Full text of "Narrative of the war with China in 1860; to which is added the account of a short residence with the Tai-ping rebels at Nankin and a voyage from thence to Hankow"

The armies halted at Sinho, the cavalry and 2nd division to the south-west of it, having a fine, large open plain in their front, with their left resting on the canals; beyond this, to the south and east of the village, were the 1st division and French. About two and a half miles to the south-east, the large entrenchments around the village of Tang-koo were visible, having a long, narrow causeway with ditches on each side, leading from our position to it. The country to the north of this causeway was very swampy and quite impassable for all arms, but to the south of it, the ground, although marshy in some spots, appeared sufficiently hard for guns to move over it.

General Montauban was very anxious to advance at once to assault that position, but Sir Hope Grant was desirous of postponing the operation until he had thrown bridges across the canals which separated the roadway and village from the open firm ground to the south of the causeway. Without the bridges, an advance upon Tang-koo could only be effected along the narrow road, which was completely commanded by the enemy's guns. The English Commander-in-Chief evidently considered such an attempt unwise, so he permitted the French general, who appeared to regard the operation an easy one, to advance alone, keeping, however, a couple of battalions under arms near the causeway to be at hand if required. The guns and infantry of our allies filed down towards Tang-koo along the causeway until they had approached within the range of their own rifled guns of that place, when their artillery unlimbered and opened fire. The enemy replied gun for gun; but, the range being too great for their pieces, their practice was wild. After a couple of hours thus spent at long bowls, General Montauban seemed convinced of his mistake, and accordingly withdrew his guns and men.

Upon the following day bridges were thrown across the several canals, and roadways made over the marshy places which we should have to pass when attacking Tang-koo. A reconnaissance was effected up the banks of the Peiho by some officers of the Quarter-master-General's department, who met with none of the enemy. This tended to show that all their cavalry had retired behind the river, and that none of their troops were on its northern bank, with the exception of those who were garrisoning the forts. During the night of the 13th a trench was thrown up by a working party under the superintendence of our engineers, its right resting almost on the Peiho and extending for some 200 yards along the face of the enemy's works at Tang-koo, and 480 yards from them. The next morning at daybreak all the troops were under arms; the 2nd division crossing over the Sinho canals, and remaining as a reserve on the open ground near the

1st division's camping-ground, whilst the latter division advanced towards the place, supporting our artillery, which commenced its march towards the entrenchments there. Our right flank thus rested on the Peiho, the southern bank of which was marshy and covered for some hundreds of yards by a thick line of high reeds, which not only screened us from view, but prevented any of the enemy's troops from showing themselves there. At one spot, however, there was a small hamlet on that bank, alongside of which two junks were anchored, or rather, owing to the then state of the tide, were high and dry on the mud. From these junks and a small battery of mud placed behind them, an annoying, though at the same time, harmless fire was opened upon us as we advanced. Two Armstrong guns and two 9-pounders were unlimbered and soon silenced this fire, and a few sailors having come up from the fleet went across in a Chinese sampan (or boat), set fire to the junks and spiked the guns. From some tombs, about a mile lower down the river, a couple of guns then opened upon us, but as usual the shot was high and their practice wild. The French force had now come up and got into position on our left, their left flank resting upon the Tang-koo causeway. The whole line of artillery then advanced, the French having twelve and we twenty-four guns in line, all coming into action when about 900 yards from the works; the enemy replied from all their guns, fourteen in number, and kept up a sharp fire from jingalls at the same time. A line of our skirmishers, the 60th Rifles, then took up cover in the trenches we had made during the previous night, for the purpose of keeping down the enemy's fire; ere long their batteries were in a very shattered condition, shell after shell bursting in the embrasures and about the parapets. As the enemy's fire slackened our guns advanced to within a range of about 450 yards, when, after a few more rounds, the enemy's guns opposite our people were completely silenced, although a fire from jingalls and matchlocks was still maintained. A rocket fire was then opened upon us from the right bank, but without doing any damage. Our infantry had now come up quite close, and a party of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant Shaw, advanced to the extreme left flank of the entrenchment, which rested on the Peiho, where they managed to scramble across the ditch and afterwards to get behind the works. A Union Jack was planted immediately and our infantry commenced pouring in. The French were still hammering away with their guns; they had greater difficulties to overcome, as there were no means of getting into the place without first bridging the ditches. A few minutes afterwards the tricolour appeared over the gateway, and our troops advanced through the village of Tang-koo to the eastern side of the works.

Tang-koo is a small village situated on a bend of the Peiho. Round it there was a mud wall of about ten feet in height, and three and a half in width at the top, which was castellated with that up-and-down sort of work, such as one sees in ruins of old strongholds belonging to the middle ages, but which with our present weapons is more ornamental than useful.

There were five Tartar camps, all walled in and ditched round, within this outer enceinte and the space between it and the village. All round this line of mud walls ran a banquette; and along the side facing Sinho, as well as that facing the Takoo forts, were numerous barbettes for guns and jingalls. Those faces were about three quarters of a mile in length, the river front being of equal dimensions, but having no works of any sort running along it. The fourth, or northern face, was about 800 yards in length, and mounted no guns, not having even many places for doing so should necessity require it, since, for some three miles to its own immediate front, the country was quite impracticable for all arms, being a succession of canals and impassable ditches connected with the great extent of salt-works which stretched away to the sea-shore.

Two deep ditches, fifty yards' distance from each other, ran round these three sides, the river being on the fourth; one of these ditches was close under the mud walls. The space within, between the line of works and the village, was much hollowed out in some places, from whence the earth had evidently been taken for the construction of the batteries, camps, &c. Several small drainage canals, for the purpose of carrying off the surface-water, ran in different directions, one being on each side of the roadway leading down from the principal gateway opposite Sinho to the village itself. There were three gateways, two facing the west, leading, one to Sinho, the other to the Peh-tang causeway, which it joined by a road, impracticable after heavy rain, at a place called "Chah-pung," i.e. "Tea-shop." The third was on the eastern face, having a roadway leading from it to where the bridge of boats stretched across to Tung-koo and Takoo opposite, there being also a track to the forts on the northern bank of the river. Both Commanders-in-Chief proceeded towards the forts, and made a partial reconnaissance of the intervening ground; but a disagreeable fire being opened upon their escort, all the men were withdrawn within the lately-captured entrenchments, which were then handed over to Major-General Sir R. Napier, who marched with his division into them, the 1st division returning to camp between Sinho and the Peiho. One battalion occupied the captured entrenchments on the causeway leading to Peh-tang, and the road to that place was kept free from interruption by a strong detachment of cavalry posted at Chah-pung. The cavalry brigade were encamped to the west of Sinho, and with their pickets observed the wide open plain extending from thence towards the west. The French were encamped in and around the south side of Sinho. Such was the position we occupied, until our heavy guns and ammunition were brought to the front, and ten days' provisions collected at a depôt which we established at Sinho.

The weather was delightful; cool breezes and cloudy days, the evenings and nights being at a temperature sufficiently warm to render a bivouac pleasant. An extraordinary high tide occurred on the 16th August, which covered a considerable portion of the Peh-tang causeway near that place, completely swamping the

Commander-in-Chief's camp, and also the tents belonging to the 1st division. The whole of the surrounding country is so little raised above the ordinary level of the sea, that the inhabitants of each village round have bestowed much labour in their endeavours to protect themselves against these inroads of the water, which frequently occur at spring tides, when the wind is blowing up the mouths of the Peh-tang and Peiho rivers.

During the time between the capture of Tang-koo and the storming of the northern forts on the 20th August, several flags of truce passed between us and the Chinese. The first, of course, came from the enemy, bearing letters from the Governor-General of Pechili, named Ho, to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. The enemy sent us back two prisoners who had been captured by the Tartar cavalry on the day of our advance from Peh-tang; one was a man of the 44th Regiment, and the other a Madras sapper. It appears that this English soldier, together with a man of the 3rd Buffs, both doing duty with the Chinese coolie corps, had loitered a long way in the rear of the 2nd division, during our advance on the 12th instant; they had a party with them, consisting of some seventeen or eighteen coolies engaged in carrying rum. The first intimation which we had of the circumstance was from one of these coolies who escaped that same night into Peh-tang; and his story, which seems to be the correct one, was to the effect that the two soldiers drank rum until they became so intoxicated that they could not move, when shortly afterwards they were all taken prisoners, with the exception of this coolie who escaped. The Madras sapper, overcome by hard work, and being unwell, had fallen out, and lain down to sleep on the spot where he was captured. The man belonging to the Buffs was either killed, or "died of drink," as the Chinese say. The soldier of the 44th, who was sent into us, either from the effects of bad treatment, or through a desire to screen his delinquencies, could not or would not give any connected account of his capture. His mind, indeed, seemed to be unbalanced, as in addition to the untruths he told, he talked utter nonsense about what he pretended he had overheard his captors say. His wrists bore traces of recent tying, and his hands were swollen from the tightness with which the cords had been fastened. He said he had been taken up before a Mandarin, who ordered him to "kow-tow," which he did, but that the other soldier refusing to do so, was beheaded. In a couple of days afterwards all the coolies were sent in under another flag of truce. They had been taken up to Tien-tsin, where they had had their tails cut off — a great degradation to Chinamen. One can understand our soldiers being returned to us, but why they should send back prisoners of their own nation seems strange. As a people they are most difficult to comprehend, and every day's residence in the country serves to prove, more and more, how thoroughly ignorant we are of their ideas and modes of reasoning. They seem to view everything in such a very peculiar light: as an instance of this, at some places they decapitate tens and hundreds daily for rebellion, and sometimes on the merest suspicion; whilst, in the above-mentioned case, when they had taken a number of their own people, actually assisting, as duly enlisted coolies, an army of foreigners in the field against them, they merely cut their tails off and sent them back with a complimentary letter.

One of our flags of truce was taken across the Peiho in a boat to Takoo, where Mr. Parkes, who accompanied it as an interpreter, had a long interview with Ho, the Governor-General. This party evidently took the people on the opposite side a little by surprise, but as speedily as possible they collected a number of soldiers together, to present as imposing an appearance as they could command. Most of these were Tartars, who were ill-clad, and wretchedly mounted and equipped, some having nothing but bows, others spears, and the rest, rusty-looking, old matchlocks.

Nearly every day there was an explosion or village burning, in the direction of the enemy's position along the river bank and towards Takoo, which we afterwards learned was done by the mandarins in several places as a punishment inflicted on those people who were suspected of harbouring foreigners. From the top of the joss-house in Tang-koo, where Sir R. Napier had his head-quarters, large numbers of people were daily seen streaming out of Takoo along the Tien-tsin road, which did not bespeak much confidence existing amongst the population as to the ultimate success of their forces. The English and French engineers commenced a bridge of boats across the Peiho to the right, and close to the camp of the 1st division. For this purpose, large numbers of junks and smaller boats were collected at Tang-koo, and up the different little creeks which run into the river close at hand. Anchors were not numerous, but "make-shifts," constructed of wood, were shortly got together, formed something after the Indian pattern. The difficulty was to find any substitute for stone, which is a feature in these anchors, for this alluvial district does not produce even a pebble of any kind; however, the millstones found in the villages near, and our enemy's shot, supplied their place tolerably well. Half of this bridge was to be constructed by the French, and half by the English, which, though very far from being a satisfactory arrangement, was the only one we could arrive at under the circumstance. The two engineer officers, each respectively representing his army, "tossed up" to determine which side of the river they should take. The Frenchman won and took the left bank. Large quantities of rope and limber were collected at Peh-tang, and sent up, together with some planking and superstructure which we had brought from Hong-kong. All our transport was busily engaged daily at these various duties, the artillery horses and waggons drawing up the heavy guns, shot, shell, &c. &c. Our coolie corps worked as usual, heartily and well.

It may not be inappropriate here to make some remarks upon our Military Train, a branch of our service which is of the highest importance to the efficiency of the army, but which is still far from being in a satisfactory condition. The battalion of Military Train, which was sent to India during the mutiny through the exigency of the occasion was converted into a regiment of cavalry, and in that capacity did good service; the men were very smart, and won the approbation of all. This circumstance, which did much credit to that battalion, seems to have had its attendant prejudicial effects, and some of the Military

Tram officers who went out to China in 1860, evidently expected that a similar career of glory would be opened to them. If our artillerymen were always longing to be used as cavalry, or our riflemen as light dragoons, is it to be supposed that those corps would long maintain their present reputation? The horses for the Military Train in China had been brought at a great expense from Bombay, and all the men were provided with regular cavalry trappings and arms. The absurdity of such a dragoon transport is apparent to every one who has ever campaigned anywhere out of India. Every one knows that a cavalry soldier on service has quite enough to do daily, in keeping his horse and accoutrements clean, without being obliged to look after the tending and feeding of a number of wretched mules and ponies.

On the march, transport is ever falling into difficulties, and requires the constant care of all in charge of it, who should, when necessary, actually with their own hands assist in putting it to rights.

On the long, narrow causeway which runs between Peh-tang and Sinho, where, from daylight until dark, strings of baggage animals and waggons were passing and repassing, you might see these semi-dragoons lolling half asleep over their holster-pipes, although perhaps some accident had occurred which they appeared to have consigned to Providence or to the unassisted exertions of the ponies to remedy. As to dismounting for the purpose of assisting a Manilla driver or coolie, the idea did not seem to occur to them, as either desirable or necessary. After the day's work was ended, the animals were tied up by their native drivers, upon whose humanity it then very much depended whether they were fed and watered. The mounted Military Train man had quite enough to do in cleaning and burnishing all the wonderful complication of straps and buckles that form such a prominent part of a dragoon's equipment. Of what use can such arms and appointments be to a man whose sole business ought to consist in a careful supervision of the transport animals, carts, and drivers, and when on the march assisting those who broke down? From the nature of instruction received when first enlisted, he should be competent not only to teach others how to repack the fallen loads, but to do so with his own hands, if necessary.

The packing of baggage animals, loading of carts, partial repair of broken down waggons (in all of which the Military Train should be as expert as an African traveller), apparently formed no part of the instruction and drill of these men, or if so, they seemed to have forgotten it, and put it down in much the same category that all soldiers do the goose-step, which is known to be necessary upon first joining, although forming no part of the drill to be especially remembered on active service. With these it would appear that that portion of their drill which is similar to what is used by our cavalry, should alone be remembered or used in the field. It is a mistake to drill a man as a soldier who will never be called upon to perform a soldier's functions. If this is not the case, why do we not drill as fighting men the Commissariat Staff Corps, consisting of butchers, bakers, and clerks, or the Medical Staff, who are merely intended as hospital attendants, &c? It may, indeed, be proper that these corps should learn the obedience and discipline of a soldier, should be able to fall into ranks, to march to church, and to load a musket; but it is not required for a Land Transport Corps that they should spend all their time in cavalry drill.

The Military Train should consist of men drilled to ride well, and also instructed in the management and care of horses, mules, and bullocks, the loading and unloading of carts, and in the repair of such accidents as are likely to occur to waggons on the road. They should be armed with a sword-bayonet, not made for aggressive purposes, but for cutting or chopping wood, ropes, &c, and also for mounting sentry at their own guard.

When campaigning in countries where it might be advisable to have native drivers, the Military Train soldiers should be mounted upon good serviceable ponies, with light saddles. So many men and officers should be told off to a certain number of carts or pack animals. Each man could thus exercise a supervision over several carts, &c, and see that the native drivers did their work properly. All should be ready at any moment to dismount and help those in difficulties. There should be a larger proportion of non-commissioned officers in this corps than others, and as their duties on active service must always be onerous, and have more or less responsibility attached to them, it might be well to pay them somewhat better than the soldiers of the line.

The system of officering this corps at present is not good. In it are many most meritorious men from the ranks, together with some young monied officers, who have joined it with a view to purchasing promotion over those who cannot do so. When they have obtained the coveted rank, they forthwith leave a corps which they had only endured for a short time in order to procure easily and rapidly what they must otherwise have had to work and wait for long enough.

There is also in it a large proportion of married gentlemen with families, to whom foreign service in the infantry is inconvenient, and home service in the cavalry is too expensive. To such men the Military Train is a harbour of refuge. The work is light; they have horses kept for them; in fact, it is the happy medium between the cavalry and infantry, embracing all that is desirable for a family man in both, without any of the disagreeableness of either.

I do not wish to detract from the zeal and ability of those good soldiers who rise from the ranks of our army — I know many of them intimately, and, moreover, respect them as much as any man can, but I am thoroughly convinced that too much of such an element in any regiment must ever be most prejudicial to it, and none will more readily agree with me on this point than these men themselves. A few men from the ranks interspersed amongst a number of British gentlemen, gradually acquire the tone and habits of those with whom they associate, and eventually may become, in ideas and bearing, and, what is far more important, in the power of influencing and disciplining their subordinates, as good as any officers in the corps. It is otherwise if a large number of these men are thrown together without a sufficient portion of that leavening influence to which I have already alluded. Under the present system, a corps like the Land

Transport will seldom get good officers into it, or such as mean to remain, especially since commissions are as easily obtained as now in the other branches of the army. No man really fond of the military profession will, in these days, enter a non-combatant corps. Increased pay may induce some who are fathers of families to enter it, but although such men may do well enough for Aldershot, they are not generally the stamp we require for active service. Their wives are invariably either in an interesting condition, or have just been confined, and are dangerously ill; their eldest girl has the measles, or the heir the small-pox, and so on. Some such highly interesting family event is perpetually occurring, and affecting papa's equanimity, so he pines to get home, and, brooding over his misfortunes, he either really does become ill, or succeeds in talking the doctor into the belief in some imaginary ailment, when he is invalided home, where he remains until the hard work in the field is over.

The efficiency of a corps can be brought to perfection only by the officers taking a pride and interest in their work. I cannot see any chance of our having an efficient transport service in our army until it is made a civil branch, resembling, more or less, the general constitution of the medical and commissariat departments, i.e., giving its officers no military authority except over their own men. I would not call them captains, majors, and colonels as now; they should have the same, or somewhat similar titles, as our commissariat officers, of which department I would make the transport service a branch, such being by far the most natural arrangement, and one which would simplify matters; those who were responsible for supplies should then have to carry them also. Our commissariat improves every day, and on the whole, does much credit to those belonging to it. At first starting upon this footing, it might be desirable to make the commandant and adjutants military men, and this could be continued permanently if found to work well; but I should at once take from the corps all men who are seeking military promotion. Until this is done, the officers of the Military Train will never make good ones for the work required in their present capacity; and. moreover, their duties, whether attended to or neglected, will, in a great measure, unfit them for those which will subsequently devolve upon them, when they effect that exchange into a combatant corps, which a large proportion of them eventually contemplate.