F I r s t d r a f t

Politically, possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italian expansionism. It would offer an opportunity for Italy to cooperate closely with Britain in the Middle East. Since Italy would provide a counter balance in the Adana region, Britain could be at ease in Mosul. Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to support a Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation with Britain, the door to Persia and the Caucasus would also be wide open. The telegram also claimed that such a scenario might even help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In other words, if Italy could offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then Moscow might withdraw its support of Turkey.²³⁸

The handling of the Mosul issue by the great powers convinced the Turkish political leaders that these powers could at any time form a coalition against Turkey. It added fuel to the Turkish fear of Europe’s great powers as the main threat to Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity.²³⁹ Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry let Rome know on various occasions that they were not certain about the policies of the great powers vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras openly declared to the Italian Ambassador in Ankara, Felice Orsini, that, in the case of Italian-British collaboration, Turkey would consider approaching other great powers. More specifically, Aras warned Orsini that Turkey might even conclude an agreement on the Mediterranean with France, although Turkey was not at all on good terms with France at the time. Ankara had in fact signed a convention of friendship and good neighborliness with France in May 1926. The main purpose of this convention was to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, then a French mandate, in the case of armed confrontation with the European powers, particularly over Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as the Turks courting the French. ²⁴⁰

Thus the nature of Italian-Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mussolini came to power. The same Italian colonial intentions towards Turkey that had existed at the beginning of the twentieth century remained in effect. The Italian military presence in the Dodecanese islands was perceived as a continuous threat to Turkey’s security, which had already been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistence during the Lausanne Conference.²⁴¹ Almost weekly, the Turkish press carried reports on the imminence of an Italian landing at Izmir.²⁴² The Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness towards Italy. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was not unjustified. Referring to a conversation with the Italian Consul-General at Mersin, a British diplomat wrote later: “[he] was at no pains to hide his belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in the fertile Cilician plain.”²⁴³

A possible Turkish-French agreement was not to the advantage of Italy which considered France as its main rival in the region. Moreover, the Mosul issue was resolved and did not give Mussolini the chance to intervene in Anatolia. Finally, the new Turkish Republic did not collapse. Ankara gave concession to London on the issue in order not to be vulnerable to any great power intervention. Mahmut Bey from Siirt, in his statement released to Milliyet, reported the opinion of a member of the opposition in Italy who said that Turkey had acted wisely in settling the question of Mosul and had ruined all the hopes and plans which Italy cherished with regard to Turkey. Then he added that Mahmut Bey should not be surprised if he saw the Italian press speak of Turkish friendship and publish “Turcophile” articles.²⁴⁴

This member of the Italian opposition predicted quite well the intentions of the fascists in the region. At that stage, it was hard for Italy to attack Turkey without British support. During the Mosul crisis, it was in the British interest to collaborate with Italy in order to create more pressure on Turkey. But once the crisis was over, the British felt the need to draw the attention of Italy away from the Near East in which belligerence was getting out of hand. Nevertheless, Chamberlain owed Italy a favour. Mussolini’s belligerence towards Turkey had contributed to Britain’s victory in the Mosul question. The best choice for Britain was to encourage Italy in Albania. Then Chamberlain was prepared to recognize Albania as “Italy’s Belgium.”²⁴⁵


Italian Overtures to Turkey
By late 1927, Italian diplomatic papers indicate there was constant probing on both sides for a high level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome. Consequently, such a visit took place in 1928. Various factors contributed to the changing relations between Turkey and Italy. Between 1925 and 1926, the Turkish land frontiers were secured under the friendship treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, in order to solve the Syrian-Turkish and Iraqi-Turkish border problems, in May 1926 Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with Britain. Turkey had already realized by that time that it could not afford to confront the great powers on all fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders to the Mediterranean Sea.

Secondly, contrary to Rome’s expectations, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of the Republic of Turkey. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosul issue for the sake of the survival of the Republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they were ill equipped militarily to confront Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they had to compromise in order not to aggravate their international isolation. Turkey’s political leaders did not want to give the great powers a pretext in the Mosul issue that could lead to the collapse of the new Republic.²⁴⁶ With the resolution of the Mosul problem, Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the hands of the great powers.

Thirdly, as Fascist Italy’s frustration with the existing international arrangements continued to grow, Rome considered ways of enlisting international outcasts like Turkey and the Soviet Union on its side to amplify Italy’s voice in world councils. Indeed, this view had a long history that dated back to the time of the Treaty of Lausanne where Italy was presented with an ultimatum by the British on the status of the Dodecanese Islands. The ultimatum included a threat by the British Prime Minister to sign the treaty without including Italy. Back then, this British ultimatum prompted Mussolini to seriously consider siding with Turkey and the Soviet Union as a diplomatic alternative. According to Lowe and Marzari, a sufficient basis for such a diplomatic option was already in place:

“The Consulta had supported Russia’s request for equal treatment at the [Lausanne Conference] and cordial contacts had been maintained throughout with the unofficial Russian delegation. Moreover, the Italian Navy pronounced in favour of the Russian and Turkish programme for the Turkish Straits, that they remain under Turkish control, and against the British programme that the transit be free and the region demilitarized.”²⁴⁷

Above all, Rome’s image of Turkey began to change. Turkey was no longer identified only with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The new Italian image of Turkey was mainly shaped around the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula. The attitude of the Italian press towards Turkey started changing from 1927 on. Rumors of Italian preparations for an attack on Anatolia were described as “fantastically false” in the Popolo d’Italia of 30 December 1927.²⁴⁸ In July 1927, there was already news from Athens as well as London that Mussolini was working actively for the realization of a Turkish-Italian rapprochement.²⁴⁹ According to Mussolini a Turkish-Italian rapprochement would also be a step towards a pro-Italian alliance in the region.

Its troubled relations with Belgrade resulted in a dramatic shift in Italian strategy towards Turkey within the Balkan context. In the winter of 1925-1926, there had been attempts to bolster an Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement. Rome had already created a kind of supremacy over Yugoslavia by the Pact of Rome signed in January 1924. In fact, France and Czechoslovakia wanted to join the Italo-Yugoslav treaty. Mussolini rejected this because the Pact of Rome not only “liberated” Fiume from Yugoslavia but also Yugoslavia “from French tutelage”.²⁵⁰ During the 1925-1926 negotiations, King Alexander proposed to Rome that the two powers partition Albania. At the same time, in order to defy Italy, Belgrade aimed at a Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement that might prepare the ground for a Balkan Locarno.

Mussolini not only opposed a Balkan Locarno but also opposed partition of Albania with another power. In fact, he decided to sign the Pact of Tirana with Albania to have complete control over this country. This time Belgrade turned to Paris which led to the signing of an alliance in November 1927 between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and France to deter Italian aggression. This alliance meant consolidation of French influence in Eastern Europe which began with the formation of the Little Entente in 1922. The alliance with France was soon followed by the Yugoslav parliament’s refusal to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20 July 1925.²⁵¹

The Paris-Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara as an extension of Mussolini’s plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusively to Rome.²⁵²

French influence in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and in Romania, and the entente system which Paris established in Eastern Europe constituted models for the new Italian policy towards Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey began to appear to Italy more as a regional actor than as simply a potential colony. Mussolini’s diplomacy then featured new aspects in its relations with Ankara. Rome wanted to take advantage of Turkey’s international isolation to turn Ankara into a pro-Italian actor. Not a member of the League of Nations until 1932, Turkey was a suitable candidate to be part of an Italian-led system in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In short, Turkey began to matter to Rome in the context of Italian-French rivalry in the Mediterranean. The French, for their part, had a “rooted distrust” of Italy.²⁵³ Another source of discord between the two countries was the Italian pursuit of recognition of equality with France in various venues. Before the ascendance of the Fascists, Italy had already been granted parity with France as a naval power at the Washington Conference in 1922. The Fascist Italian government did not bother to participate in the subsequent Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, as France would be sure to oppose the extension of this parity to other categories of naval units. Later, Mussolini confided to the American Ambassador that Italy “had been granted parity with France at Washington in 1922 and was determined not to give it up. The Fascist government could scarcely accept less than its predecessor had won”.²⁵⁴ The Italian demand for parity with France in every category of naval vessel had already undermined the progress of preparatory negotiations for the Conference. In fact, as Italy’s financial position was not seen as promising for competitive shipbuilding, its insistence on parity was considered as having merely been an issue of prestige for that country.²⁵⁵

On the one hand, the fascist regime was trying to settle problems between Turkey and Greece left unresolved since Lausanne. In this way, Rome intended to form a bloc in the Balkans against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, this alignment would work against France, the main supporter of Yugoslavia in the region. But the US Embassy in Turkey reported to Washington that the ground for a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Greece, and Italy had not yet been prepared. While the British Embassy agreed with the Americans, the Hungarian diplomats believed that such a tripartite agreement was certain.²⁵⁶

The American Embassy had, in general, doubts as to whether Turkey had the same intentions as Italy. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew wrote: “I decidedly doubt if Turkey’s new found friendship with Italy has any definitely planned anti-French intent, since an aggressive policy against any nation is entirely inconsistent with Turkey’s present interests and herdetermination to remain independent of political combinations and entanglements”.²⁵⁷ It was even more doubtful that Turkey was to be involved in any alliance against Yugoslavia.

When a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was signed between Turkey and Italy in May 1928, there were various comments in the Turkish and the Italian press. Some of these found their way into American diplomatic reports. To give but a few examples, the Cumhuriyet wrote that Italy had become convinced of the desirability of developing Turkey as a market rather than a place of colonization and of political penetration. Siirt deputy Mahmut Bey believed that the signing of the agreement would completely disarm people who had motives for reporting Italy as being ready to attack. Konya deputy Reşid Safvet Bey wrote in the Journal d’Orient on 30 May 1928 that this agreement would prevent third states from settling other Mosul questions with the threat of an alleged Italian invasion and would likewise facilitate the settlement of the on-going Turkish-Greek controversy.²⁵⁸

The Turks were not alone in believing that some western European countries were forming obstacles for Turkey’s settling of its political problems. The Americans reported on 25 April, 1928 from Istanbul to Washington that the German ambassador was of the opinion that the French were working in Greece to prevent a settlement of the population exchange question in order to prevent the possibility of a Turkish-Greek rapprochement. The Italian press also accused France of messing up the Near East to give a wrong image of Italy. The Giornale d’Italia stated: “Being the greatest Mediterranean power, Italy has, more than any other country, direct responsibilities in maintaining order in that region”.²⁵⁹

The US Embassy summarized the benefit that might be derived from an understanding with Turkey as follows: It was merely a move in the Italian-French game for influence in the Mediterranean, and was immediately induced as a means of bringing about the settlement of Greece’s difficulties with Turkey, and the conclusion of Greco-Italian understanding, the Italian ultimate objective being establishment of ascendancy in the Near East in general and in the Balkans in particular.²⁶⁰ The Americans also added that the French had lost whereas the Italians had gained since the signature of the Turkish-Italian Treaty.²⁶¹ What were the benefits of this treaty for Turkey? Again according to the American diplomats, Turkish foreign policy for some time had been centered on the negotiation and conclusion of neutrality and non-aggression pacts, such as the one with Italy, in order that it might feel secure against the political and territorial aggression and ambitions of its neighbours, with a view to obtaining the full benefits of a much needed period of years of peace for the development of its internal, legislative and economic reforms and for putting its house in order.²⁶²

Interestingly enough, the French Ambassador, Count de Chambroun, confided to the Americans that he saw no immediate danger in such treaties as the Turkish-Italian pact, but five, or ten or twenty years from then it might be a different matter. But if it were Italy’s and Turkey’s intention, tacitly or otherwise, to develop a political encircling movement around Yugoslavia, bringing Greece, Bulgaria, and eventually Hungary into the circle, France would be fully able to take care of the situation when the moment should be ripe.²⁶³

However, on 28 April 1929 when Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited Rome, in a reply to Mussolini’s welcoming speech, he stated that the Turkish government had given many proofs of its sincere desire for peace and considered French-Italian friendship of prime importance for peace in the Mediterranean.²⁶⁴ In fact, an American diplomat in Rome reported to Washington that Italy was seeking to benefit economically from the cordial relations established between Italy and Turkey since the political results in favour of Italy of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality were rather symbolic and meager.²⁶⁵

Foreign diplomats in Turkey had attributed Turkey’s desire for an agreement with Italy to its natural willingness to ward off for some years the menace of an Italian descent upon the Anatolian coast as well as to heighten its own prestige in Asia and elsewhere by the conclusion of an agreement of this character with a European power.²⁶⁶ Other commentators argued that the apparent ideological similarities between the Italian and Turkish regimes also facilitated rapprochement between Turkey and Italy. Moreover, beyond the Mediterranean balance of power, Italy needed Turkey for a secure access to Soviet natural resources.²⁶⁷

5. BREAKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
For a while, Turkey’s old arms trade links seemed to have survived the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. There was even an impression of the resilience of British influence on Turkish naval affairs, both by necessity and from choice. It should be borne in mind that on the eve of the First World War, the last Ottoman government placed a large order for naval units in British shipyards. In April 1914, the Ottoman Ministry of Marine awarded contracts to British shipbuilders for a third dreadnought and a large number of lighter units, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Although the payments the Ottoman government had made for the two ill-fated dreadnoughts had been counted towards the Ottoman debts at Lausanne, the other contracts were to be liquidated. A document in the Republican Archives reveals that the new Turkish government authorized Captain Hamdi Bey, also a deputy in the TBMM, to procure one of the three submarines in London without a tender in 1923.²⁶⁸ This procurement could never materialize and Ankara turned to another traditional supplier of naval arms, Germany, to supply the submarines. Thanks to secret German subsidies, the new Turkish Republic could order two submarines rather than one from the nominally Dutch shipyard I.v.S. in 1924.

The abolition of the Ministry of Marine in 1927 was a decisive institutional victory for the General Staff. The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff took over the functions of the defunct Ministry of Marine; the latter’s army-dominated ranks retaining ultimate jurisdiction over the navy and naval strategy. Chief of Staff Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had long been noted by foreign observers as a formidable opponent of expensive naval programs.²⁶⁹ For instance, the British naval attaché interpreted the corruption charges against the Minister of Marine as an indication of the Turkish government’s desire to cancel the contract, because, as a fighting unit, Yavuz had very little to offer. Moreover, after being re-commissioned, Yavuz would need a destroyer escort to protect her against submarine menace. The bill for the naval program was likely to mount with the cost of acquiring destroyers, to the dismay of Field-Marshal Çakmak.²⁷⁰

Now that Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had recovered his full authority over the navy, a loss of momentum in naval programs seemed unavoidable. However, the turn of events proved otherwise. First, in April 1928, the TBMM authorized a 30-million Turkish Lira appropriation for the first ten-year naval program.²⁷¹ Secondly, in September 1928, the Greek navy conducted an exercise off the Dardanelles which was perceived as a provocation. Ankara reciprocated with a similar exercise personally commanded by President Atatürk. The 1928 incident in a sense defined the parameters of the Turkish naval policy. The aim was to possess a fleet in the Aegean superior to that of Greece. Consequently, Yavuz’s reconditioning gained momentum and the shipbuilding program was revived, though on a modest scale.²⁷² The next Turkish naval order was to include two destroyers, two submarines and a number of lighter vessels.²⁷³ Funding remained a central issue for the procurement of new naval units.

Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade

In the new Turkish naval program, another politically unsatisfied European power, Italy, began to loom large. The process witnessed Italy’s transformation from a source of threat into a major supplier of arms to Turkey. French-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean after 1927 provided Turkey with an unexpected opportunity for financing its modest naval program.²⁷⁴ Fascist Italy began to entertain the idea of establishing an Aegean bloc consisting of Italy, Turkey and Greece to counter French influence in the Adriatic and the Balkans. Consequently, Rome sought not only to improve its bi-lateral relations with Turkey and Greece but also encouraged these countries to reconcile their differences. In May 1928, Turkish-Italian negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation. The Treaty marked a drastic change in Fascist Italy’s image of Turkey. It was no longer seen as a potential colony but as a sovereign state which had to be won to the Italian side through political, economic and military penetration. Here arms supplies stood as appropriate instruments for such a policy.²⁷⁵

The Italian shipyard Odero had offered to supply destroyers to the Turkish Navy before the ten-year naval program had been adopted. In December 1926, the Italian Air and Naval Attaché in Turkey, Lieutenant Commander Maroni, identified the Odero destroyers offered to the Turkish Ministry of Marine as perfect vehicles for Italian penetration into Turkey.²⁷⁶ Around the same time, Italian Ambassador Orsini urged the Italian Foreign Ministry to encourage Italian shipbuilders to take advantage of the recent opening-up in Turkey by bidding individually or collectively for the upcoming Turkish naval programs.²⁷⁷ The German naval advisors’ arrival in Turkey had already intensified Italian interest in Turkish naval matters. The Italians did not miss the obvious link between the delivery of the German-funded Dutch-built submarines and the arrival of the German naval advisors. This may have reinforced the conviction that the supply of naval hardware would entail the provision of training by the supplier and hence facilitate military penetration. With this in mind, Mussolini expressed his disappointment over the absence of any Italian military or civilian experts in Turkey. He particularly regretted that although 43 German, 17 French, two Austrian and one English advisor were then employed in the Turkish military service not a single Italian was even in civilian service in Turkey. He also encouraged the Italian Ministry of Marine to invite Turkish military and naval missions to promote the Italian arms industry, while cautioning them not to show any secret facilities or weapons to the visiting Turks.²⁷⁸