Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2

Party power and federal – regional relations
As Riker (1964) points out, the way in which party systems are organised
might reinforce or undermine the federal division of power (see chapter two). If
the same party organisation controls both federal and regional level of
government and has a centralised party structure, this might weaken the power
of the regional governments in a way that undermines regional autonomy. If a
party system is genuinely decentralised, or if the regional governments are run
by parties that operate independently of the party in power on central level, this
might enhance the power of the regional governments and strengthen both their
capability to run regional affairs and genuinely represent regional interests at
the central level.
Ethiopia is today ruled by a coalition party composed of several regionally
based ethnic parties. At first sight, this appears to be a party structure which
enhances a federal division of power, because the central government appear to
be run by an organisation with regional, rather than central bases of power.
But practically, the EPRDF is controlling all the regional state governments in
the Ethiopian federation, either directly through the member parties or
25
The revenue capacity means the region’s projected share of revenue in its budget relative to
the planned performance of all other regions (World Bank 2000: 28).

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indirectly through affiliate parties. These largely centralised party structures
appear to contradict with the devolved power structures of a federal system. In
the following sections, I will try to substantiate the argument that the party
structure in Ethiopia undermines the federal division of power and
subordinates the regional governments to the central government. Firstly, the
network of EPRDF members and affiliate parties in the country will be
described. Secondly, I will explore the inner party structures of the ruling party,
which essentially follow a centralised pattern. Thirdly, I will describe methods
how the EPRDF is controlling regional affairs.
EPRDF and its allies in the regional administrations
According to the formal structures of the political parties in Ethiopia, it seems
like party power in the country does not appear to undermine or endanger the
federal division of power. The ERPDF coalition is in power on the federal level,
and regionally based parties, either members of ERPDF or independent, run the
regional governments. On the surface, this structure might seem similar to the
Canadian party structure, where the central government is controlled by parties
with national bases, while the regions are governed by regionally based parties
without a national base. This structure enhances a decentralised federal system,
where the central government is unable to impose centrally decided policies in
the regions without negotiating and consulting with the regional parties.
But a closer look reveals the party structures in Ethiopia are not as
decentralised as the Canadian ones. The four member parties of the EPRDF,
the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO), the Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic
Front (SEPDF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) operate only in
the four regions of Oromiya, Amhara, SNNPRS and Tigray respectively.
Although they formally are equal coalition partners on national level, the TPLF
is the senior. It was the creator of the other parties and is the strongest political
organisation. A member of the TPLF central committee explains the TPLF’s
dominance like this: “It is natural that the TPLF is the strongest political force
and that its leader Meles Zenawi is the national leader. TPLF has many senior
cadres, well-trained and experienced fighters, and in the beginning the largest
numbers of members in the EPRDF coalition” (Interview Gebre’ab Barnabas,
August 2000).
Figure 6.2 ERPDF party structures