Air force 7. Small Business Innovation Research (sbir) Phase I proposal Submission Instructions

3) Hardware and software scalability
4) System cost
5) System size (Ideally a single computing tower)

Clearly, expansion to video frame rates (20 – 60Hz) opens the door to a range of applications. Further, this technology could enable larger apertures for applications that were previously atmospheric seeing limited and lack feasibility for AO.

A number of additional references are provided: Reference [3] highlights a real-time image enhancement processor, which provides incremental image enhancement without the complexity of MFBD. This can be considered the current state-of-the-art capability. Reference [4] presents an algorithm that merges multiple sensor feeds from different spectral bands. While not required for this effort, this is an algorithmic variation that may be interesting to investigate if the computational resources permit. Other variations may be proposed, including exploiting additional system state information (e.g. wavefront sensor gradients, high-bandwidth scoring camera measurements, r0); however, proposals utilizing additional data feeds should anticipate additional interfacing effort required for the Phase II deliverable.

PHASE I: Identify the specific MFBD algorithm(s) to implement. Develop a scalable software and hardware architecture implementing the selected MFBD algorithm(s). Demonstrate image correction capability, given multiple short-exposure image collection sequences of varying classes of space objects. Demonstrate understanding of how the proposed system architecture would scale to support real-time operation.

PHASE II: Build a real-time system implementing the selected MFBD algorithm(s) driven by live sensor feeds. Collaborate with government personnel to develop any necessary camera interfacing. Develop a user-friendly graphical interface to control relevant operational parameters and to view the real-time corrected imagery. Demonstrate the robustness of the control interface and real-time MFBD-enhanced imagery. Identify future upgradeability and anticipated performance gains possible (or potential limits).

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Develop and execute a plan to market and manufacture the product system. Identify and execute algorithmic, architecture, or interface modifications required to support other applications such as remote sensing, target ID, optical tracking, and medical imaging. Maintain relevance as hardware advances

REFERENCES:

1. Charles L. Matson, Kathy Borelli, Stuart Jefferies, Charles C. Beckner, Jr., E. Keith Hege, and Michael Lloyd-Hart, "Fast and optimal multiframe blind deconvolution algorithm for high-resolution ground-based imaging of space objects," Appl. Opt. 48, A75-A92 (2009).

2. Michael Werth, Brandoch Calef, Daniel Thompson, Kathy Borelli, and Lisa Thompson, “Recent improvements in advanced automated post-processing at the AMOS observatories,” Proceedings of IEEE Aerospace, March 2015.

3. David R. Gerwe and Paul Menicucci, “A real time superresolution image enhancement processor,” Proceedings of AMOS, Sept. 2009.

4. Daniel Thompson, Michael Werth, Brandoch Calef, David Witte, and Stacie Williams, “Simultaneous processing of visible and long-wave infrared satellite imagery,” Proceedings of IEEE Aerospace, March 2015.

KEYWORDS: multiframe blind deconvolution, image reconstruction, image processing, remote sensing, adaptive optics

AF171-026

TITLE: 24/7 Monitoring of Active Satellites using Passive Radio-Frequency (RF) Sensors

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

OBJECTIVE: Deliver a passive radio-frequency sensor for maintaining track custody and unique identification of actively RF-emitting satellites from low-earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) 24 hours per day through cloud cover with reasonable cost.

DESCRIPTION: The Air Force ground-based electro-optic (EO) sensor sites, such as the AFRL Dynamic Optical Telescope System at Maui, conduct monitoring of resident space objects (RSOs) both at LEO and GEO, but the mission of such facilities is limited by cloud-cover and daylight. Radio-frequency (RF) sensors can monitor RSOs 24 hours per day and through clouds, but radar techniques become expensive for tracking RSOs, especially GEOs. Passive-RF techniques could augment the ground-based EO networks with cost per site potentially comparable to a 1-meter telescope facility, and their operations are almost unlimited by weather and daylight. To be most useful, a passive-RF sensor system or family-of-systems would track and uniquely identify both RF-emitting LEOs and GEOs, and the passive-RF sensor system would report detection of a moving satellite in about a minute. For GEO, the passive-RF sensor system would maintain custody of several satellites per hour, likely in a patrol mode in which satellites are revisited in prescribed time intervals on a diurnally-persistent basis, reporting on detected maneuvers of satellites which are inconsistent with their normal station-keeping routines. These reports could be used to alert another satellite-monitoring facility to follow the maneuvering satellite. In addition, for GEOs the passive-RF sensor would uniquely-identify and spatially-distinguish satellites appearing close together along the line-of-sight. For this project, the successful bidder will to the greatest extent possible show:

1. Ability to design, build, and deliver a passive-RF sensor system(s) that can detect and track either RF-emitting LEO or GEO satellites or both with this performance:
a. Suffers minimal loss of performance through a diurnal cycle and when cloudy along the line-of-sight.
b. Produces track accuracy < 2 arcseconds RMS.
c. Distinguishes the unique RF signature of a satellite and identifies the satellite with the closest-matching SATCAT number. Here, the word distinguish is not equivalent to deciphering the satellites communication stream.
d. Derives an orbital fit, such as a two-line element set and state vector, from observations.
e. Tracks when the solar separation angle to the satellite is greater than or equal to 10 degrees with < 25% reduction in signal-to-noise ratio.
f. For GEOs: tracks greater than or equal to 10 satellites per hour with a revisit period < 30 minutes. Also, show the ability to execute changes to the list of satellites being monitored in less than 8 hours.
g. For LEOs: derives a track by the time the elevation angle to the horizon from the satellite exceeds 10 degrees.
2. Ability to put a sensor at a customer designated site, assuming site already has power and internet. Potential sites include the Maui Space Surveillance Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the GEODSS Test Site in Colorado and other government-owned facilities in the United States.
3. Ability to produce a sensor with supporting facility and software with low-cost (objective < 1Million dollars per site).
4. Ability to distribute an orbital fit to a government customer rapidly: objective for GEOs < 5 minutes and for LEOS < 1 minute.
5. Ability to accurately show the design is likely to succeed. Also, show traceability from a prototype sensor to an objective sensor that the Air Force would put into the field.
6. Ability to provide follow-on use by the Air Force under a cooperative agreement to be arranged in the future.

PHASE I: Design a passive-RF sensor that uniquely identifies, tracks, and reports position & velocity of an RF-emitting LEO or GEO or both. Show the design(s) is likely to succeed. Develop an experiment plan with the customer to demonstrate the passive RF sensor can cue an EO sensor. For GEO, suggest a threshold for detecting a "change". Deliver an estimate of the life cycle cost for an objective system.

PHASE II: After consulting the customer, build a prototype sensor(s) and demonstrate that it can cue a customer EO sensor to rapidly locate and track a satellite through a mixture of full-day and full-dark conditions for the RSO and the EO-site. For LEO, demonstrate track hand off during the same above-the-horizon pass. For GEOs, select 15 and show the prototype maintains track custody 24-hours per day for > 15 days. Show track accuracy of < 2 arcseconds when the line-of-sight is cloudy at the RF site.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: In consultation with the customer, build and demonstrate a passive-RF sensor unit ready to deliver to the field and provide an estimate of the life cycle cost. Deliver, install, and verify operation of at least one sensor unit and supporting components to an Air Force satellite-monitoring facility.

REFERENCES:

1. Development of a passive satellite tracking sensor, Gilgallon, P.F. et al, 1999, AIAA-99-4530 (http://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/6.1999-4530).

2. Estimation, tracking and geolocation of maritime burst signals from a single receiver, Nelson, D.J. et al., 2015, Proc. SPIE 9476.

3. Cross-spectral TDOA and FDOA estimation, Nelson, D.J. et al., 2015, Proc. SPIE 9090.

4. Space-based detection of spoofing AIS signals using Doppler frequency, S. Guo, 2014, Proc. SPIE 9121.

KEYWORDS: space, situational, awareness, SSA, radio-frequency, RF, passive, satellite, GEO, LEO, RSO, low-cost, cloud, custody, diurnal

AF171-027

TITLE: Cyber warfare laboratory design

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the solicitation and within the AF Component-specific instructions. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. Please direct questions to the AF SBIR/STTR Contracting Officer, Ms. Gail Nyikon, [e-mail].

OBJECTIVE: Development and demonstration of cyber warfare laboratory.

DESCRIPTION: The US Air Force has interest in quantifying the effects of cyber warfare on its systems. In order to ensure that weapons systems are adequately protected against cyber-attacks, the AF desires to design/develop a plug-and-play cyber sand box laboratory with safeguards to allow testing of computer/electronic devices against those attacks. This laboratory should be able to interface and test different AF hardware/systems to evaluate effectiveness of cyber security systems against variety of attacks. The laboratory and the equipment tested should be able to be reused after each attack, and not be permanently contaminated. Consider philosophies akin to Chem/Bio clean room techniques to prevent contamination inside and outside of cyber lab environment. Infrastructure considerations, such as but not limited to scenario generation and management, performance assessment, after-action review and feedback, should address instruction and training applications.

Need capability to test a line-replaceable unit or subsystem of ICBMs or air delivered weapon systems in a benchtop test bed. The purpose of this study is to identify and isolate the Air Force data protocols and how to set up plug-and-play interfaces with can be used for threat injection and system response evaluation.

Attack types include: denial of service attacks, disabling attacks, to include, malware, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc. that can be done via TCPIP or other AF standard data protocols, that will affect weapon system reliability and mission effectiveness.

The cyber lab design could be for either a fixed or portable lab. This is a design parameter that needs to be studied in this SBIR study. This design parameter will have to weigh accessibility/ease of use with security/isolation.

The purpose of this study is to determine the necessary design parameters to successfully build a cyber lab.

Only contractors able to obtain a Secret level security clearance should submit proposals against this topic.

PHASE I: Design a cyber warfare lab for basic cyber environment architecture, cyber-attack, AF test asset incorporation (plug-and-play), basic protocols for aseptic, sterilization & disposal procedures, high reuse of cyber infrastructure to minimize costs, data capture system, measures of perf for system sterility & effectiveness of attack. Design should also address instruction & training applications.

PHASE II: Develop a detailed design of the cyber laboratory expanding upon the items addressed in phase-I at an actionable-level.

 
Only contractors able to obtain a Secret level security clearance should apply.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Manufacture & test a portable/ small-scale version of the cyber warfare lab defined by the USAF sponsor to verify the manufacturability & performance the lab. Private companies may have interest in testing cyber security systems. Government has interest in evaluating effectiveness of systems.

REFERENCES:

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Cybersecurity, Instruction 8500.01, Washington, D.C.: DoD Chief Information Officer, 14 March 2014.

http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf.

2. Advanced Cyber Attack Modeling, Analysis, and Visualization, George Mason University for Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York, March 2010http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA516716.

3. Drew, John G., George E. Hart, Kristin F. Lynch, Don Snyder, Ensuring U.S. Air Force Operations During Cyber Attacks Against Combat Support Systems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR620.html.

4. Libicki, Martin C., Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-877-AF, 2009. As of December 29, 2013:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG877.html.

5. PorcheIII, Isaac R., Jerry M. Sollinger, Shawn McKay, A Cyberworm that Knows no Boundaries, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP342.html.

6. Schmorrow, D., Cohn, J., & Nicholson D. (Eds). (2009). The PSI Handbook of Virtual Environments for Training and Education: Developments for the Military and Beyond. Volume 1: Learning Requirements, and Metrics. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

KEYWORDS: Cyber Security

AF171-028

TITLE: Cyber Attack model using game theory

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the solicitation and within the AF Component-specific instructions. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. Please direct questions to the AF SBIR/STTR Contracting Officer, Ms. Gail Nyikon, [e-mail].

OBJECTIVE: Development and demonstration of a Cyber Attack model using game theory.

DESCRIPTION: As cyber-attacks continue to grow in number, scope, and severity, the cyber security problem has become increasingly important and challenging to US Air Force strategic weapons community. The US Air Force has interest in quantifying the effects of cyber warfare on its systems. In order to ensure that weapons systems are adequately protected against cyber-attacks, the AF desires to design/develop a modeling and simulation scheme that can best identify paths within our weapon systems that are most vulnerable.

Researchers have recently started exploring the applicability of game theory to address the cyber security problem. The weakness of traditional network security solutions is that they lack a quantitative decision framework. As game theory deals with problems where multiple players with contradictory objectives compete with each other, it can provide us with a mathematical framework for modeling and analyzing cyber security problems.

The US Air Force is interested in working with industry in developing a game theory based modeling and simulation that could be used for all strategic systems and for cyber security training applications. These strategic systems include ICBMs, Bombers, Cruise Missile, Gravity Bombs, and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications.

The US Air Force will provide data as needed for the selected system for the contractor's proof of concept (e.g., ICBMs, Bombers, Cruise Missile, Gravity Bombs, and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications). The US Air Force is not asking for a separate model for each system. The Air Force is asking for a proof of concept that can be scalable up to a whole mission system. The US Air Force will not provide material/equipment.

Only contractors able to obtain a Secret level security clearance should submit proposals against this topic.

PHASE I: Develop a preliminary design of a cyber-attack model to quantify the effects of cyber warfare on U.S. Air Force systems. Identify design components required to enable training applications. Establish feasibility and technical merit of proposed solution through modeling, and design analysis. Assess any cost, performance, or security issues and recommend risk reduction activities to address them.

PHASE II: Develop a detailed design of the cyber-attack model expanding upon the design addressed in phase-I at an actionable-level.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Develop and test the cyber-attack model defined by the USAF sponsor cyber-attack model to quantify the effects of cyber warfare on USAF systems and enable its use for USAF cyber training. Private companies have interest in modeling cyber-attacks to quantify effectiveness of cyber security systems.

REFERENCES:

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Cybersecurity, Instruction 8500.01, Washington, D.C.: DoD Chief Information Officer, 14 March 2014. http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf.

2. U.S. Air Force, Cyberspace Operations, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Policy Directive 10-17, July 31, 2012.

3. Drew, John G., George E. Hart, Kristin F. Lynch, Don Snyder, Ensuring U.S. Air Force Operations During Cyber Attacks Against Combat Support Systems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR620.html.

4. Libicki, Martin C., Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-877-AF, 2009. As of December 29, 2013: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG877.html.

5. PorcheIII, Isaac R., Jerry M. Sollinger, Shawn McKay, A Cyberworm that Knows no Boundaries, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP342.html

KEYWORDS: Cyber attack, cyber warfare training applications

AF171-029

TITLE: Training for Cyber Operations

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Human Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the solicitation and within the AF Component-specific instructions. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. Please direct questions to the AF SBIR/STTR Contracting Officer, Ms. Gail Nyikon, [e-mail].

OBJECTIVE: Develop interactive and immersive training Simulator for Cyber Weapon Systems.

DESCRIPTION: This topic focuses on the development of an interactive and immersive training simulator capability intended to ultimately reduce costs associated with the development of ranges and testbeds for cyber training. Currently, no distributed multi-unit training is available without extensive and costly travel. A capability is required to provide live, virtual, constructive, and distributed multi-unit training. This is needed to minimize costs, avoid operational disruption due to travel for remote training, and to optimize the effectiveness of both individual and inter-unit training. The training environment should reflect a DoD network from the operator perspective, should host all of the tools the operator uses to defend and operate the network, and support the tactical command and control constructs used by the units. The capability should include sensors and storage to capture the live training. Both during training and in after-training reviews, a capability should be available to stop the event and critique the trainees using the actual network traffic. Additionally, the capability should be able to start, stop, rewind, fast forward and jump to any part of the training. Airmen performance in the operational world should have the capabilities to take any dynamic cyber training ranges and leverage the following: scenario authoring, learning management systems, scenario execution engine and performance assessment in a live, virtual, constructive, distributed, and multi-unit training exercise. The goal of this effort will be to create an interactive and immersive training capability to allow variations of live, virtual, constructive, distributed, and multi-unit training needed to train cyber units/crews to the most current state-of-the-art capabilities and training, tactics and procedures available. Furthermore, the simulator should be able to integrate with any systems, cyber ranges, testbed, cyber weapons system or DoD network currently being used by cyber operators.

PHASE I: Identify and define the current state of cyber training capability for the Air Force. Assess our training capabilities and outline a cyber training simulator that can leverage the current architecture and provide training with live, virtual, constructive, distributed, multi-unit exercises. This simulator will have the capability to be used for/with any of the Cyber Weapon Systems.

PHASE II: Develop, demonstrate and validate the cyber training simulator identified in Phase I. Establish performance parameter through experiments and prototype fabrication. Construct and demonstrate the operation of a prototype training simulator on a cyber ranger in a distributed training exercise with Cyber SMEs. Conduct user and training impact assessments. Complete training simulator design and fabrication. Identify cyber customers and conduct initial evaluations.