Australian naval institute inc

STN ATLAS (AUSTRALIA)

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Joint company of MATRA DEFENSE and STN ATLAS Elektronik

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February/April IW6

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

41

haps specialising in CAS and air defence. Similarly. collocation ol a squadron of IIS at HMAS Alhatross in the East Australia Exercise Area could be worth investigating given the importance the research at­tached to building strong, permanent unit links so that consistent levels of professionalism, realistic practice and mutual knowledge are attained (These possibili­ties will be discussed later).

The research concluded that poor nine on target re­sponse was also due to an. ...almost universal failure to insist on ruthlessly realistic operations research and combined arms exercises, testing and evaluation be­fore combat'." This highlighis the second key re­quirement ol ellective joint operational response: The critical importance of realistic training and practice.

Lesson 2: Make Training and Practice Realistic

All case studies clearly indicated that regardless of force numbers, composition and weapons, profession­alism and innovation remain the decisive force multi­pliers. Readiness and leadership that Stemmed from superior training and practice decided outcomes, es­pecially in conflicts fought under unique or impro-v ised conditions. Moreover, the research emphasised that.'....training, manoeuvre and innovation are all parts of a single process that must be encouraged as much as possible and which must be tied to opera­tional need. Improving force quality involves far more than acquiring equipment..."'-"'

Surprisingly. DARPA research indicated lhat (/// par­ticipants had an exaggerated view of the lethality of modern air and artillery munitions. PGMs I Precision Guided Munitions) were generally much less effec­tive that expected and did not 'come close" to their theoretical kill probabilities, often due to a lack of training, practise and adequate arrangements of C3 assets."¹ Moreover, combatants tended to forget "...how quickly forces can "'dig in"' and disperse after die first air strike or artillery round, emphasising the critical importance of massive initial area lethality over precision strikes. This tends to validate the present NATO emphasis on improved CM/BM and snian area weapons and the experience of past w ars that air force and artillery officers greatly exaggerate the effective­ness of their weapons in peacetime, and underesti­mate the need for constant training ami practise'.'

Lack of realistic training led to a pronounced failure to appreciate how much targeting conditions can al­ter with terrain. Also, munitions, spares and POL expenditure rales far exceeded prewar calculations, and low peacetime practice levels were identified as major causes of this problem. Deployed weapons sim­ply do little good il crews are not trained to use them

during frequent, realistic exercises, lor example, long range homhing. even with smart weapons, rarely had anything approaching its anticipated effectiveness. Margins ol homhing error in Lebanon, Iran, the Ealk-lands and. according to other sources, in Libya, Gre­nada and during the second Gull War (1991) were unacceptable large. Bombing accuracy claims of up to NOG immediately alter the second Gulf War were highly exaggerated. Even laser guided munitions under staged test conditions Only realise about 00-70' i effectiveness. In eomhat. this figure reduces to JO 50%, with the higher resull only being achieved in the second Gulf War alter resistance was crushed,'* Even the highly publicised Patriot Missile had a SCUD liif rate well under 10%, despite claims made .it the highest official levels during the w ar that the rate was of the order of 95$

Professional and realistic training, coupled with the hesi use of available technology still seems to remain

the winning combination in Successful joint opera nous. A common, critical lesson arising from the re­search was that tactical skills were consistently more

important than technical performance. The ability of

personnel to make the most out of then weapons and opportunities has long been a characteristic ol supe­rior military organisations, consequently, it comes as no surprise that well trained and highly motivated troops gimpl) put things together' better to gel the best out of whatever they have at the time. For exam pie. during the Ealklands War. research emphasised lhat the British demonstrated just how much of an

operational edge military professionalism, practice

ami adequate training can give."

Australian forces still enjoy a good reputation lot pro­fessionalism and training, hut the Services may find Ihe benchmarks of professionalism arising from con­sistent training and practice increasingly difficult to maintain. The research findings seem to have general relev ance to the situation the ADE finds itself in, where readiness and sustainabtlity (the so called 'soft budget targets') have, according to some, been for too long Constrained at the expense ol force modernisation and

composition i that is. numbers and types of platform). In fact, in October 1993 the C'DE at the time (Admi­ral Beaumont I expressed deep concern ov er the dete­riorating defence funding situation and the growing readiness and snstainabilnv imbalance, suggesting that government expectations ol capability could and pos sihly should he varied:

....I have a genuine concern about the continuation of funding for defence, because I eonsidei it impor­tant that we receive adequate funding to do what gov­ernment expects ofus. If gov eminent wauls to change what its expectations are. that's line by me. but I think we are probahlv down about the hare bones'.-"

42

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

11 bruary/April 1996

Some defence commentators suggested this situation would probably gel worse as all Services continued to curtail readiness related operations due to funda­mental shortages' .21

Lesson 3: 'fuse' Command/Control/ Communications

I >Alsl'A based research also emphasised that lew par­ties appreciated the stress combat puts on C3I/BM systems and emphasised the force multiplier effect of a strong and effective eommand system hacked hv secure communications at all levels, or all the eon diets examined, only the British seemed to combine a clear hierarchy ol eommand with suitable llexibil-Itj and innovation at ever) level of operations;

'....the British reinforced their professionalism w ith a

Unified command and w ith a heavy emphasis on joint operations and inter service cooperation. The value ol such an approach to managing modem w.u has been a key lesson ol erery eonlliel since the beginning ol World War II. Virtually any command hairier or proh

lent in creating an effective command capabilit) for

joint operations leads to major military problems, whether the hairier is an inter Service harrier oi one within a given service*.

According to the research, many C3 failures and tac­tical problems occurred because ol lour mam reasons;

• 
  Lack of inter service and intereommand 'fusion' or coordination centres.
  
• 
  'Conipailmeiilahs.iiion' ol intelligence away from other C3 Centres and activities.
  
• 
  Emphasis was on middle/higher level command communications and control, rather than on de­tailed battle management at the small unit level (where most battles are fought and won), which contributed to
  
• 
  Inadequacy ol (A systems in linking together
  

smaller combat units.

Consequently, the need to Forge better links between smaller units to improve battle management at lower levels appears lo he another area where significant efficiencies may be made. Most importantly,"...free­dom of communication at all levels within the armed

I ones and command process is essential, '['he two way

Bow oi realistic information from top to bottom in

any military service is an essential condition of suc­cess'-' 1 ins connectivity is in itself a fusion or blending' process and the natural tendency lo organ­ise forces into efficient compartments and functions

can he a powerful threat to efficiency, unless '...per­sonnel in each compartment are forced to cross the hanieis and lines Of authority as part of their normal duties' - ^l

A number of the changes to A DP joint arrangements seem lo he supported hy the 'fusion' or blending to­gether argument , especially establishing a well en­dowed, integrated headquarters at the operational or campaign level which is supported on w/eby a thea­tre Joitti Intelligence Centre (ASTJ1C). 'Fusion' of the service chiefs with the Secretary and ( I )F at the strategic command level would also appear to be posi­tive However, the process of fusion mas be able to be taken down' much further in terms of blending combat and logistics units that will have to work lo-gethet in wai

Lesson 4: 'User Managed' Logistics

Not surprisingly, the importance of logistics was un­derlined in all conflicts Interestingly the research clearly indicated that improvements in logistics and support technology could be used as substitutes for mass, that is. weapons numbers and manoeuvre forces." Herein lies a potentially valuable som. | of operational efficiencies Moreover, a salient lesson is Ihe increasing need for logistical responsiveness, with the supply infrastructure being brought upas close as possible to the 'user' hi lad. the most suc­cessful forces dev eloped 'user managed' Systems thai rapidly responded lo small forward unit demand: as opposed to systems that fed forward echelons liom a large, centralised network Most importantly, all par-tics learned (especially the Israelis. British, Iraqis and Soviets) that rapid, local support unit response when supporting forward combat units, according to their ever changing needs, is 'critical to success'.-^(l

In sonic very ini|iortanl ways, logistical decentralisa­tion may he more C0S1 effective than traditional cen­tralised, functional resource control. The research siig gests that:

'....There is considerable evidence that overly com­plex, demand "pull", and "supplier managed" sy slums are less effective, anil ultimately more costly, than pushing a steady stream of "ovcisupplv" forward lo

the front (this meansi maintaining large numbers

Of I"i w aid deployed slocks and relying on "user man­aged systems" The C3/BM problem is complex enough w ithout trying lo lavci complex logistics and management support systems over the conduct of more critical phases of Wat**'

Taking 'User Managed' systems a step further

The advantages of shifting Irom highly centralised

functional control of assets to much more decentral­ised (usei managedi control arc implied hy strategist. Professor Martin Van C'reveld as be points out at­tributes ol complex functional organisations that usu

ally translate to higher costs in terms of time, money and effectiveness;

/ ebruary/April 1996

Journal oj tin {ustralian Naval Institute

«

the more numerous and differentiated the depart­ments into w inch an organisation is di\ ided the largei

the numberOl command echelons superimposed upon each other, the higher the decision thresholds, and the more specialised the mdi\ idual members, then the greater the amount of information processing thai needs to go on inside the organisation ('»< ertainty, in other words, is not dependent solely on the nature of the task to he performed; it nun equalh he ti funi imii of the organisation itself (my emphasis). -^s

In his excellent study Command in do;: VanCreveld suggests that the hallmark Ol most supetiot military organisations is that they are:

'....cohesive, sell 'contained organisations, both tacti­cally and in regard to their command systems. The cohesion - often Obtained by carefully selecting men and their commanders and allowing them to serxe

together for comparatively long periods ol time, even

at the expense ol overall flexibility - and sell eon lainment have the effect ol reducing the need for coin muuieatious and information processing both inside the units themselves ami between them ami lughei headquarters; they also ensure that errors, when made. will he limited in seope. furthermore, the self con­tainment of subordinate units helps simplify planning by reducing the lime and effort that have to be spent on overall coordination. Ifexercising central control over limited resources is one way ol maximising cost effectiveness and certainty, (then) distributing these resources among subordinate units may, by virtue of eliminating much ol the need for planning, coordina­tion, and disruption in the communications process, he another wav... / would suggest that distributing the resources may often /v the more effective way to maximise cost effectiveness mix emphasis)'.

Ibis approach is radically different to the function­ally oriented, matrix management which has charac­terised AIM- joint organisation and operations. Ma­trix organisations draw resources from their special­ised functional groups on an ad hoe basis to complete tasks, and are used widely by large corporations in project management.^' However, major difficulties in the matrix approach to joint operations have been observed in Australian operations I see General Oration's comments above I. A former Director of Joint Operations and Plans in HQADFonce summed up this kind of fundamental difficulty when testify­ing before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on For­eign Affairs, Defence and Trade that: "...(During a KANOAROO Hxereise) we look personnel from all round Australia, and quite obviously that is a major problem il you look at it in the context of handling or coping with any sort of emergency which arises". ' This experience is shared by other countries, includ­ing the US. 1 or instance, the Hollow ay Committee highlighted the numerous difficulties involved in con­tinually having to build up equipment interfaces and

inlet "-personal relationships between disparate units in modern joini operations:

"...JTF i.loint Task Force) planners underestimated the significant cohesive benefits that accrue to org.in ised combat units that train together as a team on the same equipment and use the same doctrine anil tech

tuques over a sustained period, l his underestimation tendency is endemic among out military ami civilian leadership: personnel turbulence is chronic in our armed force. Such turbulence would not be tolerated d the teamwork benefit were truly appreciated. Pat

allel to this is the tendency to overrate the ease with which ad hoe units of otherwise well qualified units can he thrown together to accomplish a special mis siou'.'- Consequently, significant efficiencies may be gained by collocating some Australian units to act as permanent formations capable oi operating with a high degree of sell containment*.