Explanation of advantages— Science Diplomacy

AT Counterplans

AT Alaska CP

Federal jurisdiction is 200 miles – States can only do 3

Pew 10 (Pew Environmental Group U.S. Arctic Program, “OIL SPILL PREVENTION and RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN: Unexamined Risks, Unacceptable Consequences” November, 2010, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_life/PEW-1010_ARTIC_Report.pdf)

Subject to important reserved-land exceptions, Alaska has jurisdiction over submerged lands extending three miles from the coastline, and the federal government has jurisdiction over submerged lands from the three-mile mark to the seaward limit of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, 200 miles from the coastline.

State procurement fails

Schrader and Morton, 2012 President of DRS International, LLC, and former deputy administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Preparedness Directorate; Strategic Advisor for DomPrep and Homeland Security Team Lead for the Project on National Security Reform (Dennis R. and John F., “Enterprising Solutions: Buying/Building New State & Local Preparedness Capabilities” Domestic Preparedness, http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Infrastructure/CIP-R/Enterprising_Solutions%3A_Buying-!Building_New_State_%26_Local_Preparedness_Capabilities/)

Operational leaders in state/local governments and the private sector have struggled to keep pace with the federal government’s effort to build the new capabilities required to support what the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) called the “Homeland Security Enterprise” (HSE). However, these leaders still lack the acquisition infrastructure needed to take full advantage of the resources that already have been poured into thecollective federal/state/local effort. For one thing, it is difficult for them to justify the overhead costs required to establish the competencies necessary to carry out rigorous requirements analyses and to oversee the program management capabilities needed to upgrade public safety and security. (Previous articles published in DomPrep Journal have advocated the direct resourcing of planning and systems engineering capabilities to state and local jurisdictions. However, that idea has not yet gained traction.) Compounding the problem are the numerous cultures and business models of the companies that rushed into the homeland security marketplace in an attempt to “follow the money.” For example, defense contractors are accustomed to focus on multi-billion-dollarprograms that have relatively long life cycles – often with a generous built-in overhead. In addition, many companies already in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) attempted to focus on the emerging and rapidly evolving homeland security market in an effort that was largely fueled not only by the billions of grant dollars suddenly available but also by establishment of the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

AT Inuits Consult CP

Normal means consults the Indians.

GAO 10 (Report to Congressional Requesters; Government Accountability Office; “COAST GUARD Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial”; September 2010; http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/311302.pdf)

The United States has obligations that apply to Arctic operations including overarching national policies, as well as more specific maritime policies and authorities. NSPD-66/HSPD-25 reflects current U.S. Arctic policy and is therefore key among these policies. The Coast Guard’s role in the Arctic was implicated in this directive,which acknowledges the effects of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic region, lays out specific policy objectives and federal partners, and reaffirms the importance of Alaska Native consultation in policy decisions. 13 In addition to NSPD- 66/HSPD-25, Executive Order 13175 also plays a key role in U.S. Arctic operations.Executive Order 13175 requires federal agencies to involve Indian tribal governments, such as certain Arctic indigenous communities in Alaska, in decisions that affect them. 14 Finally, since the Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain, existing policies and authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply.

AT Ship Building Adv CP

Can’t solve the shipbuilding industry—Jones Act restricts growth

Hansen, 12 President Hawaii Shippers Council (Michael, “Naval Shipbuilding and Repair goes Awry,” Hawaii Free Press, June 25, 2012, http://www.hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/6930/Naval-Shipbuilding-and-Repair-goes-Awry.aspx)//AS

The U.S. Department of Defense has significant problems with its shipbuilding and ship repair programs, much of which is related to inefficiencies and outright incompetence relating to the construction and repair of naval ships, and excessive costs that threaten their capacity to build new ships. The excessively high cost of U.S. ship construction is negatively affecting national security and preventing the Navy from achieving a 315 capital ship navy. Two recent news stories illustrate and highlight these problems. The Navy released its preliminary findings yesterday in the case of the fire aboard the Los Angeles Class fast attack nuclear submarine USS Miami (SSN 755) that may result in the vessel being assessed as a total constructive loss. The fire occurred on May 24, 2012, and reportedly started in a vacuum cleaner while the sub was on dock in a naval shipyard in Portsmouth, Maine. The potential loss of a billion dollar vessel due to poor shipyard practice is really not acceptable. The U.S. Coast Guard Legend-Class National Security Cutter (NSC) USCGC Stratton (WMSL-752) was returned in April 2012 to the shipyard where it was built for extensive warranty work. According to reports, four holes were found penetrating the hull and extensive corrosion oxidation was affecting the ship. The Stratton was delivered about one year ago by Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII)’s Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, for approximately $500 million. As the Stratton is the third Legend-Class NSC built by Ingalls, this is not the case of a first of a kind in a planned series or a one-off construction that can be difficult to bring in on budget and on time. The Legend-Class NSC are 416 feet long, and have a displacement of 4500 long tons. These are not large ships, and although there are many high technology aspects to the new Legend Class cutters, they shouldn’t cost a half a billion dollars. They are intended to replace the older Hamilton high endurance class cutters designed and built in the 1960’s. The problems associated with the cost of the new Legend class NSC was mentioned in an article in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser of February 27, 2012, “Guard asea on aged craft” which said, “The Coast Guard in Honolulu faces a dilemma with its two biggest ships, the aging 378-foot cutters Jarvis and Rush, which the service wants to retire but can't because it has no replacements.” Essentially, the Coast Guard will have to continue operating the ageing cutters Jarvis and Rush based in Honolulu and covering wide swatches of the Pacific Ocean, because there are not sufficient funds to build new Legend Class NSC to replace them. It is often said by Jones Act supporters that the U.S.-build requirement for ships is necessary for reasons of national security. The assertion is that requiring the construction of merchant ships in the U.S. will provide work for the major shipbuilding yards and keep them in business and economically healthy to be available for naval construction and times of national emergency. The fallacy of this assertion is that on average fewer than three large merchant ships have been constructed annually in the U.S. since the mid-1980’s, which is an insufficient level of ship construction to keep the major shipbuilding yards alive. While at the same time, both the commercial shipowners and naval procurement officials cannot replace their fleets on realistic schedules because of the prohibitively high cost of major ship construction in the U.S. The Navy’s problems with combatant ship construction and repair will not be solved by continuing to impose a domestic-only build policy on merchant shipowners.

Multiple barriers to the cp prevent solvency

Perakis and Denisis 1AC Authors, 8 – Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, University of Michigan (Anastassios N. Perakis and Athanasios Denisis, “A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA”, Maritime Policy and Management, December 2008, http://www.maritimeadvisors.com/pdf/Survey%20of%20SSS%20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf | AK)

6. Obstacles hindering the implementation of SSS in the US Despite the wide acceptance of SSS among transportation stakeholders as an environmentally friendly alternative, there are various administrative, legal, operational and financial obstacles that delay the expansion of short sea services. These obstacles are: 1. Additional handling costs. SSS adds extra nodes or transhipment points in the transportation chain. Instead of trucks carrying the cargo directly from origin to destination, short sea vessels take over the longer haulage, and trucks make only the local pick-up and final delivery. At the transfer points or intermodal terminals, there are additional handling costs for the loading and unloading of the cargo. 2. Image problem. Traditionally, SSS has the image of a slow, unreliable and obsolete mode of transportation. Therefore, shippers are currently reluctant of using this new mode. Several surveys revealed that on-time reliability is the most important priority for shippers. Therefore, SSS should provide a high level of service in terms of on-time reliability, in order me is to alter that image by effectively promoting the advantages of SSS to the shippers and facilitating the c-operation among transportation modes. 3. Harbour Maintenance Tax (HMT). The HMT is assessed as a 0.015% ‘ad valorem’ fee on the value of the commercial cargo, which is transported on vessels using the US ports. Therefore, it is applied on both domestic and international containers that are been transported by vessels, but not on the cargo that is transported by trucks or rail. This is a major impediment to SSS, since it is applied on every transhipment point. Many transportation industry stakeholders are calling on the waiver of HMT for the domestic SSS transportation. The recent repeal of the HMT in the Great Lakes is a major support for SSS. 4. Jones Act. In the US, as elsewhere, one of the major impediments to the development of coastal shipping is the restrictions of ‘cabotage’ laws. Certain provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as Jones Act, which requires that any vessel operating between two US ports must be US-built, US-owned, and manned by US citizens, significantly increases the capital and the operating costs for any short sea operation. Thus, it makes SSS more expensive and less competitive. A study in 1993 suggested that the net cost of the Jones Act to the US economy is $4.4 billion US per year [47]. As the idea of SSS is gaining ground, the debate over the Jones Act has been reignited. Defenders of the Jones Act claim that it is way to revitalize the domestic shipbuilding industry, by providing financial incentives for shipowners to build in the US. Shipyard owners claim that they can be competitive for smaller standardized vessel designs with a shipbuilding program for a series of ships to be constructed over the next 15–20 years. On the other hand, shipowners argue that they can purchase SSS vessels from the international ship market for a fraction of what they cost in the US.

No solvency—five reasons

Savannah, 9 – Savannah now, morning news, a web site that joins with the Savannah Morning News in a mission of helping build a stronger community (Associated Press Staff Writer, 3/27/2009, “Relief for I-95,” http://www.greenships.org/Media%20and%20Publications/MarineHighwayBillOverview.pdf)//SL

Aside from the funding, the Title XI program needs to be modernized to support national shipbuilding and economic development by: • Rewriting the authorization to include terminal and port upgrade guarantees that allow ports and terminal operators to buy cranes and other cargo-handling equipment to meet the cargo demand from new ships • Allowing for cash flow to take precedence over debt-to-equity ratios for loan approvals to accommodate start-up carriers that can demonstrate stable long-term customer contracts • Ensuring 3-month approvals or rejections by designing a streamlined, on-line application process. Loan processing can currently take over 18 months and require expensive legal services • Marketing fuel-efficient ships to companies, such as JB Hunt and Wal-Mart, based on their need to reduce trucking costs and support green/low carbon initiatives • Specifying that loan applicants must demonstrate that trucks will be taken off U.S. roads and highways and their cargo moved onto more fuel-efficient ships

Title XI can’t solve shipbuilding or investment

GAO 03 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weaknesses Identified in Management of the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program” 6-30-03)AH

MARAD does not operate the Title XI loan guarantee program in a businesslike fashion to the federal government's fiscal exposure. MARAD does not (1) fully comply with its own requirements and guidelines, (2) have a clear separation of duties for handling loan approval and fund disbursement functions, (3) exercise diligence in considering and approving modifications and waivers, (4) adequately secure and assess the value of defaulted assets, and (5) know what its program costs. Because of these shortcomings, MARAD lacks assurance that it is effectively promoting growth and modernization of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. shipyards or minimizing the risk of financial loss to the federal government. Consequently, the Title XI program could be vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Finally, MARAD's questionable subsidy cost estimates do not provide Congress a basis for knowing the true costs of the Title XI program, and Congress cannot make well- informed policy decisions when providing budget authority. If the pattern of recent experiences were to continue, MARAD would have significantly underestimated the costs of the program.

Title XI management kills solvency

GAO 03 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weaknesses Identified in Management of the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program” 6-30-03)AH

Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, is intended to help promote growth and modernization of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. shipyards by enabling owners of eligible vessels and shipyards to obtain financing at attractive terms. The program has committed to guarantee more than $5.6 billion in ship construction and shipyard modernization costs since 1993, but it has experienced several large-scale defaults over the past few years. Because of concerns about the scale of recent defaults, GAO was asked to (1) determine whether MARAD complied with key program requirements, (2) describe how MARAD's practices for managing financial risk compare to those of selected private-sector maritime lenders, and (3) assess MARAD's implementation of credit reform. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has not fully complied with some key Title XI program requirements. While MARAD generally complied with requirements to assess an applicant's economic soundness before issuing loan guarantees, MARAD did not ensure that shipowners and shipyard owners provided required financial statements, and it disbursed funds without sufficient documentation of project progress. Overall, MARAD did not employ procedures that would help it adequately manage the financial risk of the program. MARAD could benefit from following the practices of selected private sector maritime lenders. These lenders separate key lending functions, offer less flexibility on key lending standards, use a more systematic approach to loan monitoring, and rely on experts to estimate the value of defaulted assets. With regard to credit reform implementation, MARAD uses a simplistic cash flow model to calculate cost estimates, which have not reflected recent experience. If this pattern of recent experience were to continue, MARAD would have significantly underestimated the cost of the program. MARAD does not operate the program in a businesslike fashion. Consequently, MARAD cannot maximize the use of its limited resources to achieve its mission, and the program is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Also, because MARAD's subsidy estimates are questionable, Congress cannot know the true costs of the program.

Previous defaults need to be paid back first, and expansion doesn’t solve a lack of demand

Sibley 10 (Ryan Sibley, Ryan graduated from American University's School of Communication with a master's degree in journalism and public policy and received a BA in English literature from California State University, writer for Sunlight Foundation, “Government agency with a history of taxpayer losses keeps at it” 4-12-10AH

Between 2004 and 2009, the U.S. Maritime Administration, or MARAD, a federal agency that supports the U.S. shipbuilding industry and merchant marine, made just one loan from its troubled Federal Ship Financing Program, also known as Title XI. The borrower was Hawaii Superferry Inc., a politically connected company that hired a former chief counsel and deputy administrator of MARAD, among others, to lobby the agency. In 2005, Hawaii Superferry got a taxpayer-guaranteed loan for $139 million to build and operate a pair of high-speed ferries in the fiftieth state. Just four years later, the company filed for bankruptcy, listing assets of a mere $1 million. The failure was par for the course for a program that even the business-friendly administration of George W. Bush branded as an “unwarranted corporate subsidy.” As of August 2009, the Title XI portfolio of outstanding loans totaled $2.4 billion. According to its Web site, the U.S. Maritime Administration supports the merchant marine and the U.S. shipbuilding and waterborne transportation industries. It does so in part by prohibiting foreign shippers from accessing many American waterways. It provides U.S.-flagged ships and domestic shipyards direct funding, tax shelters and tax breaks, as well as financing programs. The agency has also managed, according to reports from Inspectors General and the Government Accountability Office, to leave taxpayers on the hook for billions of dollars for projects that have gone bust. Consider Title XI, the Federal Ship Financing Program that granted Hawaii Superferry the loan guarantee. Title XI has been plagued by loan defaults for decades, losing close to $3 billion since the 1980s due to multiple loan defaults. After 1986, when defaults caused losses of a record $1.2 billion, the program was suspended, only to be reinstated in 1993. In 1999, American Classic Voyages, owned by Chicago real estate billionaire Sam Zell, launched an ambitious, plan to expand its operations beyond its New Orleans and Hawaiian routes with $1 billion in Title XI funding. When the plan failed and the company went bankrupt, taxpayers ended up on the hook for $330 million. The high profile failure of American Classic Voyages led to new scrutiny of MARAD’s Title XI program. Then-Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., had supported American Classic Voyages’ bid to win the taxpayer-guaranteed loan because he wanted a shipyard in his state, run by Northrop Grumman , one of Lott’s largest career campaign contributors, to build the company’s cruise ships. Sen. John McCain called the program a waste of taxpayer money and an “egregious example of pork barrel spending.” President Bush took the unusual step of providing no new funding for the program in his 2002 budget. The director of the Office of Management and Budget, Mitch Daniels, labeled the program an “unwarranted corporate subsidy.” Transportation’s Inspector General launched an audit, completed in 2003, which found that “MARAD needs to improve administration and oversight in all phases of the Title XI loan process.” The report also identified a number of areas where MARAD could improve its practices to limit the risk of default, and reduce losses to the government. A second audit, completed in 2004, reported that MARAD had created policies that would address the concerns of the inspector general; the agency still had considerable work to do to implement them. Loan guarantees issued by Title XI slowed drastically in years following the default of American Classic Voyages. Hawaii Superferry received the only guarantee issued in 2005 and the last one until 2009. Disclosure records show the company lobbied Congress and MARAD in 2005 regarding ship financing and Title XI amid the program slow down. The company hired Blank Rome LLP to push its interests in Washington; among the firm’s lobbyists that represented Hawaii Superferry was Joan Bondareff , who served as chief counsel and acting deputy administrator for MARAD during the Clinton administration . She’d also served as the majority counsel to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Blank Rome reported receiving $20,000 in fees from Hawaii Superferry in 2005; the company got a taxpayer-guaranteed loan for $139 million to pay for construction and operation of a pair of high-tech catamarans. Construction of the ferries was completed in 2007, but before they could begin operations, Hawaii Superferry ended up in a fight over whether it needed to complete an environmental impact survey assessing, among other things, the impact that a high-speed, 107-meter long catamaran would have on marine mammals. The ferry company refused to do the assessment, setting up a battle between island politicians and environmental activists. Gov. Linda Lingle, who backed the project, shepherded a law through the legislature in 2007 that would allow the ferries to operate without completing the environmental impact statement, and further stated that the boats could operate no matter what the survey found, even if they had completed it. In March 2009 the Hawaii State Supreme Court struck down the law exempting Hawaii Superferry from completing an environmental impact statement, and forced the company to suspend service. The company then filed for bankruptcy in May 2009, raising the prospect of a major default that could leave taxpayers holding the bill. According to court documents, after liquidating all assets, Hawaii Superferry, Inc. will only have about $1 million available to distribute to creditors. Though MARAD has little to no chance of recovering any of the money it has guaranteed and the company is in bankruptcy, as of this writing the agency hasn’t officially recognized the loan as being in default. When that does happen, an official at MARAD said, plans will be made to start making payments on the $139 million loan. The two ferries have a book value of only $2.8 million, and were delivered to MARAD. They were used recently to aid the relief effort in Haiti. In the past, MARAD has had trouble maintaining foreclosed ships it has possession of, thus limiting the chances of recovery even further. For example, the 2003 inspector general reports notes that MARAD didn’t monitor the physical condition of a ship it intended to sell for nearly $800,000. The ship was stored in a wet berth and exposed to hurricanes causing extensive damage. The sale price of the ship had to be reduced from $793,000 to $100,000. The payout on the loan guarantee was $1.8 million.

AT Science Diplomacy CP

No solvency – An overwhelming amount of H-1Bs are subject to fraud

India Verified 2010 , (Indian News Source, “H1B Visa Fraud uncovered expect more legislation,” 4/4/2010, http://www.indiaverified.com/blog/2010/04/h1b-visa-fraud-uncovered-expect-more-legislation/)

In a report released by the USCIS, the US Citizenship and Immigration Service, has indicated that upwards of 1 in 5 (or 20%) of all H1B visas contain serious errors, such as faked addresses, fake degrees, and other structural errors indicating that employers are seriously violating the H1B visa program. The H1B visa program is already majorly unpopular in technical circles even though technology employers insist that they need the program to remain competitive. “It is clear that oversight, including an auditing function, are desperately needed to clean up the corruption,” Hira said. “But we shouldn’t forget that the major problems with the H-1B program are caused by massive loopholes that allow firms to legally pay below-market wages and displace and undercut American workers. Those wouldn’t show up in this investigation because they are entirely legal and wouldn’t be considered fraudulent or a violation.” Grassley and Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) have been ardent critics of the H-1B program, pushing for reforms and tougher enforcement. Source: Computer World The interesting part is that in the break down in the report (here) in 14 of the cases (making up 27% of all the audited files) the person who was working under the H1B visa program was not paid the prevailing wage for like or similar skills. This opens the door to the argument that employers are using the program to undercut prevailing wage, and lower the employment costs that they currently incur. The other problem is that the economy is already in trouble, undercutting wages just adds to fuel to the fire of worker discontent. The other trick used was to take out the costs associated with getting the H1B visa out of the employee’s wages; essentially the employee was paying for their own visa. That is also a violation of the program. The audit conducted by the USCIS only reported on 249 audited cases, out of some 94,000 H1B visa employees in the USA right now. If you extrapolate the numbers, the insistence of using H1B visa employees to undercut wages becomes a very likely scenario, and one that is going to cause problems for employers when they want to expand the program. Fraud like this diminishes the good that the program can do, and when used against local workers by artificially deflating wages or holding wages stagnate, that is where the real argument is going to come into play.

Fraud in the H1B visa program means that there won’t be any science diplomacy

Thibodeau 2008, (Computerworld Patrick Thibodeau, “Widespread problems, fraud found in H-1B program,” 10/9/2008, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9116758/Widespread_problems_fraud_found_in_H_1B_program , //hss –RJ)

An internal report by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) examining the H-1B visa program has found evidence of forged documents and fake degrees, and even "shell" companies giving addresses of fake locations. The USCIS report, released Wednesday by U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), indicates that serious violations of the H-1B program by employers are so common that one in five visas are affected by either fraud or "technical violations." This means that potentially thousands of employers may be violating the rules, some willfully. Employers didn't pay prevailing wages in some cases and benched employees when there wasn't work, while some employees worked at jobs that differed from what the application claimed they would be doing. In one bizarre case, an H-1B holder was found "working in a laundromat doing laundry and maintaining washing machines," the report said. "This report validates the major flaws in the H-1B visa program," Grassley said in a statement. "It's unacceptable that these fraudulent activities are slipping through the cracks when there is so much legitimate demand for H-1B visas."

H1B Visas displaces American workers and lowers wages

Cromwell 2009, (Courtney Cromwell, J.D. Candidate at Brooklyn Law School, “Friend Or Foe Of The U.S. Labor Market: Why Congress Should Raise Or Eliminate The H-1b Visa Cap” , [ http://www.brooklaw.edu/~/media/PDF/LawJournals/CFC_PDF/cfc_vol3ii.ashx ] , //hss-RJ)

Critics argue that many U.S. employers abuse the H-1B program, specifically with the use of “body shopping.” Body shopping is the name given to the practice whereby placement agencies bring H-1B visa workers into the United States and “then contract the workers out to other companies on a work-for-hire basis, in an attempt to avoid statutory wage requirements.”137 The advantage of body shopping for employers is that they can pay the employees lower wages by allowing the contracting employer to claim it never hired any H-1B workers, and the body shopping company to say it never fired any U.S. employees.138 There are a multitude of problems with the practice of body shopping. “[B]ody shops circulate lists of available H-1B workers to employers, placing them in direct competition with U.S. workers seeking similar jobs.” While body shopping is a large problem in the United States for various reasons discussed more fully below, body shopping is likely a result of, rather than a justification for, the cap. Body shopping also leads to abuse of foreign workers. For example, since companies contract out their H-1B workers, sometimes not all of the workers have work assignments. Instead of paying the workers the prevailing wage as they are required to do, body shopping agencies “bench” the H-1B workers by not paying them or “pay[ing] them a reduced rate when they have no actual work.”140 In addition, body shopping adds to the problem of displacement of U.S. workers because the H-1B workers are paid lower wages and are thus more attractive to employers.

Further wage deterioration tanks the economy

Belser 2010, (Patrick Belser is the principal editor of the ILO Global Wage Report. Before working on wages, he spent 5 years with the ILO programme on fundamental principles and rights at work and co-edited a book called “Forced Labor: Coercion and Exploitation in the Private Economy” published in 2009 by Lynne Rienner. He holds a Ph.D. from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex. Before joining the ILO he worked at the World Bank in Vietnam and at the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs in Berne, “Why we should care about wages”, [ http://column.global-labour-university.org/2010/01/why-we-should-care-about-wages_3262.html ] , //hss-RJ)

The second reason why we should care is that a continued deterioration in wages is bad news for the economic recovery. The pace of the recovery depends largely on the extent to which people are able to consume whatever the global economy produces. And consumption, in turn, depends on the level of wages. In fact, in some advanced economies, almost 80% of household income comes from wages and salaries. Although GDP figures in the course of 2009 provided indications of a possible economic rebound, the trends in real wages observed during the past few quarters raise serious questions about the true extent of a global economic recovery and also highlight the risks of phasing out government rescue packages too early. As the experience of Japan during the past decade has cruelly shown, wage deflation deprives national economies of much needed demand and can result in lengthy periods of economic stagnation. Finally, we should already be thinking about the post-crisis world. Before the crisis, in the period from 1995-2007, the share of wages in GDP had declined in a majority of countries for which data is available. This may have been due to a combination of weaker trade unions, labour-saving technology, openness to trade and the pressures arising from the financial of markets. Whatever the cause, the imbalance between increasing profits and stagnating wages has contributed to the crisis by creating an explosive mixture of high liquidity on financial markets, low rates of interest, and huge household debts. A system of bonuses which distorted incentives towards short-term risk provided the additional dynamite. For a more stable future, we should identify policies which ensure that productivity growth - when it is back - translates into adequate increases in wages for a majority, and not just higher bonuses for a few. Only this way can advanced economies achieve more sustainable patterns of consumption and investment.

Global economic decline risks nuclear war.

Merlini ‘11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

AT Ice Camps CP

Counterplan doesn’t solve – ice camps can’t work in open ocean like icebreakers and can’t support key science facilities

National Research Council 1995, (A joint report by the Committee on the Arctic Research Vessel, Ocean Studies Board, Polar Research Board, National Research Council, “Arctic Ocean Research and Supporting Facilities: National Needs and Goals”, //hss-RJ)

Ice camps are the most basic, simplest, and perhaps lowest cost “platforms” for some applications. In general the locations are stable and they are not space-limited in the area surrounding the site. The camps are usually put onsite, supported, and removed by aircraft or helicopters. There are two types of camps, based on their projected duration. Long-duration camps are those that will be operational for prolonged periods of time and tend to be occupied year-round. Ice islands, such as the former T-3, are examples of this type of camp. Short-term camps are those occupied briefly, usually for a specific purpose or mission. They are highly portable and are usually configured for specific research missions. Often they are satellites of a long-duration camp. When they can be used, ice camps are the platform of choice for many investigators. An ice camp has been used successfully in a number of studies and will be used extensively in the Surface Heat Budget (SHEBA) project planned for spring 1997. Ice camps can provide a long-term station for sampling and an opportunity for coring sediments. They have limitations, however. They do not provide for work in the open ocean or marginal ice zone. They are also unsuitable for horizontal sampling of the water with trawls. Large camps move with the ice and cannot be relocated to specific areas of interest. Small camps cannot support some important science facilities. The cost of ice-camp-based studies can range from $600 to $4,000 per person per day, depending on such factors as the amount of support needed from ships and aircraft for a given experiment.§ Helicopters Small helicopters can be carried aboard research vessels and can be staged from ice camps. Used for both research tasks and logistic support, these vehicles offer a high degree of mobility and operational flexibility. In relation to the machines of just 10 to 15 years ago, modern helicopters are reliable and reasonably easy to maintain in the field.

Ice camps fail – volatile Arctic ice cracks will inevitably cause camps to be abandoned – guts long term solvency

Larter 2014, (staff writer, “Cracks force Navy to shutter Arctic ice camp”, [ http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140324/NEWS/303240048/Cracks-force-Navy-shutter-Arctic-ice-camp ] , //hss-RJ)

Alarming ice cracks spelled an early end to a Navy camp built on an Arctic ice floe north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, the Navy said Monday. The camp was being used by U.S., British and Canadian researchers to monitor two U.S. attack submarines transiting under the ice. Vice Adm. Michael Connor, the head of Naval Submarine Forces, called off the remainder of Ice Exercise 2014 after the ice under the temporary Ice Camp Nautilus began to show signs of instability. The Navy blamed large shifts in wind direction for the cracks in the ice floe. “These cracks prevented the use of several airfields used for transporting personnel and equipment to the ice camp,” the Navy said in a press release Monday. “The rapidly changing conditions of the ice, along with extremely low temperatures and poor visibility have hampered helicopter operations and made sustaining the runway and camp too risky.” Nobody at the camp has been injured, the release said. The exercise, which involved the attack submarines Hampton and New Mexico, was scheduled to run through March 30. Crews began building Ice Camp Nautilus in early March, according to the Arctic Sub Lab’s official Facebook page. An update on March 4 stated that crews checked the thickness of the ice prior to building the camp site.. The Navy’s last ice camp was constructed in 2011. It housed about 27 researchers and lasted about two weeks.

AT: Military CP

Unilateral military arctic involvement results in a new Cold War that escalates into violent resource conflicts — civilian collaboration is key to foster arctic peace

Associated Press 4/16/12, (“The new cold war: Militaries eying Arctic resources”, [ http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2012/04/16/new-cold-war-as-ice-cap-melts-militaries-vie-for-arctic-edge/ ] , //hss-RJ)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever -- Exercise Cold Response -- with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers -- Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland -- gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, so will the need for policing, border patrols and -- if push comes to shove -- military muscle to enforce rival claims. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia -- one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle -- has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries -- Norway, Denmark and Canada -- to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. This is only going to increase as time goes on." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in the Arctic has never really waned. It remains very important." But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it lacks ships able to operate in or near Arctic ice, support facilities and adequate communications. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere -- it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers. Acknowledging the need to keep apace in the Arctic, the United States is pouring funds into figuring out what climate change will bring, and has been working closely with the scientific community to calibrate its response. "The Navy seems to be very on board regarding the reality of climate change and the especially large changes we are seeing in the Arctic," said Mark C. Serreze, director of the National Snow and Ice Data Center at the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences University of Colorado. "There is already considerable collaboration between the Navy and civilian scientists and I see this collaboration growing in the future." The most immediate challenge may not be war -- both military and commercial assets are sparse enough to give all countries elbow room for a while -- but whether militaries can respond to a disaster. Heather Conley, director of the Europe program at the London-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said militaries probably will have to rescue their own citizens in the Arctic before any confrontations arise there. "Catastrophic events, like a cruise ship suddenly sinking or an environmental accident related to the region's oil and gas exploration, would have a profound impact in the Arctic," she said. "The risk is not militarization; it is the lack of capabilities while economic development and human activity dramatically increases that is the real risk.

Legitimacy disad — The Coast Guard is recognized as a humanitarian organization and avoids the threatening perception of military activities

Nelson 2004, (Thomas G. Nelson, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy, A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, “WHEN DOES THE COAST GUARD’S FLAG COME FORWARD?”, [ www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428787 ] , //hss-RJ)

This does not mean the Coast Guard should no longer have an expeditionary role. On the contrary, employing the small service properly overseas allows for the virtual export of security while providing opportunity for a political victory rather than just a military one. This can be done most effectively by using the Coast Guard to conduct cooperative engagements. The Commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Charles E. Wilhelm, U.S. Marine Corps, stated that, “The United States Coast Guard brings tremendous capabilities and contributions across a wide spectrum of regional engagement activities.”3 These engagement missions promote global security by building on common interests. To begin with, there are various parallels between operations in U.S. harbors and those in foreign ports. What is most important though, is that when the Coast Guard operates afar, it gains an appreciation for the risk as well as a better understanding of the threats that may come from other countries. This is in keeping with current administration’s policy of waging war abroad rather than having to fight terrorism at home. Functioning shoulder to shoulder with foreigners allows the gathering of valuable intelligence that permits better preparation at home. Being both a law enforcement agency and military service permits the sharing of the information across all lines. The Coast Guard is also an enabler for the promotion of good will and democratic ideals. Recognized world wide as a humanitarian organization, the Coast Guard does not have the threatening presence that other Department of Defense services do. This can be of utmost importance when legitimacy is a concern. Coast Guard forces operating abroad can more likely keep a low profile while effectively promoting peacetime engagement aspects of U.S. strategy. The multi mission nature of the Coast Guard provides a practical forum for nations to work together on non-military issues. This is particularly applicable once the military aspect of a war or campaign is over. The Coast Guard can more effectively deal with civilians of the foreign nation, especially non world powers. Compared to most navies, especially the United States Navy, the Coast Guard is the best maritime model with a structure much more in alignment with any sea force smaller nations could ever hope to build. Most nations no matter their size, wish to protect their maritime interests. This means preserving natural resources, looking after the environment, and preventing illegal activities. The Coast Guard is the best agency in the world that can help small and developing nations deal with worldwide problems in these areas. Illegal aliens, arms smugglers, and drug traffickers are transnational threats that need to be eliminated everywhere, not just in America. Training other countries to deal with these issues essentially makes them partners with the U.S. Addressing the problem overseas like this, is another way the Coast Guard can leverage its efforts to prevent the trouble from reaching the United States. In order to be able to do all this however, the Coast Guard needs sufficient assets.