Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Chapter 4: Ethiopian federalism: Ideological
justifications and political use
The purpose with this chapter is to determine when and under which
circumstances the “federal bargain” was offered in Ethiopia. Firstly, the
justifications for introducing federalism as a principle for state reconstruction,
the so-called ideological or normative base, will be considered. Secondly, the
possible pragmatic considerations and political uses of federalism by the
Ethiopian political forces will be explored. How does the introduction of
federalism reflect the interests of the political leaders to benefit from state
building and institutional reconstruction?
The conclusions made to this chapter will provide important clues on what
expectations both the ruling party, the opposition and the Ethiopian people at
large have to the outcome of the so-called federal bargain and the working of
the federal system. Both the ideological justification and the way federalism is
used by the political leaders to support their interest have great impact on
whether or not the federal system is perceived as legitimate.
The ideological foundation: the right to national self-
determination
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), as the leading force of the
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was the political
force that initiated the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state along federal lines.
It should therefore be considered as the major architect behind Ethiopian
federalism, offering “the federal bargain”. The ideological background for
Ethiopian federalism is undoubtedly connected to the TPLF’s support for the
principle of national self-determination. But as we shall see below, the meaning
and implications of this principle remained unclear through the entire period of
struggle against the Derg, and did not get a concrete content before the drafting
of the transitional charter in 1991 and the new constitution in 1994.
The unanswered question: secession or autonomy for Tigray?
From the establishment of the TPLF in the mid-1970s, the movement argued
for the principle of “self-determination for the nationalities”. The support for
this principle was partly influenced by the ideas of the Ethiopian student
movement of the 1960s and partly by Tigrayan nationalism. Both the students
and the Tigrayan nationalists saw the Amhara domination as the major reason
behind the problems in Ethiopian society. The radical, multiethnic student
movement, based at Addis Ababa University, was inspired by the Leninist
approach to the question of the nationalities. In solving what they saw as the
fundamental problem of society, the class conflict, ethnic groups should be
given various degrees of autonomy while a strong multiethnic communist party
should stay in power. Tigrayan students were initially part of the student
movement, but the urge to organise on the basis of nationality and to address

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the national question as the primary cause became stronger. Soon, Tigrayan
students started the recruitment for an exclusively Tigrayan organisation
working for national self-determination for Tigray region (Young 1997:80).
After the TPLF was founded in 1975, it remained unclear whether national
self-determination for Tigray meant secession and independence or only
regional autonomy within an Ethiopian framework. Despite the fact that the
TPLF’s 1976 manifesto stated the aim of establishing an independent republic
of Tigray (Young 1997:99), the party later made clear that they did not
consider secession as the only option. “Being part of a multi-national Ethiopia
based on equality, where there are no oppressor or oppressed nations; where
the right of every nation without distinction is constitutionally and in practice
safeguarded, where democracy and social justice prevail, and where the
fundamental human rights of the people are not violated, is also acceptable to
the people of Tigray” (from TPLF’s submission to the United Nations General
Assembly, regarding the Tigray people’s struggle for self-determination, 1982,
quoted in Vaughan 1994:9). But during the struggle against the Derg, the TPLF
never abandoned the idea of secession completely. It stated that if the
oppression and exploitation of the Tigrayan people continued, it would mean
the creation of an independent Tigray (Young 1997:100). Neither did the
movement specify how national self-determination should be constitutionally,
institutionally and practically entrenched. Self-determination “could result in
anything from autonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including
independence” (TPLF, People’s Voice, April 1981, quoted in Markakis 1987:
254.)
The TPLF’s establishment of the multiethnic EPRDF in 1989 might be
interpreted as a sign of an increasing commitment to a united Ethiopia. By
including other ethnic groups into a common front against Mengistu, it would
seem that the movement had abandoned the idea of an independent Tigrayan
republic and that the front went for a unified solution. A consideration of the
way in which the EPRDF was created, however, might question the TPLF’s
intentions behind the formation of a common front. The organisations that
became members of the EPRDF were to a large extent created by the TPLF
itself and did not initially have any popular base. The Oromo People’s
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), as we know, consisted of former Derg
soldiers who were captured by the TPLF during the final days of the war.
According to Young (1997: 166), “the TPLF’s dependence on creating its own
allies” was due to the movement’s fear of not being able to defeat the Derg on
its own, or to be outnumbered by other organisations, such as the OLF. The
formation of the EPRDF could thus be seen as an instrumental move to ensure
a defeat of the Derg on terms defined by the TPLF, and not primarily as a sign
of dedication to a unified Ethiopia.