Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

party congresses, which are normally held every second year. The party
congresses decide the overall ERPDF programme. The central committee,
however, has the power to implement specific plans of actions which are the
basis for the EPRDF’s five-year plans that are implemented nation widely, and
has the right to elect and dismiss the executive committee as a whole or its
individual members (Interview Gibre’ab Barnabas, August 2000). The five-year
plan is adopted by all the regional parties and is the basis for regional policies
and plans.
The member parties have the same structure as the mother party within their
organisations, but they are also responsible to the central committee of the
EPRDF. The four EPRDF parties have councils equivalent to central
committees and executives at each level of administration, at the regional level,
in the woreda and the kebele. These party organs are responsible and
accountable to the party bodies in the hierarchy above them. Orders are
dispatched from the top to the lower levels, and information about activities on
the lower levels are forwarded upwards through the hierarchy to the top.
“Djoro”, the Amharic name for ear, is a popular name for local party cadres
who are conducting intelligence among people in the neighbourhoods of the
kebele, and reporting to the party organisation (Information obtained from
interviews with voters, conducted during elections in Tigray 2000 and Addis
Ababa 2001).
A general problem in Ethiopian political life is the difficulty of distinguishing
the party organs from the administrative organs of the state. People tend to see
the party and the state as one. This problem appears both at national, regional
and local level. On top level, it is hard to distinguish between the leadership of
the central committee and the party executive and the top executives of the
government, because they essentially consist of the same groups of people 
27
. As
referred to in chapter five of this analysis, the Ethiopian constitution gives
room for a strong executive, and the other branches of the government, the
judiciary and the legislative have relatively little power to impose checks on the
Prime Minister. This gives Meles Zenawi, as the head of the party executive
and the Prime Minister of the executive government, quite extensive powers.
When the executive has free hands, it means that, by all practical purposes, the
ruling party can act without interference from other political forces. On
regional level, the president of the state is both chief executive and head of the
legislative state council. Thus, there is no distinction between the legislative and
executive branch of government. The president, who in most cases is also one
27
Of the eighteen ministers appointed by Meles Zenawi, only two are from outside the
ERPDF. Most of the ministers are members of the executive committees of the EPRDF parties
and some are members of the central committees (Walta Information Centre 2001)

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of the chairmen of the regional ERPDF member party or affiliate party, has
therefore extensive power in regional affairs. On local level, the blurred borders
between the state and the party are expressed by people’s notion of the woreda
and kebele bureaucracy as party organs. In times of elections, for instance,
there is a clear perception among the voters that if they do not vote for the
ruling party, they will lose the benefits and services they have the right to
obtain from the public administration (Aalen 2000a). In the southern region,
SNNPRS, this has been a central issue in the election campaigns. The ruling
party has felt justified in claiming the right to distribute aid, food and even land
in the name of the party. Party cadres have argued that those supporting the
opposition do not have the right to obtain such services, because it is the ruling