party officials in Awassa and North Omo, names kept confidential, July 2000).
Even higher officials from the SEPDF felt uncomfortable with talking about it.
Many officials were surprised when I asked about gimgemma, and expressed
that they considered the practice more as an internal party or administrative
affair than a matter for public interest (see also chapter 3 of this analysis).
The evaluation of politicians and bureaucrats is not formalised or
established by law and is therefore open to political manipulation. The
outcome of the evaluation depends largely of the role played by the chairman
of the session, and his abilities to persuade the other participants. Based on my
interviews and the literature written on the subject, I would argue that
gimgemma is one of the most important tools for the party in power to
discipline the lower party cadres and bureaucrats and make them loyal to the
central party line. The central party uses gimgemma to ensure its interests in
the regional governments, as concretely seen in Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz
and Gambella. This might undermine the regional governments’ rights to
autonomy and ultimately obstruct the federal division of power.
All in all, it appars that the four lowland regions are the units in the
Ethiopian federation which experience the most severe central interference in
regional affairs. They are governed by formally independent parties, but are
nevertheless practically run by officials from the Regional Affairs Department
and centrally assigned party cadres without formal positions. The EPRDF
member states in the highlands, however, are facing less open interference in
regional affairs than the lowland regions, central party officials operate more
concealed. Even though the highland regions are all EPRDF members, it should
be expected that the degree of central interference varies from state to state. The
regions may have the same formal relationship to the central party apparatus,
but the internal conditions within each state will probably shape the actual
relationship between the regional and central government. The following
analyses of Tigray and SNNPRS are meant to illustrate that the federalisation
process take different shapes also within the EPRDF member states, and that
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these differences are particularly linked to the status of the regional party in
power.
