Eminent Collapse Now Good- only way to shift to a sustainable system – tech doesn’t solve Tim, Jackson

AT History Proves

Economic collapse does not cause war—their historical arguments are wrong

FERGUSON 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Econ Resil

The economy is resilient

Washington Times 2008 - chief political correspondent of The Washington Times (7/28/08, Donald Lambro, The Washington Times, "Always darkest before dawn", lexis, WEA)

The doom-and-gloomers are still with us, of course, and they will go to their graves forecasting that life as we know it is coming to an end and that we are in for years of economic depression and recession. Last week, the New York Times ran a Page One story maintaining that Americans were saving less than ever, and that their debt burden had risen by an average of $117,951 per household. And the London Telegraph says there are even harder times ahead, comparing today's economy to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Wall Street economist David Malpass thinks that kind of fearmongering is filled with manipulated statistics that ignore long-term wealth creation in our country, as well as globally. Increasingly, people are investing "for the long run - for capital gains (not counted in savings) rather than current income - in preparation for retirement," he told his clients last week. Instead of a coming recession, "we think the U.S. is in gradual recovery after a sharp two-quarter slowdown, with consumer resilience more likely than the decades-old expectation of a consumer slump," Mr. Malpass said. "Fed data shows clearly that household savings of all types - liquid, financial and tangible - are still close to the record levels set in September. IMF data shows U.S. households holding more net financial savings than the rest of the world combined. Consumption has repeatedly outperformed expectations in recent quarters and year," he said. The American economy has been pounded by a lot of factors, including the housing collapse (a needed correction to bring home prices down to earth), the mortgage scandal and the meteoric rise in oil and gas prices. But this $14 trillion economy, though slowing down, continues to grow by about 1 percent on an annualized basis, confounding the pessimists who said we were plunging into a recession, defined by negative growth over two quarters. That has not happened - yet. Call me a cockeyed optimist, but I do not think we are heading into a recession. On the contrary, I'm more bullish than ever on our economy's long-term prospects.

Decline => Cooperation

Global economic decline fosters international cooperation, not conflict.

Taylor, Fravel.M. Taylor Fravel is the Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.2010. [“The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict”. Security Studies. Volume 19, Issue 2 pages 307 – 341] www.informaworld.com/.../ftinterface~content=a922422929~f
The research inspiring the diversionary hypothesis is social-psychological, widely known¶ as the conflict-cohesion or ingroup/outgroup logic developed by Georg Simmel and Lewis¶ Coser.13 Within international relations, the diversionary hypothesis asserts that leaders recognize¶ that external conflict can increase societal cohesion and will pursue conflict abroad when¶ domestic political survival is at risk. Based on the conflict-cohesion logic, the first mechanism by¶ which leaders divert is to persuade the public to “rally around the flag,” setting aside parochial¶ interests to unite for the greater good of the nation.14 The rally effect is sometimes described as¶ scapegoating, where leaders justify a belligerent foreign policy by blaming internal difficulties¶ on foreign enemies.15 In either case, leaders initiate or use force in response to domestic threats¶ to deflect attention away from themselves and onto an external adversary, thereby using¶ symbolic politics to increase national unity and enhance their domestic political support.¶ Historical collapse of ancient states poses intriguing social-ecological questions, as well as potential applications to global change and¶ contemporary strategies for sustainability. Five Old World case studies are developed to identify interactive inputs, triggers, and feedbacks¶ in devolution. Collapse is multicausal and rarely abrupt. Political simplification undermines traditional structures of authority to favor¶ militarization, whereas disintegration is preconditioned or triggered by acute stress (insecurity, environmental or economic crises,¶ famine), with breakdown accompanied or followed by demographic decline. Undue attention to stressors risks underestimating the¶ intricate interplay of environmental, political, and sociocultural resilience in limiting the damages of collapse or in facilitating reconstruction.¶ The conceptual model emphasizes resilience, as well as the historical roles of leaders, elites, and ideology. However, a historical model¶ cannot simply be applied to contemporary problems of sustainability without adjustment for cumulative information and increasing¶ possibilities for popular participation. Between the 14th and 18th centuries, Western Europe responded to environmental crises by innovation¶ and intensification; such modernization was decentralized, protracted, flexible, and broadly based. Much of the current alarmist¶ literature that claims to draw from historical experience is poorly focused, simplistic, and unhelpful. It fails to appreciate that resilience and¶ readaptation depend on identified options, improved understanding, cultural solidarity, enlightened leadership, and opportunities¶ for participation and fresh ideas.¶ Duration of the processes¶ favoring decline or recovery helps to¶ identify the processes of devolution as well¶ as the elasticity of resilience. Drawing from¶ the experience of the historical case¶ studies, Fig. 1 suggests that a preconditioning¶ economic decline typically¶ spans decades or centuries. Contrary to¶ frequent claims of “abrupt” collapse, the¶ triggers that bring economic crisis are¶ more likely to operate at a multidecadal¶ scale. The first stage of stabilization or¶ instability may also be fairly rapid, whereas¶ a more complex reconstitution or complete¶ breakdown is likely to span a century¶ or more. Time frames would also be affected¶ by the absence of rapid or sustained¶ means of communication in earlier historical¶ eras.