Full text of "Narrative of the war with China in 1860; to which is added the account of a short residence with the Tai-ping rebels at Nankin and a voyage from thence to Hankow"
Yüklə 0,79 Mb.
|
|
THE CHINESE WAR 1860 LONDON
NEW-STREET SQUARE A Narrative Of The War With China In 1860 To Which Is Added The Account Of A Short Residence With The Tai-Ping Rebels At Nankin And A Voyage From Thence To Hankow By
90th Light Infantry D. A. Quarter-Master-General to the Expeditionary Force London
1862 DEDICATION. TO LIEUT. -GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT, G.C.B. &c. &c. &c. My dear General, It is with a deep sense of the honour you have done me, that I avail myself of your kind 'permission to dedicate the following pages to you. I could wish that they were more worthy of being presented to the public in conjunction with your name, and had something further to recommend them than the accuracy of statement which, I regret to say, constitutes their sole claim to favourable notice. For my professional comments I must claim your indulgence; but as my Narrative was hastily written in China, as events occurred, and has been only partially revised since then, I trust that you will regard its defects with leniency, and Believe me to be, My dear General, Yours very faithfully, GARNET J. WOLSELEY Army and Navy Club: London: October 1861. PREFACE.
The following narrative was originally written for my own amusement, and partly in the form of a journal. Upon my return from China I was requested by several friends to have it printed for general circulation, but refused to do so, hoping that others, better qualified for such a task, would undertake to make known their experiences of the late war. I felt reluctant, also, to publish comments upon persons and events, which — dotted down from day to day, currente calamo, whilst the impressions were fresh in my mind — might possibly, I feared, be misunderstood by many, and perhaps offend some. As no account of the campaign has been published, my scruples have been overcome, and I now give the following pages to the public: in doing so, however, I wish it to be understood that all the opinions — whether military or otherwise — expressed therein, are entirely my own, and that no other person is in the smallest degree responsible for them. Although I have endeavoured throughout to abstain from personalities, yet, as in writing of a war like that of 1860, where the various departments of our army and navy were brought into such intimate relations with the similar services of our allies, and were all working in conjunction with the embassies of both nations, it would be impossible to please every one, I must throw myself, therefore, upon the mercy of any whom I may have unconsciously offended. The chapter detailing my experiences of the Tai-ping rebels, no doubt contains much that will be objected to by those, who, prejudiced in favour of that cause, will not be easily induced to alter their preconceived notions on the subject, or to give credence to accounts which fail to tally with them. No one is more deeply interested in the cause of Christianity than myself; but, granting, for sake of argument, that the religion of the Gospel and that of Tien-wan is one and the same thing, I cannot see how its truths are to be enforced at the point of the bayonet. Such a system is surely antagonistic to the precepts inculcated by Him who came preaching peace on earth and good-will towards men. In my opinion a fair field for missionary work in China can only be obtained by a general extension of our commercial relations throughout the length and breadth of the empire. To such Tien- wan and his chiefs are as much opposed as ever the Imperial Government has been. Were the rebels in possession of undisturbed sovereign power, there is every reason for supposing that their external policy would be as obstructive as that pursued by Yeh and his predecessors at Canton. Judging of the rebellion by its present effects upon the country, none but men of the most sanguine temperament can expect any eventual benefit, political or otherwise, to accrue from its general success; whereas all must allow that its suppression would not only stay the hand of the murderer, and restore devastated provinces to their former prosperous condition, but would revive the commerce of the country, which is fast dying out under the depressing influences of internecine war. The history of our past relations with China shows, that upon many occasions when the grossest insults had been offered to our flag, and exorbitant impositions made upon trade, an appeal to arms has been prevented by the pressure brought to bear upon our authorities by the all-powerful influence of our commercial community. "After me the deluge," is a maxim which many Englishmen adhere to in the most selfish manner. Every one of any lengthened experience in China knows well that a permanent commerce with it can only be secured by an acknowledgement of equality between us and its rulers, and by inspiring them with a wholesome dread of the consequences which the disruption of such a commerce would entail. Notwithstanding the general acceptance of this truth, there are many, who, as long as they can procure the maintenance of peace during their speculative sojourn in China, care little how much such a policy may complicate affairs, or strangle commercial prospects for the future. With regard, however, to the Tai-ping rebellion, our merchants in China are unanimously in favour of its forcible suppression. The only people, therefore, who can with any reason object to our aiding the Imperialists, are those who have hitherto imagined that, by doing so, we should be obstructing a Christian movement. That such is an erroneous view of the case I have endeavoured to prove in my concluding chapters, and should I succeed in convincing any in this matter, I shall have gained one of my chief objects in publishing the following pages. CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
Transport Service CHAPTER V. Account of Papers found at Sinho. — Plans for Assault of the Takoo Forts. — Remarks upon them. — Storming and Capture of the Northern Forts. — Description of them, and their Position. — March from Takoo to Tien-tsin. — Description of the Country passed through: of Tien-tsin and its Neighbourhood CHAPTER VI. Diplomatic Negotiations at Tien-tsin, and their abrupt Suspension. — Departure of the Army from Tien-tsin. — March to Chang-kia-wan and Battle there. — Treacherous Capture of British and French Subjects by the Chinese. — Description of Chang-kia-wan and Enemy's Position. — Battle of the 21st September near Pa-le-cheaou CHAPTER VII. Remarks upon our Position after the Engagement Halt at Pa-le-cheaou. — Arrangements for an Advance upon Pekin, and Arrival of Reinforcements. — Description of the Country and the species of Transport peculiar to it. — Renewal of Negotiations with the Pekin Ministers. — The Correspondence between them and Lord Elgin CHAPTER VIII. Advance of the Allied Armies from Pa-le-cheaou. — Arrival before Pekin. — Description of the Lhama Temples near our Camp there. — Plunder of the Summer Palace by the French Army. — Description of Yuen-ming-yuen. — Distribution of Prize Money to the British Army. — Public Auction of all Articles taken by Officers from the Palaces CHAPTER IX. Précis of the Chinese official Documents found in Yuen-ming-yuen CHAPTER X. Negotiations for the Surrender of Pekin. — Release of Messrs. Loch, Parkes, and other Prisoners made by the Chinese. — Narrative of the Circumstances connected with their Capture. — Arrival of the French Army in front of Pekin. — Preparations for assaulting the Fortifications of that City, — Surrender of the An-ting Gate, and its Occupation by the Allied Troops. — Military Funeral of the British Subjects who had been murdered by the Chinese CHAPTER XI. Correspondence between Lord Elgin and the Prince of Kung. — Destruction of the Summer Palaces by the British Army. — Description of the Country around Hai-teen. — Indemnity paid by the Chinese. — Reconnaissances in the Vicinity of the City. — Lord Elgin's State Entry into Pekin. — His Interview with the Prince of Kung. — Ratification of the Tien-tsin Treaty. — Preparations for the Departure of the Army from Pekin. — March to Tien-tsin CHAPTER XII. Description of Pekin CHAPTER XIII. Embarkation of the Army at Tien-tsin. — Remarks upon the Efficiency of our Gunboats. — Review of the Objects obtained by the War CHAPTER XIV. Account of a short Residence at Nankin with one of the Rebel Kings. — The Tai-ping Religion and form of Government: their Customs, &c. — Reflections upon their present Circumstances and future Prospects. — Description of Nankin and its Neighbourhood CHAPTER XV. Diary of a Voyage up the Yang-tse-kiang from Nankin to Hankow, with Descriptions of the Scenery, &c. — Stay at Hankow, and Interview there with the Tartar Viceroy of the Province. — Return to Shanghai Appendix: — Treaty of Tien-tsin Convention of Pekin NARRATIVE
CHAPTER I. Arrival of the Expeditionary Army at Hong-Kong. Formation of a Camp at Kowloon. — Preparations for the Campaign. British Ultimatum to the Pekin Government. The Reply from the Great Council of State. Despatch of the Allied Force for the Occupation of Chusan. The British and French Governments having entered into an alliance for the purpose of enforcing, if necessary, by arms, the stipulations of their respective treaties made at Tien-tsin in 1858 with the Imperial Government of China, it was agreed that an English army of about 10,000 men, and a French force of 7000, should be despatched to China. The latter went direct from France; ours was sent from England, the Cape of Good Hope, and India, the bulk of the force from this latter place. The French collected their troops at Shanghai; we, ours at Hong-kong. During the month of March our transports kept arriving daily, the men disembarking and encamping at Kowloon, which is the rocky promontory stretching out from the mainland towards Victoria, the harbour being there about a mile in width. The precipitous shores of Hong-kong afford but very little space available for the encampment of troops; and as our force was to be collected from such different quarters of the world, it could not be expected to reach China all as nearly at the same time as if coming from one place. It was therefore necessary that, accordingly as each transport arrived, the men should either remain cooped up on board their ships, or else land somewhere, and await there until all the force had been collected. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hope Grant, arrived at Hong-kong upon the 13th March, and at once decided upon landing the troops as they came in upon Kowloon. An arrangement was entered into with the Canton authorities, by which we were to hold that promontory for as long as we wished, paying 160l. as a yearly rent. Under the directions of Colonel Mackenzie, the Quarter- master-General of the army, the ground was quickly cleared and laid out for the troops, wells dug and roads made, &c. &c, — our engineers, as usual, working with zeal and ability in providing for the wants of the various corps. In a very short time the ground, which previous to our arrival had been but a rocky waste, with a few patches of garden cultivation in the narrow valleys between the hills, was covered with tents, horse lines, and batteries of artillery; the new Armstrong guns being objects of universal interest. To the people of Victoria, this camp was what our Chobham had been to the London cockneys; crowds of people crossing the harbour daily to have a peep at the interior economy of a soldier’s life under canvas, and to see, for the first time, the far-famed Sikh cavalry being drilled upon the sands, or exercising their skill at " tent pegging." The power and precision of the Armstrong guns was also tried once or twice, the Commander-in-Chief being naturally anxious to test that much-talked-of weapon, which was destined to undergo its first practical trial in action under his orders. Barrels were anchored out at sea a long way, at which these guns made most marvellous practice, the strangest feature about which was the manner in which the shells burst the instant they struck the water. At Hong-kong the weather is delightful during March and the first week in April. Our officers, who had left Calcutta towards the end of February or beginning of March, where the hot season had already set in, were rather astonished to find everyone at Hong-kong wearing cloth clothes and sitting over fires upon their arrival there. In April the weather became warmer daily, but as long as the north-east monsoon continued there was always a refreshing breeze, particularly at Kowloon, where, up to the last day of our sojourn previous to embarkation for the north, the nights were always cool enough to permit of a blanket over one at night. Hong-kong had never before presented such a busy appearance: its harbour crowded with shipping, between which and the shore there was an endless passing to and fro of little boats, either landing troops or embarking stores for the approaching campaign. The streets of Victoria were thronged by soldiers and sailors; commissaries and staff officers were to be seen everywhere, all as busy as mortals well can be. The war upon which we were entering, was to be carried on in a country regarding the resources of which we literally knew nothing, so provision had to be made against all possible contingencies, and supplies of everything provided, just as if we were about starting upon a desert campaign. Quantities of everything that an army could require were despatched from England and India. Doctors and hospital comforts came pouring in by every mail from home; tents, waterproof sheets, and warm clothing for the winter were furnished most liberally; and the workshops of Canton and Hong-kong contributed the many little et ceteras, such as water-bottles and other articles, which had not arrived in time. Hay and forage for our horses was the greatest difficulty we had to contend with, as it had all to be imported, China producing nothing of the sort. Our chief supply of hay came from Bombay, where, unfortunately, no proper means existed for compressing it to the extent we do in England. To provide for our land transport was a serious difficulty, but, like most such in the world, simply resolved itself into a question of pounds, shillings, and pence. Very good ponies were procurable in Japan and Manilla; and a few of the very best could be collected from the Shan-tung province by sending out native buyers for the purpose from Shanghai. The difficulty of collecting all these animals, and feeding them whilst on board ship, was very great indeed. This item was a very serious one in the total expenses of the war. A battalion of the military train had arrived from England, and under the direct ions of its officer, all our arrangements for carriage ought to have been carried out. It was directed that the corps should act in all matters under the commissariat, a wise arrangement, and the only one under which the carriage of an army could be efficient. Mr. Bailey, a commissariat officer of great experience, had the immediate supervision of all the arrangements connected with such matters. It was determined to organise a Chinese coolie corps, to be raised at Canton and Hong-kong. Major Temple of the Indian army was entrusted with this duty, and we certainly owe him a great deal for the manner in which he did it. Upon all occasions during the war, whenever there was hard work to be done, these Cantonese coolies were ready and willing for it, working away cheerfully. A number of Manilla men, and bullock-drivers from Madras and Bombay, were also enlisted for mule-driving; indeed, altogether, our army, but particularly our people connected with the land transport, were the most heterogeneous collection ever before got together. Amongst the combatants actually present in China and available for field work, were regiments of the old "Pandies" of Bengal, of the miserable-looking Madrassees, of Bombay Sepoys, and of Punjaubees, in which were men of every warlike tribe in Northern India, the wild Pathan and the milder but not less brave Sikh. It was a strange assortment of human beings, all dubbed soldiers, from which to select a certain number for field work. Providing for the wants of all Indians out of their own country, and at a distance from it, is a most difficult matter; the number and variety of races and caste render the feeding of such a collection as we had in China most puzzling, and adds immensely to the difficulties of commissariat officers. What one caste will eat another will almost sooner die than touch, so that in mixed regiments the arrangement necessary for their feeding on board ship was troublesome beyond measure. With the exception of the Irregular Cavalry, the native troops had no opportunities during the war of compensating for the difficulties which they occasioned in all branches of the service. They were very expensive, their pay being fixed upon by the Indian Government at an exorbitant rate; a matter of indifference to Indian officials, as all expenses were to be defrayed by the Home Treasury. In preparing for the wants of a Christian force, in an unexplored country, the difficulties were great enough, but for a large body of Hindostanees our commissariat had more to contend with than ever, I believe, had devolved at any time upon that department before. It was arranged that all vessels proceeding north with troops should have provisions sufficient to last for several months for all the people intended to be on board. Doing this for the vessels intended for the natives of India was a complicated matter; many would not cook at all on board, so that a peculiar description of ration was required for them; and each caste required to pump in the water for their own especial use. Upon one occasion, just as a ship was reported ready for sea, and all had embarked, a man chose to turn Christian, so, in addition to the provisions then on board, supplies for the whole voyage were required for this one interesting neophyte. Imagine what must have been the daily labour of issuing the confusing rations of various sorts of peas, beans, bad butter, dried fish, and green chilies, &c. &c. to the fastidious heathen, and then the Government allowance of salt pork and biscuit to the solitary Christian. Upon the 8th of March the following despatch was sent by Mr. Bruce, the British Minister in China, to the Imperial Government of Pekin, stating the very moderate terms upon which we were prepared to forget the insult offered to our flag in 1859 at the Takoo forts, and reopen our friendly intercourse with the Celestial authorities.
"The Undersigned has the honour to state that, as in duty bound, he has laid before her Britannic Majesty's Government a full narrative of all the circumstances attending his journey to the mouth of the Tien-tsin river last summer, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin, as required by the provisions of that treaty, on or before the 26th June, 1859. "Besides the whole of his correspondence with the Imperial Commissioners and other officers of the Imperial Government, the Undersigned has transmitted to the Government of her Britannic Majesty a copy of the Imperial decree dated the 9th August, and handed by the Emperor's desire to the United States' Minister, Mr. Ward, on the eve of his departure from Pekin. "The decree begins as follows: — 'Last year the ships of the English sailed into the port of Tien-tsin and opened a fire on our troops. We accordingly instructed Sang-ko-lin-sin Prince of the Khor-chin tribe, to adopt the most stringent measures for the defence of Takoo, and (the envoys of) the different nations coming up to exchange treaties on this occasion were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana, at Shanghai, that Takoo was thus strictly guarded, and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to Tien-tsin in the 5th moon, did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Takoo, destroying our defensive apparatus.' "The Undersigned did not fail at once to apprise the Government of her Britannic Majesty that the Emperor had been singularly misled. Had it, indeed, been signified to him by the Commissioners at Shanghai that his Majesty had decided on closing to foreign envoys the natural and most convenient highway to his capital, such evidence of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Imperial Government would certainly have been regarded by the Undersigned as fit matter of remonstrance and negotiation. "No intimation of the kind, however, was conveyed to the Undersigned in the letters of the Imperial Commissioners. The port of Peh-tang was never named by them, nor did the Undersigned enter into any engagement with them other than that contained in his letter of the 16th of May, in which he acquainted his Excellency Kweiliang of the nature and object of his mission, and of his intention to proceed by ship to Tien-tsin, from which city he requested his Excellency to give the necessary orders for his conveyance to Pekin. "He begs to inclose copy of this letter, as also of that received from the Imperial Commissioner of the 12th June. These will prove that the Undersigned was allowed to quit Shanghai in total ignorance of the Emperor's objection of his employment of the usual river route. "A like silence on the subject of the Imperial prohibition was observed towards Admiral Hope, Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty's naval forces in these seas, when in furtherance of the objects made known to his Excellency Kweiliang in the letter above cited, he appeared on the 17th June at the mouth of the river to announce the approach of the Undersigned and his colleague, the Minister of France. The Admiral was assured that the passage had been closed by the so-called militia, whom he found in charge of the booms obstructing it, without the orders of their Government, none of whose officers, the militia repeatedly affirmed, were near the spot; also that it was closed not against foreigners, but against a native enemy. These false representations were supported by false appearances, the batteries of the forts were masked, no banners were displayed, no soldier discovered himself. Still further to prevent verification of the statements of the militia, no communication was allowed with the shore. After promising to remove the obstacles at the river mouth, the militia repudiated the promise. They conducted themselves with rudeness and violence to the officers who were sent to speak with them, in one instance proceeding so far as to threaten the life of a gentleman despatched with a message from the Admiral. Yüklə 0,79 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|