Control + 1 – Block Headings

Feminism focuses on excluded groups

J. Ann Tickner (professor of international relations at USC) 2001, Gendering World Politics. Pp. 31.

Critical Theory Critical theory played a central role in motivating the third debate. Critical theory comes out of Marxism as well as Hegelian and Kantian Enlightenment traditions.90 Like historical sociologists, critical theorists examine the historical development of society with the intent of understanding various forms of domination in order to overcome them. Critical theory views the prevailing order of social and political relations as a historical production that must be explained. In order to explain injustice, it is necessary to understand the world as it is. In this sense, critical theory accepts the realist description of world politics, but it seeks to change it. Critical theorist Robert Cox uses a hermeneutic approach that conceives of social structures as having an intersubjective existence; however, making the claim that structures are socially constructed does not deny that they have real concrete effects: humans act as if the structures are real. This is quite a different concept of theory from positivism, and it is one that many IR feminists find compatible with their orientations. Feminists claim that gender structures are socially constructed, historically variable, and upheld through power relations that legitimize them. Like critical theorists, most feminists would claim an emancipatory interest in seeking to overcome these structures of domination. Most feminists would also agree with critical theorists that knowledge reflects certain interests of the society from which it is produced; in IR, knowledge has generally been produced by and for men, particularly elite men. Feminists are particularly concerned to examine and explain why certain kinds of knowledge have been left out of the discipline. Like many critical theorists, they, too, question the subject matter of conventional IR. Often focused on the lives of people at the margins of global politics, they raise issues not normally considered part of the discipline and ask questions about them in new ways. As Sandra Harding tells us, an important task of feminist theory is to make strange what has previously appeared familiar, or to challenge us to question what has hitherto appeared as "natural." A reexamination of the meaning of security in chapter 2 is an example of how feminists are expanding the subject matter of IR.

AT: Essentialism Bad
They mischaracterize our argument – women aren’t inherently peaceful or caring; these attributes are entirely constructed and forced upon women. However, ignoring the social reality of gender normativity defeats any project that seeks to overcome them. Our argument is only that the rigid binary international relations upholds is destructive and should be rejected.

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 136-7

If characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are not serving to increase security in our contemporary world, do more secure futures depend on the substitution of values or characteristics more typically associated with femininity? Certain contemporary feminists have celebrated gender difference and hypothesized a special female world superior to and separate from the world of men. In her book entitled Is The Future Female?, Lynne Segal claims that this type of thinking is dangerous and divisive and unlikely to achieve the major goal of feminism, which should be to work for the equality of women.3 Segal argues that women, whose many gendered identities are constructed in terms of race, class, culture, and historical circumstances, cannot be characterized in these essentialist categories. Contemporary characterizations of women in terms similar to the Victorian ideal of the "good woman" serve only to make men more powerful. The celebration of female virtues supports the view of males as protectors and reinforces the separation between public and private spheres, relegating women to the latter. It also diverts attention from the agenda of working toward women's political, economic, and social equality, an agenda necessary for the achievement of genuine security. Characteristics that have typically been associated with femininity must therefore be seen not in essentialist terms but as characteristics that women have developed in response to their socialization and their historical roles in society. The association of women with moral virtues such as caring comes not from women's innate moral superiority but from women's activities in the private sphere where these values are accepted in theory, if not always in practice. Since they are linked to women and the private sphere, however, these feminine characteristics have been devalued in the public realm, particularly in the world of international politics. The question then becomes how to revalue them in public life in ways that can contribute to the creation of a more just and secure world. Taking care not to elevate these feminine characteristics to a position of superiority, we can regard them as an inspiration that can contribute to our thinking about ways to build better futures. Even if the better future is not female, a human future that rejects the rigid separation of public and private sphere values and the social distinctions between women and men requires that the good qualities of both are equally honored and made available to all.
We think peaceful strategies are good – that society happens to construct this view as ‘feminine’ is the only reason we argue about gender hierarchies

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 60-1

Discarding the association between women and pacifism allows us to think of women as activists for the kind of change needed to achieve the multidimensional security I have already discussed. Even if not all women are pacifists, peace is an issue that women can support in their various roles as mothers, war victims, and preservers of states' and the world's good health.84 Women at Greenham Common demonstrating against the installation of cruise missiles in Britain in 1981 came to see themselves as strong, brave, and creative-- experiences frequently confined to men.85 The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, demonstrating during the1980s in support of those who had disappeared in Argentina during the military dictatorship, experienced similar empowerment. Sara Ruddick suggests conscripting women in the interests of peace; Ruddick claims that while caring for children is not "natural" for women, it has been a womanly practice in most societies and one that she believes is an important resource for peace politics.86 Ruddick defines maternal thinking as focused on the preservation of life and the growth of children. Maternal practice requires the peaceful settlement of disputes; since she feels that it is a mode of thinking to be found in men as well as women, it is one that could be useful for a politics of peace were it to be validated in the public realm.
AT: Essentialism Bad
Tickner understands your argument and incorporates different views of women in her theories –their radical critique makes it impossible to create a sustainable movement against gender hierarchies

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 16-7

This notion of standpoint has been seriously criticized by postmodern feminists who argue that a unified representation of women across class, racial, and cultural lines is an impossibility. Just as feminists more generally have criticized existing knowledge that is grounded in the experiences of white Western males, postmodernists claim that feminists themselves are in danger of essentializing the meaning of woman when they draw exclusively on the experiences of white Western women: such an approach runs the additional risk of reproducing the same dualizing distinctions that feminists object to in patriarchal discourse. 27 Postmodernists believe that a multiplicity of women's voices must be heard lest feminism itself become one more hierarchical system of knowledge construction. Any attempt to construct feminist perspectives on international relations must take this concern of postmodernists seriously; as described above, dominant approaches to international relations have been Western-centered and have focused their theoretical investigations on the activities of the great powers. An important goal for many feminists has been to attempt to speak for the marginalized and oppressed: much of contemporary feminism has also recognized the need to be sensitive to the multiple voices of women and the variety of circumstances out of which they speak. Developing perspectives that can shed light on gender hierarchies as they contribute to women's oppression worldwide must therefore be sensitive to the dangers of constructing a Western-centered approach. Many Western feminists are understandably apprehensive about replicating men's knowledge by generalizing from the experiences of white Western women. Yet to be unable to speak for women only further reinforces the voices of those who have constructed approaches to international relations out of the experiences of men.
The alternative is founded in a methodology of inclusion –the affirmative is the world of essentialism where there is a refusal to accept women into the realm of decision-making and power

S. Laurel Weldon, PhD, University of Pittsburgh, USA, Associate Professor of political science at Purdue University, 2006 [“Feminist Methodologies for International Relations” edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auskland, New Zealand, 2006, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg. EmiW]

In this chapter I have suggested that feminist theorizing about methodology should include a more worked-out account of what scholarly collectives should look like. This approach provides the conceptual basis on which to argue that mainstream scholarship should, for methodological reasons, attend to and take account of feminist, postcolonial, and other situated standpoints. Taking account of feminist work in international relations will advance our collective understanding of international relations, and will make mainstream work more objective and less distorted. Theorizing what the structure of a scholarly feminist collective should look like highlights how the organization and procedural norms of the discipline pose obstacles to advancing our understanding of international Relations. Current feminist epistemology in International Relations emphasizes the situatedness of individual researchers, but the approach advanced here suggests that individual decisions are only part of the story; our disciplinary structure cannot be neutral in terms of epistemology. Some feminist epistemological approaches tend to emphasize the benefit of cultivating multiple perspectives, moving away from standpoint epistemology’s original emphasis on the superiority of the subjugated standpoint. But this approach provides no political leverage for those who wish to argue that mainstream scholars must attend to feminist work. The “live and let live” approach poses little obligation on mainstream scholars, and does nothing to break down scholarly segregation. In failing to emphasize that some approaches are better than others, it obscures the weaknesses of mainstream approaches and permits main- stream scholars to dismiss feminist work. (Of course, this is not the fault of these feminist epistemologies.) To the extent that arguments make any difference, it is important to have grounds for demanding that mainstream scholars attend to feminist work and take it seriously, as opposed to ignoring it. In this chapter I develop the basis for saying that they must do so, not only because ignoring this work is unfair or sexist, but also because doing so blocks them, and the broader discipline, from a better, fuller understanding of politics. Attending to feminist perspectives (and the perspectives of other marginalized groups) should force a transformation of dominant paradigms and give us all a better under- standing of international relations. This is an epistemological argument, then, grounded in feminism and pragmatism, for adopting a methodology of inclusion; for ensuring that feminist voices are articulated and heard in scholarly discussions of international relations.
AT: Essentialism Bad
Feminist perspectives are not essentializing – saying that groups that express a standpoint is not the equivalent of asserting that there is a fundamental group essence

S. Laurel Weldon, PhD, University of Pittsburgh, USA, Associate Professor of political science at Purdue University, 2006 [“Feminist Methodologies for International Relations” edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auskland, New Zealand, 2006, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg. 65-6 EmiW]

Standpoints are not innate but rather arise from a particular political situation, namely a situation of group hierarchy or domination. Standpoints are the perspectives of groups, not of individuals. Standpoint epistemology does not focus on individual differences in viewpoints, but rather on issues, values, or styles of discourse, that inform a group perspective. “Communities, and not primarily individuals, produce knowledge” (Harding 1993: 65). Asserting that groups share “standpoints” has raised charges of essentialism (Tickner 2001; Sylvester 1996b). Essentialism refers to the analytical mistake of attributing a fundamental underlying essence to a group that does not, in fact, exist. But asserting that a group shares a standpoint does not suggest that each person in the group has the same opinions or values, or that anything shared derives from the fundamental group essence or nature (cf. Harding 1998). Rather, standpoints are constructed collectively by group members. This means, for example, that feminist standpoints can be adopted by men, but they are developed when women - in all their diversity - interact, discuss, and indeed contest representations of “women,” “women’s interests,” and women’s identities. A standpoint, then, is expressed most fully in collective products: feminist publications, newspapers, conferences, and the like (Harding 1998).
Deconstructive and standpoint strategies are critical to opening up space for the marginalized – a standpoint is not essentialist, it doesn’t require any shared positions of experiences

S. Laurel Weldon, PhD, University of Pittsburgh, USA, Associate Professor of political science at Purdue University, 2006 [“Feminist Methodologies for International Relations” edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auskland, New Zealand, 2006, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg. 82 EmiW]

Rather than specify the epistemological advantages of taking a feminist standpoint, as opposed to a mainstream standpoint, some scholars have emphasized a strategy of deconstructing those dominant discourses to create space for oppositional or marginalized standpoints (Sylvester 1994a; Zalewski, this volume). This is a preferred strategy because of the difficulty of defining “women” in the first place, not to mention the difficulty of discovering “a women's standpoint.” But as I have already noted': above in relation to problems of essentialism, a perspective or standpoint is not the view of an individual, and it does not require a shared interest, experience or policy position. So these concerns seem overdrawn to me.

AT: Essentialism (Environment Impact)
We don’t say women and nature are connected – rather, the dominating logic that oppresses one is the same as the other. Feminist perspectives on the environment are an effective way to achieve ecological security

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 98

Yet ecology has also been viewed with some ambivalence by feminists. Many of them are suspicious of ecology and ecofeminism because they regard the age-old connection between women and nature, which both have espoused, as a basis of women's oppression. Socialist feminists, particularly, have criticized what they see as ecofeminists' tendency to essentialize women and naturalize their reproductive and domestic roles. This tendency perpetuates the dualistic hierarchies described in chapter 1 that most feminists believe must be eliminated if gender equality is to be achieved.3 Yet some recent ecofeminist scholarship is rejecting this essentialist connection between women and nature, as well as making important and interesting alliances with the ecological tradition. Believing that the oppression of women and the domination of nature are both the result of patriarchy, these ecofeminists claim that the connection must be made explicit if structures of domination in both our natural and human environments are to be overcome. For this reason, these feminist ecological perspectives can offer us important new insights into the way we think about our natural environment, insights that could be useful for thinking about the achievement of global ecological security.

AT: Identity Politics Bad (Butler)
Butler fails to account for biological differences and offers no opportunity for change

Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, “The Professor of Parody,” pt. III, 2K, http://perso.uclouvain.be/mylene.botbol/Recherche/GenreBioethique/Nussbaum_NRO.htm

So what does Butler's work add to this copious body of writing? Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter contain no detailed argument against biological claims of "natural" difference, no account of mechanisms of gender replication, and no account of the legal shaping of the family; nor do they contain any detailed focus on possibilities for legal change. What, then, does Butler offer that we might not find more fully done in earlier feminist writings? One relatively original claim is that when we recognize the artificiality of gender distinctions, and refrain from thinking of them as expressing an independent natural reality, we will also understand that there is no compelling reason why the gender types should have been two (correlated with the two biological sexes), rather than three or five or indefinitely many. "When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice," she writes. From this claim it does not follow, for Butler, that we can freely reinvent the genders as we like: she holds, indeed, that there are severe limits to our freedom. She insists that we should not naively imagine that there is a pristine self that stands behind society, ready to emerge all pure and liberated: "There is no self that is prior to the convergence or who maintains `integrity' prior to its entrance into this conflicted cultural field. There is only a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very `taking up' is enabled by the tool lying there." Butler does claim, though, that we can create categories that are in some sense new ones, by means of the artful parody of the old ones. Thus her best known idea, her conception of politics as a parodic performance, is born out of the sense of a (strictly limited) freedom that comes from the recognition that one's ideas of gender have been shaped by forces that are social rather than biological. We are doomed to repetition of the power structures into which we are born, but we can at least make fun of them; and some ways of making fun are subversive assaults on the original norms.
Butler’s analysis dooms any hope for emancipation – ignores empirics

Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, “The Professor of Parody,” pt. III, 2K, http://perso.uclouvain.be/mylene.botbol/Recherche/GenreBioethique/Nussbaum_NRO.htm

Thus the one place for agency in a world constrained by hierarchy is in the small opportunities we have to oppose gender roles every time they take shape. When I find myself doing femaleness, I can turn it around, poke fun at it, do it a little bit differently. Such reactive and parodic performances, in Butler's view, never destabilize the larger system. She doesn't envisage mass movements of resistance or campaigns for political reform; only personal acts carried out by a small number of knowing actors. Just as actors with a bad script can subvert it by delivering the bad lines oddly, so too with gender: the script remains bad, but the actors have a tiny bit of freedom. Thus we have the basis for what, in Excitable Speech, Butler calls "an ironic hopefulness." Up to this point, Butler's contentions, though relatively familiar, are plausible and even interesting, though one is already unsettled by her narrow vision of the possibilities for change. Yet Butler adds to these plausible claims about gender two other claims that are stronger and more contentious. The first is that there is no agent behind or prior to the social forces that produce the self. If this means only that babies are born into a gendered world that begins to replicate males and females almost immediately, the claim is plausible, but not surprising: experiments have for some time demonstrated that the way babies are held and talked to, the way their emotions are described, are profoundly shaped by the sex the adults in question believe the child to have. (The same baby will be bounced if the adults think it is a boy, cuddled if they think it is a girl; its crying will be labeled as fear if the adults think it is a girl, as anger if they think it is a boy.) Butler shows no interest in these empirical facts.