Fear of violent outbursts of international violence overseas construct Others as

1NC

A) Surveillance requires the monitoring of people.

William Staples, 2014 (Prof., Sociology, U. Kansas), EVERYDAY SURVEILLANCE: VIGILANCE AND VISIBILITY IN POSTMODERN LIFE, 2014, xiii.

The word surveillance, in the most general sense, refers to the act of keeping a close watch on people.

B) Violation: Plan doesn’t curtail monitoring of people.

C) Standards:

1) Fair limits: Millions of cases deal with monitoring of natural resources, the environment, arms control, or species. The negative interpretation fairly limits the topic by focusing on people.

2) Disad and counterplan ground: They avoid the core controversies of the topic like terrorism disadvantages and political disadvantages.

D) Voting Issue: Fairness, Education, & Ground

ECON

Growth collapse coming now --- tech can’t solve

Alexander ‘14 (Dr. Samuel – lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, AND Jonathan Rutherford – Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex, ““The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition,” Simplicity Institute Report 14a, http://simplicityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Deep-Green-Alternative.pdf)

Evidence continues to mount that industrial civilisation, driven by a destructive and insatiable growth imperative, is chronically unsustainable, as well as being grossly unjust. The global economy is in ecological overshoot, currently consuming resources and emitting waste at rates the planet cannot possibly sustain (Global Footprint Network 2013). Peak oil is but the most prominent example of a more general situation of looming resource scarcity (Klare, 2012), with high oil prices having a debilitating effect on the oil‐dependent economies which are seemingly dependent on cheap oil to maintain historic rates of growth (Heinberg, 2011). At the same time, great multitudes around the globe live lives of material destitution, representing a vast, marginalised segment of humanity that justifiably seeks to expand its economic capacities in some form (World Bank, 2008). Biodiversity continues to be devastated by deforestation and other forms of habitat destruction (United Nations, 2010), while the global development agenda seems to be aiming to provide an expanding global population with the high-impact material affluence enjoyed by the richest parts of the world (Hamilton, 2003). This is despite evidence crying out that the universalisation of affluence is environmentally unsupportable (Smith and Positano, 2010; Turner, 2012) and not even a reliable path to happiness (Lane, 2001; Alexander, 2012a). Most worrying of all, perhaps, is the increasingly robust body of climate science indicating the magnitude of the global predicament (IPCC, 2013). According to the Climate Tracker Initiative (2013: 4), the world could exceed its ‘carbon budget’ in around 18 years, essentially locking us into a future that is at least 2 degrees warmer, and threatening us with 4 degrees or more. It is unclear to what extent civilisation as we know it is compatible with runaway climate change. And still, almost without exception, all nations on the planet – including or especially the richest ones – continue to seek GDP growth without limit, as if the cause of these problems could somehow provide the solution. If once it was hoped that technology and science were going to be able decouple economic activity from ecological impact, such a position is no longer credible (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011). Technology simply cannot provide any escape from the fact that there are biophysical limits to growth. Despite decades of extraordinary technological advance, which it is was promised would lighten the ecological burden of our economies, global energy and resource consumption continues to grow, exacerbated by a growing population, but which is primarily a function of the growth-orientated values that lie at the heart of global capitalism (Turner, 2012). Against this admittedly gloomy backdrop lies a heterogeneous tradition of critical theorists and activists promoting what could be called a ‘deep green’ alternative to the growth-‐orientated, industrial economy. Ranging from the radical simplicity of Henry Thoreau (1983), to the post-‐growth economics of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al, 1972; 2004), and developing into contemporary expressions of radical reformism (Latouche, 2009; Heinberg, 2011; Jackson, 2009), eco-‐socialism (Sarkar, 1999; Smith, 2010), and eco-‐anarchism (Bookchin, 1989; Holmgren, 2002; Trainer; 2010a), this extremely diverse tradition nevertheless agrees that the nature of the existing system is inherently unsustainable. Tinkering with or softening its margins – that is, any attempt to give capitalism a ‘human face’ – is not going to come close to addressing the problems we, the human species, are confronted with. What is needed, this tradition variously maintains, is a radically alternative way of living on the Earth – something ‘wholly other’ to the ways of industrialisation, consumerism, and limitless growth. However idealistic or utopian their arguments might seem, the basic reasoning is that the nature of any solutions to current problems must honestly confront the magnitude of the overlapping crises, for else one risks serving the destructive forces one ostensibly opposes.

Growth causes resource wars, warming, poverty and environmental collapse --- near tipping points

Vidiera et al. ‘14 (Nuno – Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Sciences and Technology of the New University of Lisbon’s Department of Sciences and Environmental Engineering, AND Francois Schneider – industrial ecologist and degrowth researcher with a PhD on Allocation Problems in Cascade Systems and researcher at the INSA engineering school in Lyon and at the CML in Holland, AND Filka Sekulova – Ph.D. student in Economics at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, AND Giorgos Kallis – a Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D. in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean, “Improving understanding on degrowth pathways: An exploratory study using collaborative causal models,” in Futures, Volume 55, January 2014, p. 63—65, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328713001596)

Participants at the ‘Mapping Degrowth’ workshop collaborated in the construction of three CLDs addressing the social, ecological and economic implications of the degrowth proposals. According to the methodology, participants in each group started with the identification of a ‘problem variable’ placed at the centre of each diagram (social, ecological, economic), after which causes and consequences were added. In the first round of the mapping exercise the focus was on the conceptualization of the causal structure of issues without the consideration of degrowth proposals. Afterwards, participants were asked to add those proposals from the conference that they found most relevant in each of the maps. The CLDs resulting from the workshop are presented in Figs. 2-7, together with a narrative of the main links and loops identified by participants. These diagrams represent dynamic hypotheses and participants’ views on the cause-effect relationships underlying each sector. In the ‘Social Sector’ CLD (Fig. 2), the group selected the variable ‘social inequality’ as the core problem. This CLD has ten positive loops (indicating self-reinforcement of a given change within the loop) and one negative loop (indicating self-regulation and balancing of a given change within the loop). To illustrate how to trace the feedback loops in a CLD, consider, for example, loop R8 together with the CLD notations presented in Appendix 1: ‘‘an increase in social inequality will lead to an increase in conflicts, which decreases cooperation. Less cooperation leads to less trust and sharing and this will lead to a further increase in social inequality’’. From this CLD, we can learn that, according to participants’ perspectives, the underlying causes of social inequality are driven by dominance of reinforcing loops R1, R2, R3, R9 and R10. Accumulation increases the scale of the political/economic system, which reinforces will to accumulate more (R1) and increases social inequality. Accumulation also causes natural resources to be more and more exploited (R2). The will of accumulation loop is sustained as long as a ‘utilitarian view’ dominates over other ethics (R3), but as long as conflicts resulting from social inequality are not prevented, less cooperation and sharing in society strengthens the prevalence of the ‘utilitarian view’ and will to accumulate (R10), and also leads to increasing consumption of natural resources and more social inequalities (R9). This ensemble of loops illustrates the phenomenon of path dependence often observed in ecological and social systems. Path dependence arises when small and unpredictable changes early in the history of the system lead to the preference for a given pathway (i.e. will to accumulate) and subsequently the dominant positive feedback loops amplify these changes. As a dominant system design emerges, resistance to switching increases and the system eventually reaches a lock-in [27]. In Fig. 2, it is also possible to observe which feedback loops are perpetuating impacts arising from social inequality. Social inequality leads to more conflicts (e.g. social, war, violence), eventually poverty increases and conflicts are reinforced (R5). With rising poverty access to goods and services by vulnerable groups decreases below what it would have been, leading to even more poverty (R4). As conflicts increase in society this leads to an increase in the exclusion of communities, which ultimately increases social inequality (R7). Conflicts also erode trust causing more exclusion and social inequality (R6) and decreasing cooperation and sharing (R8). Subsequently, degrowth proposals have been added to this initial diagram by participants and new causal links were established, as illustrated in Fig. 3. As depicted in Fig. 3, there are proposals addressing both the causes and consequences of social inequality. But how may these degrowth proposals create a systemic change leading to social equality? And where are the strongest leverage points for intervening in this system? To answer these questions we have used the framework proposed by Meadows [18], identifying the following leverage points: • Reducing the strength and gains around positive loops - Proposals find leverage in weakening the strong positive loops, which cause social inequality. That is the case with education, direct democracy, limits to private property and sharing. All these measures weaken the reinforcing loops driven by the will for accumulation (R1, R2, R9) and as a consequence, balancing loop B1 (regulating loops involving the welfare state and progressive taxation) becomes more effective; • Changing the rules of the system - The proposal of creating experimental spaces and empowering the poor has high leverage by changing the rules governing access to goods and services by vulnerable groups, decreasing political apathy and increasing trust and cooperation among societal groups; • Changing the paradigm of the system - by ‘decolonizing’ the imaginaries of growth [11] the strength and dominance of positive loops of accumulation for accumulation’s sake are put in question. This is a high leverage point since it challenges the lock-in created in a path-dependent system designed towards continuous economic growth. Proposals related with sharing, recognition and promotion of the commons and education act by triggering innovations, which may lead to an ‘architectural shift’ [27] that renders the dominant standard obsolete.

No impact to decline

Drezner ‘14 (Daniel – Professor of IR at Tufts University, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession,” in World Politics, Volume 66, Number 1, January 2014, p. 123-164)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

Transition key --- growth and tech solutions lead to ecological collapse and warming

Vidiera et al. ‘14 (Nuno – Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Sciences and Technology of the New University of Lisbon’s Department of Sciences and Environmental Engineering, AND Francois Schneider – industrial ecologist and degrowth researcher with a PhD on Allocation Problems in Cascade Systems and researcher at the INSA engineering school in Lyon and at the CML in Holland, AND Filka Sekulova – Ph.D. student in Economics at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, AND Giorgos Kallis – a Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D. in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean, “Improving understanding on degrowth pathways: An exploratory study using collaborative causal models,” in Futures, Volume 55, January 2014, p. 67—68, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328713001596)

The analysis of feedback loops causing overexploitation of natural resources and decline in the state of biodiversity show that increasing consumption of natural resources increases with a growing scale of international trade (R2) and growth- oriented technologies. According to participants there is uncertainty regarding the effect of technology on resource consumption, which could lead to a different polarity of the causal link established with consumption of natural resources and also efficiency. Technologies driven by markets are likely to increase the need for resources and raw materials but technologies and innovation for frugality and sharing do not impose such pressures on natural resources. With increasing energy flows delivered to society, urbanization increases (R1), natural land use cover decreases and pressures grow on ecosystems and the state of biodiversity. As the throughput of energy and materials increases this creates mounting pressures on biodiversity. The decline in biodiversity is caused by land use changes, intensive agriculture, monocultures, deforestation, pollution, GMOs, climate change and proliferation of biological invasions (which increase with growth of international trade). As the state of biodiversity deteriorates demand for local ecological knowledge increases (B1) which leads to communitarian and cultural elements. On the other hand, more and more pollution, intensive agriculture and growth-driven technologies also have an undesired impact on social equality, by eventually increasing poverty and contributing to an unequal access to natural resources. To illustrate how degrowth proposals depicted in Fig. 7 promote a systemic change towards living within ecological limits and preserving biodiversity, the following leverage points may be highlighted from this diagram: • Reducing the strength of positive loops and enforcing/creating new balancing loops - Proposals have high leverage in weakening resource extraction growth loops and arguing for adjustment of throughput to carrying capacity (i.e. reducing the global throughput of energy and materials, adjusting it to the biosphere’s carrying capacity), which in systems language means the creation (or enforcement) of negative balancing loops that correct the rate of exploration of natural resources and biodiversity to the desired goal (i.e. carrying capacity); • Changing the rules of the system - removing harmful subsidies, introducing multiple criteria in evaluations (e.g. to have an energy system with the highest Energy Return on Investment and the lowest environmental impact and material throughput with least transport distance) and a moratorium on resource extraction (e.g. in areas of high biodiversity, leaving resources in/on the ground and creating resource sanctuaries) finds leverage in changing the rules on how natural resources are explored and constraining throughput growth rates. Finally, it should be mentioned that there are obvious connections between the three sector diagrams. Most notably, ‘social inequality’ and ‘consumption of natural resources’ stand as variables that appear in all CLDs, illustrating the interconnections between ecological, social and economic systems and showing the need for an holistic analysis of the possible effects of a given degrowth proposal.

4 degree temperature increase will breakdown civilization and cause every impact

Roberts 13 (David, citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies, “If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention” http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/)

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent World Bank review of the science reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6 degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.