Australian naval institute inc

WHAT COULD THIS ALL ADD UP TO FORTHEADF?

Investing in three general areas could improve the efficiency anil effectiveness of sustained, joint con­ventional operations conducted by the Al 'I

I. "Fuse ' our Forces together

'( oinparinieutalisalion' kills. There appear to be sound reasons to believe that efficiency and effective ness benefits can he gained by experimenting with a

resource decentralisation bias that moves away I mm

the AIM \ current emphasis on discrete, functional

groupings of platforms, processes and people that only get pooled together in exercises and during wartime Best "Time on Target' performance seems to arise from maximum operational integration or 'fusion' of.Serv­ices. Arms. CD. logistics and intelligence capabilities into their 'wartimegroupings' Consequently, Strong, permanent unit links could he established so that con­sistent levels ol professionalism.ind cooperation are attained and maintained: this reduces eomparlmentalisation and is likely to develop a moie responsive chain ol command. Specifically, an exam pie of "Capability fusion' cm force blending ashore might be able to lake place al the Brigade level and could include collocated, dedicated lighter ami air transport support as well as collocated groups front other Arms. Keeping all these units together and well practised could optimise their effectiveness and re-sponsiveness if the force multiplier benefits ol fu­sion' suggested by DAK PA based research and Van (reveld exist . Of eoitise. inevitable logistics prob­lems in permanently deploying and maintaining rela­tively small numbers of aircraft, artillery ami tanks el, would exist Sell Containment", or permanent amalgamation of selected units, may have to done at the expense of some platform maintenance flexibility and. perhaps, even some platform availability,

44

Journal of the Australian Sural Institute

February/April 1996

An example ol "Joint Fusion' lor the KAN could in­volve dedicated FA IS air support permanently based m the hast Australian hxercise Area, possibly at IIM\s \i BATROSS and focusing on support to the Med Again, collocation may prove he more cost ef­fective than traditional centralised, functional resource control, through main sums' based on direct and opportunity costs could be done to disprove it, This is because actual operational value ol such changes is hard to measure quantitatively, while dollar and op­portunity costs are relatively clear. Nevertheless, a redistribution bf already available resources in ex­change lor a potentially substantial increase in com­bat effectiveness may well be worth further, far more detailed investigation.

Practice for RKAI. Training must be realis­tic, consistent, continuous and occur under varied conditions ot weather, stress and terrain. Again, strong, permanent unit links should he established so that

consistent levels of professionalism and mutual knowledge are attained and maintained. This rein­forces the need for the 'fusion' or blending approach being pushed beyond establishing integrated strate­gic and operational headc/iinrters. and reinforces the need lor selected force groupings to have a large de­gree ol 'self containment' and commonality of ap­proach. The importance of realistic practice under­lines ihe importance of readiness and sustainahility as two key pillars ol Australia's military capability. Readiness and sustainahility may well have been se­riously neglected in the drive for force structure mod­ernisation during the last decade, and efforts to re­store balance to the situation should be made, even if force composition (platform numbers and types) has to be dunged to accommodate the requirement.

Most importantly, especially during long periods of pfiace, lighting units must be able to develop and trans­mit a military ethos which stems largely from l.imili arity with their weapons, platforms and tactics, and regularly working with eomrades (not strangersi in realistic exercises. The qualhy <>i the entire force stems Irum this. Given that a critical lesson arising from the research w as that tactical skills were consistently more important than technical performance, more lime aim­ing loi best time on target performance at sea. in the field and in the air could prove more cost effective than a tightly rationed 'bean courtier" or efficiency oriented approach . This change of focus would yield solid measures of effectiveness based around limes, distances, synchronisation and rates of engagement.

Rebalancing readiness, sustainabiliiy. modernisation

and lone structure could have a dramatic effect on much of the next generation of AIM-' equipment, in winch a requirement for minimum support during extended operations would become a primary selec­tion criterion Fot equipment This involves high equip­ment reliability, ease of repair and low spares con-

sumption rates. Consequently, the design of some types of equipment may have to give higher priority to robustness and maintainability, rather than peak

performance.

J. User managed logistics Logistics and support technologies can increasingly be used as sub­stitutes for mass. Convincing evidence exists that com­plex, demand "pull", and "supplier managed" sys­tems are less effective than "user managed systems", A strong bias should he given to user managed sup­ply systems capable of delivering oversupply' 10 op­erational units.

Conclusion

Fighting smarter depends OH having insight into when and how to best use various strategies, tactics and weapons systems Ibis involves setting up organisa­tions and procedures in peacetime that can make quick and effective use of resources when trouble happens. Today, in what is rightly called the 'Information Age', the main game is still to put in place a clear hierarchy of command which can elicit - not hamper - respon­siveness, flexibility and innovation at even level ol operations. A big pari ot this in war and peace is en­suring the two way How of necessary information from top to bottom' by removing barriers to communica­tion between areas like lite political leadership, op­erations, intelligence, planning and logislies systems. Several recent changes to joint command and control arrangements in the ADF represent attempts ft I aehiev e this aim. and in this article 1 have tried to assess these changes in the light of evidence from a number ol recent conflicts. I have also speculated on directions which may further improve the effectiveness of ADF joint operations.

Many in the ADF have justifiably grown to tear the spectre of overmaiigement and. on the surface, Some ol the current changes to joint command and control arrangements may seem to exacerbate a tendency to mieromanage the force and invest in 'fat' rather than 'muscle'. However, the fundamental test 01 bene lit is

whether these changes are likely to amount to a clari­fication or simplification of the C3 process during conflict On the basis of the empirical research cited

in this article the answer is. on balance. Yes. Com­mand is likely to be appropriately centralised and sim­plified at both the strategic and operational levels Moreover, an appropriate degree of control is likely to be decentralised from 'Canberra' to a well equipped, fused' operational level headquarters. Simply put. collocation of key players at strategic and operational headquarters should enhance cooperation ami promote homogeneity of approach and outlook (pre requisites for genuinely decentralising control) in the services However, in a sense, setting up these organisational frameworks is easy It is relatively simple lo set up joint organisations, build headquarters and change

February/April 1996

Journal ai the Australian Xuval Institute

45

organisational charts if money can be found, While integration or centralising of strategic and operational headquarters may streamline the workings within these headquarters sueh efficient eompartmenis and functions can, paradoxically, be powerful threats to military effectiveness. Connectivity between various headquarters and units remains critical and connec­tivity goes well beyond high ^[cch. secure data links ami command oriented. 'Top down' change. Ensur­ing freedom of communieation and similarity ol ap­proach at and between all levels of command is \ital and. unless personnel m each 'compartment' are in­clined to cross the barriers and lines of authority as part of their norma] duties, eompanmentalisation will have simply been rearranged by these chances. Fewer, but stronger feudal kingdoms' can exist.

alism. realistic practice and mutual know ledge within the ADF are attained, maintained and perpetuated. 'Fusion' or col location ol combat units and their sup-|x>n demands a fundamental rethink of traditional 'dol lar based' arguments supporting the advantages of centralised, functional management of ADFresources. Fundamental to these considerations is the common and eritieal lesson arising from lite research eiled thai tactical skills were consistently more important than technical performance in conflict Improving the • its of the force from the bottom up involves rebalancing the lour pillars' of military capability lreadiness, sustainability. modernisation and force Structure] in favour of readiness and sustainability. even at the expense of some platform performance, availability and maintenance flexibility.


The -Top down* command oriented changes are posi­tive but they cannot guarantee widespread, success­ful human interaction and may not significantly im­prove capability of the ADF as a whole. This has to come hugely from the 'bottom' up. A complemen­tary, 'bottom up' approach to decentralising control may now be needed, and probably starts with perma­nently collocating units that have to work together in conflict so that real hotnogeneityofapproach is likely lo he achieved throughout the ADF. right up from the tactical level.

Essential in achieving decentralised control is recog­nition of the primacy of building up strong, perma­nent unit links so that consistent levels of profession

Having successfully put in place a plan lor strong, centralised command over the ADF from the top down', the next test of generalship, or Adtttiralship, may be lo complement this by creating a genuine de centralisation of control bias throughout fat ADF Iroin the 'bottom up': a bias that elicits ami optimises re­sponsiveness, flexibility and innovation at even level of operations. However, successfully coupling ccti-tralised command with genuinely decentralised con trol has been an elusive goal achieved by very lew nations in history...This is the stuff of - dare I say u -RMAs! Yet the opportunity may exist for the ADF to get close to this happy condition in the not too if-,

taut future and. while the risks and costs of this new approach for the ADF are substantial, the challenge is clear.

About the uuthor

Lieutenant ('ommonderMan Hinge was bom in South Melbourne in 1955. He holds it Masters Degree IMA) in Strategic Studies ami a BSc tPhysics). both from the ANU. In 1984 he became the Jirs) junior officer in the ADF to he awarded a Defence fellowship, ami since then has had forty articles published in professional military journals in Australia and overseas. These articles have covered a with- ramie of topics, from leadership. management ami adventurous training to naval operations, weapons technology, defence economics and project management. He has also written o book on mine warfare : edited two others on project management and is a Contributing author to the Australian Dictionary of Biography. He has won ten major prizes in international essay competitions and edited this

journal during 1987-88 and 1994-1995i In 1993 he became the inaugural

Hot kwell Scholar in Sirategit studies ami is currently Co Director of the UMmrnr W fs

Australian Defence Studies Centre \ Detente industry and Logistics Program. In June 1996 He lakes up the inaugural CDI Scholarship. His topic is: Achieving More Cost Effective Defence Preparedness in the Post Cold War Era. This paper represents some preliminary research into this topic.

76

Journal <>l tin- Australian Naval Institute

Eebruary/April 1996

Notes:

Cordesman \ and Wagner.A. Lessons of Modem Wat Vol I iWesmeu Press. Boulder. 199 l)p.353

Cordesiiiaii.A and Wagnor.A. lessons ol Modem War Vol III (WtetVie* Press. Boulder. I99 | | p 3? I

Van ("rewld.M. Command in Wat (Harvard I Hi

vetsily Press. Mass. 1985) Chapter 8 discusses thfiSC

concepts ai length

4 Earl. R. a Matter of Principle', is Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1983 cites results oi the Holloway repon in his article. The Hollowa) Report was prepared for the US Joint Chiefs of.stall In ex

<'N't > Admiral James Hollow ay III LSNiretdiand live oilui active and retired verj senior military officers. The 7s page repon which was released on 23 August 1980 is considered the definitive analysis of Opera­tion 'Blueltght', the codename for the abortive hos-tage rescue mission. Importantly, man) elements of the I'S forces seemed to have learned from this expe­rience as operations in the lale I9SIK and early 1990s

indicate, lor the Ground Force commander's com­ments on the mission's background organisation and

operation, see IVckwith. C, 'Delta force' (Arms and Armour Press, 1984), In particular, see p.295 with re

yard to bcllci conduct fjl joint operations.

Sonic icsulls ol Bus report arc cited In (heescnian (.. ' I he Search lor Self Reliance' il ongman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993), pp 85-86

6 Weekend Australian, January 20-21. p hi

7 Strategic Review I'my p.47.49

s Key results of the DARK.A analyses are used hy Cordesman and Wagnert lyyOi. open, in Vols I.II and III ol their work.

Vol I oflhid. p.ti '"Cordesman and Wagner. Vol III. p.394

1' WoodmaruS and HomerJD (Eds). 'Re Shaping the

Australian Army: Challenges for the 199QV, Ban iiena Papei on Strategy and Defence No 77. sdsc AND. 1991), p.93

12 Cordesman and Wagner, Vol III. op cil p 192

15 Ibid, p 188

11 Ibid

|S Cordesman and Wagner, Vol I. p.353.

i" < ordesman ami Wagner, Vol III. p.394 and Vol I.

p.Kl

17 [bid, p.394

'" Ibid, PI' 189 90. loi adisciissioiiofGulfW.il in accuracy, even under close lo ideal conditions, see Badsev.S and Primlott.J iLdsi. The Gull Wai As-

sessed' i Arms and Armour Press. 1992) pp. 122-23.

'" Ibid, p.395 Also. Van Creveld.M. "Fighting Power' iArms and Armour Press. 1983) looks m de­tail at the operational edge good training gave the German Army dining World War II In particulai See Chapters X and II where he suggests that enduring summon factors exist for attaining and maintaining

fighting power

-" Cited hy Cameron Stuart in the Weekend Austral lali 22-23 Jan 64. pi "Lorees unable to counter Threats',

21 See Ibid

-- Cordesman and Warmer. Vol 111. p..451

-■ Cordesman and Wagner. Vol I. p.355

24 Ibid

2?l Cordesman and Wagner. Vol III. p bit,

2,1 Ibid. p.39X

27 Cordesman and Wagner, Vol III. p 197

,s Van Ctvv eld i 19X51 op cil. p.2b6

2''Ibid. p.271

™ Matrix management is defined by Ma&sie. J. 'Es­sentials ol Management¹ [Prentice Hall, NJ. 19791 pp.81-82

71 IPCFAD 19X4 Report The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities' i A( IPSi. p. 152

'- L.arl. op eit, p 36

" An acronym not in widespread use in the Navy. km \t Revolution in Military Affairs) has become the

hottest uiiliiarv "buz/word' o| the 90s and. like the Maltese Falcon, it may be the Stuff dreams are made Of m that n can be all things to all i military I men and women. Il you arc m the Air Loire il could be some­thing along die lines oi the result ol the integration of four new and emerging warfare areas Precision Strike. Information Warfare, Dominating Maneuver and Space Warfare', II you are in the Army it can be reduced lo a simple equation: RMA = Time x Tech­nology x Tactics. The Navy seems to be less excited about the term than the other serv ices W bile remain mg open lo new missions and adaptations ol current doctrine, many believe thai the role of current plat­forms and operations will probably increase in future, especially in non warfighling roles. What the dispa rate components of the so called RMA offer Navy are likely to be force focusing options that can be selec­tive!) taken on board' and exploited to maintain ca­pabilities in an environment of increasing austerity.

February/April 1996

Juiinnil <>i the Australian Naval Institute

47

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