Vvratusa isa 2008

2 The social and historic context and the main findings of the 2003 survey in Serbia

Before presenting the main findings of the 2003 survey in Serbia that included questions concerning attitudes toward privatization and paricipation in decision-making, it is necessary to recall the main elements of the historic and social context in which the analysed research was conducted.
The beginnings of the modern era attempts at construction of self-management as the emancipating form of the organisation of relations between people concerning things necessary for their life reproduction in Serbia like in some Western European countries as France, should be sought for in the revolutionary activities of the working class and radically oriented inteligentia in the war surroundings of 1870's as well as in the partisan self-organization of people during antifascist liberation struggle during the Second World War. From the formal legal perspective, the begining of the normative institutionalisation of self management in Serbia and entire Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia (later renamed into the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) presents the enactement of the 1950 Basic law on the management of the state economic enterprises and higher economic associations by the working collectives. This was done mostly „from above“ on the initiative of the Communist Party of Yugosloavia under the leadership of Tito during the conflict with Soviet and Informbureau communists under the leadership of Staljin. Subsequent process of the self-management institucionalization can be divided into four periods (compare for example Prašnikar, J., Svejnar, J., 1991). In these periods the dominant forms of the normativ institutional regulation of ownership relations and of the economic, political, cultural and other activities have been shifting.

In the first phase of self-management introduction that lasted from 1952. to 1960, the state ownership and central state administrative planining were dominant. These regulatory mechanisms were criticized for not being sufficiently stimulative for the transition from the extensive period of industrial development into the intensive one. In the second phase of controlled market oriented self-management from 1961 to 1970, the material basis of self-management in the enterprises was strengthened to a certain degree and the decentralisation of investment decisions through the indicative planning was introduced. Increasing reliance upon the market mechanismes for the allocation of production resources after the 1965 economic reform contributed to the increase in power of experts and directors or „technocracy“ on the basis of their control of the access to essential informations and to communication systems. The absence of commonly accepted criteria for management and distribution of the proceeds from the use of the social property after the tax on the use of the social capital¹ was eliminated, created the posibility for the deformation of social property. The employed in a given enterprise or organisation began to behave as if they were the group owners of that enterprise or organisation, forgeting that imfrastructure, investment credits, social and health security and education were socially provided for on the basis of solidarity from the inputs of entire working population. The ensuing increase in matterial inequalities has compromised the socialist legitimation of the ruling power of the party, state and self-manageing bureaucracy or „politocracy“.

In the third period that begins in 1971, “politocracy” turns to “normative – ideological elaboration” of self-management and from time to time to „political campaigns” (Županov, 1983). In all legal acts, from 1971 Constitutional ammandements, to 1974 Constitution and the Law on associated labor, the ownership of entire society over all capital goods and infrastructure is proclaimed. Workers’ councils and all employees directly use, manage and enjoy the fruits of the social property’s use in respective enterprises and institutions. Employees and workers’ councils however do not have the right to alienate social property that they use through selling and have the obligation to increase it for the future generations. In the third self-management period the space for the mechanismes of market competition decreased while the complex production systems were divided into basic social and economic organisational entities. It was envisaged that these basic entities through coordinated mutually oriented planning and deliberation of delegates reach agreements on mutual adaptation of production and distribution. In the reality, due to failure to establish self-managing institutions on the federal level like all-Yugoslave workers’ council, the process of decentralization stopped at the level of constitutive Republics. At the level of Republican governments was thus created the particularism in the relationship to the country as a whole and bureaucratic centralism in the relationship to working collectives. Boris Kidrič predicted already in 1950 that this could happen if the vertical association of self-manageing working collectives would not materialize (Kidrič, B., 1985 (November, 1950, Vol.V): 163-166).
Researchers of the real functioning of the Yugoslave self-manageing normativ institutional system have established as well that there existed discrepancy between formally defined aims and rules of democratic decision-making according to the principle one person one vote and the factual informal „reality“ of autocratic and oligarchical decision-making in which the greatest influence had small groups of functionaries gathered arround the director, while the smallest influence had the most numerous workers (Rus, V., 1972; Arzenšek, V., 1984). Over-institutionalized self-managing decision-making system in former Yugoslavia presented in reality the system of „organized irresponsibility“. In this system directors and experts have transformed the self-managing organs into their organs. They have used the authority of self-managing organs for formal obtention of the legal „cover“ for already made decisions that were taken not even by themselves but more often by local and republican level politicians. In this way the system made it possible that the „most responsible“ cadres in the economy and politics in fact flee the individual responsibility. The dominant influence of the League of communists and of the „politocratic“ environment of working organizations on that what can be decided about at all and what would be the conditions of production and of distribution of the results within and between work organizations, became the object of increasingly sharp and open criticisms (Rus, V., Adam, F., 1989 for instance). The sharpest criticisms came from authors of neo-liberal orientation who claimed that self-management was defect, ineficient and damaging practice of irational use of credits (Madžar, Ljubomir, 1992).
In the conditions of economic, social and value crisis and increasing frequency of the critique not only of the realisation of the self-management, but also of the self-management as an regulative ideal, one 1988 research of the self-managing orientation among the young has for the first time detected that not self-managing orientatin bigan to predominate over the self-managing orientation (39% : 37%, Pantić, 1990), in contrast to the situation seven years earlier when the same researcher found that among the young convincingly predominated self-managing orientation over the not self-manageing one (61% : 15%, Pantić, 1981), or the situation just two years earler when another researcher detected that self-managing orientation still convincingly predominated (52:22, Kuzmanović, B., 1986) So ubrupt changes of attitudes toward self-management and participation in management point out to the need not only to check the validity and reliability of items measuring self-managing oientation, but also to cary out representative surveys, qualitative case studies and action researches frequently and regularly enough so that the key social environment factors influencing these changes in attitudes could be identified.
In the fourth period that began in 1989 by the adoption of the program of radical „economic reforms“ by the government of Ante Marković, first using the evasive language and later completely openly, the strategy of constructing of socialist self-management was abandoned. The strategy of construction of the capitalist market economy, restauration of capitalist private property and the diminishment or even complete elimination of previous constitutionally guaranteed self-managing rights of employees was adopted. Some bad experiences connected with inefficiency of broadly defined but seldomly really practiced self-managing rights in the past, contributed probably to the fact that direct producers did not oppose strongly enough the elimination of their previous constitutional right to self-management. In the conditions of multidimensional crisis thay let themselves believe that restauration of private property would improve their deteriorating living standard. The Consortium of the Yugoslav Social Sciences Institutes conducted in 1989/90 the first and the last all Yugoslave research of social structure and quality of life on the stratified sample of 14438 adult citizens of Yugoslavia (KJIDN, 1989/90). Judging according to the complete (23%) and partial (31%) agreement with the statement that «Private property is the basis of all progress», absolute majority of 54% of respondents in 1989/90 expected betterment from privatisation. The attitude toward participation and self-management in the working organization in KIDNJ 1989/90 was measured on the basis of the respondents' answers to the question «How great is your participation in decision making at your work place?». Almost three fifths of respondents (59%) replied that their participation in decision making was small, but only one fourth of these respondents replied that he or she was satisfied with this small participation, while the rest wanted to increase their small participation in decision making (Vratuša, 1999a:57-68).
The Federal Law on the Circulation and Disposition over Social Capital from December 1989 that was inacted in August 1990, attempted to legalize the beginning of the proces of privatization. It enabled employees (the opportunity was mostly used by managers) and retired people of the given enterprise in social ownership to participate under privileged conditions in the process of their «cappitalisation». The motive of many employees for buying shares in enterprises in which they worked was the attempt to secure their working place. According to some estimates, in one third of the total number of enterprises in Serbia (3678) that were transformed in this way into share companies, the shareholders have payed in fact less than 5% of the capital value of shares that they booked due to inflation (Mijatović, B., 1993:118). The mixed form of ownership was thus created in which privatized and still social part of enterprise capital value remained insufficiently delineated and subjected to the inherited self-management norms. Big industrial, energy and systems of public services with 44% of the engaged basic economic resources and 22% of employees were transformed into state property (Zec, Z., ur. 1994: 241)
This change of legitimation ideology and development strategy in Serbia and former Yugoslavia, enveloped in the global circumstances of the sharpening of the capital accumulation crisis and concentration of wealth in the global proportions ever since the end of the sixties, debt crisis of the seventiees and financial crisis of the eighties and the nineties (Amin, S., Gunder-Frank, A., Arrighi, G., Wallerstein, I., 1983); Nuscheler, Franz, 1987; Chossudovsky, Michel: 1997; Schifferes, Steve, 2002). In the atmposphere of mass forced bankruptcies and mass layoffs, the first multiparty elections were being prepared and the changing of constitutions of constituent Yugoslav Republics. The USA financial capital that controls the credit policy of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund, stopped the transfer of the borrowed funds to the Federal Yugoslav financial institutions through the 1990 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and conditioned their further arrival on the accounts of particular republican financial institutions by the implementation of the speaded up privatization and deregulation. The analiticians of the Central Information Agency have characterised the clauses of this act as „signed death penalty“ for Yugoslavia and predicted that the bloody civil war would break out (Burkholder, Jim, 2002) The talks of Republican leaderships have begun in the attempt to avoid the civil war in Yugoslavia, with little hope of success due to interference of transnational capital militarily organized into NATO. After the dezintegration of the USSR and economic and military block of socialst countries (to which Yugoslavia did not belong but was on the contrary one of the founding members of the Non-alignement movement), it came to the replacement of the so called Cold War with the „hot“ wars euphemistically called „humanitarian interventions“, instead of the announced new order of the world peace. The proclaimed aim of these interventions was the fight for democracy in the countries that “happen” to find themselves along the corridores for the transport of the Caspian oil and/or resist the ultimative programs of „restructuration“ of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These programs imposed privatisation and deregulation in the interest of the free acces of transnational corporations to cheap row matterials, labor power and markets (Collon, Michel, 2000: 210 – 214; Rozoff, Rick, 2004; Ganapathiraju, Aditya (2008).
The new bearers of administrative power that won the first multiparty elections in 1990 in particular Republics continued to implement the privatisation. Only in Serbia and Montenegro both presidential and parliamentary elections were won by socialists who did not rush with privatization and joining NATO. Former deputy of the US Secretary of the state Strobe Talbott indirectly confirmed the truth of the statement that humanitarian considerations present mare excuse for economically motivated military interventions imposing neoliberal strategy of privatization, stating openly that the resistence of the „Milošević’s Yugoslavia“ to broader „trends of political and economic reforms...explains the best NATO war in Kosovo and Metohija, and „not the care for the destiny of Albanians“(Talbott, Strobe, 2005: xxii-xxiii).²
In described social and historic circumstances of the last decade of the XXth century, only one survay included several items measuring self-managing orientation in Serbia and the attitude toward privatization (Mihajlović, S, ed, 1997). Center for the Politological and Public Oppinion Research of the Institute od Social Sciences (CPIJM IDN) conducted in May 2006 the survey on the stratified three level sample containing 1954 adult citizens of Serbia and Monte Negro. Data gathering enveloped two years after the April 1994 annulment of the already realised privatization of more than two thirds (69%) of enterprises in Serbia, from which around one fifth through the employee buyouts. Official explanation was that the transformation of social property was realized in the conditions of high inflation, reaching even 60% daily in 1993. Official declarations were accompanied by unofficial explanations that the important additional reason for this annulement was the attempt of different interest groups to position themselves better politically and to acquire in the repeated proces of privatization greater part of social and state property for themselves and their foreign partners and mentors, than they have succeeded to that moment.

From the sociology of knowledge perspective it is not sufficient to search for the explanation of such conspicuous absence of systematic and systemic research and public debate on the ongoing contradictory social relations’ transformation process and project just in the lacking financial means. The unusually openly formulated confession of one of the direct participants in the process and project of social property’s privatization on the territory of former Yugoslavia and Serbia, reveals the opposed social interests’ structured background of the phenomenon not only of the absence of ongoing social relations’ transformation systematic research, but also of deliberate avoidance of this transformation process’ and project’s adequate naming: “Having in mind the revolutionary character of changes brought about by the changes in ownership, especially in the dominant way of thinking and ideological conceptions, public presentation of one’s attitudes, at the least in the beginning, had to be not irritating” (Vukotić, Veselin, 1993: 79). The technocratic fraction of the ruling class decided to use euphemism (“reform” of socialism) instead of openly speaking about the restoration of capitalism due to the fact that opinion surveys revealed that values of egalitarizm and not values of free competition were predominant among respondents especially workers and peasants (Vasović, M., 1996:192-3). Important part of highly educated specialists however, saw in private property safer mechanism of self reproduction in privileged social positions than it was the nomination by the higher echelons of the “politocratic” fraction of the ruling class in the ruling party to the commanding positions in the socially owned enterprises and organizations (Vratuša, V. 1993). It was obvious to the partisans of privatization that in a referendum concerning the acceptance or rejection of basic social relation’s transformation they would not get the constitutionally required qualified majority. Because of this they have dedicated so much attention to the terminological game of hide and seak, until according to their opinion the process and project of privatization has sufficiently progressed to become irreversible.

One of the items in the 1997 survey joined together the aspects of the attitude toward the preferred enterprise ownership form, on the one hand, with the aspects of the attitude toward the preferred bearers of key decisions in the enterprise, on the other. The closed type question: “Who should select the enterprise director?” offered the following answer modalities: 1) private owners; 2) private owners and employees togather; 3) the state administration; 4) the employees should be owners and select director”; 5) undecided. It was established that the relative majority of respondents (34%) chose “the mixed” answer modality that private owners and employees should decide together, suggesting that the interest in at the least some form of participation survived the change of the social development strategy. The opposite “private owners” and “employee owners” answer modalities were selected almost evenly by just above one fifth of respondents, slightely more for the modified self-manageing one (21% and 23% respectively). Each sixteenth respondent chose the “etatistic” answer modality, while the rest of respondents remained undecided (Kuzmanović. 1997).

Sufficient funds and above all sufficient will to undertake another representative survey of adult population that would include gathering among other data those concerning attitudes on participation and privatization, were assembled in 2003. Within the framework of the project 'Transformation strategies of social groups in Serbia' financed by the Ministry for science and technology of the Republic of Serbia, Institute for sociological research of the Belgrade Faculty of philosophy, conducted in November 2003 (ISIFF03) a survey of the adult population in Serbia.

ISI2003 survey was carried out four years after the NATO member states commited the crime against peace and bombardement with forbidden cassete bombs and with depleted uranium coated projectiles (Vratusa, V., 1999b; Atkinson, Rodney, 2000), three years after the debate whether the constitutional conditions were met for the election of the president in the first round of voting, putting on fire of the election documentation in the building of the Parliament, armed occupation of the central bank and several other key institutions and controversial qualification of the events of October the fifth 2000 as the democratic revolution or counterrevolutionary putch (Savić, Mile, 2001; Marshal, Tim, 2002), two years after the conflict between the trade union and the new government on the occasion of inactement of the new Law on work which in fact eliminated most of the remains of constitutionally still guaranteed mechanismes of the employees' controle over the enterprise management and participation in decision-making (Zakon o radu, 2001). ISIFF 2003 survey was realized in the year when the prime minister was killed along with the two main suspects for his murder, according to the notorious rule of the organised state and private crime that dead mouth does not speak (Malbaški, Nikola, 2005), declaration of the state of emergency during which 12000 people were incarcerated, out of which some forty were in the end indicted for some criminal deed. The attention of respondents in this year could have been attracted as well by the numerous affairs. They were related to theft of voices in the Parliament, corruption behind the acceptance of detrimental conditions of the so called National savings bank creation and activity with majority foreign capital after forcing into bunkroptsy the greatest domestic investment banks, selling of the metallic complex in Smederevo and of the electrical energy trade under the most detrimental conditions, fraud with the export of imported sugar and many others (Savet za borbu protiv korupcije, 2003-6). All this was happening in the circumstances of the prolongation of the negative tendencies like the fall of industrial production index (by 2.9% in comparison to 2002) and the decrease of the total number of employed for more than 7%, amounting on average to 1,800.000 in 2003. On the other hand it came to the increase of the total number of unemployed by 12.4% , reaching on average 947 000 in 2003, as well as of the foreign-trade deficit for 40% in relation to 2002 and even 91% in comparison to 2001 (Republički zavod za statistiku, 2004).

Within ISIFF03 1635 households were surveyed in 48 municipalities outside of Kosovo and Metohija. The sample was multi level with the probability of inclusion proportional to the size of respective category, subsequently weighed according to the age and education of respondents simultaneously. It enables reliable estimates on the level of Serbia, as well as the comparisons on the level of particular regions (Vojvodina – Belgrade - Central Serbia, or rural – urban setlements) (Cvejić, S. 2004).

In each representative research one should use in the best way possible existing attainments from previous researches. It is good to improve the formulations of earlier questions, but it is also necessary not to miss the opportunity for the gathering of longitudinally comparable data through repeating of the identical formulations. Unfortunately the question formulations differ again. In the ISIFF03 survey were introduced two batteries of new questions on the theme of privatization and participation in decision making. They separate aspects of the attitude toward preferred form of enterprise ownership, on the one side, from the aspects of the attitude toward participation and the preferred bearer of key decision making in the enterprise, on the other. One of the new questions asked “What is your attitude toward privatization?” with answer modalities: “1) all social and state enterprises and firms should be privatised; 2) only small and middle sized enterprises and firms should be privatised; 3) only up to 49% of enterprises’ capital value should be privatised; 4) nothing should be privatised”.
ISIFF 2003 Survey established that contrary to the attempts of the government to speed up the process of privatization in conformity with the short deadlines “advised” by IMF and translated into the Law on privatization in 2001, only 19% of respondents supported without any qualification privatization of all social and state enterprises and firms, 4% less than in the case of respondents who completely reject privatization, while the absolute majority of respondents entirely opposed privatization of electricity (71%), health care institutions (68%), water and sewage system (67%), oil (62%) and public transport (54%) and 17, 18, 19, 21 оr 22% of them proposed that privatization in these sectors of economy remains within the limits of the 49% of their respective capital value. Only in the case of banks the complete opposition to privatization fell below one half (48.5%) of respondents. Even though in the case of banks at the time of survey it was already mostly the finished process, complete agreement with their privatization did not reach even the one third of respondents (30%), while somewhat more than one fifth of them (21%) sitll priferred that banks remain in majoritary state ownership (Vratuša, Vera, 2005).
The same survey ISIFF 2003 points out as well to the existence of the isomorphic discrepancy between the preference of the absolute majority of respondents (54%) for the participation of the employed in the decision making and management in all firms rigardless of their ownership regime (19% of respondents more expressed themselves in favor of such participation just in social and state firms), on the one hand, and existing legal norms that either do not even mention or do not provide sufficient protection for this right of the employees against the obstruction of the enterprises’ or organizations’ management leaderships in all regimes of property relations, on the other (Vratuša Vera, 2006).
Separate group of questions attempted to measure the attitude toward different forms of decision making. One of these questions asked “Who should decide in enterprises and firms about selection of directors?” with answer modalities “1) management alone; 2) management with consultation of the employees”; 3) employees should have the veto power”. Even though theoretically and methodologically legitimate, this separation of the aspects of the attitude toward the participation in decision making from the aspects of the attitude toward preferred ownership relations, on the practical level can indirectly suggest to the respondent the biased attitude of the author of the questionnaire that passive and negative veto power presents in fact the pinnacle of the possible participation in decision-making and the goal to be attained, instead of unification of social ownership and control through self-management, as it was the case in the formulation of the corresponding combined question from CPIJM IDN 1997 survey.
On the basis of the comparison of the answers concerning the selection of directors it is possible to conjure in spite of the fact that the formulations are not identical, that the popularity of the answer modality that only management or private owners should decide fell to 11% of all respondents, that 24% demanded veto power, and that the popularity of the “mixed” answer modality that employees be consulted rose to the convincing absolute majority of 66% of all respondents.
It is established that this growing group of respondents which chooses the „mixed“ answer modalities and which can be named „social democrat“ for its atempt to reconcile the principles of private capitalist market allocation of resources and of their collective redistribution, comprises mainly of male administrative personell respondents, having middle education, age and economic position, who live mainly outside of Belgrade. Group of respondents named „neo-liberal“ since its affiliates are partisans of capitalist private property and market mechanismes of reproduction regulation, gathers mainly respondents private entrepreneurs, directors and other highly educated managers, students and pupils who live mainly in Belgrade. Clear boundaries of this „winning“ groupation in the proces and project of „transition“ however are begining to vanish when a two fifths relative majority of its affiliates opts for the participation of employed in all enterprises irrespective of their ownership status. This finding does not present necessarily the expression of inconsistency of the value orientation of the entrepreneurial and managerial “elite”. It can be explained as well by the fact that this category of respondants is becoming increasingly aware of productive and socially integrative function of the participation of the employees in decion making. The opposed „self management nostalgic“ groupation of the “losers” in the „transition“ process, comprises primarily less qualified workers and female more qualified workers, respondents having elementary education, housewifes, retired, living predominantly outside of Belgade, who were socialized at the time when there existed at the least formal legal equality in acces to capital production means, infrastructure and natural resources in collecive (social) ownership. Boundaries of this groupation are begging to blure as well when one quarter of its affiliates more often than affiliates of the opposed „wining block“ express themelves against participation. Further qualitative research should explore whether everyday fight for bare survival supresses all „higher“ values and interests like participation in decision-making and self-realization among the most voulnerable social groups.
The existence of these attitudes which are less expected from the standpoint of conventional theory among one part of respondents occupying the top and the bottom positions in the class division of labor, indicates the need for supplementary examination of social correlates and motives for the choice of opposed positive and negative attitudes toward privatization and participation by respondents of different class affiliations. On the basis of the correlation analysis of the relevant data³ it was establishhed that the values of association indicators were the highest for the cross-tabulation of the general attitude toward privatisation and the level of education (CC:-.298), followed by the consumption index (-.239), income index (-.226), present working place (.185), gender (-.172), property index (-.156) and age (.123) Regression analysis shows that these independent variables in a combination account for the .376 percent of he variance of the dependent variable. The general attitude toward participation is among the mentioned independent variables at the significance level of 0.000 connected only with the age (-.100) and gender (-.054), so that in combination they account for only .123 percent of the variance of the attitude toward participation. Relatively low measures of association between the work position and attitudes toward privatization and especially toward participation, only confirm the main finding of ISIFF 2003 survey that absolute majority of respondents expressed themselves in favor of only partial privatisation, strongly against the privatisation of public services and for the existence of at the least consultative form of participation of the employees in decision making, contrary to the new legal norms. The “personal opinion” of Prof. Mirko Vasiljević, participant in the preparation of the new Law on enterprises, that participation of employees in the management “should be reduced to the minimum, since we had bad experiences” (Jovičić, S.: 2003), namely, was translated into the new Law on economic societies (Službeni glasnik RS, br.125, 2004). This law completed the “exclusion of the employees’ participation in management” (Rombanji, S., 2004).
The clash between the attitudes of the relative or the absolute majority of respondents about the desirable form of (re)construction of the basic social relations, on the one hand, and of the legal regulation and the formal political legitimation of these processes, on the other, have noticed as well the researchers participants of the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) from Serbia, which in December 2003 and January 2004 included 2997 respondents. Researchers from Serbia named the perceived clash “normative-values dissonance”. They explained the clash as the effect of the protracted political and economic domination of the so called nomenklatura or the ruling class that survived from the period of socialism after the Second World War, as well as by the persistence of the structurally homologenous pre-market, patriarchal agrarian selfsufficient economy and of the collectivistic value patterns of action from the period before the Second World War among the wide layers of the massively impoverished population. These remains have according to the researchers from Serbia significantly slowed down the establishment of the predominantly market new order of economic relations and political democratization (Lazić, M., Cvejić, S., 2007: 56-7)
Lazić and Cvejić conclude that „a serious problem“ presents a strong presence of precisely those value orientations to which they give negatively connoted names “authoritarian collectivism” and “redistributive statism”, also among the affiliates of higher and middle layers. These layers should be namely the main realizators of the institutional-normative context transformation in the direction of the officially proclaimed aims, to which Lazić and Cvejić attribute as well the positively connoted names “political liberalism” and “market liberalism”. Simultaneously these researchers did not examine whether there still exist and how widespread are the elements of the authentic self manageing value orientation that should not be identified neither with authoritarianism nor with statism among the population of the country for which researchers themselves admit that it is specific according to “autochtonously formed socialism” which had a much more “liberal nature” (Lazić, M., Cvejić, S., 2007: 58). From the dichotonomously constructed theoretico methodological and ideological perspective, Lazić and Cvejić perceive slow and insufficiently widespread privatization, delayed restructuring or closure of large state firms, as well as high unemployment, as important conditions which contributed to the appearance of this “normative-values dissonance” and to the simultaneous existence of the elements of “regulated market”, “state regulation” and “wild market”. From this perspective, however, Lazić and Cvejić tend to oversee that unemployement increased the most in the period to which they attribute as well the positively connotated name “deblocked transformation” and that the unemployment will increase still more, when “the efficiency of production and profit-making” will not be any more “subordinated to the redistributive principle and passivity”, what is according to their opinion still the case in Serbia, and when “the new elite, the entrepreneurs, and the middle class – as mediators of value patterns – widely accept” values of political and market liberalism (Ibid, 70-71). Concentration of entire international research project on the “Determinants and Social Attitudes in the Western Balkans”, also makes it impossible to check whether there exists “normative-value dissonance” and simultaneous presence and mutual reproduction of the elements of “regulated markets”, “state regulation” and “wild market” also in the countries of Western Europe and entire world in which dominate capitalist relations of exploitation and oppression.

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