Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 Lovise Aalen r 2002: 2



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ethnic federalism (1)

TPLP’s and SEPDF’s regional positions and relations to the central
EPRDF
The different status of the regional parties in Tigray and SNNPRS should have
implications on the relationship between the two regional governments and the
central level. Before I had conducted my data collections in Tigray, my
assumption was that because the region is ruled by the TPLF, the senior partner
in the central government, I could expect few instances of conflicts between the
regional and central level, and little central interference in regional affairs. In
SNNPRS, however, where the regional party is relatively weak, I assumed that
the central party would intervene in regional affairs in order to ensure its
interests. Both of these assumptions were largely affirmed during my data
collection.
When the Derg evacuated the southern areas in 1991, there was no TPLF-
allied southern-based organisation to take over the administration of the area.
The first administrations were therefore militarily dominated and made up of
TPLF-officials. Instead of relying on already established independent parties
like the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Coalition (SEPDC, led by
Beyene Petros), the TPLF gave political training and administrative positions to
southern Ethiopians who had been captured during the war (Young 1998:
198). Thus, the first administrations in the transitional period lacked both
skilled manpower and legitimacy among the population. Although the region
got its own EPRDF party in 1994, the extensive assistance and intervention
from TPLF officials has continued. Several high-ranking individuals from the
EPRDF apparatus are still stationed in the region. People interviewed in
southern region had a relatively concrete picture of the central interference in
the regional government. Generally, they did not mention structures or policies,
but the interference was personalised through one specific man: Bitew Belay,
member of the TPLF central committee who later became the head of the
Regional Affairs Department at the Prime Minister’s Office. He was officially
known as a centrally appointed expert or advisor, assisting the regional
president and chief executive, Abate Kisho, and the establishment and
organisation building of the SEPDF. Initially, he was permanently stationed in
the region, but after he was appointed as head of the Department of Regional
Affairs, he continued to follow the regional affairs closely by frequently
travelling to the region. During his permanent assignment, had no specified
portfolio, so most people could not describe his role in southern politics
accurately. The secrecy and ambiguity around his position is also expressed by
high-ranking officials in the regional bureaucracy. A higher civil servant
described him as “never directly involved in decisions and processes, but in
practice he was at the top of the regional council” (Interview, July 2000, name
kept confidential). Others have witnessed him participating in the sessions of
the regional council, intervening in discussions and decision making (Stated by
former participant in regional council meetings, name kept confidential, July
2000).
Representatives of the ERPDF in Addis Ababa confirm the presence of the
EPRDF/TPLF officials in SNNPRS. Dawit Yohannes presents it as if the
assigned TPLF cadres’ tasks are to “identify the democratic elements in the


C M I
92
region and help them to unite and develop” (Interview, Dawit Yohannes,
November 2000). From the descriptions above, it is fair to say that the EPRDF
has not only been interested in identifying and developing democratic elements,
but has first of all been instrumental in creating a loyal ally, the SEPDF. This
ally, however, has not yet been able or allowed to stand on his own feet.
Several people interviewed in the southern region, including informants from
the religious communities and NGO’s, viewed the SEPDF as a puppet of the
TPLF (Interviews, names kept confidential, June /July 2000). Thus, the presence
of TPLF officials and their intervention in the regional affairs have hampered
the SEPDF in gaining legitimacy and genuine support from the local
population. The major objective of the central involvement is apparently to
defend EPRDF’s interests and ensure that the central party organisation
maintains the control of the region that it gained when the Derg withdrew in
1991. Ultimately, this purpose is hard to combine with the aim of the federal
constitution, which gives the “nations, nationalities and peoples” the right to
self-determination.
In Tigray, the regional EPRDF party has a completely different position
from that of the SEPDF has in the southern region. TPLF’s position has been
virtually unchallenged by political opponents
31
, and the party has a firm grip
on the population through various mass organisations that were established
during the struggle against the Derg.
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