Europeanization of turkish subnational administrations

DETERMINING THE USAGE OF EUROPEANIZATION

The discussion to this point has concentrated on the common issues within the Europeanization literature and on the value of new institutionalism for the subject matter. There are still several conceptual and methodological challenges for the students of Europeanization seeking to analyse the EU-induced change on a given national setting (for the methodological challenges see Chapter 3). Despite the impact of the EU on the domestic change in member (and candidate) states, there is a risk of exaggerating the significance of Europeanization. This highlights the importance of definition and conceptual precision. The problem of concept stretching in Europeanization studies therefore runs some risks. To avoid this, Radaelli (2003) precisely suggests that Europeanization should not be confused with convergence, harmonization and/or political integration. While harmonization is an overt goal of European integration, convergence is one possible consequence of it. At this point, one may need to consider that convergence is not used synonymously with Europeanization because there is a distinction between a process and its consequences. While it is possible to observe convergence in various policy domains (or cases), there are, on the other hand, some other issues such as interest representation, subnational governance, subnational mobilisation; as Eising (2009) argues, the responses to European integration may be thoroughly differential.

The second challenge arises whether the selected scope of Europeanization is so broad as to stretch the concept of Europeanization beyond the limit of what is acceptable in the social sciences (Radaelli 2003: 28). In the literature, there is a tendency to separate the distinct usage of Europeanization. The most well-known separation breaks the literature into three traditional dimensions: top-down, bottom-up and two way relations. While top-down Europeanization examines the EU-induced change in member (and candidate) states, the bottom-up (uploading or shaping) approach shows that states are not passive downloaders, but also actively seek to upload their domestic preferences to the EU level. The integrated approach (two-way interactions) synthesizes the merits of top-down and bottom-up Europeanization (Börzel & Panke, 2010: 407). Some scholars tried to break down the literature into more than three traditional usages¹⁰. Despite these apparent differences in language, as Dyson and Goetz (2003: 14) put it, this is not evidence for the emergence of rival schools of thought but it could be useful to keep them in mind while seeking to map the field.

The research finds the categorization between first-generation and second-generation Europeanization studies made by Dyson and Goetz reasonably straightforward (cited in Bache & Jordan, 2006: 25). Within this categorization, the former emphasizes the more formal, observable consequences of membership (or prospect of membership), whereas the latter focuses on less formal and less observable changes. This rather points out the common distinction between formal (technical) adoption and informal (cognitive) adoption of conditionality for candidates (Hughes et al., 2004). By taking this categorization, Bache and George (2006) systematize two generations of Europeanization research as follows:

Table 1.1. Two Generations of Europeanization

Table 1.1 summarizes the discussions which have been covered so far. Yet, as a primary concern of this research, one still needs to determine in which cases one observes elements from first generation or second or both. To find a proper answer to this, the scope and content of policy (i.e. direct or indirect mechanisms) that is under scrutiny should be included. A policy domain is consequently another key point. It may not only help to distinguish the EU influence from other exogenous and endogenous factors but also observe the mechanisms of domestic change for the given national setting (i.e. opportunity structures; learning, and the like). The next section outlines the direct and indirect effect of Europeanization to examine the interplay between the multi-level governance and subnational mobilisation across the EU arena.

Direct and Indirect Effect of Europeanization

A clarification on whether the scope of research intersects with the direct or indirect policy of the EU is important in order to analyse the impact of Europeanization on the domestic arena. By the direct effect of EU policies, it is simply meant that the EU constructs a policy template derived from intergovernmental negotiation and the involvement of the Commission and the Parliament (Ladrech, 2010: 30). In line with this suggested template or prescription, member (and applicant) states are compelled to download resulting legislation(s). This is the general perspective of top-down Europeanization that the outcomes of domestic level developments in member (and candidate) states are affected by the EU level development. Such an understanding implies that if the EU were to be absent that a particular outcome would not occur (Haverland, 2006).

The top-down understanding of Europeanization has remained one of the influential research agendas to unveil the domestic effects of Europeanization (Ladrech 1994; 2010; Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2003). In this usage, Europeanization denotes the process and mechanisms by which European institution-building may cause change at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2000:2). Consistent with the top-down tradition, other scholars define Europeanization as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance associated with problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of European rules (Cowles et al., 2001:3). Here, Europeanization is taken as an independent variable and emphasis is given on both the processes by which European integration is effected and the outcome of this change¹¹.

Top-down Europeanization throws light on the conditions and casual mechanisms through which the EU triggers domestic change in its member states and in third countries (Börzel & Panke, 2010: 409). In examining the domestic impact of European policy making, Knill and Lehmkul (2002) present an analytical distinction between three mechanisms of Europeanization: institutional compliance, where the EU prescribes a particular model which is imposed on member states; changing opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources between domestic actors; and framing domestic beliefs and expectations, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors (on framing also see Radaelli, 2000). This model defined by Knill and Lehmkul is one of the most adopted mechanisms by Turkish scholars to their research designs (Bölükbaşı et al., 2010: 469). Based on the new institutionalist account, the mechanism involves positive and negative integration and framing integration in terms of socialization and social learning.

While Knill and Lehmkul’s model continues to dominate the agenda among Turkish scholars, the single most approved model was developed by Cowles et al. (2001). As leading exponents of top-down Europeanization, they argue that different casual mechanisms can be channelled into two logics of domestic change. They introduced one of the most prominent models to account for domestic change: ‘goodness of fit’. It explains the divergence between European and national policies, institutions and processes on the one hand, and the existence of mediating factors or intermediating variables that filter the domestic impact of Europe on the other (Börzel, 2005: 50).

Börzel and Risse (2000:1) maintain that ‘misfit’ and ‘facilitating factors’ are two major conditions for expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanization. At one with two institutional logics, scholars mention two types of misfits by which Europe exerts adaptational pressure on the member (and candidate) states: ‘policy misfit’ and ‘institutional misfit’ (Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2003). The latter suits the purpose of this research as it suggests misfits in system-wide domestic structures, challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understanding attached to them (Börzel, 2005: 50). It is worth noting that even if institutional misfit may result in substantial adaptational pressure, it is less direct than policy misfit and its effects more likely to be long-term and incremental (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 7).

Scholars conceptualizing the goodness of fit approach operationalize their model in three steps. While the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance refers to the first step, the goodness of fit with domestic politics is assessed in the second step. In the third step, they use two ontologically distinct perspectives, the logic of consequentialism and of appropriateness, in order to conceptualize the adaptational process in response to Europeanization. The findings of Cowles et al. (2001) justify the importance of national factors as intermediating variables, which were firstly emphasized by Ladrech (1994). Cowles et al. (2001) designate five intermediating variables: multiple veto points in the domestic structure; facilitating formal institutions; a country’s organizational and policy making cultures; the differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning. They are supposed to interact with the so-called adaptational pressure.

The concept of fit/misfit can be generalized through many cases. Yet what some scholars disagree on is how can one apply the goodness of fit in the absence of adaptational pressure? Or how can one observe the goodness of fit, if there is a voluntary mechanism at work? As Radaelli (2003) argues, adaptational pressure is not the best predictor of how a country responds to Europeanization. He criticizes that the ‘goodness of fit’ framework is excessively structural and claims that there is not enough room for agency. True, actors are not completely neglected, but they act only in response to pressure. Instead, actors may alternatively choose and learn from Europe outside adaptational pressures (Radaelli, 2004). By indicating the sociological turn in EU studies, Woll and Jacquot (2010:113) suggest that to move beyond the misfit model to study not just institutional constraints, but also informal politics and the cognitive dimension of multi-level policy making, allows for an understanding of the instances of deliberative policy changes in the absence of adaptative pressures.

Other scholars have followed suit regarding the discussion of how valid misfit is as an explanatory factor (Knill & Lehmkul, 2002; Heritier & Knill, 2001). Heritier and Knill (2001: 288) found that Europeanization could occur without there being misfit. Bulmer (2007: 52) points out that the goodness of fit precondition itself better fits policy areas where the EU sets a policy template that has to be applied in the member states. However, the indirect policy, or what some other scholars name ‘policy coordination’ (Wallace, 2003) or ‘facilitated coordination’ (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005) reveals that there is no template or prescription to implement in a given national setting. While the mechanism of adaptation is clearer in the case of direct effects (e.g. environmental policy), indirect effects (e.g. the Open Method of Coordination) may introduce new mechanisms such as policy transfer, diffusion or lesson-drawing that are more difficult to detect (Graziano & Vink, 2007: 8-10).

The indirect mechanisms of Europeanization have indeed gained importance to achieve sustainable compliance processes and internationalization of norms. This is because the cross-national learning process is almost as important as the finance that SNAs receive. This process brings about the exchange of values and ideas about how politics works, challenging established orders and practices (Goldsmith, 2003: 128). For instance, as Keating (1995:16) argues, regions learn from each other about problems and policies, about how to organize for development and about the preparation of effective intelligence. After a period of rather naïve imitation, they may learn how to adapt each other’s experiences to their own cultures, institutions, traditions and problems (ibid). Accordingly, the process of spreading European institutions and principles outside Europe is experienced with ‘logic of the attractiveness of European prescriptions and normative standards and exposure to European reforms’ (Olsen, 2001).

In the recent tradition, the attractiveness of European normative standards is reflected in the accession strategies of the candidate countries and to some extent in certain non-member countries of the EU. Such changes in these countries have been captured by two different research agendas: the ‘external governance model’ (Lavenex, 2004, Lavenex et al., 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelpfening, 2011) and the ‘transformative power of EU’ (Börzel & Risse, 2009). The former suggests that governance extends beyond EU member states, attributing a new perspective on the EU’s international role. The crucial criterion for external governance is the extension of the legal boundary of authority beyond institutional integration. In contrast to co-operation under an international agreement or convention, external governance takes place when parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states (Lavenex, 2004: 683).

Although the external governance approach has focused on the insufficiency of conditionality principles, it diverges from the aims of this thesis’ for two reasons. First of all, the external governance model has more merits in analyses of the EU’s immediate neighbour countries. This is because beyond membership or the prospect of membership, these countries are subject to other mechanisms which lead them to adapt their systems to EU standards (such as the European Economic Area, Swiss-EU bilateralism or European Union Neighbour Programs) (Lavenex et al,, 2009). Secondly, its empirical focus is usually on soft security politics which are the centre of national politics, such as the environment, internal affairs and energy politics (Lavenex, 2004) The external governance model is also more commonly applied to models of EU’s democracy promotion in the EU’s neighbourhood (Lavenex & Schimmelpfening, 2011). Moreover, there is no emphasis on the situations of changing territorial relations in the candidate or non-candidate countries, which is the focus of this research. As such, the interconnection of the Europeanization and multi-level governance literatures provides a more appropriate starting point for this thesis.

On the other hand, theories of the transformative power of the EU overlap with the second generation of Europeanization literature described in this thesis because of their emphasis on the diffusion of the EU’s ideas into member and candidate countries. In distinguishing cognitive and normative dimensions of ideas, Börzel and Risse (2009) define the different mechanisms of diffusion, such as instrumental rationality, normative rationality and communicative rationality. This research has placed a similar emphasis on the issue of diffusion of ideas, norms and policies by adapting the two mechanisms of learning: thin (instrumental logic) and thick (normative logic). However, the issue of learning in this research is but one of the various independent variables considered in this thesis (as in the context of ‘pulling effects’, incentivising subnational mobilization). However, there are also important push factors motivating subnational mobilizations. This is the main reason that the research argues that the impact of Europeanization on the behaviour of SNAs and their mobilization across the EU arena is explained by complex mechanisms that are top-down, horizontal and bottom-up, all suitably framed by the second generation Europeanization literature.

Overall, the external governance model and the transformative power of the EU support the idea that there is a need for a shift from first- to second-generation Europeanization within the wider EU context. In this respect, this research considers that the Europeanization of SNAs from a candidate state context provides the most appropriate framework to demonstrate this shift. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, according to many interview participants in Turkey, if there is dissatisfaction in certain existing policy areas, the EU does not need to exert influence on these policy domains because actors at both national and subnational levels will seek best practices from the EU context. Europeanization is therefore possible when no explicit EU guidelines exist since the EU is used as a platform for policy transfer (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000) or lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Consequently, although actors are purposeful, they do not always have cost-benefit calculation in mind. As for the main purpose of this research, the scope includes both direct effects (implementation of European legislation) as well as indirect effects (horizontal effects of European integration). The next section outlines the Europeanization research in candidate states.

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