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This situation restricted Turkey in its choice of naval arms suppliers. Given the poor state of its economy, foreign credits and government guarantees were imperative for building new naval units. Only European powers unsatisfied by the status quo would provide such facilities for political purposes. Italy had already embarked on ambitious arms projects to fill the supplier vacuum, whereas Germany was seeking a way around the Versailles restrictions.194 Consequently, both countries figured prominently in Turkish naval programs in the 1920s. France was also a potentially strong supplier to the Turkish arms market. However, the deterioration of political relations soon ruled out the French option. By August 1924, British, American, French and Italian shipyards had already offered to supply submarines to the Turkish navy. According to the French naval attaché report, British ship-builder Armstrong Vickers' offer to build five submarines was conditional on the scrapping of the battlecruiser Yavuz within five years. Among the French shipyards, Schneider was singled out as the strongest contender, as it had an outstanding contract to deliver to Ottoman Navy two submaries from its 1914 order at a cost of 4.760.000 French francs.195 Along similar lines, it was speculated that the Italian shipbuilder Ansaldo might be preferred by the Turks because of its outstanding obligation to supply a cruiser that had been ordered by the Ottoman Empire but commandeered by the Italian navy after the invasion of Tripoli in 1911.196 The British-Turkish rift over the status of Mosul in September 1924 had immediate impact on the submarine deal. During the crisis, Italy supported Britain and was poised to stake a claim in Western Turkey, if the crisis led to a British-Turkish war and to the collapse of the fragile regime in Turkey. Hence, when the Turkish government invited bids for one submarine, the British bidder Armstrong Vickers was eliminated par principe, whereas Ansaldo's bid was rejected on the grounds that its submarines were of outdated design.197 In December 1924, the strongest contenders for the Turkish submarine contract were two French, one Dutch (offering German designs) and one Swedish shipbuilder. The Turkish navy decided to place its order with the Dutch shipyard. The Turkish decision disappointed the French, who had been almost sure that their shipyards would receive the contract.198 The order was justifiably taken as a clear indication of the continued German influence on the Turkish navy. In fact, of the three officers that evaluated the designs offered, two had had training on German submarines during the First World War.199 Thus, they were certainly likely to be more inclined towards German designs. The disappointed French also mentioned the possibility of bribery in view of reportedly higher Dutch unit prices.200 All these factors may have contributed to the outcome. However, the decisive factor was the secret funds Germany pledged to the building of these submarines. Indeed, the Dutch shipyard of Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (I.v.S.) had been set up by three German shipbuilders, Krupp Germaniawerft (Kiel), A.G. Weser (Bremen) and Vulkanwerft (Hamburg and Stettin), seeking a way around the Versailles restrictions on German submarine-building. German financial support meant that Ankara could order two submarines instead of a single unit. In return, Turkish submarines could be counted on in the training of a new generation of German submariners.201 The naval programs of Turkey, already an outcast in the 1920s, even though modest by any standards, served to reinforce Turkey’s image as a potential revisionist. The hiring of German naval instructors, the ordering of submarines secretly funded by Germany and finally the refurbishing of the “notorious” battlecruiser Yavuz were all regarded as manifestations of Turkish ill-will towards the post-war international settlement.202 It was around this time that European intellectuals such as Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi were espousing ideas about the need for a European union. Not surprisingly, he conceived the European Union as an answer to what he imagined as a Russo-Turkish military threat to Europe in general203 and a Turkish threat to the Balkan countries in particular.204 Thus, in the 1920s, Turkey seemed to have a long way to go in order to be accepted back into the European states system as a legitimate member. Strangely, Turkey’s way back into the international fold began with the improvement of its diplomatic and naval relations with Italy who at the time considered the existing European system unfair.
Their frustration with the existing international system provided a common ground for Italy and Turkey in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Ankara was not a challenger to the status quo. Its resentment stemmed largely from being excluded from the post-War international order and from lack of recognition of Turkey as an equal and legitimate member of the international community. This resentment did not necessarily entail a revisionist stand. Mussolini’s Italy, on the other hand, pursued recognition of its political equality. Mussolini’s policy was aimed at securing a greater say and share in world affairs as a fully-fledged Great Power, not as the least of the great powers. While Ankara viewed the international system as being composed of horizontally ordered equal and sovereign states, Fascist Italy’s policy was premised according to a Great -Power-managed internal system of hierarchically ranked states. Consequently, the common ground was not to last long and Italian and Turkish policies evolved in diverging directions after the mid-1930s, particularly after Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations which symbolized the end of its exclusion from the international system. It must be granted that unintended consequences of this short-lived Italian-Turkish friendship included rapprochement between Ankara and Athens as well as international endorsement of Turkey’s European identity through its participation in various schemes and proposals for political and economic union in Europe. Finally, Turkish naval revival in the early 1930s with Italian government loans can be regarded as another unintended consequence of the years of “warmth.” Italy as a Potential Menace in the Mediterranean The ambiguous relationship between Italy and Turkey depended, in part on Turkey’s concerns about security. These concerns were based on the fact that Turkish people had witnessed Italian aggression in Tripoli and the Dodecanese in 1912 and, following the First World War, had had to endure the Italian occupation of part of Anatolia. Although Italy withdrew its occupation forces during the Turkish War of Independence,207 Mussolini’s advent to power with a pronounced rhetoric of change in foreign policy, dubbed tono fascista (fascist tone), immediately revived Turkish fears of Italy.208 While history loomed large in shaping Turkish leaders’ views of Italy, Turkey’s approach was also influenced by two inter-related factors: the need for foreign economic support and its international isolation. These two factors prompted Ankara to seek rapprochement with the great powers of Europe in order to survive as a new nation-state. Between 1922 and 1927, Mussolini’s tono fascista translated into Italy’s refusal to see Turkey as a sovereign state. It viewed the new country only as a geographical entity, Anatolia, with promising opportunities for Italian expansion. In the case of the collapse of the new regime in Turkey, the Italians were planning to invade the country by taking advantage of the proximity of the Dodecanese Islands and using them as a staging post. It was expected that the ongoing Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would offer an opportunity for Rome to get its share of Anatolia. Mussolini was convinced that the new Turkey was not strong enough to resist a powerful country such as Britain. As ”a frustrated potential ally of Britain”, Mussolini’s Italy expected to be treated by Britain like ”a sister rather than a waitress”.209 Mussolini believed that, due to the Mosul crisis, Turkey would offer Rome this chance. After he came to power in Italy, Mussolini pursued an Italian version of Lebensraum in the Balkans.210 The Balkan Peninsula, an area between the Adriatic and the Aegean, lies north of the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini. Actually, the early twenties offered conditions conducive to Italian expansion into these territories as Mussolini’s advent to power followed the collapse of both the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire. Mussolini aimed to extend Italian control over the new nation-states that had thus come into existence in the territories of these former multi-ethnic empires. The Balkans, at the crossroads of the two collapsed empires, became a natural target and preoccupation for the Fascist regime. For Mussolini, Turkey, in the first half of the 1920s, was not a country in the Balkans worthy of attention. In fact, the fascist leader intended to keep Turkey out of Balkan affairs through diplomacy. This goal prompted Mussolini to personally appear at the Lausanne Conference (November 1922-July 1923). Mussolini’s policy at Lausanne was a typical example of the persistence of Italy’s former colonial policies. Italy had a special interest in the Dodecanese, which formed the maritime border of the two Mediterranean and Balkan countries, Turkey and Greece. He sought to contain Turkey because he feared that victorious Turkish nationalists might assert claims over these islands. Mussolini must have also disliked the idea of Greece controlling various strategic islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since Greece had already acquired the Northern Aegean Islands, it had to be deterred from demanding the Dodecanese Islands. Once in power, Mussolini invigorated Italian expansionist designs over Anatolia. During the Lausanne Conference, the Italian representative Montagna, in a conversation with Americans, compared Turkey to a mummy “which so long as it remained sealed in its tomb retained its normal state but as soon as the tomb was opened and it came into contact with the outside air it immediately began to decompose and to crumble away.” Then Montagna added when Turkey’s collapse came, the other nations would be there to profit from it and Italy could not be left out in the cold.211 In the final analysis, Mussolini’s presence at Lausanne was meant to convey a clear warning to Turkey. At a time when Turkey emerged as a sovereign state, Mussolini secured formal recognition of the Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Even though at Lausanne the fascist leader recognized the Turkish presence in the Balkans (limited to Eastern Thrace), his insistence on the annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy made Balkan Turkey more vulnerable to any attack on the demilitarized Straits. In addition, Mussolini was present at Lausanne to assert that Italy was an equal “partner” with other European powers and that he would not allow Italy’s wartime allies to cheat Italy again over the spoils of war.212 The Lausanne Conference offered Mussolini a venue to further his quest for recognition among the Great Powers. On his way to the conference, Mussolini stopped at Territet, several miles short of his ultimate destination. In so doing, he compelled his French and British counterparts to meet him for a pre-conference discussion. This may be regarded as an achievement in terms of securing recognition of Italy’s equal status with France and Britain. Indeed, the official communiqué issued after the meeting emphasized this equal status. However, such recognition inevitably implied that previously Italy had not been exactly equal.213 For Mussolini, international conferences such as the one at Lausanne were not the only fora where Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violent methods in the Balkans without regard to international organizations. When the Lausanne Conference was drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself over the port city of Fiume on the Adriatic coast of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan was to annex the city if Belgrade rejected the proposal. However, the chain of events prompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island in the Adriatic. Italy attacked the island, yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure. Intimidated by Italy’s aggressive behaviour during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually conceded and recognized Italy’s full sovereignty over Fiume.214 These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target of Italian expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini’s attention at that time was directed towards the Adriatic coast of the Balkans where he found himself blocked by French dominance.215 France remained “public enemy number two” for Italy but after the collapse of Austro-Hungary there was no “public enemy number one” .216 The fascist leader was obsessed with the idea of putting an end to French influence in the region. The best way to undermine France was to weaken its ally, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Only after that, could he turn to Turkey, whose viability as a new state, he believed, was questionable. In the latter half of the 1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once he had consolidated his power domestically and taken complete control of the Palazzo Chigi. Thus, the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.217 The authoritarian state was also reinforced in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and their replacement by committed fascists. In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreign office ought to be the most fascist of all government departments. He gave preference for diplomatic posts to those with party membership dating back to before October 1922.218 With these new civil servants in place, Mussolini was able to put his assertive foreign policy into practice with tono fascista. The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian-Turkish relations. Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in 1924 and 1925 in Turkish defensive measures along the Western coast.219 Two events specifically, the Mosul issue and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925, marked a transition in Turkish-Italian relations. On the one hand, the Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policy in Europe and the Balkans, and, therefore, inevitably concerned Turkey as well. On the other hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would provide Italy with a share of Anatolia. Distinct from the question of Mosul, Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli around the same time was to give similar messages to Turkey. Ankara was visibly apprehensive regarding Italian colonial aspirations in Anatolia as a result of Mussolini’s demonstrative Mediterranean cruise. The Turkish press pointed out Italy’s recent activities in the Balkans and wrote about the loan recently granted to Greece for the purchase of ammunitions.220 In fact, according to Mussolini, the British-Greek-Italian alignment was a great conspiracy against Turkey. After the Corfu incident, the new regime of Theodoros Pangalos in Greece offered Mussolini opportunities stemming from this alignment. The coming to power of the military dictator, Pangalos, transformed Greece from victim into potential junior partner. In fact, in the winter of 1925-1926, Mussolini apparently contemplated a Corfu -style descent on Turkey.221 US High Commissioner Admiral Bristol wrote from İstanbul to Washington that Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli preceded by Greco-Italian pourparlers was coincidental with the British Ambassador’s return to Turkey and the reopening of the Mosul negotiations. All these developments occasioned considerable concern to the Turkish government as well as general uneasiness on the part of the public.222 On the one hand, the Turks were suspicious of the existence of an Italian-Greek alliance. On the other hand, they were apprehensive about collaboration between Italy and Britain. In fact, when Mussolini and Chamberlain met at Rapallo, the semi-official newspaper Milliyet wrote that it would have been highly desirable for the Italian ambassador in Turkey to have informed the Turkish public regarding the nature of the Mussolini-Chamberlain Rapallo interview. By the end of April, there was already news in the Turkish press on the nature of the Rapallo Conference.223 The Turkish press stated that the news of an Italian-British agreement dividing Abyssinia into spheres of influence had thrown light on the situation. They added that the clouds which at present darkened the European horizon had not been dispersed but on the contrary were becoming darker because of the violation of the country’s independence.224 According to the Turkish press, such a violation would indicate first that there existed no difference between the mentality of present-day European statesmen and that of their pre-war predecessors and secondly, that there was no international principle or doctrine which could resist violation by the ambitious and egoistic designs of European states.225 Turkey’s feeling of insecurity concerning the European powers continued all through the 1920s. Although Turkey accepted the solution to the Mosul issue in June 1926 in favour of Britain for reasons of its own security, it was aware that political instability in the region could create further problems for Ankara. After the signing of the treaty between Britain and Turkey on the Mosul issue, an American diplomatic dispatch drew attention to the Daily Express of London which published an article on the decision by Italy to occupy its former “sphere of influence” in Turkey and claimed that Britain had requested the intervention of the United States in order to maintain peace.226 Even though there was no evidence of the accuracy of the Daily Express’ report, certain milieus in Turkey feared Italian-Greek cooperation in an Italian occupation of Cilicia. The US legation in Bulgaria reported that Soviet and Turkish Commissioners for Foreign Affairs discussed at Odessa the alleged existence of an Italian-Greek-Bulgarian pact, supported by Britain, against Turkey.227 At the beginning of 1927, the Turkish press wrote that Britain, in return for Italy’s military cooperation in China, accorded Italy absolute freedom of action in its Turkish policy.228 This kind of rumor was a reflection of deep Turkish suspicion vis-à-vis the intentions of the European powers such as Italy and Britain. The fact that secret agreements continued to be established, as had happened in the First World War, made the Turkish political leadership distrustful towards the reliability of the world system. For instance, the way the Mosul issue was resolved at the League aggravated Turkish distrust. During the Mosul discussions, Lord Balfour said that the way had been left open for the Council to say that Turkey would only be asked to take part in its deliberations upon terms of inequality with other members of the Council.229 The Mosul crisis between Britain and Turkey offered an opportunity for Italy to carve out a future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realize the Italian colonial dream in Anatolia since he expected the disintegration of the Republic of Turkey during the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared towards reviving the old expansionist designs of Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britain and Turkey. London used all of its resources in order not to relinquish this oil-rich region to Ankara. At Lausanne, it was decided that the Mosul issue would be settled within nine months by direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, or, failing that, the problem would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.230 Bilateral negotiations led to a deadlock and the Council of the League of Nations decided in December 1925 on the attachment of Mosul to Iraq, which was placed under British mandate for 25 years. On 6 June 1926 Turkey accepted the League of Nations’ decision by signing a treaty with Britain concerning the establishment of the Turkish-Iraqi frontier. According to this treaty, Turkey, in return for relinquishing Mosul, was to receive ten percent of Iraqi oil revenues for 25 years.231 In January 1925, meanwhile, Italian diplomats in Turkey recommended to the governor of the Dodecanese Islands that the Datça and Marmaris regions be inspected for possible landing operations. The Italian Consul in Antalya even complained that his location was not suitable for obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coastal line across from the Dodecanese.232 Ankara was alert to the possibility that Italy might send troops to Anatolia due to the Mosul crisis.233 The Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility of Italy using Rhodes as a military base in the case of war.234 In fact, Italian diplomatic reports included extracts from daily Turkish newspapers such as İkdam whose headlines pointed in alarm to Italian military preparations.235 Moreover, the Turkish press in Antalya published articles against the presence of Italians in the province. The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The perpetuation of these institutions, the press argued, proved that Italy had not given up the idea of taking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openly stated to the Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions concerning Antalya and that the existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed these intentions. 236 The Italian mindset, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsurprisingly reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. A telegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focused on the advantages to Italy of pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The telegram identified 1927 as the critical year in which to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as the new Turkish regime began to consolidate domestically and before it acquired effective means to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy the Adana region, instead of İzmir and Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better economic as well as political benefits. The Adana region was rich in resources that would be a great contribution to the Italian economy. 237 Yüklə 0,71 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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