Financial sector levies bill


Proposed Solution: Funding Model of the Prudential Authority



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Proposed Solution: Funding Model of the Prudential Authority


We suggest there are a number of possible models to address the Prudential Authority funding requirements. We reiterate that transparency and fairness across the full spectrum of the financial services industry and also within the banking industry should prevail. We are currently deliberating on the various possibilities and would appreciate the opportunity to meet with the Regulators to discuss the Prudential Authority requirements in more detail and agree on the most equitable model.

Our thinking on possible funding proposals includes the models discussed below (or a combination):


Model 1 – retain formula but adjust the cap


Retain the current formula approach in respect of the Prudential Authority, as reflected in Schedule 1 of the Bill, but adjust the maximum levy of banks in a fair and equitable manner to a lower amount (between R5 and R15 million). Since the prudential regulation and supervision of banks already assist, support and complement the SARB’s legal responsibility for financial stability and matters connected therewith, any shortfall in the Prudential Authority’s budget should be carried by the SARB, which generates substantial income (interest income) from the banks as noted above. The above minimum reserve requirement is applicable to banks only and not to other financial product and services providers.

Specific care should be taken to ensure that the cost structure is fairly and equitably absorbed by all regulated institutions in proportion to the real cost of supervising these institutions and not only the size of respective balance sheets. The cost to supervise a small to medium size bank is high, regardless of its balance sheet size.


Model 2 – use sliding scale and drop the cap


When one applies a cap, using the suggested formula, the bigger banks could potentially benefit as their (uncapped) contribution could exceed the capped value (and thereby reducing their contribution amount), whilst the smaller banks may derive little or no value as their (uncapped) contribution may still come in below the capped amount, resulting in them actually contributing a full 100%.

This model suggests that there is no capped amount and that the funding of the Prudential Authority is done on a sliding scale, based on the size of the bank measured in total liabilities. Institutions like BASA and PASA are funded in this manner and this approach is, in our view, the most equitable amongst all banks.



We propose that the total funding required be disclosed so that appropriate formulae between sectors and per institution size can be developed for discussion.

Model 3 – combination of current proposal and SARB interest


A third model could encompass the existing proposals in the Bill, but with a commensurate requirement that the SARB be required to pay between (for example) 0.5-1.0% interest to banks on their minimum cash reserve requirements. This, in our view, could represent the most equitable and fair short-term approach to the evolving new regulatory and funding process.

Additional Considerations


The general principles listed below, are not only applicable to the recent proposals by National Treasury in respect of its proposed funding model for the approach introduced by the FSRB, but should be carefully considered from a fair, sustainable and equitable point of view.

  • Market principles should inform all regulatory activities and decisions with the objective to add value in the broadest sense.



  • The proposed FSRB framework and all related matters connected therewith, including the direct cost and funding, should contribute to maintaining the foundation for sustainable long-term growth in the economy in a fair and equitable manner.



  • Acknowledgement that prudential regulation is the framework through which the soundness of the financial system is promoted, which also is essential for financial stability (a SARB function). The prudential and conduct regulation and supervision of banks will assist, support and complement the SARB’s legal responsibility for, and matters connected therewith, in relation to financial stability.




  • The minimum reserve requirement, which is deposited with the SARB on an interest free basis, is already facilitating the funding of the SARB’s business activities and, although we are very much aware of the fact that it is a macroeconomic requirement, comes at a great cost to the banking sector which must absorb interest costs associated with this funding model.



  • It is important to ensure that specific care be taken to ensure that the cost of regulation (and the funding model thereof) aligns to globally accepted principles in so far as the benefits derived from regulation should exceed the costs of regulation (balanced funding model required). Acknowledgement that the micro economic costs (which are an additional and incremental tax burden (licences, levies, fees, etc.) on the financial services industry imposed by regulation), should be fair and equitable and that double tax scenarios in this regard should be avoided. The current general economic climate and future outlook (macro prudential considerations) are not favourable.




  • The budgeting process should be transparent promoting collaboration whereby increases and specific levies can be discussed and substantiated with reference to their underlying drivers.

The direct and indirect costs under the Twin Peaks framework need to be carefully managed so as to ultimately neutralise any impact on the financial consumer.





The PA has to increase capacity in policy and in its regulatory and supervisory resources to take on its expanded mandate which includes financial conglomerates, market infrastructures, insurers. In addition, the twin peaks introduce a shift in the manner in which the PA is financed.

JSE

General: Market Infrastructures

Market infrastructures
Section 1 of the Bill provides for the definitions of “central counterparty”, “external central counterparty”, “trade repository and “external trade repository”, however the Schedule refers only to a “central counterparty” and “trade repository”. It is not clear whether it is intended that the terms central counterparty and trade repository, as set out in the Schedule, include external central counterparty and external trade repository or whether levies or fees are not applicable to these types of market infrastructures.
Although “clearing house” is defined in section 1 of the Bill, no provision is made for this type of market infrastructure in the Schedule to the Bill. In terms of the Financial Markets Act, as amended, an entity may be licensed as an independent clearing house and not be licensed as a central counterparty. We recommend that the Schedule should include a levy payable by an independent

clearing house that is not a licensed central counterparty or external central counterparty.


No provision is made in the Schedule for the levying of an exempted market infrastructure (e.g. central counterparty), even though the process to exempt such an entity from licensing and the ongoing monitoring obligations by the relevant Authority will require significant supervisory resources. We respectfully recommend that provision is made in the Schedule for a levy for exempted market infrastructures which reflects the intensity of the supervisory effort required.


Noted. All external market infrastructures with members in South Africa will be levied separately if they have local presence in South Africa.

Noted. An independent clearing house with a licence from the FSCA will be levied as a separate entity.
In terms of section 6(3)(m) of the FMA the Registrar may exempt any person or category of persons from the provisions of a section of the FMA if the Registrar is satisfied that-

  1. The application of the said section will cause the applicant or clients of the applicant financial or other hardship or prejudice; and

  2. The granting of the exemption will not

(aa) conflict with the public interest; or

(bb) frustrate the achievement of the objects of the FMA.
Any market infrastructure that wishes to be exempted from the provisions of a section of the FMA will have to apply to the Registrar from such exemption and satisfy the Registrar that the jurisdictional requirements in section (6(3)(m) have been met. Once a market infrastructure has satisfied the said jurisdictional requirements the Registrar may exempt it from the relevant section of the FMA e.g. exchange licensing requirement in section 7(1). Assuming an exchange is exempted from the requirement to be licensed it will therefore not be a regulated person. The FMA defines a regulated person, inter alia, to mean a licensed exchange. The Registrar does not have the statutory power to levy an unregulated person.

JSE

General: Budget, fees and levy proposals

Budget, fees and levy proposals
It is unclear whether the Supplement published with the Bill represents the budget required in terms of section 239(1) of the FSR Bill or whether the Supplement was published merely as an indicative guide as it provides no details in respect of the nature of the expenditure of each of the financial sector bodies. In addition, an estimate of expenditure giving rise to the special implementation levy has not been provided as required in terms of section 239(2).
Table 2 of the Supplement sets out an estimated annual levy for central counterparties of R10m and the Schedule to the Bill provides for a levy of R10m per central counterparty indicating that only one central counterparty is envisaged in the South African market. However, it is our understanding from

the discussion with National Treasury that it is expected that multiple central counterparties will be licensed in South Africa which could result in a significant over collection of levies.




The budget published in terms of the section 239 of the FSR Bill will be published post the consultation process with the budgets and their levies etc.
Over collections can be accounted for in the next levy cycle to adjust for the excess funds collected in the previous years.


JSE

General Comments

The JSE is supportive of and recognises the benefits of the new regulatory system and we are of the opinion that the Twin Peaks supervisory model will meet the policy objectives outlined in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill (“FSR Bill”). However, we firmly believe that these benefits should be balanced with the cost of the reforms which will inevitably raise the costs for financial consumers.
Our concern, specifically, is in respect of the cumulative effect of the regulatory levies and fees which will be passed on by supervised entities to participants, investors and financial consumers. A significant increase in the cost of regulatory oversight which will translate into an increase in the cost of trading could lead to unintended consequences such as a decline in liquidity in the South African capital markets and the diminished attractiveness of South Africa as an investment destination.
The JSE, like other global exchanges, is under extreme pressure to reduce execution, clearing and settlement costs and a significant increase in regulatory fees will necessitate that the JSE passes on this cost to market participants, potentially rendering the exchange uncompetitive as a trading venue and a listing venue, particularly in respect of the dual listed securities.
In addition to our concerns regarding the potential impact on investors and the South African financial markets of a significant increase in the cost of supervision under a new regulatory structure recovered through regulatory levies, we are also concerned about the manner in which the Bill proposes to apportion the cost of regulatory supervision amongst the various market infrastructures.
The JSE is of the firm view that regulatory levies or fees payable by a market infrastructure should be calibrated to the intensity of regulation and supervision required and should be proportional to the nature, scale and complexity of regulatory risks present in that type of market infrastructure. We do not believe that a levy based on the value of securities traded with a low fixed fee component, as proposed, will achieve that objective.


We agree that regulatory levies or fees payable by a market infrastructure should be calibrated to the intensity of regulation and supervision required and should be proportional to the nature, scale and complexity of regulatory risks present in that type of market infrastructure. However, we are of the view that the value of trades provides an appropriate proxy for this.


Liberty

General: Level of Fees- Cost of regulation

It is important to also note that regulatory pressures on financial institutions have resulted in higher costs of doing business which creates significant challenge for the financial services industry at large.

Noted, but this also reduces risks. Costs will be kept to a minimum.

Peregrine

General

Peregrine Equities and the Peregrine group is very supportive of a robust regulatory framework and is also supportive of initiatives where both the private and public sector engage in a constructive manner to achieve outcomes desired in the impact study. Peregrine believes that a regulatory framework can be created that not only protects the public interest, but also that encourages investment of capital, stimulates economic activity, promotes competition, entrepreneurship and transformation, creates jobs and ultimately generates tax revenue. We appreciate that there are both explicit and implicit costs to the South African economy, but that these can be offset by the benefits of such a framework.
The estimated revenue of the Financial Sector Regulation is provided, but there is no detail on the resources required and the cost of those resources. There is room for the industry and practitioners to contribute both structure and expertise for maximum efficiency. There is scope for industry bodies like the Banking Association of South Africa, the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa and the South African Institute of Stock Brokers to be engaged or to form partnerships in harmonizing the regulation and committing resources from its member firms.

Consultation on the regulatory strategies and processes will take place.

SAIS

General

We are aware of Global regulations and the role the regulator plays in drafting these policies. SAIS is supportive of a robust regulatory framework and initiatives where Industry and regulators engage constructively to achieve practical outcomes that are in the interest of Financial Markets minimizing both systemic and market risk as well as the costs to the South African economy. We actively review new market regulation especially at present around the Financial Regulation Bill, Financial Sector Levies Bill and the Impact Study on Twin Peaks.
As an industry body we believe that there should be a closer working relationship between industry bodies and the regulatory authorities. A partnership would be beneficial in harmonizing regulations and to effectively commit resources, validated by market expertise as and when required.


Noted.





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