Australian naval institute inc
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July/September /W Journal oi the Australian Naval Institute South-East Asian Security Architectures Within South-East Asia, progress towards a niultilateral security dialogue has gathered tempo recently: largely under the leadership of ASEAN. During the Cold War. South-East Asian nations did not enter into the type of comprehensive or cohesive bilateral alliances so evident in Europe. The major reasons for this were the lack of a common threat coupled with the 'relative immaturity of the regions countries as nation-states, their emphasis being upon internal security concerns'. ' Further, the certainty of the security umbrella provided by the United Stales precluded any regional imperative to develop extensive bilateral or multilateral alliances. With the end of the Cold War. there is a unique window of opportunity to try to do exactly that. Certainly the initial steps in institutionalising regional security dialogue have been taken."' The formation in 1993 of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) offered the first region-wide forum for quasi-official dialogue on security problems." Similarly, the newly formed ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). which met for the first time in mid-1994, is likely to become an In this regard. South-Easi Asian nations need to learn to walk before they try and run. Bilateral relationships give nations confidence of military support in times of crisis: multilateral arrangements do not always carry this certainty. Strong bilateral alliances and relationships, including with the US. should he the first priority in approaching this emerging multilateralism. Such bilateral alliances are needed to resolve current problems such as the South China Sea. Additionally, they will be a necessary complement to multilateralism no matter how auspiciously it develops. So in addition to engaging old and potential adversaries, regional nations need to work hard at maintaining old friendships and patterns of cooperation. It is with this caveat that a South-Easi Asian maritime strategy will he proposed. 1 A South-East Asian Maritime Strategy South-Easi Asian naval forces have a significant rule to play in this emerging multilateral approach to security. However, given the suspicions and historical antagonisms that exist in the South-Easi Asia region. the development of a regional maritime strategy should he undertaken as a sequence of complementary stages. The first stage should be the elucidation of national maritime interests. Most regional countries have not expounded their national interests, particularly regarding maritime issues, beyond notions of the maintenance of national sovereignly and a desire to police offshore resources. Few regional countries have produced any form of defence 'White Paper'.'' However, a clear expression of national interests would ease regional uncertainties and aid in creating an atmosphere of regional transparency conducive to the formulation of multilateral security agreements. This stage must also include resolution ol existing intra-regional territorial disputes. While easier said than done. South-East Asia must get its own maritime shop in order before an effective multilateral maritime strategy can be implemented. This should not he considered a pipe-dream though, as one observer has noted, 'the atmospherics in the region are distinctly conducive to initiatives for region-wide engagement now'." The second stage should be the identification ol mutual maritime interests. This stage will be complicated by the absence of a common and readily identifiable threat'.' Nevertheless, regional navies should recognise that national sovereignly and economic development are underpinned by regional security and growth. Similarly, regional stability is fostered by encouraging regional cohesion and resilience to outside influence. 'With national resilience in each country, there will be no weak links in the region to exploit, and by working together, there will be regional resilience and the region will be better prepared to face the unknown'." The third stage should be an assessment of national maritime capabilities to identity regional strengths and weaknesses. This may prove to be the most difficult step. Regional suspicions are likely to prevent honest assessments oi maritime shortcomings and South-East Asian strategic culture is characterised by a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other regional nations.'" However, bilateral and multilateral agreements should accentuate national strengths and compensate regional weaknesses. By keeping an eye on each others 'maritime backyard". South-Easi Asian navies can make a credible contribution to regional cohesion and resilience. July/September 1997 41 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute ie fourth stage should be the eommeneeiiieiil of combined naval training and exercises. Such combined activities currently occur in the region, usually under the auspices ol United Slates or. more recently. Australian naval direction. Regional nations should foster Iheii own combined naval training programmes, including an extensive personnel exchange programme to promote trust and interoperability. The aim ol combined naval exercises should include gaining regional sea control. particularly lor protecting trade and the offshore estate. The final stage should he the development of combined maritime defence agreements. Keeping in mind regional sensitivities, such defence agreements should initially be along bilaleral rather than multilateral lines. Such agreements should be aimed at fostering a cooperative regional security umbrella that will act as a deierrent against hostile actions by external nations. In this way. the small Smith-Eusl \si.ni navies can combine to thwart hostile action by much l.ugei forces. Without a common threat perception this stage is likely to take considerable lime to accomplish. However, even lightly Structured, pluralistic alliances can be effective in Asia: ASEAN is an example The overall aim of such a maritime strategy should be. as one observer has noted, lo coordinate each nalions maritime power to 'avoid contention and confrontation, and seek cooperation in order to maximise the aggregate ability <>i a country to benefit from making use ol ihe sea to fuliil its national economic, security and other goals'.' Conclusion The Cold War provided a certain framework to Soutb-I asi \siau security issues that is no longer present. In particular, questions over the long-term commitment Of the United States to regional engagement have created a milieu ol uncertainty within South-East Asia Mils uncertainty has accentuated the impact of I ()S developments on the coastal stales of South-East Asia While the sea is a potential source of significant regional resources, on going EOS disputes have the potential to result in conflict as nations seek to resolve overlapping national interests, South-East Asian nalions are dependent on the sea tor their economic growth. Such dependence makes them vulnerable to a range of maritime threats, particularly the potential llneals that could be pOSed by glowing powers such as India. China or Japan. Without a guaranteed United States security umbrella. South-l.asi Asian navies will be increasingly called upon to make a credible contribution to defeating maritime threats. To this end. there has been a rc-cmergencc of seapower in Soulh I asi Asia. Regional navies have developed both horizontally and vertically over the past two decades. However, despite qualitative and quantitative improvements, regional navies remain small with only limited capabilities. lo make a credible contribution to maintaining peace W resolving eonlliet within the region. South I .asi Asian navies must be able lo exercise a degree of sea control through either use of the sea or sea denial. Given their limited capabilities, individual navies could only realistically pursue a sea denial strategy. However, such a Strategy does not provide a viable. long-term option for nations that are economically dependent on sea trade. Therefore, without incurring crippling defence expenditure, the most cost-effective maritime strategy for the region would be the maintenance of existing bilaleral naval alliances coupled with the development of new forms of multilateral co-operation. Sueli a strategy would promote the common national interests ol regional stability and economic growth, and provide a visible deterrence to larger, external powers. The formation of the ARE and CSCAP forums are clear indieaiions of Ihe momentum which the move towards a multilateral security dialogue has gathered in the region. However, this is not to say thai achieving consensus amongsi South-East Asian nations will be an easy or short-term task. Ralltet. the road In multilateral military alliances will be a long and difficult one. particularly given the lack ol a common threat perception. However, the South-East Asian maritime strategy proposed in this essay offers a good starting point lor this journey. As Captain I ee Cordner has written, the opportunity to achieve regional resilience is at hand. Political and military leaders must recognise die imperative and accept the challenge." NOTES
i Cheung I'm Ming, Command ol ihe s.-.i, im Eastern Eamamii Revlev, 11 Jul) 1989 p In
No 1^7 Peace Research Centre, Australian Nat a) University. Canberra, Febrviarj 1993 i, in .i hiioi viiiMLvni.-iii in March 1988 ihe Chinese sank three Vietnamese transport .hips, killing 72 seamen ami i.ikniL1 9 prisoners. Ch.ni,la N South China Sea lieashennis Shoajl par Eastern Ecvnonui Review, 11 August 1992, p 13 7 Qoldrick J Developments in Regional Maritime Forces. n.iieni.in S. >x Sherwood D teds). Australias Maritime Bridge into Asia Allen & Unwin. Sydney, 1995 pp 105-6 x In ihis essay, South-Bosl Vsia comprises Ihe seven members ol ihe Association ol South last Asian Nations (Indonesia. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand. Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam), the two countries ol Indochina (Cambodia and Laos! and Burma i.Mwimnai i u Hull,,w .i\ \ ,v MoffettS Cta. ks in ilk- Milium Par Eastern Economh Review, Mav 2. 1996 p 14. 42 My/September 1997 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute in [3 13 i i is Ifi :4 23 2d 27 2k 2') 30 41 42 11 44 45 36 37 38 4(1 41 42 44 44 In 1969, (hen I'S President Nixon ipelled <>ui Im- doctrine thai Lis allies should aim for defence raff-reliance in all bui the iiiusi serious scenarios This rationale underpins Auslralias defence relationship wilh lire US. Mean leu ('lice Maritime I'osier in South Last Asia Journal • ■I ill, Aiistndhm Nuvtil Institute. November 1991. p 14. McCuffrie J. Strategic Implications for Australian and the Region of IJcvelopinents in Maritime Power in East. Southeast and South Asia. Jaumai i>t tlu- Australian Nayat Institute, Novcmhcr 1993, p 2d. The 1995 GDP i'. p.o lor l.asi Asia and Soulh-Easl Asia (China. South Korea. Taiwan. Hong Kong, Indonesia. Thailand. Singapore and Malaysia] was k 5', Market Insights WIS I PAC Bank. Nnumihei/Deccmhor 1995. Approximately 90', ol regional trade travels by sea Cordiier E.G. Regional Resilience: The Imperative lor Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Naval Ww College Review Vol XLVTI. No 2. Spring 1994 0 42 Hills term for a nations dependence on the sea in various aspccls of their national life. Hill J.R. Maritime Strategy tee Medium Powers, Croom Helm. Loudon. 1986. p 41). Except for Singapore, which only claims 3am, and the Philippines, winch claims historic waters cxictiding mil lo )85nm, all coastal slates of the region claim a I 2nm territorial sea. Booth. ,71 eft p 3ft Heart, up en. p 13. Ibid p 14. Booth, up eit. p 50. Tile term creeping |iinsdiciioii refers to the extension of national or inlcrnalion.il rules ami regulations, and righls and duties oxer the sea. in straits and coastal /ones, on and under the xeahed. and in the vasi slretchcs ol the high seas thul, p AH Although technically not LOS disputes, redrawn maritime boundaries have led to dispute over the ownership of several South-Easl Asian islands. Till G. Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century. Till G. (ad). Seapowtr. Theory and Practice, Frank Cass. Essex. 1994, p | on. fill (I Mainline Stiuteyv anil the Nuclear Age. St. Martins Press. New York. I9k4 p 14. Pare Pfed) Makers of Modern Strategy from Mochtovelli ro the NtieUui Age. Clarendon Press. Oxlord. 1986 p455. BR IS06. The Fundumeniuts oj Henish Maritime Doctrine Directorate of Naval stall Dunes. 1004. pGlossary-lft Till, ap 111. Chaplcrs k and 0. ibid. p21b. Hill, opt a. pp 79-80, I ill opcit, pp 194-6. Whether these nations arc actual threats or not is noi germane lo 1 Ins essay. Goishkov S.G Seapnwei and the Stale Peigamon. Oxlord. 1967. p22l Harris K. The Maritime Agenda Bahhage R A Baleinan S Maritime Change: twins tar Asia Allen A Unwin, Sydney. t 1993 Till, opcit. p 190. Roskill S W The Strategy oj Sea 1'nwer Collins. London. 1962. p 15 Cahle J Gun haul Diplomats MacMillan. London. 1994. pp 23 4 and Appendix I. Glove E. A Century ol Seapower Janes Nas s lanrnatianiit Nod Vol km). November/December 1995 p s4 Hill, up en. p85. 1 oi.lnci. ,,/>. 11. p 48. I l.iluli A.S. The Post-Cold War Political-Security I andscapc ,-l the Asia Pacilic Region. Indonesia Quarterly: Vol XXII. No I. January/March 1994 p 7. Harding H. Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Nolan J E. icdi Global Engagement. Cooperation ami Security m die 2lsl Century The Brookings Institution, Washington he. 1994 p44ii Mack V Strategic Security Issues Balcman ,V Sherwood, ap .11. pkl Walls R. The Maritime Strategic Setting An (ipcr.ihonal View. Bate-man & Sherwood, op hi. p 96. /.akaria H.A. The Quest lor (healer Coiiiinunaluy m Southeast Asia. A Political and Security Perspective Asian Defenei Journal No J, March 1994. p 12. Yüklə 1,33 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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