F I r s t d r a f t

A fourth approach, which is also called ‘functional’ or ‘behavioural’ approach, focuses less on moral aspects but more on a particular style of behaviour in international relations which is considered the hallmark of “middlepowermanship.” In practical terms, this approach defines middle powers primarily by their behaviour that emphasizes pursuit of multilateral solutions to international problems and adherence to compromise positions in international disputes and last, but not least, adherence to the notion of “good international citizenship” to guide their foreign policy. However, even the chief proponents of this view , Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, grant that this kind of middle power behaviour is not completely devoid of “healthy doses of self-interest.”¹⁷

Finally, there is a derivative of the fourth approach which is grounded in political economy. Departing from a statistical definition of ‘middle powers,’ it challenges the normative definitions of middle power and revolves, instead, around the concept of ‘statecraft’ in locating middle powers. This may be regarded as an extension of ‘functional’ or ‘behavioural’ approach with a shift of geographic focus away from ‘tradititional’ middle powers.¹⁸

In this book, we rely on the ‘functional’ or ‘behavioural’ approach in analyzing Turkish diplomatic activism in the Mediterranean during the interwar years as introduced by Cooper, Higgot and Nossal. However, like Ping, we will depart from a statistical interpretation of Turkey’s status in the international hierarchy between the two world wars and employ the concept of ‘statecraft’ with its four main components: domestic, international, tools and practitioner.¹⁹

Therefore, we should first provide an examination of attributes of typical middle power behaviour. To begin with, the middle powers are noted for their tendency to look for like-minded and comparably placed or situated states in the international hierarchy as partners of choice in building coalitions. Coalitions of such states are expected to contribute to the “growth and health of international institutions.” As a corollary to this, multilateralism is the preferred means of advancing their foreign policy interests, inter alia, “for reasons of enlightened self-interest: in order to maximize parochial interests that could not be advanced alone.”²⁰ Middle powers are also considered to have a vested interest in collective security due to their intermediate position. This interest is an inevitable outcome of the mismatch between their relatively large size, coveted resources and strategic importance and their means to defend the former. This mismatch turns them into reliable partners in international organization.²¹

However, security is the field which offers the least latitude to middle powers for coalition-building. In other words, the leadership potential of middle powers is much more restricted on the issue of security than on any other issue as military capabilities retain their significance in a range of issues in international relations.²² In this field, “the middle power coalition-building associated with multilateralism has another side. This is the passive and largely reactive role of follower... Middle powers may be active leaders in coalition-building, but they are just as willing to have multilateral coalitions ‘built on them’”.²³

In this context, Canadian and Australian reactions to the Gulf Crisis in 1990/91 can be compared to Turkey’s reaction to the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935-1936 and its position at the Nyon Conference in 1937. In the former, both countries followed the U.S. lead in the coalition to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These countries’ responsiveness to the U.S. leadership stemmed partly from their shared concern for upholding the norm of territorial integrity and for securing the highest possible number of subscribers to this norm by joining the coalition by joining the coalition. For Australia, upholding territorial integrity not only reflected a normative concern but also its historical experience of the threat of Japanese invasion during the Second World War which could only be averted by U.S. intervention. In sum: “if the international community acted in concert to uphold the sanctity of borders, would-be violators of the territorial integrity of others would be deterred, and Australia would be safer for it.”²⁴

Throughout the crisis and subsequent war both remained committed to the coalition, despite the fact that their role in the coalition would be secondary or peripheral in the larger game and that they were probably uneasy about the idea of committing their forces to the actual battle.²⁵ Hence, the dilemma of middle powers as followers in coalitions built and led by powers of higher degrees is portrayed by Cooper, Higgot and Nossal as follows: “For followership in coalition-building creates a dynamic for the followers that, once they have joined, binds them tightly to the preferences of the coalition’s leader. Once the leader has gathered a coalition around itself, it can radically alter the preferences of the coalition as a whole, relying on its subordinate power to keep its junior members with it, regardless of their preferences.”²⁶

The level of development of international organizations may be an element that either facilitates or hinders middle power activism. For instance, Cooper, referring to Cox, argues that attention should be paid to the evolution of middle power role in the context of dynamic historical processes linked to the development of international organizations.²⁷ On the relationship between size and foreign policy goals, Cooper identifies middle powers as ardent supporters of the international system with an “impulse towards the creation and maintenance of world order.”²⁸

In the absence of leadership from traditional sources, middle powers’ ability to assume high profile international roles may be contingent on the quality of their diplomacy. Building on the Australian and Canadian experiences after the end of the Cold War, Cooper, Higgot and Nossal²⁹ argue that in the absence of leadership from a hegemonic power or of an agreement on the sharing of leadership responsibilities between the major economic powers, the vulnerability of the middle powers increases dramatically. In response to their increased vulnerability to the lack of leadership from traditional sources, secondary actors such as middle powers may step in to fill the leadership vacuum. Unlike the great powers, the secondary powers’ leadership and initiative draw largely on non-structural forms of power and influence such as the quality of their diplomacy.³⁰ Consequently, “middle power diplomacy, which is geared towards mitigation of conflict and building consensus and cooperation, can be as important as structural sources of leadership.”³¹

At this point, it may worth introducing a different but complemenatry method of identification of international actors into our discussion of middle powers. ‘Great regional power’ denotes yet another category of power in international politics. Although it is regarded as a category of its own, it is sometimes confused with, and used as being synonymous to the term middle power. For instance, Osterud argues that “however we define them, middle powers or regional great powers make an ambiguous category, with a rather arbitrary lower limit.”³² It should also be borne in mind that these two categories may not necessarily be mutually exclusive. “A regional great power may be a middle power in the global context... On the other hand, a middle power is not necessarily a great power regionally, since it may exist in the close and dominated vicinity of really great powers, or a number of powers aspiring to a leading regional role”³³. By the same token, “[generally a middle power is defined within an international hierarchy of powers, while a regional great power is determined within a regional division of globe”.³⁴ A regional great power “either has a dominant position within the regional hierarchy of states, or is party to a regional balance of power system – presumably able to defend itself against a coalition of other parties... It has a managerial role at the regional level. It balances other forces, maintains codes of conduct, stabilizes spheres of influence and polices unruly clients”³⁵. The concept of ‘regional great power’ will provide us with a yardstick against which we will assess Turkey’s position within the Balkan regional context in the mid-1930s.

Interwar Conditions for Middle Power Activism
One of the principal characteristics of the interwar world order was the lack of international political leadership from traditional sources. The United States’ decision to stay out of the League of Nations accounted to a large extent for this lack of political leadership which had become even more accentuated by the World Economic Crisis of 1929. Hence, by the 1930s, international systems offered nearly optimum conditions for emerging middle powers like Turkey to attempt to fill the leadership role with regional initiatives. The continued absence of international leadership in both political and economic fields by the end of the decade propelled Turkey into extending its diplomatic and naval activism to levels which up to then had remained traditionally great power domains.

Moreover, contrary to the original expectations and desires of its intellectual fathers, the League of Nations failed to provide a viable alternative to traditional great power management in international relations. An Italian delegate to the League of Nations confided that in the League he never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by an agreement between the Great Powers. The procedure of the League was “a system of detours, all of which lead to one or other of these two issues: agreement or disagreement between Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany”.³⁶ Edward Carr pointed out that the earliest British and American drafts of the Covenant planned that membership of the Council of the League would be limited to the Great Powers. According to Karl Polayni, the League of Nations was a product of the victorious powers of the First World War who pursued restoration of an enlarged and improved Concert of Europe system after the war. For that reason, he called the 1920s the ”Conservative Twenties.”³⁷

James Barros wrote in his book The Corfu Incident of 1923 that, throughout the interwar years, Britain and France approached the problems facing the League, including the Corfu crisis, within the context of their own conflicting interests and desires.³⁸ In fact, the Corfu incident formed a good example to prove how France tried to involve the League Council in the solving of an international issue. In August 1923, the Italians bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu after the murder of Italian General Tellini, on Greek soil while he was performing his task of delimiting the Greco-Albanian frontier.

The Poincaré government in France did not want to bring the Corfu issue before the League Council. A number of factors accounted for the French unwillingness to refer to the League over the Corfu issue. First of all, if the Corfu issue had come before the League Council, Germany could also have attempted to bring before the Council the French occupation of the Ruhr³⁹ Secondly, France did not want to alienate Italy because the latter gave support to the Franco-Belgium occupation of the Ruhr. In more general terms, Paris needed to rebuild its relations with Italy against Germany. France was not only disappointed by Anglo-American co-operation against Germany after the Treaty of Versailles but also estranged from London because of the Ruhr occupation.

Although France did not want to alienate Italy during the Corfu crisis, Eastern Europe and the Balkans were controversial regions in French-Italian relations. During the Corfu crisis, the Czech press maintained that France had weakened the League by supporting Mussolini and wrote that the League had no jurisdiction when the interests of big powers were at stake.⁴⁰ The Czech delegate to Geneva, Eduard Benes, said that if Mussolini escaped unpunished from the Corfu affair, he would likely implement his expansionist program in Fiume and Dalmatia.⁴¹

Just before the Corfu crisis, Belgrade, fearing fascist violence, officially requested France to assume the protection of Yugoslav citizens in Fiume. In November 1922, the Poincaré government did not approach the Yugoslav request positively. Yet in April 1923, France approved a 300 million franc loan to Belgrade for the reorganization of the Yugoslav army.⁴² In the wake of Locarno, Belgrade wanted to sign a Franco-Yugoslav pact immediately because it had to accept the Italian annexation of Fiume by signing the Italian-Yugoslav accord of January 1924. But Berthelot instructed the French Minister in Belgrade that such a pact could be interpreted differently by Rome which had given guarantees to France’s frontier along the Rhine.⁴³

As for British foreign policy in the post-war era, Brian McKercher, for instance, wrote that those who dominated the Foreign Office saw the League as only another tool in the British diplomatic arsenal.⁴⁴ According to him, “Edwardian” balance- of -power thinking still dominated interwar British foreign policy. In fact, the “Edwardians prided themselves on seeing the world for what it was, not what it should be”.⁴⁵ For them, essential British interests had not changed because of the war. These interests were compounded thanks to the acquisition of mandated territories in the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, the Edwardians did not see a balance which existed only on continental Europe but saw several balances judged vital to British and imperial security in different areas of the globe.

A very good example of the British reluctance to find international solutions to stability issues was its rejection of the Geneva Protocol prepared by a subcommittee of the League. In the fall of 1924, a special subcommittee of the League produced a document entitled “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes”. The Czech Foreign Minister, Benes, as rapporteur of this subcommittee, advocated that the Geneva Protocol use arbitration for the purpose of defining aggression with the slogan “arbitration, security and disarmament”.⁴⁶

The British Conservative government refused to accept the Geneva Protocol even though it was endorsed unanimously by the Assembly of the League. London criticized the Protocol for not providing for arbitration of possible causes of war, namely the existing frontiers on the Continent.⁴⁷ According to Wandycz, London at the same time criticized the French for using the Protocol to involve Britain in its defence. In contrast to the British officials, this time the Herriot government in France favoured international reconciliation. For the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, the Geneva Protocol was a way to reach a pact of mutual help between the great powers and the minor ones.⁴⁸ In fact, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia closely cooperated in the making of the Geneva Protocol. The latter was distinguished as being the only state which ratified the Protocol.

But not all regions of the globe, not even those in Europe had equal value for the British. For example, Austin Chamberlain divided Europe between east and west saying that “in Western Europe we are a partner … in Eastern Europe our role should be that of disinterested amicus curiae”.⁴⁹ Goldstein argued that, even in the post First World War era, Eastern Europe’s place on the British mental map of Europe was still very much terra incognita. At the time of Locarno, Chamberlain told the British ambassador in Berlin Lord d’Abernon “for the moment I think the less that is said about the east the better it will be “.⁵⁰ In fact, Goldstein made an important point: that in 1925 Britain was still uncertain as to whether these newly created states would survive.⁵¹

Carr believed that treaties of non-aggression, such as the Locarno Treaty, signed in the 1920s were an expression of the power politics of a particular period and locality.⁵² In fact, to define the nature of Locarno Jon Jacobson gave as a reference Chamberlain’s declaration to the Committee of Imperial Defence in July, 1925. Chamberlain’s three main concerns summarized well the aim of Locarno: first, to prevent Germany from overrunning Europe, second to prevent a Russo-German understanding and third to create a friendlier France.⁵³

In fact, the goal of a friendlier France was reached while Briand was in office. In his memoirs, a French diplomat, Jules Laroche, talks about two successive policies in France in the 1920s. One was executed by Poincaré: He focused on German reparations and separatism in the Rhineland in order to get extra concessions from Germany for French security. This policy failed because of British opposition which did not want a French hegemony to succeed the German one. The second policy was led by Briand who emphasized the reinforcement of French security and searched for an entente with Britain. This policy was implemented by ending the French occupation of the Ruhr and the adoption of the Dawes plan. The implementation of this policy was facilitated by the German desire for the evacuation of “Cologne” and by the presence of Chamberlain in Foreign Office who favoured this. In the end, Briand led this policy up to the Locarno agreements.⁵⁴

Locarno was not only a continuation of the balance- of -power system but also an attempt to transform the Treaty of Versailles. As Polayni argues, the outcome of the war and the treaties signed afterwards had eased political tension superficially by eliminating German competition.⁵⁵ This was superficial because it aimed at the unilateral permanent disarmament of the defeated nations. But by the mid-1920s, the victorious countries, especially Britain, realized that they had to move beyond that. As an example of this, Cohr gave MacDonald’s pursuit of the US and German involvement in the existing system which was an indication of the shifting of post-war politics away from the Versailles system.⁵⁶

One could argue that German involvement in the existing system started at the signing of the Locarno Treaty and continued through the membership of Germany in the League of Nations. But meantime Locarno confirmed the deadlock of French policy. When the French delegation came to Locarno, it intended to recover as much of France’s interests and commitments in Eastern Europe as were possible. According to Wandycz, the French aim was to assume a position in Eastern Europe comparable to that of Britain in the west by making France a guarantor of the German-Polish and Czechoslovak-German arbitration treaties.⁵⁷

However, Locarno destabilized France’s position by excluding Eastern Europe from the guarantee.⁵⁸ Before Locarno, France could have given immediate assistance to Poland in any situation it considered a threat to peace. After Locarno, France could help Poland only if the latter invoked Article 16 of the Covenant.⁵⁹ In other words, from Locarno on, France’s eastern pacts were linked to the League and their implementation depended on the interpretation of the Covenant.

To sum up, Germany recognized the Versailles order in the west but this did not imply renunciation of territory in the east. For example, if Germany attacked an Eastern European country, France could only reply by counter-attacking in the west across the Rhine.⁶⁰ Adamthwaite also argues that no military agreements were concluded between France and its Eastern allies. For example, in June 1928, France rejected a Yugoslavian request for military talks. On the other hand, according to Shorrock, France hammered out a series of defensive military alliances with Poland and the members of the Little Entente between 1921 and 1927.⁶¹

But the application of the Locarno system in Western Europe only could not and did not bring stability to Europe. Allan Cassels argues that exclusion of Eastern Europe from the Locarno system allowed Mussolini to pursue a dynamic policy in the Balkans and the Danube valley where his main concern was to diminish France’s influence.⁶² Both times when the League was called on to defend the integrity of one of its smaller members, first France and then Britain sought a solution by undercutting and bypassing the League.⁶³
Turkey as a Middle Power
Although his definition of middle powers is fairly conventional, Holbraad captures strikingly Turkey’s evolution in the international system in his general description of middle powers. To him, “... the intermediate category of states... is the meeting place of once great but declining powers, tired from generations of power politics at the highest level but rich in experience, and of lesser but ascending powers, conscious of their potential and stirred by ambition.”⁶⁴ This description is obviously inspired by Martin D. Wight’s work on Power Politics where he expresses a similar observation: “Middle powers appear when qualifications for great power status are being revised... The most obvious middle powers today are the powers which have lost the status of great power as a result of two World Wars: Britain, France, Germany and Japan.”⁶⁵

Turning to the international power hierarchy before the First World War, Holbraad identifies the Ottoman Empire as one of the two states that occupied intermediate positions in the European hierarchy of powers in the second half of the nineteenth century, Italy being the other one.⁶⁶ However, he argues that, compared to Italy, the Ottoman Empire was a unique example of its kind.

“... it was not really a part of the international society of Europe. Geographically marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile, it was still a frontier country... though it was a member of the state system in the sense that it interacted with European powers and filled some role in the balance of power, its status in the system was uncertain. On the one hand, its large population of various races, nationalities and religions, its vast territories in Europe as well as Asia, and its strategic importance to several great powers, clearly marked it off from the minor powers and small states of the system. On the other hand, its military weakness, inefficient administration and long record of economic decline had long since taken it out of the rank of great powers. This combination of qualities placed the Empire in a particularly exposed position in relation to Europe”.⁶⁷

Yet in his seminal work he stops short of recognizing as a middle power the modern-day or republican Turkey, which acquired, among other things, the geographical core and the diplomatic tradition of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁸ His definition of middle powers is based on traditional indicators of size and national strength, namely population and Gross National Product (GNP). In his attempt at producing, in accordance with these two criteria ,a list of middle powers in the Cold War years, Holbraad admits that Turkey would have qualified as a middle power by virtue of its population and GNP (both comparable to those of Iran), if it could have been classed under Asia. However, as Turkey considers itself a European power, ranked as the eighth-strongest small power with its then-current population and GNP, it fails to qualify for middle power status in a European context.