,000 and exemplary damages be increased from P 30,000 to P 100,000. It is our considered view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the CC resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages in accordance with Art. 2220. In this case, the breach appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may not be discriminated against with impunity. Since both Alitalia and Lufthansa are members of IATA and are agents of each other, they are bound by the mistakes committed by a member such as the mistake of the Alitalia EE to inform Ortigas that he could travel first class instead of only being waitlisted. The award of higher damages is justified by the aggravation of the situation when the Lufthansa EE at Rome falsely noted on Ortigas' ticket that he was traveling economy from Rome to HK and which was repeated four times. Also taken into consideration was the heart condition of Ortigas which gave him added apprehension about traveling economy against the advice of the doctor.
4. Exemplary